



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Sevier, Tennessee 37379

J. L. Wilson
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

September 9, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of) Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority) 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR-79 -- SPECIAL REPORT 92-07

The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire barrier being nonfunctional for a period greater than the technical specification (TS) allowable seven-day timeframe. Details are also provided concerning the inoperability of the fire detectors in the essential raw cooling water building for a period greater than the TS allowable 14-day timeframe. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS Action Statements 3.3.3.8(b) and 3.7.12(a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

J. L. Wilson
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Enclosure
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cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint, North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852

NRC Resident Inspector
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
2600 Igoe Ferry Road
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)
SPECIAL REPORT 92-07

I. FIRE DOOR A-41

Description of Condition

On September 1, 1992, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1 at full power, Auxiliary Building Fire Door A-41 was breached to provide unimpeded access to Auxiliary Building Room A21, which houses Positive Displacement Charging Pump 2C.

Cause of Condition

Auxiliary building Fire Door A-41 will be breached to permit personnel unimpeded access and the transportation of tools and equipment during a pump-removal activity. The door will remain breached for the duration of the activity, which is expected to be four to six weeks.

Corrective Action

In accordance with Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), fire detectors in the room were verified operable, and a roving fire watch was established and will be maintained until the breach is removed and the fire door barrier is reestablished.

II. FIRE DETECTORS LOCATED IN THE ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER (ERCW) BUILDING ABOVE ERCW PUMPS

Description of Condition

On July 29, 1992, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1 at full power, two thermal fire protection detectors in Fire Zone 277 were removed to facilitate the removal and repair of ERCW Pump K-A. The maintenance activity exceeded the technical specification allowable timeframe of 14 days for fire detection devices to be out of service.

Cause of Condition

The maintenance activities required the two detectors to be removed to facilitate the removal of the pump motor to pull the pump.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (a), a continuous fire watch was established and maintained for the duration of the maintenance activity. LCO 3.3.3.8 was entered at 1150 Eastern daylight time (EDT) on July 29, 1992, and exited at 1426 EDT on August 13, 1992.