UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-2713

May 5, 2020

Mr. Brad Berryman
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC
769 Salem Blvd., NUCSB3
Berwick, PA 18603

SUBJECT: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2020001 AND 05000388/2020001

Dear Mr. Berryman:

On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. On April 17, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Kevin Cimorelli, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

X /RA/

Signed by: Jonathan E. Greives
Jonathan E. Greives, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000387 and 05000388
License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22

Enclosure:
As stated

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SUBJECT: SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2020001 AND 05000388/2020001 DATED MAY 5, 2020

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:	05000387 and 05000388
License Numbers:	NPF-14 and NPF-22
Report Numbers:	05000387/2020001 and 05000388/2020001
Enterprise Identifier:	I-2020-001-0058
Licensee:	Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC
Facility:	Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:	Berwick, PA
Inspection Dates:	January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2020
Inspectors:	P. Boguszewski, Resident Inspector L. Casey, Senior Project Engineer N. Floyd, Senior Reactor Inspector L. Micewski, Senior Resident Inspector R. Rolph, Health Physicist M. Rossi, Resident Inspector
Approved By:	Jonathan E. Greives, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 98 percent power. The station had been requested by grid operator on November 21, 2019, to reduce power to approximately 1260 MWe, which corresponds to approximately 98 percent power, during a planned distribution line outage. This request is in place until further notice. On January 10, 2020, operators commenced end-of-cycle coast down for the remainder of the cycle. On March 27, 2020, operators commenced reducing power from 72 percent for a planned refueling outage. Unit 1 reached Mode 4 on March 28, 2020, and remained shut down for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 98 percent power. The station had been requested by grid operator on November 21, 2019, to reduce power to approximately 1260 MWe, which corresponds to approximately 98 percent power, during a planned distribution line outage. This request is in place until further notice. On February 14, 2020, operators inserted a manual reactor scram due to degrading vacuum in the main condenser. Operators commenced a reactor startup on February 15, 2020, and returned the unit to 98 percent power on February 21, 2020. The unit remained at or near 98 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, “Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase.” From January 1 – March 19, 2020, the inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, “Plant Status,” and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, “Problem Identification and Resolution.” The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; and observed risk significant activities when warranted. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In the cases where it was determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management elected to postpone and reschedule the inspection to a later date.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 1, emergency core cooling system (ECCS) during Unit 1 'B' core spray system outage window (SOW) on January 13, 2020
(2) Unit 1, high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) during reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) 24-month functional test on January 27, 2020
(3) Unit Common, 'A', 'C', 'D' emergency diesel generator (EDG) during 'B' post maintenance testing on February 19, 2020
(4) Unit 2, ECCS and Unit Common 'A' loop essential service water (ESW) during 'B' loop ESW weld repair on March 9, 2020
(5) Unit 1, RCIC, core spray, and residual heat removal (RHR) systems during online HPCI logic functional testing on March 24, 2020

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Unit Common, standby gas treatment filter area (fire zone 0-30A) on January 22, 2020
(2) Unit Common, engineered safeguards service water (ESSW) pumphouse (firezones 0-51 and 0-52) on February 6, 2020
(3) Unit Common, diesel generator bay 'E' (fire zone 0-41E) on February 10, 2020
(4) Unit 1, HPCI pump room (fire zone 1-1C) on February 26, 2020
(5) Unit 1, division 2 lower relay room (fire zone 0-24D) on March 17, 2020

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill in the Unit 1 'B' core spray room on March 9, 2020.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room following Unit 2 reactor scram on February 14, 2020.
(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during start up following Unit 2 reactor scram on February 15, 2020.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulation of a steam leak in the drywell, coincident with the loss of several ECCSs, requiring emergency depressurization on February 3, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Unit 1, hydraulic control unit 50-27 high water alarms on February 18, 2020
(2) Unit 2, drift trend in 'B' narrow range reactor vessel water level switch on March 20, 2020
(3) Cooling water flexible tubing used for EDGs on March 25, 2020

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;

(1) Unit 2, yellow risk during automatic depressurization system (ADS) drywell permissive surveillance testing on January 10, 2020
(2) Unit 1, ECCS protected during Unit 1 'B' core spray SOW on January 13, 2020
(3) Unit 2, yellow risk during reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level functional testing and calibration on January 23, 2020
(4) Unit 2, HPCI protected during RCIC SOW on January 28, 2020
(5) Unit Common, 'A', 'B' and 'D' EDGs protected during emergent repair on 'C' EDG on February 4, 2020
(6) Unit 1, HPCI protected during RCIC instrumentation maintenance and repair on March 5, 2020
(7) Units 1 and 2, yellow risk during weld repair of 'B' loop ESW on March 9, 2020
(8) Unit 1, yellow risk during 0A10303 breaker maintenance on March 12, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 1, HPCI static inverter failure on January 10, 2020
(2) Unit 1, HPCI breaker difficult to close following preventive maintenance on January 21, 2020

(3) Unit Common, past operabillity for linear indication on ESW pipe to 'B' EDG on February 27, 2020
(4) Unit 2, 'B' narrow range reactor vessel water level switch found out of tolerance on March 3, 2020
(5) Unit 1, instrument air with significant piping leak on the 1B air compressor on March 11, 2020

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) Unit 1, 'B' core spray system outage window on January 13, 2020
(2) Unit 2, RCIC system outage window on January 28, 2020
(3) Unit Common, 'B' EDG mid-cycle overhaul on February 13, 2020
(4) Unit 2, scram discharge volume valve stroke timing following repair of decoupled actuator on drain isolation valve on February 15, 2020
(5) 'B' loop ESW weld repair on March 9, 2020

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated cooldown and heatup and startup activities following a Unit 2 scram due to loss of condenser vacuum from February 14, 2020 to February 15, 2020.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

(1) Unit 2, reactor pressure vessel level functional test and calibration on January 23, 2020
(2) Unit 1, RCIC 24-month functional test from remote shutdown panel on January 27, 2020
(3) Unit 2, division 2 RHR flow verification on February 13, 2020
(4) Unit 2, rod block monitor and rod coupling testing on February 15, 2020
(5) Unit Common, 'B' EDG analyzer and monthly operability run on February 19, 2020
(6) Unit 1, online functional test of remote shutdown panel on March 24, 2020
(7) Unit 1, loss of coolant accident with loss of offsite power surveillance test on March 31, 2020

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2, division 1 core spray quarterly flow surveillance test on January 2, 2020

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Tabletop exercise, radiological emergency due to reactor water cleanup leak concurrent with inability to close containment isolation valves on February 27, 2020 and March 11, 2020

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas:

(1) The inspectors evaluated the controls for the following Locked High Radiation Areas in the Unit 1 reactor building:
- Reactor water clean up pump room
- Reactor water clean up heat exchanger room

The inspectors also evaluated the controls for the Very High Radiation Areas in the Unit 1 reactor building:
- Traversing incore probe room
- Drywell personnel entrance

71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment

Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization.

Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments for actual internal exposures:

(1) Internal dose assessment performed on April 5, 2019, for an individual who received facial contamination on March 28, 2019. The individual was working in the control rod drive rebuild room.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019- December 31, 2019)
(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019- December 31, 2019)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019- December 31, 2019)
(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019- December 31, 2019)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019- December 31, 2019)
(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019- December 31, 2019)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Degraded bolts on the 'C' emergency service water pump

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Followup (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2, manual reactor scram in response to degrading main condenser vacuum on February 14, 2020

INSPECTION RESULTS

Observation: Degraded bolts on the 'C' emergency service water pump	71152
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Susquehanna's causal evaluation and corrective actions associated with condition report CR-2019-13078 for degraded bolts discovered on the 'C' emergency service water pump. Specifically, the pump failed its in-service test acceptance criteria for differential pressure during a flow verification test on August 28, 2019, and upon further investigation, Susquehanna staff discovered severely degraded bolts on the pump flange connections as well as separation of the pump casing. Susquehanna staff replaced the 'C' emergency service water pump and bolting hardware as an immediate corrective action and sent the bolting to a laboratory for failure analysis. The NRC previously reviewed the in-service testing data and documented a Green NCV because Susquehanna did not identify and evaluate the past surveillance test data. Further details on	

the violation can be found in IR 05000387, 05000388/2019004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20044E226). This inspection focused on Susquehanna staff's performance to evaluate the problem, identify the causes, and develop effective corrective actions for the degraded condition associated with the bolting hardware.

The inspectors interviewed Susquehanna staff, reviewed the chemistry treatment program and monitoring trends for the spray pond environment, and reviewed work orders for past pump overhauls, including pictures and associated condition reports. The inspectors conducted a walk down of the accessible portions of the ESW and RHR service water components in the pumphouse. The inspectors also independently examined portions of the bolting hardware, pump casing, and pump columns removed from the 'C' ESW pump and the '2B' RHR service water pump that were stored in the maintenance shop.

Susquehanna staff identified the decrease in differential pressure measured during pump testing was due to degraded bolting which led to the separation of the pump's flanged connection between the bottom column to top casing and protrusion of the supporting O-ring. Susquehanna staff determined the cause was the corrosion susceptibility of the carbon steel bolting in a raw water environment. Additionally, Susquehanna staff determined the corrosion was accelerated by galvanic interactions with silt, copper "never-seize" lubrication applied to the bolts, and alloy steel. As part of the extent of condition, Susquehanna staff considered all the pumps submerged in raw water at the plant and narrowed their review to the ESW pumps and RHR service water pumps because they were exposed to the same water environment (i.e. spray pond) with carbon steel hardware. Susquehanna staff removed the '2B' RHR service water pump from service in December 2019, which was the next pump in service for the longest period to that point and performed an inspection to determine if a similar issue existed. Susquehanna planned additional corrective actions to review and update work orders with the appropriate use of never-seize compounds; review various corrosion prevention options with the pump vendor; develop a technical decision-making document to establish an appropriate frequency for pump overhauls; and if necessary, revise their cause evaluation based on further activities.

Based on direct observations of the removed hardware and a review of pictures from other pump overhauls, the inspectors did not conclude the copper "never-seize" lubrication accelerated the corrosion because the threads of the bolts and nuts where the lubrication was applied were largely unaffected while significant corrosion was present on the exposed surfaces of the hardware where there was no lubrication. The inspectors discussed this with Susquehanna engineering staff and acknowledged that further analysis by a laboratory and discussions with the pump vendor were in progress. The inspectors noted that there is an open corrective action to revisit the cause evaluation based on the inspection results of the '2B' RHR service water pump, which is scheduled to be completed by June 2020. The inspectors determined Susquehanna's overall and ongoing response to the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and included appropriate corrective actions.

However, during a review of the preventative maintenance strategy for the ESW pump, the inspectors identified that Susquehanna staff changed the frequency of pump overhauls from 10 years to 12 years as documented in AR-2018-12840, dated December 5, 2018. Procedure NDAP-QA-0415, Susquehanna Preventative Maintenance Program, Revision 10, requires the staff to evaluate applicable operating experience from past failures, vendor manual recommendations, and maintenance feedback. The inspectors reviewed previous work orders and pictures from overhauls on the other ESW pumps and identified that the 'A', 'B'

and ‘D’ pumps displayed significant degradation after being in-service beyond 10 years. Susquehanna staff documented severe corrosion of the pump hardware in a condition report for each of the occurrences, but they did not utilize this information in their decision to extend the overhaul frequency to 12 years.

The failure to properly consider plant operating experience when changing the preventative maintenance frequency was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, “Additional Issue Screening Guidance,” because none of the screening questions were met. Specifically, the preventative maintenance change was a procedural error that did not result in the failure of the pump.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On April 17, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. Kevin Cimorelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.05	Fire Plans	FP-013-236	"E" Diesel Generator Building Fire Zone 0-41E Elevation 656'-6", 675'-6", 708'-0"	Revision 7
		FP-113-103	HPCI Pump Room fire zone 1-1C Elevation 645'-0"	Revision 5
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	AR-2020-00430	Provide Engineering Input to Support Reportability Evaluation for CR-2019-15165	01/06/2020
		CR-2020-01315	LISB212N024B SW1A Drift Trend	01/27/2020
	Miscellaneous	NSEP-AD-0413D-1, Attachment G	Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Cause Determination	12/18/2019
	Work Orders	WO 2303297	Quarterly Calibration – Reactor Vessel Water Level Channels	02/27/2020
71111.13	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2020-00750	NRC comment relating to protected equipment postings	01/13/2020
		CR-2020-00820	NRC comment relating to protected equipment postings	01/14/2020
71111.15	Calculations	EC-PIPE-0799	RHR Service Water and ESW Inspection Thickness Evaluations	Revision 2
	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2019-15165	LIS-B21-2N024B SW#1A As Found reading was out of acceptance criteria during SI-280-305	12/03/2019
		CR-2020-02144	WO 2128103 after prepping the HRC-3 piping for welding a crack like indication was found	02/11/2020
71111.19	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2020-02366	SDV drain valve XV247F011A remained closing during U2 scram	02/14/2020
	Procedures	SO-255-002	Quarterly SDV Vent and Drain Valves Operability Check	Revision 21
71111.20	Procedures	SO-200-011	Reactor Vessel Temperature and Pressure Recording	Revision 28
71111.22	Corrective Action Documents	AR-2020-04494	Document Alternate Methodology for Satisfying Acceptance Criteria under SO-124-117	03/31/2020
		CR-2020-04496	Continuity was not lost as expected at the 1C222 Panel while performing SO-124-117	03/31/2020
		CR-2020-04497	During Loca loop testing DG recorders failed to record data needed for acceptance criteria	03/31/2020
	Procedures	ON-4KV-101	Loss of 4KV Bus	Revision 6

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		ON-4KV-101	Loss of 4KV Bus	Revision 6
		SO-124-117	Unit 1 Division 1 Diesel Generator LOCA LOOP Test	Revision 5
		SO-124-117	Unit 1 Division 1 Diesel Generator LOCA LOOP Test (Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution)	Revision 5
		SO-149-019	On-Line Functional Test of RHR Loop A, Common, CIG, and SRVs at 1C210B	Revision 2
		SO-249-B02	Quarterly RHR System Flow Verification Div II	Revision 28
71124.01	Corrective Action Documents	CR 2019 10684	Area Contamination Report (ACR)	
		CR 2019 12560	ACR U2 'B" RHR	
		CR 2019 13489	ACR Radwaste 660'	
		CR 2019 13731	ACR Unit 2 Reactor Building 645' RCIC	
		CR 2019 15229	Stop Work	
		CR 2019 15230	ACR Reactor Building 670' Floor Drain	
		CR 2019 15234	ACR Unit 1 Reactor Building 670'	
		CR 2019 15695	Stop Work	
		CR 2020 00414	Liquid Radioactive Waste Collection Tanks OP 302	
		CR 2020 00509	Valve Miss-position Liquid Radioactive Waste Effluent Monitor	
	Radiation Surveys	Unit 1	Reactor Building 799'	12/6/2019 1329
		Unit 1	Reactor Building 779'	11/7/2019 0840
		Unit 1	Reactor Building 749/762'	11/26/2019 1000
		Unit 1	Reactor Building 719'	10/28/2019 1405
		Unit 1	Reactor Building 683'	10/29/2019 1251
		Unit 2	Reactor Building 799'	12/6/2019 0815
		Unit 2	Reactor Building 779'	11/7/2019 1118
		Unit 2	Reactor Building 749/763'	12/6/2019 0845

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		Unit 2	Reactor Building 719'	11/26/2019 1240
		Unit 2	Reactor Building 683'	11/15/2019 1200
		Unit 2	Reactor Building 670'	11/7/2019 1015
		Unit 2	Reactor Building 645'	11/19/2019 1530
		Unit 2	Reactor Building 645' RCIC	12/6/2019 0300
		Unit 2	Reactor Building 645' 'B' RHR	12/6/2019 0819
		Unit 2	Reactor Building 645' HPIC	12/6/2019 0300
71124.04	Corrective Action Documents	CR 2019 15625	Electronic Dosimeter Dose Rate Alarm	
71152	Corrective Action Documents	CR-1518508		
		CR-1738058		
		CR-2014-26980		
		CR-2019-12789		
		CR-2020-00965		
		CR-2020-01129		
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2020-01495	NRC inspector identified a potential gap between the adjustment plate and the coupling on 0P504D	01/30/2020
		CR-2020-02289	NRC notified WCC of a Rad trash bin in U1 683' equipment space with trash above the arresting lid	02/12/2020
		CR-2020-02591	NRC walk down of B DG area	02/19/2020
		CR-2020-03888	NRC concern regarding DR 174 being unlocked	03/17/2020
	Work Orders	1948157		
		2139300		
71153	Corrective Action Documents	CR-2020-02350	U2 RPS Div 1 logic failed to reset post scram	02/14/2020
		CR-2020-02354	During U2 loss of RCB transient ~75% of radio comms were	02/14/2020

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			not received in the main control room	
		CR-2020-02366	SDV drain valve XV247F011A remained closed during U2 SCRAM	02/14/2020
		CR-2020-02374	U2 Control rod 54-23 declared slow following performance of SR-255-004 for plant scram	02/14/2020
		CR-2020-02411	Continued U2 CRD Accumulator trouble alarms from U2 42-23	02/15/2020
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-2020-02404	NRC Question related to CR-2020-02305 U2 RPS Div 1 logic failed to reset post scram	02/14/2020
	Miscellaneous	OP-AD-327 Attachment A	Post Event Review Report for event # SC-02-20-01	02/14/2020
		OP-AD-327 Attachment C	RPS Performance Review	02/14/2020