TU ELECTRIC

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Group Vice President

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS

REF: 1) TU Electric letter, TXX-4206, dated June 28, 1984 from Mr. R. A. Werner to Mr. B. J. Youngblood of NRC
2) TU Electric letter dated February 14, 1983 from Mr. B. R. Clements to Mr. H. R. Denton of NRC - Transmittal of FSAR Amendment #38.
3) Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) #6, dated, November, 1984 for CPSES

Gentlemen:

Reference 1, Item 1, provided the following information regarding reactor vessel vent line:

"In addition it was determined that no mitigation is required for inadvertent opening of a vent valve because the flow from the one inch vent line with a 3/4 inch orifice is much less than the minimum small-break-LOCA flow and well within the capacity of the charging system."

Reference 2, Item II.B.1, Page II.B-1, provided the following information regarding reactor vessel vent line and pressurizer vent line:

"Venting of the reactor vessel head is provided via a line isolated by two one-inch valves in series which vents directly to containment. The venting of the pressurizer vapor space is provided in the same manner."

The NRC staff has reviewed the above information and provided the following results of their review in SSER #6, Item II.B-1, Page 22-7, 2nd paragraph:

"In FSAR Amendment 38, and by a letter from R. A. Werner to B. J. Youngblood dated June 28, 1984, the applicant described the high-point vents for Comanche Peak. Venting of the reactor vessel head is provided by a line containing a 3/4-inch orifice and two 1-inch valves in series. The line vents directly to the containment atmosphere in an area that provides good mixing. The venting of the pressurizer vapor space is provided in the same manner."

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Based on further review of the project documents, it appears that a typographical error has been made in TXX-4206 (Reference 1) indicating a 3/4 inch orifice in lieu of 3/8 inch orifice in the 1-inch reactor vessel vent lines with double isolation valves. The pressurizer vent is similar to reactor vessel vent with 1 inch line with double isolation valves but does not require an orifice.

TU Electric requests the NRC to review the above information and clarify the information provided in SSER #6 to indicate the following:

- Both the reactor vessel and pressurizer high point vents are 1 inch lines with two ANSI Safety Class 2 isolation valves in series.

- The Safety Class 1 to 2 change is provided upstream by passive flow restrictions. The reactor vessel head vent has a 3/8 inch orifice. The pressurizer vapor space vent has a 3/4 inch connection at the Safety Class interface.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Manu Patel at (214) 812-8298.

Sincerely,

William J. Cahill, Jr.

By: D R Woodlan

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MCP/ds

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