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September 23, 1985

Darl Hood, NRC Project Manager Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station

Response to Questions Concerning

Fire Suppression Pump 'C'

In response to your questions of September 10, 1985, the following information is provided:

1. Can any fire suppression pump be loaded on the 1E diesel?

The repowering of an existing Fire Suppression Pump from a Class IE Diesel is undesirable due to current loading on the IE Diesels, such an arrangement would cause the power to be unavailable during LOCA situations.

2. For fire suppression pump 'C', is the substation part of the grid or can it be separated from it?

Fire Suppression Pump C receives power from a 44KV substation fed from Riverbend Steam Plant Switchyard. There is no direct connection between the McGuire Switchyard and the 44KV System at Riverbend. The McGuire 525KV Switchyard has no direct tie to Riverbend, while the 230KV Switchyard is connected to Riverbend via the Schoonover and Norman Lines (see attached). At Riverbend, Units 6 and 7 feed the 230KV Switchyard through step-up transformers 6B and 7B.

The 44KC Switchyard is fed from the 100KV Switchyard through a tertiary winding on the step-up transformer for Units 1, 2, and 3 or through tie lines such as Mountain Island.

Under normal plant conditions, there is no tie between the 230KV Switchyard and the 44KV Switchyard at Riverbend. Units 6 and 7 have the capability to be aligned to the 100KV yard through alternate step-up transformers 6A and 7A; however, if this alignment is used, breakers to the 230KV Switchyard are opened and still no direct connection exists between the 230KV Switchyard and the 44KV Switchyard.

This isolation allows a total blackout of the McGuire Switchyard for any reason-fault, natural disaster, equipment failure, etc. to occur with no consequences to the 44KV feeder to Fire Suppression Pump C. Therefore, for any localized blackout situation at McGuire which would cause the loss of Fire Suppression Pumps A and B, Fire Suppression Pump C would still be available for service.

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> 3. Stability studies - are there quantitative type studies that have been performed that could be used to support the "independence" of the substation?


To our knowledge, no quantitative type studies have been performed that could be used to support the independence of the substation. However, a record of power interruptions to Fire Suppression Pump C from May, 1975 to November, 1982 (see Attachment 1) shows the 44KV line to be reliable.


If there are any further questions regarding this area of concern, please call.


R. L. Gill, Jr. Nuclear Engineer

RLG/hrp

Attachments







Record of Power Interruption to McGuire C Main Fire Pump Motor

• DATE	DIRATOPM	CAUSE
1. May 14, 1975	1 min	no indication
2. June 12, 1975	88 min	lighting
3. November 22, 1977	- 19 min	no indication
4. October 2, 1979	less than 1 min	lighting
5. November 4, 1982	137 min	line insulator failure