

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry - Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0   5   0   0   0   2   5   9										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0   2			
TITLE (4) Loss of Standby Gas Treatment System																							
EVENT DATE (5)				LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)				OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENT'AL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
									Browns Ferry - Unit 2				0   5   0   0   0   2   6   0										
0   7	0   6	8   5	8   5	0   2	8	0   0	0   8	0   28   5	Browns Ferry - Unit 3				0   5   0   0   0   2   9   6										
OPERATING MODE (9) N				THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)																			
POWER LEVEL (10) 0   0   0		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)									
		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				X 50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)									
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)									
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)													
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)													
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)													
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																							
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER													
Stephen B. Jones										AREA CODE 2   0   5   7   2   9   1 - 2   5   3   8													
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																							
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS				
X	B   H	T   I   S	C   3   3   2	Y																			
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)															EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)					MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)															X NO								

On July 6, 1985, at 2245, "C" train of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system was declared inoperable due to the failure of the charcoal bed heater high temperature cutout switch. The "B" train of SBGT was already out of service for maintenance. Technical specifications require two of the three trains to be in service to satisfy secondary containment requirements. In this situation, technical specifications would require primary containment be maintained. This was not possible since primary containments on all three units were open. "C" train was declared operable one hour and five minutes later by starting the system which bypassed the defective switch since the charcoal heaters automatically turn off on initiation of SBGT. The defective switch was replaced.

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PDR ADCK 05000259  
S PDR

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Browns Ferry - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9	8 5	- 0 2 8	- 0 0 0	2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (1.7)

Units 1 and 2 were in refueling outages, and unit 3 was in cold shutdown. All three units were affected.

On July 6, 1985, at 2245, the "C" train of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) (BH) system was determined to be inoperable due to the failure of the charcoal bed heater high temperature cutout switch. The switch had drifted and was preventing the charcoal heaters from operating. The "B" train of SBGT was previously out of service for maintenance. Technical specifications require two of the three trains to be in service to satisfy secondary containment (NG) requirements. In this situation, technical specifications require primary containment (NH) be maintained. This was not met since primary containments on all three units were open. During the investigation of the problem, it was determined that by operating the "C" train the defective switches would be bypassed since the charcoal heaters trip on initiation of SBGT. "C" train was started and declared operable one hour and five minutes after being declared inoperable.

The root cause for the inoperability of "C" train was the setpoint of the Chromalox Model ARC590 temperature switch had drifted low and was preventing heater operation. A new switch was installed (same model) and calibrated to the 450°F setpoint.

Secondary containment was not actually compromised during the time period of this event. SBGT train "C" would have initiated during the event since the failed switch does not affect operation of SBGT.

Responsible Plant Section - N/A

Previous Events - BFRO-50-259/84003; -259/83034

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant  
P. O. Box 2000  
Decatur, Alabama 35602

August 2, 1985

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555


Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1 -  
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE  
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFRO-50-259/85028

The enclosed report provides details concerning loss of standby gas treatment system. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



Robert L. Lewis  
Acting Plant Manager  
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

INPO Records Center  
Suite 1500  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, BFN

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