

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)

Fermi-2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

0 5 0 0 0 3 4 1 1

PAGE (3)

1 OF 0 P

TITLE (4)

HPCI/RCIC Surveillance Tests not Performed

EVENT DATE (6)			LER NUMBER (8)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (9)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)	
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THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50 (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9)	20.402(b)	20.406(i)	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	80.73(a)(2)(v)	80.73(a)(2)(vi)	73.71(e)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	80.73(a)(2)(vii)	80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(vii)	80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	80.73(a)(2)(viii)		
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	80.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
L. P. Bregni, Compliance Engineer	AREA CODE 3 1 3 5 8 6 - 5 3 1 3

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 11, 1985, a surveillance test for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems was not performed within the twelve hour time limit prescribed by technical specification. This was a violation of technical specification. Failing to perform the RCIC surveillance also violated the technical specification that requires RCIC to be operable when HPCI is inoperable. The surveillance tests were missed because they were not included in the general operating procedures. This oversight was found on July 13, 1985, at which time the RCIC surveillance was successfully run and the system declared operable. During the time the RCIC surveillance was delinquent, the plant was in Operational Condition 2 and reactor power between 1 and 2 percent. No safety significance is attached to this event since RCIC performed satisfactorily and all other emergency core cooling systems were operable.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At about 2000 hours on July 10, 1985, while in Operational Condition 2 and reactor power between 1 and 2 percent, reactor pressure was raised above 920 psig. Within twelve hours, or by 0800 hours on July 11, 1985, a surveillance test should have been performed on both the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems to demonstrate operability. These surveillance tests, which are required by technical specification, were not performed.

This was a violation of technical specification surveillance requirement 4.5.1.b.3. for HPCI, and 4.7.4.b. for RCIC. Both require that the specified surveillance be performed within 12 hours after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test. This is specified as 1000 (+20, -80) psig.

However, seven hours later at 0300 hours on July 11, 1985, the HPCI system was declared inoperable because of equipment problems. Technical specification 3.5.1, action c.1, requires that HPCI be restored to operable status within 14 days, or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours. On July 24, 1985, at 1510 hours the plant was in hot shutdown.

Failing to perform the RCIC surveillance test within 12 hours was also a violation of the above HPCI action statement which requires RCIC to be operable when HPCI is inoperable.

The oversight was noted during review of operable equipment on the morning of July 13, 1985, at which time action was taken to perform the necessary surveillance on the RCIC system. At 1500 hours on July 13, the RCIC surveillance was started while reactor pressure was at 1000 psig. At 1610 hours the RCIC system was shut down with the satisfactory completion of the surveillance.

Procedural inadequacy caused these surveillances to be missed. The general operating procedure requires a test of the HPCI and RCIC systems after reaching 150 psig as required by technical specifications. The procedure neglects to require testing at 1000 psig. This is being corrected by adding a step to perform HPCI and RCIC surveillances at 1000 (+20, -80) psig to the appropriate procedures. During the nuclear shift supervisor's meeting on July 13, 1985, the shift supervisor's present were apprised of the procedural deficiency.

No safety significance is attached to this event since RCIC performed satisfactorily. All other emergency core cooling systems were operable during this time period and were available to perform should the need have arisen.



2000 Second Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48226
(313) 237-8000

August 12, 1985
NP850024

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Reference: Fermi 2
NRC Docket No. 50-341
NRC Operating License No. NPF-43

Subject: Transmittal of Licensee
Event Report 85-038

Please find enclosed LER No. 85-038-00, dated August 12, 1985, for a reportable event which occurred on July 13, 1985. As indicated below, a copy of this LER is being sent to the Region III office.

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Sincerely,

R. S. Lenart
Plant Manager

Enclosure: NRC Forms 366, 366A

cc: P.M. Byron
M.D. Lynch

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