

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-282/92030(DRSS); 50-306/92030(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306

License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60

Licensee: Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401

Facility Name: Prairie Island Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection Dates: December 14-18, 1992 (On-Site)
January 4-14, 1993 (In-Office)

Type of Inspection: Reactive, Announced, Review of Concerns Relating to
Physical Security and Fitness-For-Duty

Inspector:

J. L. Belanger
J. L. Belanger
Senior Physical Security Inspector

1/22/93
Date

Approved By:

James R. Creed
James R. Creed, Chief
Safeguards Section

1/22/93
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection between December 14, 1992 and January 14, 1993 (Reports
No. 50-282/92030(DRSS); No. 50-306/92030(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Reactive, announced review of concerns related to the security and fitness-for-duty programs. These concerns related to the following general areas of interest: Security Procedures; Management Effectiveness and Actions; Access Control Personnel; Compensatory Measures; Lighting; Protection of Safeguards Information; Guard Training and Qualification; and the Chemical Testing Program.

Results: As a result of our review of thirteen concerns, it appeared that one licensee identified non-cited violation and several program weaknesses were identified. Specifically:

- A watchperson was posted at a post when an armed guard was required. The approved security plan and procedures permitted an unarmed watchperson to be posted. We identified one sentence in a procedure that appeared confusing.

- On a specific occasion, the badge issuance area was not manned by an armed guard. Although there were no specific requirements that the area in question be manned by an armed guard, we found in the case in question, it actually was always manned by an armed guard.
- On a specific occasion, a trailer with "QA Type 1" materials was not locked and dark. We confirmed that the trailer was found not locked, but that there were no requirements to secure the trailer or to light the interior.
- Security officers do not receive training on new equipment. We found that security officers did receive training on new security equipment but that the documentation of on-shift training was poor. This was identified as a program weakness.
- On two specific occasions, adequate compensatory measures were not implemented because only one officer was utilized when normally two are used. We found that the compensatory measures implemented complied with security procedures.
- On a specific occasion, a security shift supervisor left a safeguards disk in a security computer unattended. We confirmed that a security shift supervisor did leave a safeguards disk in the computer but found that the information on the disk was not safeguards information. A program weakness was identified in the marking of safeguards disks.
- Security procedures were deviated from due to interpretations by managers to meet their needs. We found unanimous agreement among security management and security officers that this was the case in the past; however, in the past several months, this has been less of an issue because of efforts to improve consistency in procedure implementation. We identified no instances of procedure violations.
- A security officer remained suspended from employment for fitness-for-duty reasons even though all programmatic requirements have been met. We found that the officer in question remains suspended for reasons not relating to the fitness-for-duty program.
- A second machine was not used as a confirmatory test for alcohol in a for-cause test. We found that a confirmatory alcohol test on a second machine was not required because the individual's tests results were negative.
- Security personnel are treated differently than other site employees regarding implementation of the licensee's fitness-for-duty policy. We found the licensee's fitness-for-duty policy to be consistently implemented for both licensee and contractor personnel.

- The required fitness-for-duty appeal process was not followed because a letter for a security officer was ignored. We could not find an appeal letter and found that an appeal was not necessary because the officer was not denied access.
- A security officer was suspended for approximately one week because the current guard contractor lost a file. We found that the officer was suspended, but not because the contractor had lost a file. We found that a temporarily granted access authorization went beyond 180 days and that when the licensee received verification of military service, certain derogatory information had to be resolved before the individual was granted permanent access. After the information was resolved, access was granted. One licensee identified noncited violation was noted in this matter.
- A security officer's site access authorization was suspended but the individual was not escorted. We found that when suspended, the officer was visually observed until exiting the protected area. We found a program weakness in that the licensee procedures were lacking in addressing actions to be taken for an unfavorable suspension or termination of access authorization.