

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report No. 50-219/85-16

Docket No. 50-219

License No. DPR-16

Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation


100 Interpace Parkway

Parsippany, New York 07054

Facility Name: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection At: Forked River, New Jersey

Inspection Conducted: May 14, 1985

Inspector:  6/10/85
Jack M. Dunlap, Physical Security Inspector date

Approved by:  6/1/85
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section date

Inspection Summary: Special, unannounced physical security inspection on May 14, 1985 (Inspection Report No. 50-219/85-16) of an event involving lost security badges which came to the attention of licensee management on February 14, 1985.

Areas Inspected: Access control-personnel. The inspection involved a total of 6 hours onsite by one region-based inspector.

Results: Two apparent violations involving personnel access requirements and one apparent violation of NRC reporting requirements were identified related to the event.

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DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

- *P. B. Fiedler, Vice President/Director, Oyster Creek
- *J. J. Burton, Deputy Director, Oyster Creek
- *B. Hohman, Licensing Engineer
- D. Long, Supervisor, Security
- *J. F. Wechselberger, Resident Inspector, NRC

*Present at the exit interview.

The inspector also interviewed various members of the security force.

2. 30703-Exit Interview

At the conclusion of the inspection on May 14, 1985, the inspector met with licensee representatives to review the purpose of the inspection and to present the findings. At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.

3. Background

The licensee advised the resident inspector on February 13, 1985, that processing of a plant employee's thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) for January, 1985, revealed a radiation exposure in excess of the individual's self reading dosimeter record for the same period. When the licensee investigated the high exposure, it was determined that the employee lost his TLD, photo ID badge, and key card on January 16, 1985, in the area of the fuel pool cooling pumps (a high radiation area) in the plant and did not retrieve them until about three days later. He also did not report the loss of his TLD to the radcon department or the loss of his photo ID badge and key card to the security department in accordance with plant procedures. The resident inspector was made aware of the loss of the security badges on February 14, 1985.

On May 14, 1985, an NRC region based security inspector interviewed Oyster Creek security department personnel and obtained the details of the event as documented in this report.

4. MC 81070 - Access Control (Personnel)

On January 16, 1985, at about 4:30 p.m., a regular plant employee, who had lost his TLD, photo ID badge, and key card within the plant earlier in the day, exited the plant's protected area (PA). His method of exit through the PA exit turnstile is unknown, since his key card, needed to activate the turnstile, was not in his possession at the time. He did not report the loss of the TLD, photo ID badge, or key card to anyone, either during the day or upon leaving the plant. The employee returned to the plant about midnight on January 18, 1985, with another regular plant employee.

He requested his employee badge (with key card attached) and, when it could not be located by the security officer (badging clerk), he was processed into the plant as a visitor, utilizing the other employee as an escort. According to a plant security supervisor, the security officer apparently assumed that the badge had been misplaced in the badge rack.

The two employees entered the plant PA and, after arriving at their work station, informed their foreman of the lost items. The foreman advised the escort to look for the items in the area where they were believed to have been lost. The employee with the visitor's badge remained with the foreman while the search took place. The lost items were found and returned to the employee to whom they were originally issued. The employee then returned to the north gate without his escort and clocked out of the PA through the turnstile at 1:23 a.m., January 19, 1985. He returned the visitor badge to the badge clerk and then re-entered the PA at 1:25 a.m. through the turnstile.

Employees whose badge cannot be located in the badge rack, as described above, are issued a visitor badge to expedite their access to the site, utilizing another employee as an escort. Licensee procedures (such as Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Procedure Nos. 1101 and 1114) provide instructions on the badging and escorting of visitors and on recordkeeping requirements associated with the process. Employees are not visitors, yet they are subject to the same access restrictions when it is necessary to issue them temporary badges. The inspector determined, for example, that the following restrictions would apply to an employee being issued a visitor badge:

- Approval of a GPU Systems Supervisor responsible for the area to be visited must be obtained, since site protection officers do not have authority to grant access to visitors.
- Visitors must be escorted at all times while within the protected area.
- When visitors are turned over to another escort, the new escort must read and sign the visitor registration form that must accompany each visitor.

10 CFR 73.55(b)(3) requires a nuclear power reactor licensee to have a management system which provides for implementation and enforcement of security procedures. For Oyster Creek, this management system is described in the Oyster Creek Physical Security Plan and implemented through Oyster Creek Nuclear Generation Station Procedures.

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Additionally, the foreman did not properly instruct the employee regarding his responsibility to report the lost items, nor did the foreman report the incident himself. The training of supervisory personnel in this responsibility is an inspector follow-up item. (50-219/85-16-02)

The employee stated during an interview conducted by the licensee on February 15, 1985, that he believed he lost the items at about 10:30 a.m. while working around the fuel pool cooling pumps. He exited the PA at approximately 4:30 p.m. the same day. During the elapsed six hours, he did not display his photo ID badge, as required by the security plan, and neither he nor any other employee reported this fact to the licensee. The coverage of employee security responsibilities in the licensee's general employee training program will be reviewed in a future inspection and is an inspector follow-up item. (50-219/85-16-03)

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5. MC81038 - Records and Reports

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