Georgia Power Company
Route One, Box 278
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

Georgia Power

April 14, 1981
PM-81-337

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Special Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Pursuant to Section 6.9.2 of Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications, please find attached Special Report.

C. M. Moore for
M. Manry
Plant Manager

MM/WHR/cd

xc: J. H. Miller
R. J. Kelly
J. T. Beckham, Jr.
C. L. Coggin
R. D. Baker
Control Room
Document File

Special Report No. 1-Sp-81-2
Georgia Power Co.
Plant E. I. Hatch
Docket No. 50-321
April 14, 1981

HIGH RADIATION AREA INCIDENT

On March 19, 1981, while the unit was in cold shutdown, two contract workers entered and worked in two high radiation areas in the Unit 1 Radwaste Building without being provided with or accompanied by one or more of the following; (a) A radiation monitor device which continuously indicates the radiation dose rate in the area. (b) A radiation monitoring device which continuously integrates the radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a preset integrated dose is received or (c) An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures who is equipped with a radiation dose rate monitoring device. Additionally, the contract workers left these areas unattended with the doors open for a period of approximately 20 minutes. These two incidents violate the intent of Technical Specification section 6.12, High Radiation Area.

The workers were part of a team of workers who were assigned to decon the 108 feet elevation of the Radwaste Building. Four (4) Radiation Work Permits (R.W.P.) were processed by Health Physics prior to the start of work. Only one, however, was picked up by the contractor and taken to the Shift Foreman for approval. This R.W.P. was for the floor area outside of the high radiation areas. R.W.P.'s for the high radiation areas remained in the Health Physics Office. The R.W.P. submitted to the Shift Foreman was approved by him and was used by the contractor for all decon work.

The incidents were discovered when the two workers arrived at the Dosimetry Office to have their dosimeters rezeroed. One worker's low range (0-200 mr) and high range (0-1 R) dosimeters were offscale and the other worker's high range dosimeter was reading 270 mr and the low range dosimeter was offscale. The high range dosimeter which went offscale was found to be defective. The low range dosimeters went offscale for obvious reasons as indicated below:

The workers were immediately restricted from further radiation work pending outcome of reading their TLD badges. The TLD badges were read by a contract laboratory and indicated no over exposure had occurred. The TLD badges indicated 441 mrems and 730 mrems. Adding these values to previous values for the calendar quarter gave quarterly exposures, as of 3-20-81, of 634 mrem and 730 mrem respectively.

The apparent cause of the violations to Tech Spec section 6.12 was as follows:

(1) Working under the wrong R.W.P. The correct R.W.P. specified the workers to contact H.P. prior to work.

(2) Inadequate communication between Health Physics and the workers.

(3) Inadequate control of keys to high rad areas.

To prevent a re-occurrence, the following measures have been initiated:

(1) Keys to high radiation areas will be controlled by Health Physics where previously they had been controlled by the Control Room. This will assure that Health Physics will have knowledge of each entry into High Radiation areas.

(2) Entry into High Radiation areas will require a Health Physics escort. This will assure that proper radiation monitoring instrumentation is provided and that positive control over entries are made.