

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)										DOCKET NUMBER (2)										PAGE (3)																																																	
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit #1										0 5 0 0 0 3 2 2										1 OF 0 2																																																	
TITLE (4)																																																																					
CRAC initiation due to low Reactor Building differential pressure																																																																					
EVENT DATE (5)										LER NUMBER (6)										REPORT DATE (7)										OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																																							
MONTH			DAY			YEAR				YEAR			SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			REVISION NUMBER			MONTH			DAY			YEAR				FACILITY NAMES										DOCKET NUMBER(S)																														
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THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5 (Check one or more of the following) (11)																																																																					
OPERATING MODE (9)										2										20 402(b)										X										80 73(a)(2)(iv)										73.71(b)																			
POWER LEVEL (10)										0 1 0 1 1										20 408(a)(1)(i)																				80 38(a)(1)										80 70(a)(2)(iv)										73.71(c)									
																				20 408(a)(1)(ii)																				80 38(a)(2)										80 73(a)(2)(vi)										OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)									
																				20 408(a)(1)(iii)																				80 73(a)(2)(i)										80 73(a)(2)(viii)(A)																			
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																																																																					
NAME																				TELEPHONE NUMBER																																																	
Gary G. Rhoads, Operational Compliance Engineer																				5 1 6 9 2 9 - 8 3 0 0																																																	
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																																																					
CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFAC TURE		REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFAC TURE		REPORTABLE TO NPDOS																																																			
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)										MONTH DAY YEAR																																							
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																				X NO																																																	

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On September 9, 1985 at 0915 and September 18, 1985 at 2216, Control Room Air Conditioning (CRAC) initiations occurred due to a Reactor Building low differential pressure condition. The plant was in Operational Condition 2 at the time of both events at a RPV pressure of 440 psig and power level of 1.4% for the first event and a RPV pressure of 160 psig and power level of 1.7% for the second event. Both events occurred while performing a surveillance procedure on the Reactor Building Standby Ventilation System (RBSVS) filter trains (SP 24.405.01, RBSVS Filter Train Operability Test). The test required taking suction from the Reactor Building Normal Ventilation System (RBNVS, which was in operation at both times) exhaust fan discharge line, through a mixing plenum and then through the filter trains. However, a partial amount of air was being diverted up to the refuel floor which caused an increase in Reactor building pressure. This allowed the differential pressure to decrease and CRAC initiations occurred. The test was stopped, the RBSVS was secured, the differential pressure increased and CRAC was secured. Plant Management was notified of the events and the NRC was notified per 10CFR50.72. To prevent recurrence, the surveillance procedure has been revised to take air from the refuel floor, into the mixing plenum and circulate it through the filters.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit #1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000322	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		85	039	0	0	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On September 9, 1985 at 0915 and September 18, 1985 at 2216, Control Room Air Conditioning (CRAC) initiations occurred due to a Reactor building low differential pressure condition. The plant was in Operational Condition 2 at the time of both events at a RPV pressure of 440 psig and power level of 1.4% for the first event and a RPV pressure of 160 psig and power level of 1.7% for the second event.

Both events occurred while performing a surveillance test procedure on the RBSVS (SP 24.405.01 RBSVS Filter Train Operability Test) which was required to demonstrate the operability of the RBSVS filter trains (1T46*FLT-01A & B) by verifying proper flow through the filters. To perform this function (in accordance with the procedure), the RBSVS Booster fans (1T46*FN-079A & B) take suction from the Reactor Building Normal Ventilation System (RBNVS) exhaust fan discharge line (RBNVS was being run in parallel at the time), through dampers (1T46*MOD-031A & B) and into a mixing plenum. Some of the air is then drawn out of the plenum by the RBSVS Booster fans and through the filter trains. However, there is also a mass of air being directed up to the refueling floor which is increasing the pressure in the Reactor Building. Due to this increase in pressure, the differential pressure was decreasing and at 0.39" water vacuum, differential pressure switches T46*PDS-043A & B tripped, initiating the CRAC system. Technical Specifications require the differential pressure switch setpoint to be \geq to 0.30" water vacuum. The test was stopped, the fans and valves were secured and the negative pressure was increased above the initiating setpoints. The CRAC system was then secured.

There was no safety significance to the events. All plant systems functioned as designed. The operators carried out all required actions. No ECCS systems were challenged or required for the event. Plant Management was notified of the events and the NRC was notified per 10CFR50.72.

To prevent recurrence, the surveillance test procedure has been revised to require the securing of the two air intake dampers from the RBNVS exhaust fan discharge line prior to starting the booster fans. Instead of air discharging from the plenum to the refuel floor, the air will be taken from the refueling floor, through the plenum and then through the booster fans and the filter trains.



LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION • P.O. BOX 628 • WADING RIVER, NEW YORK 11792

TEL. (516) 929-8300

October 8, 1985

PM-85-221

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, enclosed is a copy of Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1's Licensee Event Report 85-039.

Sincerely yours,

William E. Steiger, Jr.
Plant Manager

WES/gr

Enclosure

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator
John Berry, Senior Resident Inspector
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Records Center
American Nuclear Insurers

SR.A21.0200