

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
Office of Inspector and Auditor

Date of transcription September 17, 1984

Report of Interview

[REDACTED] Office of Investigations (OI), Atlanta Field Office, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), was interviewed with respect to what impact Region II actions at a meeting on September 23, 1983, with Mississippi Power and Light (MP&L) had on OI case #2-83-037. He provided the following information:

If, on September 23, 1983, Region II had entertained any ideas or discussions about referring the matter of false Reactor Operator (RO) and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license applications or Material False Statements (MFS) regarding training matters at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) to OI, there should have been no further discussion about the possible MFS with MP&L unless there were health and safety implications involved. He noted, that to his knowledge, there were no health and safety implications involved with this matter at that time. He had no problem or concern with the Region II onsite review of the operator licensing program at GGNS as long as the MFS issues about training were not discussed. He believes that Region II conducted themselves in this matter as has been the practice of the NRC in general. That is to say that there is a continual exchange of information towards the end of health and safety. He believes this practice resulted in an element of preparedness on the part of certain MP&L employees whom he interviewed. In his opinion, this was caused by the discussions between Region II and MP&L about the possibility the issue of the discrepancies with the applications for RO and SRO exams at GGNS was an MFS. He explained that by preparedness he meant that he perceived certain MP&L officials (Ken McCoy, Douglas Hunt, Jim McGaughy) had answers already prepared to his questions regarding MP&L management responsibility, oversight, and in general, involvement in the overall RO and SRO license application process. More specifically, the questions concerned their responsibilities to provide correct information to the NRC in the applications. He believes for the reasons previously noted, that the objective of the OI investigation was made known prematurely to MP&L and from that standpoint there was a compromise of the investigation. He does not believe that there was any ill conceived motives or intent on the part of Region II when they advised MP&L their actions in this matter were possibly an MFS.

With respect to the MP&L letter allegedly withdrawn during the September 23, 1983, meeting between MP&L and Region II, he had verbally requested the former MP&L plant manager, Ken McCoy on November 8, 1983, to provide him with all MP&L documentation concerning the RO and SRO license applications for the initial cold license class at GGNS. However, he was not provided with that particular letter. He did not specifically ask for that draft letter.

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INVESTIGATION OF September 14, 1984 AT Atlanta, Georgia FILE # 84-35  
BY MEP Mark E. Resner, Investigator, OIA DATE DICTATED September 17, 1984

He had not seen the draft letter until his interview with OIA and, at that time, he requested and was provided with a copy of it for possible use in the Grand Jury proceeding resulting from the OI referral on June 1, 1984, to the U.S. Department of Justice. In his analysis of the letter, the contents would not have altered the course of his investigation because ultimately his investigation identified the same facts identified in the letter as well as additional facts beyond what the letter detailed.

He noted that his views as stated characterizing Region II's actions in this matter as not in the best interest of the OI investigation effort have not previously been made known. He also noted that any past comments relative to his concerns in this matter were made in a general sense and not specifically identified with the GGNS case.

Generally, the problem regarding discourse between Regional Staff and the licensee is not unique to the GGNS, but are also apparent in other OI investigative efforts. Again, he noted that he does not believe such actions by Region II are intentional, but only an effort on the part of the Regional Staff to address health and safety issues.