

APPENDIX A

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-2<sup>85</sup>~~58~~/85-13

License: DPR-40

Docket: 50-285

Licensee: Omaha Public Power District  
1623 Harrey Street  
Omaha, Nebraska 68102

Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station

Inspection At: Fort Calhoun Station Site, Blair, Nebraska

Inspection Conducted: June 10-14, 1985

Inspector: M. E. Murphy  
M. E. Murphy, Project Inspector, Project Section B  
Reactor Project Branch

7/31/85  
Date

Approved: L. E. Martin  
L. E. Martin, Chief, Project Section B, Reactor  
Project Branch

7/31/85  
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted June 10-14, 1985, (Report 50-285/85-13)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of Fire Protection/Prevention Program Implementation. The inspection involved 32 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: Within the one area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

\*R. L. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Production  
 D. Bannister, Training Instructor  
 \*J. J. Fiscaro, Supervisor, Nuclear Reg. & Ind. Affairs  
 \*S. K. Gambhir, Manager, GSE Electrical and Nuclear  
 \*J. K. Gasper, Manager, Administrative Services  
 \*W. G. Gates, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station  
 \*R. L. Jaworski, Section Manager, Tech. Services  
 \*J. E. Lechner, Fire Protection Engineer  
 \*T. J. McIvor, Supervisor-Technical, Fort Calhoun  
 \*A. W. Richard, Supervisor, Corporate QA

\*Denotes those present during the exit interview on June 14, 1985.

### 2. Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings

(Open) Violation (285/8312-01): Failure to Provide Approved Fire Protection Measures to Ensure Safe Hot Shutdown Capability - This item is open pending completion of corrective actions and the issue of an SER from NRR concerning the exemption requests.

(Closed) Violation (285/8312-02): Failure to Complete Analysis of All Fire Areas for Potential Associated Circuits Interaction with Safe Shutdown Capability - This item was open pending completion of the analysis of potential associated interaction with safe shutdown equipment and systems for fire areas 6 and 20. The licensee has completed the analysis for fire areas 6 and 20. There were no modifications required.

This violation is closed.

(Open) Violation (285/8312-03): Failure to Provide Fire Protection Measures and Repair Procedures to Ensure Capability to Achieve and Maintain Cold Shutdown - This item is open pending the issue of an SER from NRR concerning the exemption requests.

(Open) Violation (285/8312-04): Failure to Install Fixed Fire Suppression System in the Control Room - This item is open pending the issue of SER from NRR concerning the exemption request.

(Closed) Unresolved (285/8312-05): This item was open pending the licensee's determination that the failure of auxiliary feedwater pump F-10 recirculation valve FCV-1369 in the open position will not degrade the flow capability of FW-10 below that which is required to provide adequate decay heat removal. The licensee contends that paragraph 9.4.6 of the USAR; which states that: "... the system can function without the

recirculation valves if required," adequately addresses the issue of the failure of the pump recirculation valve.

This item is closed.

(Closed) Open Item (285/8312-06): This item was open pending the licensee's making available to the control room security guard a key to the switchgear room. The licensee has installed a break box with a key to the switchgear room in the control room at a point readily accessible to the security guard.

This item is closed.

(Open) Unresolved (285/8304-02): During repair of Fire Door 1011-7 a new latch mechanism was installed that is smaller than the original resulting in a hole around the latch exposing the void core of the door. This hole has since been repaired by covering with a metal plate. However, the licensee does not have any UL documentation that the door fire rating is acceptable as modified and repaired. The new latch is UL rated.

This item is open.

(Closed) Open Item (285/8304-03): This item was open pending resolution of the engineering assistance request concerning the lack of manual initiation capability on the control room Halon system. The licensee has now installed manual actuation capability for the control room halon system.

This item is closed.

### 3. Fire Protection/Prevention Program Implementation

This inspection was to determine that the licensee is implementing a program for fire protection and prevention that is in conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications, and industry guides and standards.

The NRC inspector toured accessible areas of the plant site for general area condition, work activities in progress, and visual condition of fire protection systems and equipment. It was found that combustible materials, flammable and combustible liquid and gas usage is restricted or properly controlled in areas containing safety-related equipment and components. Items checked included positions of selected valves, fire barrier condition, hose stations, Halon systems lineups, and fire lockers.

There were no welding, cutting, or use of open flame ignition sources found in the areas toured. General housekeeping conditions were found to be very good. There were no construction activities in progress in the toured areas.

Fire protection systems and equipment installed for protection of safety-related areas were found to be functional, and tested in accordance with the requirements specified in the Technical Specifications. Fire Brigade equipment, including emergency breathing apparatus, was found to be properly stored and maintained. Fire Door 1011-1 was found in an inoperable condition. This condition had already been identified by the licensee and the operability of adjacent fire zone detectors had been determined and an hourly fire watch patrol established. A maintenance order has been initiated and the door and frame assembly will be replaced.

The NRC inspector also reviewed fire brigade training and drill records and reviewed the current roster of qualified brigade members. The records were in order and confirmed that training and drills are being conducted at the specified intervals. During a tour of the control room the NRC inspector discussed the fire brigade composition with the shift supervisor. The only discrepancy was in the designation of fire brigade leader. Subsequent discussions with a licensee representative revealed that Procedure G-28, "Station Fire Protection Plan," still designates the shift supervisor as Fire Brigade Leader, but a revision to this procedure was in process to redesignate this function to the licensed equipment operator nuclear.

During this same control room visit the NRC inspector asked the security guard stationed in the control room if he knew where the access keys were kept for entry into the switchgear room in the event of a need to implement Procedure EP-24A, "Forced Evacuation of the Control Room Due to Fire." He thought the keys were in break boxes in the corridor adjacent to the switchgear room access. These keys are in break boxes in the control room. Subsequent discussion with the fire protection engineer and a training representative revealed that this information is not mentioned in Procedure EP-24A and had not been covered in the security guard training. The licensee issued "Security Bulletin" 85-07, dated June 12, 1985, to insure that all security guards were aware of the emergency access key location in the control room. This information will also be incorporated in EP-24A and the lesson plans.

There were no violations or deviations in this area of the inspection.

#### 4. Exit Interview

An exit interview was conducted June 14, 1985, with those personnel denoted in paragraph 1 of this report. The senior resident inspector also attended this exit meeting. At this exit interview, the NRC inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.