

**Florida
Power**
CORPORATION

August 6, 1985
3F0885-02

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3
Docket No. 50-302
Operating License No. DPR-72
Engineered Safeguards Actuation Logic

Dear Sir:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you of an additional modification made to the makeup system at CR-3 during our recent outage (Refuel V) to add further protection to the makeup pumps from loss of suction. In your letter dated August 22, 1984, permission was granted to remove the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) close signal to makeup tank outlet valve MUV-64. This modification was completed in Refuel V.

Upon review of spurious actuations of equipment for Appendix R concerns, it was determined that MUV-64 could be spuriously closed. Florida Power Corporation has, therefore, locked this valve in the open position in addition to removing the ESFAS close signal.

Another modification was performed in Refuel V to further protect the makeup pumps from loss of suction. A low level makeup tank signal was inserted into the open circuits of valves MUV-58 and MUV-73 (the outlet valves from the borated water storage tank to the suctions of makeup pumps MUP-1A and MUP-1C) to ensure a continuous supply of water to the pumps. An alarm was added to alert the operator that the makeup pump suction was shifted from the makeup tank to the borated water storage tank.

Additionally, in order to protect against a hydrogen bubble forming in the makeup pump supply header as a result of low makeup tank level, hydrogen supply valve MUV-468 was temporarily closed until a permanent modification can be made to regulate the hydrogen supply pressure.


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These modifications will serve to protect the makeup pumps from loss of suction water and consequent damage caused by spurious ESFAS signals, as well as spurious closure signals postulated by a fire under Appendix R considerations. In the event of a LOCA, these modifications will ensure that a source of water is available to the makeup pumps to enable them to perform their intended function.

Sincerely,



E. C. Simpson
Director, Nuclear Operations
Engineering and Licensing

EMG/feb

xc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace
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Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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