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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-461
License No: NPF-62

Report No: 50-461/96016(DRS)

Licensee: Illinois Power Company

Facility: Clinton Power Station

Location: Clinton, Illinois

Dates: Between December 16, 1996 and
January 7, 1997

Inspector: Terry J. Madeda
Physical Security Inspector

Approved by: James R. Creed, Chief
Plant Support Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Clinton Nuclear Power Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-461/96016

This inspection included our review of plant support activities relative to the physical protection of your facility. The report covered our initial review of your vehicle protection program and routine review of your physical security program to include audits; protected area detection equipment; alarm stations and communications; testing, maintenance and compensatory measures; security training and qualifications; and follow up on previous inspection findings. The inspection was conducted between December 16, 1996, and January 7, 1997.

- Security performance was adequate.
- The performance of security intrusion and surveillance equipment was observed to be very reliable. Security management was aggressive in resolving issues identified during this inspection.
- The security program was challenged in the areas of package control, vital area personnel access control, and implementation of compensatory measures. Violations involving the failure to properly control packages in the protected area (Section S4.b.1) and the failure to properly control personnel access authorization to a vital area (Section S4.b.2) were identified by the inspector. Another violation, which was licensee identified, involved two examples of failure to implement compensatory measures in an appropriate manner (Section S4.b.3) was determined to be a non-cited violation.
- Also of concern was an inspector-identified vulnerability in the vehicle barrier system that was missed during several "walk downs" by your security and engineering staff (Section S8.1.b.1).
- Despite the fact that full credit was given for your identification of two of four violations, the basis failure to adhere to established procedures was common to all.