

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-348, 50-364
License Nos: NPF-2, NPF-8
Report Nos: 50-348/96-11, 50-364/96-11
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2
Location: 600 North 18th Street
Birmingham, AL 35291-0400
Dates: October 7 - October 11, 1996
Inspectors: L. Stratton, Safeguards Inspector
Approved by: Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief
Special Inspection Branch
Division of Reactor Projects

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-348/96-11, 50-364/96-11

This routine announced inspection was conducted in the area of plant support by a regional safeguards specialist. The specific area evaluated was the Physical Security Program for Power Reactors.

- Long term temporary compensatory measures implemented at the Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) are still ongoing. However, the licensee plans to incorporate these measures into their NRC approved physical security plan (PSP) as part of their protection strategy of the SWIS. (S1.1)
- Alarm stations were properly operating and alarm station operators were knowledgeable in their duties. Communication functions were acceptable and performing within the commitments specified in the licensee's PSP. (S2.2)
- Testing and maintenance of security related equipment was timely and well documented. Protected area lighting was excellent. (S2.4)
- The licensee's firing range and training and qualification program were well managed and appropriate to carry out the commitments specified in their contingency and training and qualification (T&Q) plans. (S5.1)

REPORT DETAILS

S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities

S1.1 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspector evaluated the licensee's ongoing compensatory measures implemented for the assessment of the protected area at the Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS).

b. Observations and Findings

In a meeting on September 25, 1996, the licensee discussed with the inspectors a proposed permanent modification to protect the SWIS in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55. However, after a walkdown and further discussion, the licensee was informed that crucial elements of 10 CFR 73.55 were omitted. The inspectors informed the licensee that the modification appeared to be a decrease in effectiveness from their NRC approved Physical Security Plan (PSP) and would have to be submitted as a 10 CFR 50.90 change to their PSP.

c. Conclusions

Upon further discussion, the licensee determined that an acceptable short-term correction to the SWIS problem would be to implement the current compensatory measure into their PSP under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p). Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 94-016-01 will remain open pending the licensee's PSP change.

S2 Status of Security Facility and Equipment

S2.2 Alarm Stations and Communications

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The licensee's established security alarm stations and security communications were observed by the inspector to verify compliance with regulatory requirements and commitments contained in the licensee's NRC approved PSP.

b. Observations and Findings

Review of security operational activities in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and monitoring of security communications during the course of the inspection confirmed that the alarm stations were equipped in accordance with commitments contained in the PSP, and were capable of communicating and effectively controlling the security force during routine and contingency operations. Alarm station operators were observed to be adequately trained and capable of effective utilization of access control, intrusion detection, monitoring and communications equipment available in the alarm stations. It was

noted by the inspector that the CAS and SAS were independent and diverse to the extent that no single act could remove the capability of the security force to call for assistance or otherwise respond to a threat. There were no operational activities observed in the alarm stations that would interfere with the execution of response to alarms or other contingencies. Intrusion detection equipment and alarms annunciated audibly and visually, as required. The alarm stations were continually manned by capable and knowledgeable alarm station operators.

c. Conclusions

Based on demonstrated operability of alarm station access control, intrusion detection, monitoring and communications equipment, functional capabilities of alarm station operators and available procedural guidance, the inspector concluded that the licensee's alarm stations functions and communications systems were effective and adequate to meet regulatory requirements and commitments of the licensee's PSP.

S2.4 Testing and Maintenance

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's testing and maintenance program to verify compliance with the provisions specified in the licensee's PSP.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector verified, through document review, that the licensee implemented a testing and maintenance program that ensures that the physical protection related equipment and security related devices were properly installed, tested and maintained properly, and were replaced in a timely manner when determined to be defective or marginally effective.

On the evening of October 8, 1996, the inspector toured the protected area with a security officer equipped with a light meter, to determine if lighting was at least 0.2 footcandle, as required by the licensee's PSP. All areas observed were in compliance with regulatory requirements. Those few areas that were determined to be less than 0.2 footcandle were properly compensated with additional lighting or security officers. The inspector noted that the licensee had a dedicated testing and maintenance team (PT-5) to perform security related seven day, quarterly, and post maintenance tests. Documented work orders verified that security related requests were responded to in a short period.

c. Conclusions

Through document review, interview with licensee representatives, and direct observation, the inspector concluded that licensee's testing and maintenance program, was satisfactory and met the requirements specified in their PSP.

S5 **Security Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification**

S5.1 Security Training and Qualification

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspector reviewed the security training and qualification (T&Q) program to ensure that the criteria specified in the licensee's T&Q plan were being met.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector toured the licensee's firearms range and noted an elevated platform to better simulate plant conditions. Records reviewed of qualified officers were well documented and met the criteria specified in the licensee's T&Q plan. Officers interviewed appeared knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities, plan commitments, and implementing procedures. The inspector found that armed response personnel had been instructed in the use of deadly force as required by 10 CFR 73. Training documentation verified that members of the security organization were requalified every 12 months in the performance of their assigned duties, both daily operational and contingency. This included the completion of a physical fitness requirements and the firearms course.

c. Conclusions

Through document review, interview with security force members, and direct observation, the inspector concluded that licensee's T&Q program met the requirements specified in 10 CFR 73 and the licensee's T&Q plan.

S8 **Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards Issues**

S8.1 Action of Previous Inspection Findings (92904)

(DISCUSSED) IFI 94-016-01. This IFI remains open pending the licensee's submittal of a 10 CFR 50.54(p) PSP change that incorporates their compensatory measures currently implemented at the SWIS (further discussed in S1.1).

(CLOSED) VIO 96-01-01. The licensee's corrective action for their failure to physically check randomly selected vital areas was reviewed by the inspector. The licensee had modified Security Procedure (SP) FNP-0-SP-22, "Testing of Security Systems," Revision 6, dated April 2.

1996, to incorporate a checklist of identified vital areas that would randomly be checked within a one month timeframe. The inspector verified these checks were being performed by reviewing documentation of vital area checks for the months of April through September. All areas checked matched access reports for those individuals who had entered the area. This violation is closed.

Management Meetings

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results to licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 11, 1996. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. In addition, the licensee noted that a 10 CFR 50.54(p) PSP change would be forthcoming to incorporate the compensatory measure currently being utilized at the Service Water Intake Structure. The inspector acknowledged the licensee's comment. Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

W. Cooley, Assistant Security Supervisor, Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP)
 R. Culver, Engineer, Southern Nuclear Company (SNC)
 L. Enfinger, Administrative Manager, FNP
 L. Grantnan, Security Training Coordinator, FNP
 C. Hillman, Security Manager, FNP
 G. Siliba, Engineer, SNC
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NRC

R. Caldwell, Resident Inspector
 D. Thompson, Security Inspector
 T. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 81700: Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
 IP 92904: Action on Previous Inspection Findings

ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Discussed

50-348, 50-364/94-016-01 IFI Long Term Compensatory Measures

Closed

50-348, 50-364/96-01-01 VIO Failure to Physically Check Vital Areas