



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS FIELD OFFICE, REGION I
631 PARK AVENUE
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

REPORT OF INQUIRY

SUBJECT: SUSPECTED MALICIOUS DAMAGE TO CABLES AT MILLSTONE 3
CONSTRUCTION SITE

REPORT NUMBER: Q-1-83-017

DATE CLOSED: June 30, 1983

On June 29, 1983, at 10:19 AM, I received a telephone call from Eugene M. KELLY, Reactor Engineer, NRC Region I, regarding suspected malicious damage to cables at Millstone 3 Construction Site. According to KELLY, the licensee, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNEC), reported to him at approximately 10:00 AM on June 29, 1983 that unknown person(s) had cut 15 cables located in the basement of the control room and that five or six of the cables were color coded to indicate that they were safety related. KELLY said that the licensee informed him that the damaged cables were located in an area to which access was not restricted and that approximately 500 people could have had access to that area which is situated in the basement of the control building hidden behind cable trays and ducts. KELLY identified Robert E. BUSCH, NNEC, as his point of contact (telephone number area code 203-442-0751). KELLY also indicated that the wires had apparently been cut by a sharp instrument, possibly a wire cutter, since the cables were cleanly sliced.

On June 29, 1983, at 11:45 AM, Lisa M. MCKEOWN, NRC Region I Physical Security Inspector, provided me with substantially the same information as above. She indicated that the point of contact at the site was Stephen TOTH, telephone number area code 203-442-0751 extension 526. She advised that the incident had been discovered at 3:30 PM on June 28, 1983 by a Stone and Webster craft worker and that the licensee had reported the problem to Eugene KELLY on June 29, 1983 at approximately 10:00 AM. She indicated that the licensee had not identified any suspects at this time.

On June 29, 1983 at approximately 12:30 PM, I telephoned TOTH regarding the above. He indicated that a total of 20 cables were cut, 12 of which were non-safety related and 8 of which were safety related. According to TOTH, the cables were located at the bottom elevation of the control building in the southwest corner. He indicated that the incident was discovered at 3:30 PM by a Stone and Webster craft electrician. The licensee, according to TOTH, had determined that the cables had apparently been cut by a side cutter or some sort of wire cutter since the cuts were clean and did not indicate that any kind of blunt instrument was used.

Information in this record was deleted
in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act, exemptions b6 + 7C
FOIA 92-163

9301070007 920617
PDR FOIA
GUILD92-163 PDR

9301070007 A-3
1/1/83

He stated, however, that no cutting instrument was found in the immediate area of the alleged damage. He said that side cutters or cable cutters are commonly used on site by numerous craft personnel, including electricians. TOTH indicated that the area where this incident occurred was a "non-control area" since the site was under construction. He indicated that at least 500 people including, carpenters, laborers, electricians, iron workers, as well as engineers and plant personnel, would have access to this area. He surmised that a possible motive was malicious mischief in order to make additional work; however, as far as he knew there were no disgruntled employees or any recent threatening letters or phone calls, problems between trade crafts or any other sort of personnel problems. He estimated that the cost to repair the damage would be less than \$50,000 since repair work would only require pulling and splicing the affected wires. He indicated that this would take less than a week. TOTH indicated that he would be conducting the licensee's investigation in this matter. I advised TOTH that I would contact him at a later date to let him know what OI would do regarding this matter.

Subsequent to the above telephone conversation with TOTH, on June 29, I informed Peter C. BACI at OI:HQ of the above incident. At approximately 1:30 PM BACI contacted and advised me that he would recommend, based on a conversation which he had with Roger FORTUNA, that OI not conduct an investigation into this matter since the incident occurred at a non-operating reactor site which was under construction and therefore could not be classified as a violation of the Atomic Energy Act but only as malicious mischief. BACI advised me to notify the local FBI office of the incident. Subsequently, I contacted Anthony T. GODY, Chief of the Safeguards and Fuel Facilities Section, Region I, and apprised him of OI's position with regard to this matter. I indicated to GODY that I would notify the local FBI office of the problem.

At approximately 2:00 PM on June 29 I contacted [redacted] the New Haven, Connecticut, FBI office, telephone number area code 203-777-63 [redacted]. I apprised [redacted] of the above incident and point out to [redacted] that Millstone 3 is a non-operating plant under construction. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] would file the information; however, [redacted] advised me that the FBI would not conduct either an investigation or a preliminary investigation.

On June 29, 1983, at approximately 3:00 PM, I contacted Stephen TOTH and informed him that OI would not conduct an investigation into this matter. I also informed TOTH that the FBI had been apprised of the incident by OI:Region I. TOTH indicated to me that he is the NNEC Superintendent of the construction site. TOTH was unable to provide any additional pertinent information. No further action will be performed by OI:RI regarding this matter.

*Send Copy to OIA
BTA 7/6/83*

Prepared by: *R.K. Christopher*
Peter J. Connolly, Investigator
Office of Investigations Field Office
Region I

Approved by: *R. Keith Christopher 6/30/83*
R. Keith Christopher, Director
Office of Investigations Field Office
Region I

cc: Peter C. Baci
Thomas E. Murley

617C

6-30-83