




ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

POST OFFICE BOX 551 LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72203 (501) 371-4000

August 25, 1985



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
Mr. Richard P. Denise, Director
Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

SUBJECT: Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 & 2
Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368
License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
Response to Inspection Reports
50-313/85-16 & 50-368/85-17

Gentlemen:

The subject inspection reports have been reviewed. A response to the Notice of Violation is attached.

Very truly yours,


J. Ted Enos
Manager, Licensing

JTE:RJS:ds

Attachment

cc: Mr. James M. Taylor
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Mr. Norman M. Haller, Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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IC-125/85

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

During an NRC inspection conducted during the period June 1-30, 1985, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. The violation involved the failure to follow the requirements of a valve lineup procedure. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1985), the violation is listed below:

Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that, "Written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering . . . a. The applicable procedures recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978."

Plant Operating Procedure 2102.01, "Plant Pre-heatup and Pre-critical Checklist," has been established in accordance with this Technical Specification.

Section 3.5 of Attachment E to Procedure 2102.01 requires any valve not in the required position be listed on the Category E valve log sheet (Form 1015.01C).

Contrary to the above, Category E valve 2BS-32 was found to be out of its required position on June 3, 1985, yet no entry was made on Form 1015.01C.

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I.E) (368/8517-01).

Response

On May 12, 1985, in preparation for plant heatup after the ANO-2 fourth refueling outage, alignment verification of Category "E" valves was performed as required by Plant Pre-Heatup and Pre-Critical Checklists procedure. During the performance of this alignment verification, all valves that were not positioned to their required Category "E" position were identified and were listed on the Category "E" Valve Log Sheet in the control room. While performing final checks and realignment of these valves during plant heatup, an error was made concerning the required locked position for valve 2BS-32. An entry was made on the Category "E" Valve Log Sheet specifying that valve 2BS-32 should be "LOCKED OPEN". The required Category "E" position for this valve is "LOCKED CLOSED". This error resulted in the valve being verified in the incorrect position. Also, as a result of the entry for the valve being incorrectly completed on the Category "E" Valve Log Sheet, no record existed to indicate that 2BS-32 was not in the correct Category "E" position. The NRC resident noted this discrepancy on June 3, 1985.

As stated in the body of the report, the Unit 2 operator immediately entered 2BS-32 on the valve exception listed as required by procedure.

An independent review of this incident was conducted. As a result, the following actions will be taken to prevent recurrence:

1. Review of the incident with Operations personnel with emphasis on the importance of Category "E" valve administrative controls and documentation.
2. Performance of a detailed review of procedures relating to Category "E" valve alignments and administrative controls and revision of these procedures to provide clear, unambiguous instructions concerning their use.
3. Detailed operator training on the use of procedures relating to Category "E" valves.

Full compliance was achieved when an entry was made on the Category "E" Valve Log Sheet for 2BS-32 on June 3, 1985. Actions to prevent recurrence are planned to be completed by October 11, 1985.