




UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

September 19, 1985

NOTE FOR: Tom Rehm   
FROM: J. DelMedico  
SUBJECT: TOPICS FOR BRIEFING ON DAVIS-BESSE REQUESTED BY  
RICHARD UDELL AND RELATED REQUESTS

In preparation for the Markey Subcommittee hearing on Davis-Besse, Mr. Udell of the Subcommittee staff has made the following requests:

1. An August 5, 1985 memorandum from Mr. Dircks to Chairman Palladino summarized the responses of project managers concerning operating nuclear power plants where required corrective action has been outstanding for an extended period of time. Mr. Udell requests a copy of the actual response submitted by each project manager.
2. An August 5 memorandum from Mr. Dircks to Office Directors asked, in light of the Davis-Besse incident, how NRC programs could be made more effective. Mr. Udell requests copies of the responses to that memorandum.
3. There is a maintenance inspection at Davis-Besse this week. When it is available, Mr. Udell requests a copy of the report or document generated as a result of that inspection.
4. As I mentioned this afternoon in our telephone conversation, Mr. Udell requests a briefing on Davis-Besse and proposes Tuesday, September 24 at 2 P.M. as the date and time. The areas to be covered in this briefing are:
  - NRC's current views of the utility analysis and the Los Alamos study concerning feed and bleed at Davis-Besse.
  - An expansion of the NRC response to Question 12 in our letter to Mr. Markey dated July 12, 1985. This expansion would extend the response concerning aux feed reliability to all operating power reactors.
  - Information on how the core melt frequency calculations in the January 16, 1984 memorandum from Thadani to Parr came about.

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- In the September 18th briefing before the Commission, the Staff mentioned efforts to increase aux feed reliability at some plants. Mr. Udell would like to discuss the specific plants and, if there is a CRGR package, he would like to obtain a copy of it.
- Generic implications of the Davis-Besse incident.
- INPO activities at Davis-Besse, including staff access to INPO documents on the plant and whether INPO anticipated the problems at Davis-Besse.
- The grandfathering process as it relates to GDC and SRP requirements, including what plants have to comply with which requirements and how this is determined.
- The number of failures at Davis-Besse, their causes, their estimated probability and the combined probability of occurrence. This relates to our response to Question 2 in the NRC response to Mr. Markey dated July 17, 1985.
- Prerequisites to restart, including IE issues such as pending enforcement action as a result of the incident.