NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
OYSTER CREEK, UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

FAILURE TO MAINTAIN DRYWELL TO TORUS DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
												0 5 0 0 0
0 6	2 9	8 5	8 5	—	0 1 3	—	0 0	0 7	3 0	8 5		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
	N	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 9 8	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Rick Biddle, Plant Engineering	6 0 9 — 9 7 1 - 4 3 4 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On Saturday, June 29, 1985 at approximately 0020 hours, Drywell to Torus differential pressure was found to be below the minimum value of 1.0 psid as specified in Technical Specifications. At 1130 hours on June 26, 1985, the pen which records torus pressure on Control Room recorder 12XR6 was turned off. When the pen was returned to service (at 0020 hours on June 29, 1985), the Torus to Drywell differential pressure was 0.89 psid. Within 10 minutes after discovery, the required Torus to Drywell differential pressure was restored by purging the Torus.

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OYSTER CREEK, UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9	8 5	— 0 1 3	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Date of Occurrence

The event occurred on Saturday, June 29, 1985 at approximately 0020 hours.

Identification of Occurrence

Drywell to Torus differential pressure was not maintained within the acceptable operating range during power operation in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.A.9.a.

This is considered to be a reportable event as defined in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The reactor was operating in the RUN mode at 642 MWe.

Description of Occurrence

At 0020 hours on June 29, 1985, the Torus pressure recorder was found in the off position. Discussions with on-shift and instrument personnel could not identify a specific action which caused the recorder to be turned off. A calibration had been performed on another pen (drywell pressure) on this recorder on June 26, 1985 at 1126 hours. It should be noted that the calibration procedure used for the calibration requires that both pens be verified operational. The Torus pressure pen remained out of service and indicated -0.08 psig (the Torus pressure normally indicates slightly less than atmospheric), until 0020 hours June 29, 1985. The pen was turned on and indicated +0.25 psig. Drywell pressure was 1.14 psig, which resulted in a low out of specification Torus to Drywell differential pressure of 0.89 psid. At the time of the incident, the torus level was 2.5", corresponding to 3.35 feet of downcomer submergence. A minimum differential pressure of 1.0 psid is required at 3.35 feet submergence. At 0030 hours, on June 29, 1985 (10 minutes after the discovery) Torus to Drywell differential pressure was restored to greater than 1.0 psid.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The root cause of the event was personnel error attributed to the failure to recognize and act on out of spec conditions. Three out of specification readings, from local instrumentation measuring Torus to Drywell differential pressure were logged by Equipment Operators (EOs). This data is recorded once per shift in the Technical Specficiation log sheet by the EOs and the Control Room Operators (CROs). It should be noted that the EOs and CROs both enter

differential pressure readings on the Technical Specification log sheet. The indicators used by the CROs were the out of service Torus pressure indicator and the in-service Drywell pressure indicator, which together indicated an acceptable differential pressure. The EOs logged the out of specification differential pressure from local indicators, but failed to circle the out of specification condition on their tour sheet and the Technical Specification log sheet, as required by procedure. On-shift supervisory management personnel are responsible for reviewing this data for Technical Specification compliance.

Other contributing factors are as follows: Procedural compliance requires action by the technician to ensure the Drywell and Torus pressure pens are on. Additional verification that the recorder is returned to service and operating properly is required by Quality Control and supervisory on-shift personnel. However, the controlling maintenance short form specified that only excerpts of the procedure be used, which erroneously omitted the verification of recorder operability by on-shift supervisors.

Analysis of Occurrence and Safety Assessment

The purpose of the Torus to Drywell differential pressure requirement was to limit the hydrodynamic loads on the Torus during LOCAs as part of the Mark I Containment short term program. Structural improvements made to the Torus during cycle 10 refueling outage eliminated the need to maintain the differential pressure requirement. A Technical Specification change request was submitted to the NRC to eliminate the differential pressure requirement, and was subsequently issued as Technical Specification Amendment No. 87 on July 1, 1985. Thus, there is no safety significance to this event.

Corrective Action

The immediate corrective action was to turn on the Torus pressure recorder pen and establish proper Drywell to Torus differential pressure.

A memo was issued to all Operations personel, emphasizing the importance of careful attention to log readings and tour sheet data. Specifically, the memo detailed the need to be aware of trends and out of specification conditions of plant parameters. Meetings were held with all Operators and Shift Supervisors who were involved to further stress the importance of complete and accurate log readings and reviews. In addition, appropriate management corrective action to prevent recurrence is being taken.

Long term corrective action will include changing the Drywell and Torus pressure recorder calibration procedure from a maintenance to a surveillance procedure. The change will include detailed controls allowing for surveillance testing of individual components.

GPU Nuclear

GPU Nuclear Corporation
Post Office Box 388
Route 9 South
Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388
609 971-4000
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

July 30, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report

This letter forwards one (1) copy of Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 85-013.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:KB:dam(0002A)
Enclosures

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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