

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Unit No. 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 3				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2							
TITLE (4) Unplanned Secondary Containment Isolation																					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)								
0	7	1	2	8	5	8	5	0	1	7	0	0	8	0	9	8	5	0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																			
N		20.402(b)				20.406(a)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		0 9 4				20.406(a)(1)(i)				80.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(a)							
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				80.73(a)(2)(vi)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 305A)							
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				80.73(a)(2)(viii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)											
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				80.73(a)(2)(ix)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(ix)											
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				80.73(a)(2)(x)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(x)											
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																					
NAME Gregory G. Belmonte - Plant Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER											
										AREA CODE 6 1 7 7 4 6 - 7 9 0 0											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR					
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO									

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 7/12/85, at approximately 1500 hrs., while performing a routine semi-annual High Drywell Pressure, Low Water Level and High Radiation Logic System Functional Test, a secondary containment isolation was received. Reactor power was approximately 94% prior to the event.

Cause of the secondary containment isolation was due to non-licensed utility personnel error.

Corrective action was to reset the isolation and counsel personnel.

A search of our records indicates no previous LER's of a similar nature have been submitted.

This event did not impact the health and safety of the public.

8508190095 850809
PDR ADOCK 05000293
S PDR

1622
1/1

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 5	— 0 1 7	— 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On 7/12/85, at approximately 1500 hrs., while performing a routine semi-annual High Drywell Pressure, Low Water Level and High Radiation Logic System Functional Test (Procedure No. 8.M.2-1.5.8.2), a secondary containment isolation was received. Reactor power was approximately 94% just prior to the event.

Cause of the secondary containment isolation was due to non-licensed utility technician error. The error occurred when the technician blocked open the incorrect contacts on Relays 16A-K5C & 5D, contrary to the surveillance test procedure. This inadvertently caused a secondary containment isolation.

The subject surveillance was being performed during a limited time frame allotted by the regional power pool for performance of "High-Risk" surveillances (e.g., surveillances that could cause a scram). At the time of the event, less than half of the "High-Risk" time remained. This relatively short time remaining could have contributed to the error by causing the technician to rush with the test.

Corrective action was to reset the isolation and return the plant configuration to normal. In addition, the procedure, circuitry, and prints were compared and verified as correct. To preclude recurrence, the technician was counseled on the importance of reviewing and accurately following procedures. As a group, the technicians were also counseled on the importance of not rushing during performance of surveillance tests. The group was also counseled on the importance of careful adherence to procedures when performing an infrequent surveillance test such as the subject.

A search of our records indicates no previous LER's of a similar nature have been submitted. This event did not impact the health and safety of the public.

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
800 BOYLSTON STREET
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02199

WILLIAM D. HARRINGTON
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR

August 9, 1985
BECO Ltr. #85-145

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Docket Number 50-293
License DPR-35

Dear Sir:

The attached Licensee Event Report 85-017-00, "Unplanned Secondary Containment Isolation," is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.

If there are any questions on this subject, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Respectfully submitted,



W. D. Harrington

GB:caw

Enclosure: LER 85-017-00

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Standard BECO LER Distribution

IE22

1/1