

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): LaSalle County Station, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2): 050000374	PAGE (3) 1 OF 03
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TITLE (4)
Spurious Safety Relief Valve Actuation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		
05	23	85	85	023	000	06	18	85			
									DOCKET NUMBER(S)		
									050000		

OPERATING MODE (9) 4	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5 (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
POWER LEVEL (10) 900	20.402(b)			20.408(c)			30.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)		
	20.408(a)(1)(ii)			30.38(a)(1)			30.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)		
	20.408(a)(1)(iii)			30.38(a)(2)			30.73(a)(2)(vi)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text: NRC Form 305A)		
	20.408(a)(1)(iv)			30.73(a)(2)(iii)			30.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)					
	20.408(a)(1)(v)			30.73(a)(2)(iv)			30.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
20.408(a)(1)(vi)			30.73(a)(2)(v)			30.73(a)(2)(ix)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Richard J. Rohrer, extension 575	TELEPHONE NUMBER 815 357-6701
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	SIB	SRVC	7110	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If you complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately three single space typewritten lines) (16)

Safety Relief Valve, 2B21-F013D, opened for no apparent reason, then reclosed. This event occurred at 1349 hours on May 23, 1985, while Unit 2 was in Cold Shutdown. Investigation into surveillance, maintenance and troubleshooting activities in progress at the time of the event has revealed no cause for the actuation. The "D" SRV control circuitry was checked for faults, but none were found.

The event had no safety significance since Unit 2 was in Cold Shutdown, and the valve reclosed shortly after opening.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENCE NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		815	-0123	-010	02	OF	03

LaSalle County Station Unit 2

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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3054's (17))

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION

Safety Relief Valve, 2B21-F013D, (NB, SB) opened for no apparent reason, then reclosed 23 seconds later. This event occurred at 1349 hours on May 23, 1985, while Unit 2 was in Cold Shutdown.

II. CAUSE

Thorough investigation has revealed no cause for the SRV operation. The following areas were examined.

1. Surveillance activity.

It was thought that an error made during surveillance could have generated a false signal to open the "D" SRV. Electrical surveillance procedure, LES-RH-01, "Residual Heat Removal System Relay Logic Test", was in progress for Unit 2. The steps being performed at about the time of the SRV actuation (F.3.j through F.3.m) involved measuring the voltage across terminals BB-5 and BB-7 and terminals BB-6 and BB-8 at panel 2H13-P629. This panel is directly adjacent to a panel housing terminal boards for SRV control circuits (2H13-P628). It is conceivable that the personnel performing the surveillance erroneously went to panel 2H13-P628 instead of 2H13-P629 and took the voltage measurements across terminals BB-5 and BB-7 and terminals BB-6 and BB-8 of the SRV control panel. However, none of these terminals is associated with the "D" SRV, so an error of this kind could not have resulted in its actuation.

2. Maintenance Activity.

Maintenance per Work Request number L48511 was being performed by Instrument Maintenance personnel during the time when "D" SRV opened. Part of this work involved calibrating the pressure switches for the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS, SB) accumulator low pressure alarms per procedure LIP-GI-11, "Calibration of Pressure Switches". At the time of the SRV actuation, the Instrument Maintenance personnel had just properly completed calibration of the "S" ADS accumulator pressure switch and had relanded leads on terminal board TBI in terminal box 2JB730R. They were preparing to perform the calibration of the ADS accumulator "D" pressure switch which requires lifting leads from the same terminal board in the same terminal box. Any error in terminal box 2JB730R could not have caused an SRV to open since the SRV control circuits do not enter this box. It is not likely that the personnel involved inadvertently lifted leads which could have actuated an SRV, since this would have required going to another panel in another part of the plant.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) LaSalle County Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 5	- 0 2 3	- 0 1 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

II. CAUSE (Continued)

3. Possible Ground Faults.

Operating Department personnel were isolating a ground fault on the deluge valves (FP, KP) of the Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment system (SBGT)(BH) filter train when the SRV opened. A simultaneous ground fault in the circuit for the "D" SRV could have caused an actuation, since the SRV controls are powered from the same bus (212Y) as the deluge valves. This theory was strengthened by the fact that a previous spurious SRV lift had been caused by a ground in its control circuits (reference: LER 373/84-051-02). Technical Staff and Electrical Maintenance personnel tested the "D" SRV solenoids and control circuits for ground faults per special test LST-85-064 and standard electrical troubleshooting practices. No ground faults were found, so the theory that a ground fault had caused the actuation was discounted.

4. Control Room Print-outs.

The Unit 2 sequence-of-events recorder and alarm typer print-outs were examined, but neither gave any further clues as to the cause of the actuation.

The Safety Relief Valves are manufactured by Crosby Valve and Gage Company and are 6xRx10 style NB-65-BP valves.

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE

The event had no safety significance since Unit 2 was in Cold Shutdown at the time of occurrence. The valve reclosed shortly after opening.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Thorough investigation, as described above, discovered no problems, so no corrective action was necessary.

V. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

Spurious actuation of a Unit 1 SRV was reported in Licensee Event Report 373/84-051-02. This actuation was caused by a ground fault in one of the actuating solenoids.

VI. NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PREPARER

Richard J. Rohrer, 815/357-6761, extension 575.



Commonwealth Edison
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Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

June 18, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #85-023-00, Docket #050-374 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

for *R.D. Bishop*
G. J. Diederich
Station Manager
LaSalle County Station

GJD/DRR/kg

Enclosure

xc: NRC, Regional Director
INPO-Records Center
File/NRC

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