




GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

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July 18, 1985
RBG-21,326
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.1

Mr. Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011



Dear Mr. Martin:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458
Interim Report/DR-314

On June 17, 1985, GSU notified Region IV by telephone of DR-314 concerning leakage of the fluid Fyrquel from pump seals to the pump drive motor in Borg-Warner electrohydraulic operators for Copes-Vulcan modulating valves. GSU has determined DR-314 to be reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). The attachment to this letter is GSU's interim 30-day written report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e)(3) with regard to this deficiency.

An interim or final status report will be provided by July 26, 1985.

Sincerely,

J. E. Booker
Manager-Engineering,
Nuclear Fuels & Licensing
River Bend Nuclear Group

JEB/PJD/lp

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector-Site

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ATTACHMENT

July 18, 1985
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DR-314/Electrohydraulic Operators

Background and Description of Problem

This deficiency concerns leakage of the fluid Fyrquel from pump seals to the pump drive motor in Borg-Warner electrohydraulic operators for Copes-Vulcan modulating valves 1SWP*PVX32B and D and 1SWP*PVY32A and D. This problem was identified by the Startup and Test (SU&T) Group at the River Bend Station (RBS) site. A report from the field identified valves 1SWP*PVX32B and D and 1SWP*PVY32A and D as having a fluid leak from the pump seal to the pump motor, thereby failing the valve in the as-is position instead of the preferred fail position. These modulating valves are bought under Specification No. 247.497 from Copes-Vulcan. Borg-Warner is the subcontractor for the valves' electrohydraulic operators. The electrohydraulic operator contains the pump motor and Fyrquel fluid to place the valve actuator in the desired position in response to an electrical signal corresponding to process requirements. A change in the process requirements necessitates a change in the valve actuator position, which is achieved by the valves' electrohydraulic operator. Failure of electric power causes the valves to fail in the preferred design position, i.e., fail closed or fail open. Because of this fluid leak, pump motors have an open circuit and thus are incapacitated, thereby failing in the as-is position.

Other similar valves from the same vendor are being used in the penetration valve leakage control system, main steam valve leakage control system, and control building chilled water system.

Although the exact cause of the problem has not yet been determined, it is known that Fyrquel fluid (from the pump) leaked to the valve electrohydraulic actuator pump's dc motor. This leak interrupted the electrical power supply to the dc motor, thereby interfering with the valve actuator's performance. Consequently, the valve failed. Exact cause of the problem has not yet been established by the vendor.

Safety Implication

Failure of valves 1SWP*PVX32B and D and 1SWP*PVY32A and D in the as-is position instead of the designed fail open or fail closed position will render the control building chilled water system, and therefore control building HVAC operation, erratic or ineffective. Improper operation of the control building HVAC System may cause the safety-related equipment and system to malfunction.

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Corrective Action

The subject valves have been replaced with manual gate valves. The systems are operational with these temporary valves. Actuator assemblies are being shipped to Borg-Warner in accordance with Nonconformance and Disposition Report No. 12,146. The vendor has not yet determined the corrective action.