

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 6/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1): Palo Verde Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0500052885	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3):		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		85	065	0	02	OF	02

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 360A-1 (1))

On August 29, 1985, Palo Verde Unit 1 was in Mode 1 conducting POWER OPERATIONS with the reactor producing 18 percent power. The hydrogen and oxygen analyzer which monitors the contents of the gaseous radwaste system (WE) for potentially explosive gas mixtures had been declared inoperable on June 29, 1985, and the requirements of ACTION 39 of Technical Specification 3.3.3.9 were being complied with. The reactor coolant system (AB) was undergoing periodic degassing via the gas stripper located in the Chemical and Volume Control System (WF).

At about 1850, a contract Chemistry Technician attempted to obtain a sample of the Waste Gas Surge Tank to comply with the four hour surveillance required by the ACTION statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.9 during degassing operations. The technician was unable to establish sample flow and investigated the system to determine the cause of the apparent failure. His investigation identified the probable cause of the problem to be moisture within the sample lines of the system (KN) which was preventing flow.

The technician notified the lead on-shift technician of the situation and the unit control room staff was notified at 1920 that the sampling system was experiencing difficulty. The lead technician continued to address the problem and re-aligned the sampling system to a parallel path, obtaining the required sample at 1930. This was 15 minutes beyond the four hour surveillance interval requirement of the applicable Technical Specifications ACTION statement.

The cause of this incident was a build-up of moisture in the sample lines between the gaseous radwaste system and the hydrogen-oxygen analyzer unit. A design change has been developed for implementation to address this problem and is being reviewed prior to its installation.

This event had little effect on the safe operation of the facility. Historical data has indicated that changes in the concentration of hydrogen and oxygen within the gaseous radwaste system have been very slow. The 15 minutes by which the surveillance interval was exceeded did not allow a significant deviation to occur, based on historical experience and results of the final analyses performed on the sample, when it was obtained.

This event is somewhat similar to that described in LER 85-017-01 which described a moisture intrusion into a radiation monitoring system, rendering it inoperable and also requiring a design change.



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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, D. C. 20555

September 30, 1985
ANPP-33606-EEVB/GEC

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 1
Docket No. STN 50-528, License No. NPF-41
Licensee Event Report - Moisture Buildup in Sample
Lines to Hydrogen Oxygen Analyzer
File: 85-056-026; G.I.OI.10

Dear Sirs:

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 85-065-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. This LER addresses a moisture buildup in sample lines to the hydrogen/oxygen gas analyzer preventing the sampling of the gaseous radwaste surge tank within the time period required in the Technical Specifications. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V Office.

If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President
Project Director

EEVB/GEC/alh
Attachment

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