

Docket File

50-255/80-12

cc in Oper. file.

License No. SOP-3160-1
Docket No. 55-4007
(File With Docket No. 50-255)

Mr. Anthony S. Kanicki, Jr.
RR #1 52 M-43
South Haven, MI 49090

Dear Mr. Kanicki:

Thank you for your letter dated September 29, 1980, responding to the noncompliance identified in our letter dated September 16, 1980. Please take steps to assure that proper procedures are used and followed. These matters are a part of our continuing inspection effort.

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely,

James G. Keppler
Director

cc:
Mr. R. B. DeWitt, Vice President
Consumers Power Company
Mr. D. P. Hoffman, Nuclear
Licensing Administrator
Mr. R. W. Montross, Manager

cc w/ltr dtd 9/29/80:
Central Files
Reproduction Unit NRC 20b
AEOD
Resident Inspector, RIII
PDR
Local PDR
NSIC
TIC
Ronald Callen, Michigan
Public Service Commission
Myron M. Cherry, Chicago

8507200480 850509
PDR FOIA
JONES85-106 PDR

OFFICE	RIII	RIII	RIII	RIII		
SURNAME	Boyd/rl	Heishman	Narelin	Keppler		
DATE	10/15/80	10/15/80	10/20/80	10/20/80		

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST OPERATOR LICENSEES

GETR - TR-1

~~4~~-8-73 Failure to observe operating procedures
Repeated operation of the reactor in violation of the shutdown margin requirements defined in the Tech Specs.

4-8-73 Failure to observe operating procedures
Repeated operation of the reactor in violation of the shutdown margin requirements defined in the Tech Specs.

Vermont Yankee - DPR-28

- 11-7-73 1. Directed control room operators to follow procedure that was not reviewed by the PORC or reviewed and approved by the Manager of Operations.
2. Authorized the operation of core verification, including jumpering of refueling interlocks, a surveillance test involving nuclear safety, to be conducted without a detailed written and approved procedure.

Millstone Unit 1 - DPR-21

11-12-76 Performing action that led to unplanned startup of the reactor.

11-12-76 Suspension of license for permitting and supervising the withdrawal of a control rod that led to an unplanned reactor startup.

Monticello - DPR-22

2-23-77 Directed and supervised withdrawal of the same control rod that resulted in the short period over the same notch positions. After again receiving an indicated fast period, again directed and supervised withdrawal of a symmetric control rod, knowing that the reactor response should be similar. This action resulted in another fast period and subsequent reactor scram.

Dresden Unit 2 - DPR-19

12-28-76 While directing an operator, the reactor went critical with the instrumentation showing a period less than 30 seconds. The reactor operator was not instructed to insert control rods but the reactor power level was allowed to increase into the heatup range (range 6 of the intermediate range monitoring system) with Reece and at least two others operating the IRM range switches.

