

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 1 OF 0 3										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3																					
TITLE (4) INOPERATIVE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERIC ANALYZERS																																									
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																																
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)																											
0 9	1 3	8 5	8 5	0 2 4	0 0	1 0	1 1	8 5						0 5 0 0 0																											
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																																							
N																																									
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.402(b)										20.405(e)										50.73(a)(2)(iv)										73.71(b)									
1 0 0		20.406(a)(1)(i)										50.38(a)(1)										50.73(a)(2)(v)										73.71(e)									
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)										50.38(a)(2)										50.73(a)(2)(vi)										OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)									
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)										50.73(a)(2)(i)										50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)																			
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)										50.73(a)(2)(ii)										50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)																			
		20.406(a)(1)(v)										50.73(a)(2)(iii)										50.73(a)(2)(x)																			
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																																									
NAME Joseph P. Flaherty Assistant Instrument & Control Superintendent										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 1 5 3 4 2 - 3 8 4 0																															
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC																	
D	I K	A I T	X 9	9 1 9	N																																				
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)															EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR																						
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)															NO		0	1	1 5 8 6																						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Technical Specification sections 3.7.A.6.b and 3.7.A.9 require containment oxygen and hydrogen to be continuously monitored while containment integrity is required with oxygen concentration to be maintained less than 4.0% by weight. From 0940 on Sept. 17, 1985 until 1400 on Sept. 18, 1985, both A and B Containment analyzers appeared to be out of procedural tolerances in the non-conservative direction and were declared inoperable.

After site testing and discussions with the manufacturers, it has been shown that the surveillance procedure inadvertently could have caused erroneous as left data. The procedure is being revised to reflect the changes necessary to rectify this situation.

8510280404 851015
PDR ADOCK 05000333
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 8 5 — 0 2 4 — 0 0 0 2 OF 0 3	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

Technical Specification sections 3.7.A.6.b and 3.7.A.9 require drywell oxygen and hydrogen to be continuously monitored while containment integrity is required and oxygen concentration to be less than 4.0% by weight. From 0940 on Sept. 17, 1985 until 1400 on Sept 18, 1985, both A and B Containment Atmospheric Analyzers appeared to be out of procedural tolerances in the non-conservative direction and were declared inoperable.

During the 1985 Refuel Outage (Feb. 15 thru June 1) a plant modification was performed which replaced the original Beckman Containment Atmospheric Analyzers with instruments manufactured by Exo-Sensors, Inc. These new instruments were to meet the requirements of REGUIDE 1.97 and NUREG 0737.

While writing the surveillance test to meet the Technical Specification quarterly calibration requirement, it was noted that the manufacturers technical manual called for an automatic calibration every 90 days with no provisions for determining As Found or As Left Values. At that time, from experience with other instruments, it was determined to pass calibration gas thru the sensors before and after calibration to obtain these values. Initial results were satisfactory.

In late June, it was noted that the As Left values were not always in tolerance. The manufacturer arrived on site, about the 1st of July, for troubleshooting and calibrating the system utilizing our procedure.

The representative questioned our method of determining As Found and As Left values but could not provide specific other methods. The representatives expressed an opinion that the sensors were being dried out due to sample gas being induced into the system for extended periods of time. His recommendations of decreasing the amount of time the sample gas passed thru the sensors were incorporated into the procedure.

During the scheduled quarterly surveillance test on Sept 13, A and B oxygen and A hydrogen analyzers were found out of procedural tolerance in the non-conservative direction. B hydrogen analyzer was out of tolerance conservatively. At 4.0% oxygen, A would have indicated 2.9% and B 3.0%. Both hydrogen analyzers would have been in tolerance at 1.0%.

All channels were immediately adjusted to within procedural tolerances and placed on increased frequency of once/month for trending and observations. The recorders monitoring oxygen were checked back to the last calibration of Sept. 4, 1985 and after adjusting for the As Found values, it was determined that the Technical Specification limit of 4.0% oxygen was not exceeded.

Three (3) days later (Sept. 16), B Oxygen analyzer was declared inoperable due to high readings. Calibrations were performed with questionable results. On Sept. 17, 1985, drywell atmosphere grab samples were started twice a day and A oxygen analyzer was removed from service to perform a calibration check, it was found low and immediately adjusted. On Sept 18, after calibration and comparison to sample gases, A was returned to

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 8 5	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		—	0 2 4	— 0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

service, B was left inoperable for testing. Grab samples continued for one week.

Testing of B analyzer over the next 3 weeks and discussions with the manufacturer has lead to the conclusion that during our calibration process we were still excessively drying out the sensors by passing very dry calibration gas thru the system for extended periods of time to get our As Found and As Left data. As determined by testing and confirmed by manufacturers telecom, As Found and as Left Data will now be determined by software data points rather than by passing sample gas thru the system. The surveillance test is presently being revised to reflect these changes. The oxygen channel will continue to be monitored on an increased frequency to verify proper operation.