

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3180-0104
EXPIRES - 8/31/83

FACILITY NAME (1)										DOCKET NUMBER (2)										PAGE (3)									
Limerick Generating Station - Unit 1										0 5 0 0 0 3 5 2										1 OF 0 3									
TITLE (4)																													
Failure to Perform Hourly Fire Watch																													
EVENT DATE (5)						LER NUMBER (6)						REPORT DATE (7)						OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH		DAY		YEAR		YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER		MONTH		DAY		YEAR		FACILITY NAME											
																		DOCKET NUMBER (8)											
0 6		2 3		8 5		8 5		0 6		0 0		0 7		2 2		8 5		0 5 0 0 0											
OPERATING MODE (9)						THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 19 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																							
MODE 1																													
POWER LEVEL (10)						OTHER (Specify in Abstract Section and on Tool, NRC Form 364)																							
0 0 0																													
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																													
NAME																				TELEPHONE NUMBER									
John C. Nagle, Engineer - Special Projects																				AREA CODE 2 1 5 8 4 1 - 5 1 8 4									
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																													
CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC				CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC									
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)									
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																				MONTH DAY YEAR									
X NO																													

АБСТРАКТ (лимит не 1000 знаков, т.е., одговарающий Russian language abstract) (18)

Abstract: 85-060

On June 23, 1985 with the unit in cold shutdown, a fire watch patrol failed to make an inspection of the 'B' diesel generator bay within the one hour time limit required by Technical Specification 3.7.7. This area was inspected at 2:08 p.m. and then again at 3:39 p.m., 91 minutes later. An inoperable card reader prevented access to the area. This area was being patrolled because of an inoperable internal conduit fire seal between the 'B' and 'C' diesel generator bays. The fire watch inspection point was changed from the 'B' diesel generator bay to the 'C' bay. On June 27, 1985, additional practices were outlined to facilitate more rapid response by security force personnel to fire watch personnel in the event of a card reader failure.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/86

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		0 5 0 0 0 3 5 2 8 5	— 0 6 0	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365a (17))

Description of the Event:

On June 23, 1985 with the unit in cold shutdown, a fire watch patrol failed to make an inspection of the 'B' diesel generator bay within the one hour time limit required by Technical Specification 3.7.7. An inspection of this area was performed at 2:08 p.m. and then at 3:39 p.m., 91 minutes later. The hourly fire watch patrol was established as the result of an inoperable internal conduit fire seal located between the 'B' and 'C' diesel generator bays.

The EIIS Code for the affected system is EK.

Consequences of the Event:

There were no adverse consequences as a result of the event. The bases of Technical Specification 3.7.7 state that the limiting condition for operation and the associated action statement are established to minimize the probability of a single fire involving more than one fire area prior to detection and extinguishment. Smoke and heat detection and the automatic preaction sprinkler system were available in the affected diesel generator bays and would have provided early detection and fire control. Additionally, this area would have been accessible to emergency response teams and plant operations personnel through the use of master keys.

Cause of the Event:

The card reader at the entrance to the 'B' diesel generator bay had failed. As a result, security personnel had been posted to ensure the proper door position. The fire watch patrol notified the security personnel of the need to enter the area. However, the security personnel had failed to sign out the key necessary to unlock the door to the 'B' diesel generator bay according to post orders. This combined with inadequate communication between the fire watch and security personnel concerning the time limitations for inspecting the area, resulted in failure to comply with Technical Specification 3.7.7.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 5	0 6 0	0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

Corrective Actions:

The fire watch inspection point was changed from the 'B' diesel generator bay side of the inoperable fire seal to the 'C' bay side. In the meantime, the card reader at the entrance to the 'B' bay was repaired and returned to service.

A memorandum dated June 27, 1985 was sent to fire watch and security force supervisors describing additional practices to be followed by fire watch and security force personnel. These practices should minimize the probability that card reader failures will seriously interfere with the completion of fire watch patrols in the future. Some of the key elements of these practices are as follows: 1) A list of the areas where access would be necessary for fire watch patrol personnel in the event of a card reader failure will be sent to the Security Shift Supervisors daily; 2) In the event of a card reader failure, the fire watch patrol will call security and state the room and door that he or she must access and the time by which it must be done; 3) Security will maintain a log of all such requests by fire watch personnel to assist in the dispatch of security force personnel; 4) All such fire watch requests will be treated with the utmost priority, consistent with security procedures. These actions should facilitate more rapid response by security force personnel to fire watch patrol access requirements.

Previous Similar Occurrences:

84-033
84-043
84-053, Rev.1

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

2301 MARKET STREET

P.O. BOX 8699

PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19101

(215) 841-4000

July 22, 1985

Docket No. 50-352

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report
Limerick Generating Station - Unit 1

This LER deals with the failure to meet an hourly fire watch requirement of the Technical Specifications.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-352
Report Number:	85-060
Revision Number:	00
Event Date	June 23, 1985
Report Date:	July 22, 1985
Facility:	Limerick Generating Station P.O. Box A, Sanatoga, PA 19464

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(c).

Very truly yours,



W. T. Ullrich
Superintendent
Nuclear Generation Division

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator, Region I, USNRC
E. M. Kelly, Senior Resident Site Inspector
See Service List

IE22
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