Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

Robert A. Fenech
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

January 7, 1993

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of) Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority) 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR-79 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.12 SPECIAL REPORT 92-11

The enclosed special report provides details concerning two fire barriers being breached for a period greater than the technical specification (TS) allowable time. The condition was the result of a preplanned activity, and compensatory measures were taken in accordance with TS requirements. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Fenech

Robert A. Fenech

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

120051

IE22
1/1

cc (Enclosure):
Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint, North
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739

NRC Resident Inspector
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
2600 Igou Ferry Road
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624

Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323-0199

ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT
SPECIAL REPORT 92-11

Description of Condition

On December 2, 1992, with Units 1 and 2 operating in Mode 1, two penetration fire barriers were breached, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 was entered, and appropriate compensatory measures were initiated. The breached condition existed for a period of time that was greater than the technical specification (TS) allowable period of seven days. The fire barriers were breached in the process of removing defective cables and routing new cables. The penetrations are for cable trays going from the turbine building into the control building on Elevation 706.0 and from the control building into the auxiliary building auxiliary relay room on the Unit 1 side.

Cause of Condition

The fire barriers were not reestablished within the 7-day TS allowable timeframe because the fire retardant sealant that is used to establish a fire barrier was determined to be defective. Quality Control inspectors tested and rejected the sealant before it could be used. New sealant could not be obtained before the 7-day timeframe expired.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the operability of fire detectors on one side of each penetration was verified, and a roving fire watch was established. New fire retardant sealant was obtained and installed. The fire barriers were returned to functional status on December 22, 1992.