

*Christopher*

U.S. NRC  
DEC 19 1984

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OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS  
FIELD OFFICE, REGION I

MEMORANDUM FOR: Alan Shropshire, Compliance and Investigations Coordinator

THRU: Harry B. Kister, Chief, Projects Branch No. 2, DPRP

FROM: Robert M. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A, DPRP

SUBJECT: MULTIPLE ALLEGATIONS (SEABROOK STATION):  
 RI-84-A-0110, RI-84-A-0111, RI-84-A-0112, RI-84-A-0113  
 RI-84-A-0114, RI-84-A-0115, RI-84-A-0116, RI-84-A-0117,  
 RI-84-A-0118, RI-84-A-0121, RI-84-A-0122, RI-84-A-0123,  
 RI-84-A-0124, RI-84-A-0125, RI-84-A-0126, RI-84-A-0127,  
 RI-84-A-0128, RI-84-A-0130

This refers to an anonymous, multiple allegation, dated July 24, 1984, that was received by NRC Commissioner James Asselstine. This written allegation detailed the alleged's concerns about the quality of work at the Seabrook Station; specifically, the quality of piping, welds, steam generator nozzles, concrete walls, and valves installed at the Seabrook Station. On August 24, 1984 members of the Region I staff and the Office of Investigations spoke with the alleged. During this conversation the alleged clarified certain areas and provided additional information. A special team inspection, lead by Mr. S. Ebnetter, Region I, was conducted during August 13-17, 1984 and August 27-31, 1984 at Seabrook to evaluate those concerns of the alleged that related to hardware deficiencies only. (The other set, RI-84-A-0119, RI-84-A-0120 and RI-84-A-0129, dealing with QA concerns, was referred to OI for investigation).

As a result of the team inspection, only one (RI-84-A-0128) of the eighteen allegations listed above was partially substantiated. This allegation concerned improper storage of motor operated valves (MOVs); however, the licensee had taken proper actions to correct the situation prior to Region I's special inspection, and therefore, it is no longer a concern. The results of the entire inspection are documented in the enclosed Inspection Report (Combined IR 50-443/84-12 and 50-444/84-06).

Based on actions taken by the Regional Staff and the results of its special team inspection at Seabrook, Region I considers the above allegations closed, and plans no further action.

*Robert M. Gallo*

Robert M. Gallo, Chief  
Reactor Projects Section 2A, DPRP

Enclosure: As Stated

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Memo to A. Shropshire

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DEC 19 1984

cc:

A. Shropshire

S. Ebnetter

R. Christopher ✓

D. Eisenhut

QUESTIONS FOR SEABROOK ALLEGER

1. General time frame of work at site and type of job? Emphasize we are trying to gauge his level of knowledge not his identity.

2. What is time frame of his concerns.

3. Pipe tunnel allegation p. 2 of letter? In reference to lack of proper documentation of faulty welds, specify what type of documentation you are talking about, ie. inspection records, NCR's etc. *mostly not documented*  
*cutting out welds. Dan B + ans was in charge of this area*  
*(Pipe. not aware of actual inspection that was destroyed,*  
*not aware of inspection falsifications. ~~signature~~*  
*'Ordered' who was ordered not to inspect the diameter*  
*Welding was done by David O Baker Foreman Penning Clark*  
*ordered him not to inspect the welds. op 10 note*

4. Are these documents evidence of falsified inspection findings?

5. Who did falsification, names, title, etc. management direction.

6. Explain what you mean by QC Inspectors not being permitted to do inspection.

7. Were the inspectors threatened, intimidated, bribed or what?

8. Give me some names that I can independently interview for confirmation.

9. What type of inspections were the inspectors told not to do? *who is the company" who gave the order not to inspect*

10. Were they told not to do them because the welds were going to be cut out and done again or because they were hiding the bad welds?

11. What is the current status of their welds?

12. Other instances of falsification, threats intimidation and give me some names of witnesses.

13. Who are the supervisors that ordered inspectors not to inspect welds, when did it occur, under what circumstances?

OK

14. Who was the supervisor who commented about the 100 suspected welds?

OK

15. Were they ever inspected?

OK

16. Who was the inspector that heard the supervisor make the comment about the welds?

OK

17. What other management was involved in the cover up of the bad welds?

18. Name all inspectors and supervisors involved in intimidations, falsifications.

COLD SPRING PIPES

20. Explain what he knows about QC inspectors who wrote up NCRs that were by passed.

21. Who was the inspector?

22. What was the basis for the accept override?

23. Question about the NRC inspection for clarification.

24. Is he saying inspector covered up problems?

--Pipefitter from October 1980 to June 1983

--Carpenter from August 1978 to September 1980

--As pipefitter/welder - welded pipes and fit as well. Concerns - August 1981-June 1983 (when resigned). Reason for problems - 1980 as carpenter/welder trained by Pullman Higgins (PH) then transferred. Concerned w/ PH construction end. -- Yankee Atomic and A&E QA Inspectors

Areas worked in plant as pipefitter/welder - containment, waste process, cooling tower, deisel, turbine, PAB, steam feed and radioactive tunnel.

Size? 10" line in main stainless steel steam feed line (Schedule 80)

Grinding pipes - who was aware -- trade managers, Mike Scoha who is Company Manager and QC.

John Martin (PH) did inspection, knew of mixmatch. Process sheet required fit up and tack and visual inspection. was connecting 16" was open could see mixmatch.

Martin did look at weld and said "you guys are going to grind it, right" response was yes.

Martin commented it was unfit, grind to pass. To confirm this - Don Walsh, Trade Supervisor and Geno Lefevre, Foreman, and Mike Scoha.

Code does not permit you to grind - if grind beyond wall thickness then beyond requirement. Caller did grinding.

Acceptable to grind to pass - Reinspection - NDT did xray and must inspect. NDT asked if grinded response was yes. Management didn't care. Welders were aware not suppose to grind but did anyway.

Had no names to confirm this practice but said to check w/ people who worked on 16" weld.

Caller was asked if welders raised issue on welding. Responded no. Not much concern.

Caller was asked of intimidation. Response not that he knew of.

#### Pipe Tunnel

Lack of proper documentation - Kind of documentation was cutting of joints w/out documentation. Management knew joints were below standards (Dan Evans, PH Supervisor)

Asked if documentation was destroyed before NRC inspection. Responded no.

Caller not aware of welds/inspections documentation being falsified.

" is aware of inspectors performing inspections that are required.

6 welds cut

Dave/Doug Baker (Inspector) ordered not to inspect welds any further by PH. Foreman, Dennis Clark, informed Baker not to inspect - don't cut welds as Caller cut - Baker observed w/ flashlight. Baker transferred to 2nd shift. Caller transferred to another area. Clark said you're cutting everything - word from supervisor to get Caller and Baker out. Clark didn't make decisions on transfers or welds only QA management. Evans said can't keep cutting. Caller doesn't believe Clark cared about cutting.

Caller believe Baker was intimidated. Baker did not actually say he was being intimidated just callers observation.

Caller believes PH using unqualified/untrained welders.

100 suspected welds - who heard that comment - piping engineer, Dennis Clark, Ray Walsh (General Foreman) and other welders were present.

Clark told Baker not to examine - Baker couldn't w/out caller present to cut.

To his knowledge weld not finished. Checked yr later and not done. Transferred 11/81 to turbine.

Prior to transfer worked w/ diametrics. Out of 100 did 30.

Inspection requirements - 100%

Inspections always done. Signed off based on visual inspection. Suspected problems when saw gap allowed, route not being consumed. Confirmed suspicions - did 3" joint 3' from pipe. Could see shiny ring after weld. That joint was cut out and management was aware. Had to cut windows per management.

Asked Geisbe if proper procedure and was told no. Stopped cutting - brought in QA.

Unsure if Baker is onsite.

Not aware of any documents being falsified.

#### Mainsteam Feed

Aware of mixmatch.

May '82 transferred to 2nd shift (turbine)

2" steam line - cutting in 10" weld - inside lack of fusion zone, pointed out to inspector - told not to worry it's "my problem".

QA Inspectors who NRC can talk to - Dan Geisbe and Baker and maybe Baker's foreman (Caller could not recall name).

DRAYO - Turbine building #1

PH's QA inspector - Brian Kennedy

Kennedy always said "not our problem". Was also inspectors common reply.

Welding supervisor/superintendent only concern with fit up and tack installation.

Waste Process Building

Valve installed and not checked.

NRC would inspect and put hold tags-aware of damage.

Caller never saw actual damage. Couldn't turn valves. Suspected teflon damaged. Observed rust etc. NRC overlooked violation - pipe installed.

Worked on xray pipe Jan. '82.

Written up for storage of stainless steel valves. LWA issued.

Caller thought he would be terminated - took photo between 12/81 and 1/82.

Did not tell NRC of conditions - knew NRC issued LWA's should of been aware.

Not sure if NRC inspector did anything improper - concerned that condition existed and installed anyway.

Pipe Storage

left open - piled on on top of other. Not sure if damaged done to pipes.

Took photo.

Aware that craftspeople orderd to falsify

Jim Butler, head of welding supervision, aware of problems.

On first names basis w/ inspectors, who come and go. Can not recall names.