

PDR

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III  
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD  
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

April 8, 1976

K. V. Seyfrit, Chief, Reactor Technical Assistance Branch  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Headquarters  
THRU: *[Signature]* G. Fiorelli, Chief, Reactor Operations and  
Nuclear Support Branch

NORTHERN STATES POWER (MONTICELLO)  
DOCKET NO. 50-263  
BWR REFUELING BRIDGE

The attached memorandum from Mr. Hunter of this office identifies a potential for fuel damage by operator error in either the reactor cavity or fuel pool of GE BWRs. In the specific instance identified, a new fuel assembly was damaged, therefore, there were no radiological consequences.

It is recognized that the consequences of fuel damage resulting from excessive movement of the refueling bridge and/or trolley while withdrawing or inserting an irradiated fuel assembly are within the refueling accident analysis. Our concern is that the probability of damage due to operator error may be higher than we should accept. Refueling bridge and trolley drives in Westinghouse plants are interlocked to reduce the probability of fuel damage due to operator error.

As discussed with you by telecon on April 7, 1976, we request a review of this matter as appropriate. Mr. Hunter and others of this office can be made available for detailed discussion of refueling practices, experiences and interlock functions.

*[Signature]*  
E. L. Jordan, Chief  
Reactor Projects Section 2

Attachment:  
Memo, Hunter to Jordan, dtd 3/25/76

cc w/attachment:  
R. F. Warnick, Regional Coordinator  
IE Files  
Central Files  
J. G. Keppler, Regional Director  
R. C. Knop, IE:III  
W. S. Little, IE:III  
N. C. Choules, IE:III  
D. R. Hunter, IE:III