



GPU Nuclear Corporation
Post Office Box 388
Route 9 South
Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388
609 971-4000
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

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
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Actn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Voluntary Licensee Event Report

This letter forwards one (1) copy of Voluntary Report No. 92-014. This event has been determined to be not reportable as defined in the USNRC regulations.

Sincerely,



John J. Barton
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

JJB\BDEM: jc
Enclosure


cc: Administrator, Region 1
Senior NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek NRC Project Manager

(LER-COVLTRS)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Oyster Creek, Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 1 5 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 9 PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 4

TITLE (4) Voluntary Report - Service Water Piping Failure May Have Affected Secondary Containment Integrity

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR 1	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME
12	09	92	92	014	00	01	11	93	
									DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									0 1 5 1 0 1 0 1
									0 1 5 1 0 1 0 1

OPERATING MODE (9) N THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50. (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.406(a)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.76(a)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(a)
20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.76(a)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
20.406(a)(1)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH 06 DAY 01 YEAR 93

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces - i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

A hole in the Service Water System piping on the outlet of the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water heat exchanger was discovered on December 9, 1992. The plant was shut down at the time, but it is not known how long the condition existed prior to discovery. The hole was discovered by a technician working in the area who heard a sound like rushing air and reported it to the Control Room. A Control Room supervisor cut away a piece of wetted insulation from the pipe and exposed a hole approximately four inches in diameter. No water leaked from the pipe because the system discharge is at a vacuum. A patch was placed over the hole. The apparent cause of the occurrence is piping erosion due to failure of the pipe's internal coating. Additional piping sections were inspected and the failed section was replaced. Service water piping will be added to an existing inspection program. This hole may have affected secondary containment, which is designed to minimize ground level release of radioactive materials. An evaluation is being performed to assess the effects of a radioactive release with this piping hole and a revision to this report will be submitted when the evaluation is complete.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Oyster Creek, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 15 10 0 0 2 1 9	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR 9 2	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 1 4	REVISION NUMBER 0 0	0 2	OF 0 4

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

DATE OF OCCURRENCE

The condition was discovered on December 9, 1992.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

A hole in the Service Water System (IEEE - BI) piping on the outlet of the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (IEEE - CC) heat exchanger was discovered. This may have constituted a degradation of Secondary Containment (IEEE - BD). This is a voluntary report pending analysis of the condition, which may be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO DISCOVERY

At the time of discovery, the reactor was in the SHUTDOWN mode with reactor coolant temperature at 150 degrees F, and reactor cavity floodup in progress in preparation for defueling. It is not known how long the condition existed prior to discovery.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On December 9, 1992, at approximately 0700 hours, a plant Instrumentation & Controls technician working in the area of the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water heat exchangers (CFI - HX) heard a sound from the Service Water piping that sounded like rushing air. He contacted the Control Room and a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) Licensed supervisor investigated the report. There was a dark spot on the Service Water pipe insulation on the outlet of the RBCCW heat exchanger. The Control Room supervisor cut away a piece of the insulation, which exposed a hole in the piping approximately 4 inches in diameter. No water leaked from the hole because the Service Water system discharge is at a vacuum. Immediate corrective action was taken to place a temporary patch on the pipe at 1200 hours. The system was removed from service on December 17 and a permanent repair was then made.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If space allows is preferred, use institutional NRC Form 306A-1) (17)

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The apparent cause of the occurrence is piping erosion due to failure of the pipe's internal coating. The cause of the coating failure is indeterminate at this time. An evaluation of the event is being performed. Any further details resulting from the evaluation will be provided in a followup report.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

Secondary Containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive materials. The Reactor Building (IEEE - NG) provides Secondary Containment during reactor operation when the drywell is sealed and in service and provides primary containment when the reactor is shut down and the drywell is open, as during refueling. Both the Reactor Building Ventilation system (IEEE - VA) and the Standby Gas Treatment system (IEEE - BH) are designed to maintain a 0.25 inch water vacuum in the Reactor Building. Therefore, air leakage is inward from outside to inside the Reactor Building. Secondary Containment is required during fuel handling operations and whenever work is being performed on the reactor or its connected systems in the Reactor Building since their operation could result in inadvertent release of radioactive material.

The Service Water system discharge is kept at a vacuum to reduce head requirements for the pumps. The Service Water piping did not leak from the hole because of this vacuum. The vacuum in the piping drew air from the Reactor Building atmosphere into the system piping, which discharges into a seal well. Under these conditions a radioactive release into the Reactor Building may have resulted in an unmonitored ground level release, since the Service Water Radiation Monitor was not operable at the time and grab samples were being taken to monitor system radioactive releases. An evaluation is being performed to assess the possible effects on secondary containment and of a radioactive release with this piping hole, and a revision to this report will be submitted when the evaluation is complete.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Oyster Creek, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR 9 2	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 0 1 4	REVISION NUMBER 0 0	0 4	OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 360A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate corrective action was taken to place a temporary patch over the hole. The patch was in place by 1200 hours on December 9, 1992. The system was removed from service on December 17, and the piping section was removed and replaced. Ultrasonic inspections were performed on two other system elbows and one straight piping run with no significant indications. Service water piping inspections will be added to an existing piping inspection program for the next refueling outage.

An evaluation is being performed to assess the possible effects on secondary containment and of a radioactive release with the presence of the hole in the Service Water piping. In addition, an evaluation of the pipe's internal coating is being investigated. Results of these evaluations will be provided in a followup report.

SIMILAR EVENTS

None.