

APPENDIX

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/85-61

Construction Permit: CPPR-145

Docket: 50-458

Licensee: Gulf States Utilities
Post Office Box 2951
Beaumont, Texas 77704

Facility Name: River Bend Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection At: River Bend Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection Conducted: August 23-25, 1985

Inspectors:

J. E. Martin
for E. H. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch

10/15/85
Date

R. G. Taylor
R. G. Taylor, Project Inspector, Project
Section A, Reactor Projects Branch

10/15/85
Date

W. M. McNeill
W. M. McNeill, Reactor Inspector, Operations
Section, Reactor Safety Branch

10/15/85
Date

J. E. Martin
for B. B. Chamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector

10/15/85
Date

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted August 23-25, 1985 (Report 50-458/85-61)

Areas Inspected: This was a Region IV special inspection of allegations of improprieties on the part of certain licensee contractor and/or subcontractor persons. The inspection involved 100 inspector-hours on-site by four NRC inspectors.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

Details

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Personnel

- *W. J. Cahill, Senior Vice President
- *J. Deddens, Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group
- *T. C. Crouse, QA Manager

Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (S&W) Personnel

- *R. L. Spence, Resident QC Manager

The NRC inspectors also contacted a substantial number of other licensee and SWEC personnel during the course of the special inspection.

*Denotes the principal management personnel attending the exit interview.

2. Inspection Scope and Findings

This special inspection was conducted to review the licensee's response to certain concerns over the quality of work performed by several people at the River Bend Station.

The NRC special team determined that the work performed by 11 people were in question. This group consisted of 1 laborer who worked for a subcontractor, 1 person who worked in an engineering capacity, 3 craft workers and 6 field quality control inspectors.

The NRC inspection team closely followed the on-going activities of the licensee in determining what work these people had performed. It was determined that none of the first five individuals performed work which could have reasonably impacted quality. The laborer performed only manual work involved in handling insulation materials at the job site. None of the three craft were qualified welders, two were apprentices who worked under direction of journeymen craft and all three were involved only in moving pipe, etc., into place for subsequent fit-up and welding by qualified welders. The engineer worked in a capacity as a planning engineer preparing construction status and planning reports for management. During the last 6 months at the site, this person worked in the construction test group on some construction acceptance testing (prior to preoperational tests) on nonsafety-related equipment drains and a portion of the fire protection system, where this person observed system flushes and hose station flushes. These areas went through subsequent preoperational tests.

The NRC team reviewed personnel files, interviewed supervisors, and some GSU personnel, and reviewed job descriptions to confirm the licensee's conclusion that these persons did not perform work that would have an impact on safety.

The remaining group of six persons all worked as FQC inspectors in the piping/hanger group as level II inspectors. By reviewing FQC logs, the licensee determined that these individuals had performed over 14,000 inspections of various types during their employment. These inspections consisted of fit-up, final visual and some liquid penetrant. A random sample consisting of at least 60 piping and 60 hanger inspections was selected for each inspector, covering the total period of each person's employment selected. For each of these welds, the weld data sheets were pulled and examined. In over 40% of the cases, the inspector did not perform the final inspection of that weld. Of those welds that were final accepted by one of the inspectors in this group, the licensee selected 10% at random for reinspection. An NRC inspector accompanied the licensee's QC inspectors and did an independent inspection for 9 of the 57 welds in this category.

The licensee also reviewed the NCRs and unsatisfactory inspection reports written by these six people to determine, qualitatively, if they were similar in nature to those produced by other inspectors. The licensee concluded they were. The NRC team reviewed the rate of reject on inspections for the six QC inspectors in the piping/hanger group and determined that these rates were nearly identical.

The NRC team also reviewed the personnel files for these individuals for indications of problems and noted that four of the six had been terminated for excessive absenteeism during the last month of employment. Using this data, the team reviewed the personal field log books for these inspectors (not all log books were available for one inspector) to determine what type of inspections had been performed and what patterns of work were apparent. The handwritten log book entries did not raise any questions in the minds of the NRC team. Using the periods of greater absenteeism as a guide, the NRC team selected additional welds to add to the licensee's sample for review, and where appropriate, for reinspection.

Of the 57 reinspections performed, one 3/4" hanger weld was found 1/8" undersized. This weld was determined suitable upon evaluation by site engineering. In addition, for one weld, a liquid penetrant exam showed a linear indication at the toe of the weld where the weld abutted another socket weld. This was confirmed to be caused by the valley between the two well toes and was removed by light surface filing.

The NRC team concluded that the licensee performed an adequate review of the concerns over the work of these individuals and determined that their work was of suitable quality and did not impact the quality of construction at River Bend.

3. Exit Interview

An exit interview was conducted with Mr. Cahill and members of his staff following the inspection. The scope and findings of the inspection as noted above were discussed.