


NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20656

February 19, 1985



MEMORANDUM FOR:

Commissioner Asselstine

FROM:

Samuel J. Chilk, Secretar

SUBJECT:

OI REQUEST FOR COMMISSION GUIDANCE ON INITIATING INVESTIGATIONS OF SENIOR MANAGERS AT THE WOLF CREEK

GENERATING STATION

A majority of the Commission has not supported your suggestion regarding the initiation of an investigation by OI on the matters contained in Ben Hayes' December 24, 1984 memorandum for the reasons indicated in their responses which were provided to you. Commissioner Roberts requested additional information from OI and received it on January 15, 1985. He has made no further comment.

Attached is a copy of a memorandum to Mr. Hayes on this subject.

This completes action on your memorandum of January 2, 1985.

Attachments: As Stated

cc: Chairman Palladino

Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech

OGC OPE EDO OI

APPENDIX

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: STN 50-482/85-03 Construction Permit: CPPR-147

Docket: 50-482

Category: B1

Licensee: Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E)

P. O. Box 208

Wichita, Kansas 67201

Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station

Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas

Inspection Conducted: January 7-24, 1985

Inspectors:

P. Mullikin, Reactor Inspector, Project Section A, Reactor Project Branch 2

(pars. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6)

J. E. Bess, Reactor Inspector, Project Section B, Reactor Project Branch 2

(pars. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6)

G. L. Madsen, Reactor Inspector, Project Section A, Reactor Project Branch 2

Callaway on the quality of seals there, and covered approximately 55 percent of the total population. No significant problems were identified. The NRC inspector also randomly inspected penetration seals in the control and auxiliary buildings and found those to be acceptable, based on B&B inspection and manufacturer criteria.

The allegation into the reprisals against the alleger for identifying safety issues was investigated by the NRC Office of Investigations and documented in report Q4-84-048.

Conclusion:

Based on the above findings, it is concluded that some required QC inspections of fire penetration seals were bypassed. This allegation was partially substantiated, and appears to have had safe shutdown significance. However, corrective action is considered satisfactory to resolve this concern.

c. (Closed) Allegation (4-85-A-04): The alleger stated that the resolution to KG&E CAR 15 was inadequate due to the use of unqualified DIC QC inspectors. CAR 15 dealt with the corrective action required for NRC Violation 50-482/8422-02 concerning violations of the 1 inch separation criteria for electrical conduits. In addition, the alleger stated that NCRs 19715E and 20443E identified minimum bend radius problems in small terminal enclosures but many more exist.

Findings: The NRC inspectors identified the four DIC QC inspectors that participated in the walkdown associated with CAR 15. The qualifications and training for these inspectors were reviewed. Although the NRC inspectors were unable to determine how much actual inspection experience each person had relative to electrical separation, each QC inspector was trained and certified for that discipline. Also, it was determined that each inspector was given a refresher course in separation requirements prior to the walkdown