GPU NUCLEAR

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December 12, 1996
6730-96-2361

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report 96-013: Motor Control Center DC-2 Did Not Meet Seismic Design Bases

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 96-013. This event did not impact the health and safety of the public.

If any additional information or assistance is required, please contact Mr. Terry Sensue, Regulatory Affairs Engineer, at 609-971-4680.

Very truly yours,

Michael B Roche

Michael B. Roche
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

IE22

MBR/TS/gl

Enclosure

cc: Administrator, Region I
NRC Project Manager
NRC Sr. Resident Inspector

-00028

NRC FORM 366 (4-95) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 04/30/98
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

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TITLE (4)

Motor Control Center DC-2 Did Not Meet Seismic Design Bases

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision	Month	Day	Year	Facility Name	Docket Number
11	13	96	96	-- 013 --	00				FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	N
POWER LEVEL (10)	100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)
20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71
20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER
20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36©(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.36©(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Clyde Brookbank - Senior Engineer	609-971-4823

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to NPRDS		Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).		NO X				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On November 13, 1996, it was discovered that mounting bolts were missing from a seismic restraint frame around Motor Control Center (MCC) DC-2. The MCC was declared inoperable and a Technical Specification LCO was entered. The four missing bolts were reinstalled and the MCC subsequently declared operable.

This condition was caused by personnel error. The seismic restraint was disassembled to support recent modification work. A final MCC walkdown at the completion of the work overlooked the bolts not being installed.

The safety significance of this occurrence is minimal since the equipment powered by this MCC is not relied upon to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Required Reading will be issued and job orders provided with specific instructions to prevent recurrence.

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TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)* (17)

DATE OF DISCOVERY

This condition was identified on November 13, 1996, at 1445.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

During the course of Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) walkdowns it was discovered that Motor Control Center (MCC) (EIIS-EJ) DC-2 had its seismic restraint frame's mounting bolts missing. A review of this configuration determined that during a seismic event the operability of MCC DC-2 and "B" Isolation Condenser could not be assured. It was also determined Technical Specification Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO) and their corresponding ACTION statement allowed out-of-service time limits of seven days had been exceeded based on the knowledge that this seismic restraint was disassembled to support work in the MCC during the recently completed 16R refueling outage. This event is considered to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i).

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO DISCOVERY

The plant was at full power for four (4) days before this discovery. The plant recently completed a Refueling Outage, 16R, during which work on MCC DC-2 was performed from September 19 to October 18, 1996. Shutdown margin surveillance testing and initial reactor startup occurred on October 20, 1996, with a subsequent shutdown on October 21, 1996. Another reactor startup occurred on October 22, 1996, with a subsequent shutdown on October 25, 1996. Reactor startup from this unscheduled outage occurred on November 6, 1996, seven days before this discovery.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

During a plant walkdown for the purpose of evaluating electrical panel seismic acceptability, it was identified that four 5/8 inch diameter bolts were missing from the seismic restraint frame around MCC DC-2. Without these bolts installed, the MCC could have been susceptible to tipping during a seismic event. MCC DC-2 and "B" isolation condenser were declared inoperable and Technical Specifications were reviewed. The plant entered a 30 hour LCO shutdown ACTION statement in accordance with Technical Specifications. The four bolts were reinstalled and MCC DC-2 and "B" isolation condenser were declared operable at 1825, less than four hours from initial discovery. The plant remained at full power for the duration of the repair.

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TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)* (17)

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

This condition was caused by personnel error. This seismic restraint was disassembled by maintenance workers to support modification work on MCC DC-2 during the recent 16R refueling outage. The workers did not exhibit sufficient attention to detail during the final MCC walkdown upon completing the work. Thus the seismic restraint frame bolts not being installed was overlooked.

A significant contributing cause was a lack of specific detail in the job order. Removal and reinstallation of the seismic restraint frame around MCC DC-2 to gain access to the MCC was not discussed in the work instructions but instead was left up to the skill of the craft.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

MCC DC-2 supplies 125 vdc electrical power to two loads. Both loads are motor operated valves (MOV) (CFI-20) for the "B" isolation condenser (EIIS-BL). One MOV is V-14-0033, a normally open steam inlet isolation valve. The other MOV is V-14-0035, a normally closed condensate return isolation valve. A loss of MCC DC-2 would render the "B" isolation condenser inoperable since V-14-0035 must cycle open to place the isolation condenser in service. The isolation condensers are designed to remove core decay heat when the reactor is in an isolated condition. By design, one isolation condenser can remove all core decay heat following a reactor shutdown. No accident analysis discussed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report relies upon the isolation condensers to remove decay heat. Additionally, a loss of MCC DC-2 would not prevent the isolation capabilities of the "B" isolation condenser from occurring if required. V-14-0033 may not cycle closed to isolate an inservice isolation condenser in the event of a break in the steam or condensate lines. However by design another normally open steam inlet MOV placed in series with V-14-0033 would be able to close to isolate the break. Therefore, the safety significance of this occurrence is minimal.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The plant entered a 30 hour LCO shutdown ACTION statement in accordance with Technical Specifications upon declaring MCC DC-2 and "B" isolation condenser inoperable.

The four missing bolts were reinstalled on the seismic restraint frame around MCC DC-2 and MCC DC-2 and "B" isolation condenser were declared operable ending the LCO required shutdown.

SQUG walkdowns of all MCC panels were completed. No additional problems were identified.

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TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)* **(17)**

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Continued)

This event critique is being included into the Required Reading program for maintenance supervision and planning personnel. Management expectations for self-cheecking and attention to detail will be highlighted.

Job orders which are planned for work on SQUG components will include specific instructions for the removal and reinstallation of seismic restraints.

SIMILAR EVENTS

LER 85-023 Emergency Service Water System Seismic Concerns
LER 86-014 Containment Spray System Seismic Concerns
LER 86-021 Plant Systems Did Not Meet Seismic Design Bases
LER 94-001 Core Spray Piping Exceeding the Code Allowable Stresses Due to Original Design Deficiency
LER 94-011 Containment Spray/Auto Depressurization Panels Did Not Meet Seismic Criteria Due to Original Design
LER 96-012: Racked Out Breakers in 4160 vac Switchgear Do Not Meet Seismic Design Bases