

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

May 1, 2020

Mr. Daniel G. Stoddard Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Energy Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Blvd., Floor: IN-2SW Glen Allen, VA 23060

SUBJECT: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2020001

Dear Mr. Stoddard:

On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. On April 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. George Lippard, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.

D. Stoddard

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <u>http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html</u> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Randall A. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000395 License No. NPF-12

Enclosure: As stated

cc: Distribution via LISTSERV®

SUBJECT: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000395/2020001 DATED: May 1, 2020

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NAME	Jake Dolecki	Eliza Hilton	Katie McCurry	Adam Wilson	T. Nazario	Randy Musser
DATE	4/30/2020	4/27/2020	4/27/2020	4/30/2020	4/30/2020	5/1/2020

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection Report

Docket Number:	05000395
License Number:	NPF-12
Report Number:	05000395/2020001
Enterprise Identifier:	I-2020-001-0034
Licensee:	Dominion Energy South Carolina (DESC)
Facility:	Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Location:	Jenkinsville, SC
Inspection Dates:	January 01, 2020 to March 31, 2020
Inspectors:	J. Dolecki, Senior Resident Inspector E. Hilton, Resident Inspector K. McCurry, Acting Resident Inspector T. Nazario Cruz, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:	Randall A. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Inadequate procedures and actions following safety-related charging pump failure to start							
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting	Report				
		Aspect	Section				
Mitigating	Green	[P.2] -	71111.19				
Systems	NCV 05000395/2020001-01	Evaluation					
	Open/Closed						
A self-revealed Gre	en finding and associated Non-cited Violat	ion (NCV) of 10 CF	R Part 50,				
Appendix B, Criterio	on V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawin	ngs," was identified	when the				
licensee failed to ac	lequately prescribe activities affecting qual	ity by documented	procedures				
of a type appropriat	e to the circumstances and including appro	opriate quantitative	or qualitative				
acceptance criteria.	Specifically, after charging pump 'A' failed	to manually start of	lue to a				
degraded main control switch on November 18, 2019, safety-related Operations							
Administrative Procedure (OAP)-100.5, "Guidelines for Configuration Control and Operation of							
Plant Equipment," did not provide adequate instructions for operators to troubleshoot the							
issue and repair the	e switch prior to charging pump 'A' failing to	start again on Jan	uary 7,				
2020.							

Additional Tracking Items

Туре	Issue Number	Title	Report Section	Status
LER	05000395/2019-002-00	LER 2019-002-00 for V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.6.4.	71153	Closed
LER	05000395/2019-001-01	LER 2019-001-01 for V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.4.6.1.	71153	Closed

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." From January 1 – March 19, 2020, the inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status," and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week during which they conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, and observed risk significant activities when warranted. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In the cases where it was determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management elected to reschedule the inspection to a later date.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) Emergency diesel generator (EDG) 'B' prior to a monthly surveillance run on January 14, 2020
- (2) Service water train 'B' in preparation for an upcoming permanent modification on February 21, 2020
- (3) Emergency feedwater train 'A' with work ongoing on emergency feedwater train 'B' on March 16, 2020
- (4) Residual heat removal train 'A' on March 17, 2020

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) Intermediate Building (IB) Battery Charger Room A/B (412'), Fire Zone IB05, on February 24, 2020
- (2) Turbine Building General Area, all elevations, Fire Zone TB01, on January 27, 2020
- (3) Service Water Pump House (SWPH) Electrical Equipment Room A, Fire Zone SWPH01, on February 24, 2020
- (4) SWPH Service Water Pump Area (436') / Valve Pit Room (425'), Fire Zone SWPH05, on February 24, 2020
- (5) IB General Area, all elevations, Fire Zone IB25, on March 11, 2020
- (6) Auxiliary Building General Area, all elevations, Fire Area AB01, on March 26, 2020

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Regualification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed operations personnel during the semiannual 'B' EDG operability test after a test deficiency was identified related to chart recorder frequency readings on February 19, 2020; during maintenance test run of the 'A' EDG after issues were identified with the service water flow indications and jacket water temperature on March 6, 2020; and during response to failed pressure transmitter and associated abnormal operating procedure entry on March 26, 2020.

Licensed Operator Regualification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed a simulator evaluation that included a failed closed pressurizer block valve, tripped charging pump, tripped main condenser vacuum pump, degrading main condenser vacuum, failure of the reactor trip system, and an unisolable main steam line break on January 27, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

- (1) 'A' EDG during a series of preventative maintenance and corrective action activities.
- (2) Chemical and volume control system for maintenance rule-related analyses and the licensee's system plant health review.
- (3) Reactor building cooling units for review of past and upcoming maintenance activities to correct vibrational concerns, and for maintenance rule-related analyses and the licensee's system plant health review.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;

- (1) Yellow risk during scheduled maintenance on the turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump on January 13, 2020
- (2) Yellow risk during solid state protection system actuation logic and relay test on February 7, 2020
- (3) Elevated risk during scheduled maintenance activities on the 'B' EDG during week of March 9, 2020
- (4) Emergent work/elevated risk following loss of the digital rod position indication system on March 5, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) Condition Report (CR)-20-00131 Chiller 'B' due to leak on January 15, 2020
- (2) CR-19-04308 Core subcooling margin monitor due to 'B' train calibration failure and associated compensatory actions on February 13, 2020
- (3) CR-20-00665 'A' EDG due to air receiver tanks reduced wall thicknesses on March 11, 2020
- (4) CR-19-04191 Containment integrity due to nitrogen purge isolation valves left open on February 11, 2020
- (5) CR-20-00830 'B' Chiller due to inadvertent oil sample on March 16, 2020

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

- (1) SOP-102, "Chemical and Volume Control System" 'A' charging pump following replacement of main control room switch on January 8, 2020
- (2) STP-125.002A, "Diesel Generator A Operability Test" 'A' EDG following series of maintenance activities on March 7, 2020
- (3) STP-125.002B, "Diesel Generator A Operability Test" 'B' EDG following series of maintenance activities of March 13, 2020
- (4) SOP-211, "Emergency Feedwater System" 'B' emergency feedwater pump following electrical preventative maintenance on March 16, 2020

(5) ICP-500.019, "NI Power Range and Miscellaneous Drawers Alignment for Troubleshooting / Maintenance" - Audio count rate channel INI00034 following reinstall and calibration on February 26, 2020

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

- (1) STP-125.002B, "Diesel Generator B Operability Test," on January 14, 2020
- (2) STP-123.003B, "Train B Service Water System Valve Operability Test," on January 17, 2020
- (3) STP-136.001, "Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Operability Test," on February 25, 2020
- (4) STP-220.07, "Backup Air Supply Check Valve Test for Emergency Feedwater Valves," on February 19, 2020
- (5) STP 302.002, "Delta T-T avg Protection Loop B Operational Test," on March 17, 2020
- (6) MTP-E-50733.003B, "EDG Train B: Baseline Phase Rotation Testing," on March 13, 2020

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated licensee staff during simulator-based requalification evolution training involving a faulted steam generator and adverse containment on January 22, 2020.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) CR-19-01802, CR-19-04499, CR-19-03444 - Licensee corrective actions from three Severity Level IV traditional enforcement violations in past 12-month period

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

- (1) LER 05000395/2019-001-01, Virgil C. Summer, Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.4.6.1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19105B284). The inspectors reviewed the updated LER submittal. The inspectors determined that no additional performance deficiency or violation of NRC requirements occurred. The previous LER submittal was reviewed in Inspection Report 05000395/2019002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19225D219). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in Inspection Report 05000395/2019001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19134A300) under the Inspection Results Section. This LER is closed.
- (2) LER 2019-002-00 for V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.6.4 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19283B209). The inspectors determined that no performance deficiency or violation of NRC requirements occurred. This LER was submitted and subsequently retracted by licensee correspondence titled "Cancelation of LER 2019-002-00 for V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Regarding Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.6.4," dated January 23, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20024F545). For tracking purposes this LER is considered closed.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Inadequate procedures and actions following safety-related charging pump failure to start						
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-Cutting	Report			
		Aspect	Section			
Mitigating	Green	[P.2] -	71111.19			
Systems	NCV 05000395/2020001-01	Evaluation				
	Open/Closed					

A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified when the licensee failed to adequately prescribe activities affecting quality by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and including appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria. Specifically, after charging pump 'A' failed to manually start due to a degraded main control switch on November 18, 2019, safety-related Operations Administrative Procedure (OAP)-100.5, "Guidelines for Configuration Control and Operation of Plant Equipment," did not provide adequate instructions for operators to troubleshoot the issue and repair the switch prior to charging pump 'A' failing to start again on January 7, 2020.

<u>Description</u>: The safety-related charging pumps are relied on to mitigate an accident. When safety injection (SI) logic conditions are actuated, the charging pumps automatically start to provide high head SI into the reactor coolant system (RCS). Also, Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) require the manual start of a charging pump during certain accident conditions. For instance, operators are instructed to manually start a charging pump following an SI termination when RCS temperature or pressurizer level cannot be maintained, for cold leg recirculation in response to inadequate core cooling, and during a transfer to hot leg recirculation.

On November 18, 2019, during the performance of a surveillance test coming out of a forced outage in accordance with system operating procedure (SOP)-102, "Chemical and Volume Control System," the 'A' charging pump failed to start after the main control board (MCB) manual switch was taken to start. The licensee entered OAP-100.5, Section 8.4, "Equipment Start Failures or any 7.2 kV and 480-volt breaker malfunction." Electrical maintenance personnel were sent to investigate the breaker. As stated in CR-19-04154, electricians determined that there were no issues with breaker alignment and power was available. The electricians then requested that operations attempt to manually start the pump again. The pump started successfully. On January 7, 2020, during the performance of a post-maintenance test start in accordance with SOP-102, the 'A' charging pump failed to start after the MCB manual switch was taken to start. The licensee again entered OAP-100.5 to investigate the equipment start failure. Electrical maintenance personnel investigated the breaker and manual switch and identified that the manual start contacts on the MCB switch did not provide consistent continuity. The 'A' charging pump was declared inoperable.

Following equipment start failures, operators enter OAP-100.5 Section 8.4. This section, in part, provides the following direction:

- If possible, sequester the breaker and switch.
- If not possible, document the basis in a condition report (CR) and contact electrical maintenance to initiate a work order and a troubleshooting plan when necessary.
- If applicable, declare the component inoperable and generate a Removal & Restoration (R&R) report.

However, on November 18, 2019, the operators did not troubleshoot the MCB switch, document the basis for not doing so in a CR, initiate a work order to take additional actions, or generate a R&R. Furthermore, although not directed in OAP-100.5, a second manual start of the 'A' charging pump was performed.

OAP-100.5 does not provide adequate direction to operators following the failure to start of a safety-related SSC to appropriately determine whether sufficient troubleshooting has been satisfactorily accomplished before returning the SSC to service. Additionally, OAP-100.5 does not provide direction to operators to restart safety-related equipment if an investigation of the failure does not determine a cause. Specifically, OAP-100.5 does not provide sufficient procedural guidance to ensure a degraded condition does not exist and that all causes to equipment failure are addressed prior to starting safety-related equipment.

Corrective Actions: Following the 'A' charging pump failure to start on November 18, 2019, the licensee generated CR-19-04154. Following the 'A' charging pump failure to start on January 7, 2020, the licensee generated CR-20-00046, declared the pump inoperable, initiated a work order, and replaced the MCB switch prior to restarting the 'A' charging pump and declaring the pump operable. The licensee correlated CR-19-04154 and CR-20-00046, with actions driven via changes to CR-19-04154. Within CR-19-04154, the licensee performed an apparent cause evaluation and determined the cause of the start failure as degradation of the cover plate and start contact on the MCB switch. Also, the licensee identified similar switches to evaluate through an extent of condition and initiated actions for one-time replacement of the switch and created an action to enhance the guidance in OAP-100.5.

Corrective Action References: CR-19-04154, CR-20-00046, and CR-20-00470 Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined OAP-100.5, a safety-related procedure containing activities affecting quality, did not prescribe instructions appropriate to the circumstances with quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," which was reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors also used examples in IMC 0612, Appendix E, effective January 1, 2020, to determine whether the performance deficiency was more than minor. Similar to Example 4.c, the performance deficiency was more than minor because the 'A' charging pump was returned to service and due to the inadequate troubleshooting performed, the licensee did not identify the MCB manual switch had a degraded cover plate and corroded contacts which could have impacted the charging pump's ability to perform its safety function in a design basis event.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power." Specifically, using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because even though the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating component, the system maintained its probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) functionality because the 'A' charging pump never lost its automatic start capability and the 'C' charging pump could still be relied on to feed the A-train through manual action.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the condition in the field to determine the cause of the start failure before returning the pump to service. In addition, the condition report generated was not appropriately screened to reflect the safety significance of this issue.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states in part "activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished."

Contrary to the above, the licensee did not prescribe activities affecting quality by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances, including appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities had been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, the instructions given in OAP 100.5,

"Guidelines for Configuration Control and Operation of Plant Equipment," were not appropriate for troubleshooting the equipment failure of charging pump A which failed to manually start on November 18, 2019, and then subsequently on January 7, 2020.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation:Review of licensee corrective actions as a result of three Severity
Level IV traditional enforcement violations in past 12-month period71152As documented in Inspection Reports 05000395/2019001, 05000395/2019010,
05000395/2019004, from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019, the NRC issued three
Severity Level (SL) IV Traditional Enforcement Violations in the area of impeding regulatory
process.

The NRC did not conduct IP 92723, "Follow-Up to Inspection for Three or More Severity Level IV Traditional Enforcement Violations in the Same Area in a 12-Month Period," as a traditional enforcement follow-up inspection. Inspectors determined that the three SL IV violations were not related to each other and therefore would not warrant the follow-up review described in IP 92723. Inspectors determined that V.C. Summer / DESC understands the causes of the multiple SL IV traditional enforcement violations. Also, the inspectors determined V.C. Summer / DESC's corrective actions to address the violations are sufficient.

V.C. Summer / DESC generated a series of condition reports following the NRC's issuance of the SL IV violations. The inspectors determined the licensee entered the violations into their corrective action program in a timely manner. The condition reports (CRs) included, in part, CR-19-01802, CR-19-04499, and CR-19-03444. Additional CRs were generated to capture other observed deficiencies. The CRs contained an assortment of corrective actions to resolve the noncompliance and to reduce the likelihood of recurrence.

The inspectors reviewed the CRs and determined that there were no additional performance deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On April 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. George Lippard, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Туре	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.04	Drawings	D-302-085	Emergency Feedwater (Nuclear)	Revision 51
		D-302-221-1	Service Water Cooling	Revision 33
		D-302-222-3	Service Water Cooling, B - Train Outside RB	Revision 6
		D-302-222-4	Service Water Cooling, B - Train Cooling to RBCU Loop	Revision 4
	Procedures	ES-120	Operability or Functionality Recommendation Development	
		SAP 209	Operability Determination Process	
	Work Orders	1906897		
71111.05	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-20-00767		
	Drawings	FP1AB-374	Auxiliary Building, EL. 374	Revision 1
		FP1AB-388	Auxiliary Building, EL. 388	Revision 2
		FP1AB-412	Auxiliary Building, EL. 412	Revision 2
		FP1AB-436	Auxiliary Building, EL. 436	Revision 2
		FP1AB-463	Auxiliary Building, EL. 463	Revision 1
		FP1AB-485	Auxiliary Building, EL. 485	Revision 1
		FP1IB-412	Intermediate Building, EL. 412	Revision 3
		FP1SWPH-425	Service Water Pump House, EL. 425	Revision 1
		FP1SWPH-436	Service Water Pump House, EL. 436	Revision 3
		FP1TB-412	Turbine Building, EL. 412	Revision 1

Inspection	Туре	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or
Procedure				Date
		FP1TB-436	Turbine Building, EL. 436	Revision 2
	Procedures	FPP-022	Fire Prevention	Revision 5
		NFPA 805	Fire Protection (FP)	Revision 2
	Work Orders	1811413-001		May 29, 2019
		1816352-001		September 10, 2019
71111.11Q	Corrective Action	CR-20-00513		
	Documents	CR-20-00937		
	Procedures	AOP-401.7	Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel Failure	Revision 4
		ARP-001	Panel XCP-624, Annunciator Point 1-6, AMSAC General Warning	Revision 7
		STP-125.013B	Diesel Generator B Semiannual Operability Test	Revision 1
	Work Orders	1918041		
71111.12	Corrective Action	CR-19-01499		
	Documents	CR-19-01874		
		CR-19-01926		
		CR-20-00665		
		CR-20-00667		
		CR-20-00694		
		CR-20-00713		
		CR-20-00789		
		CR-20-00796		
		CR-19-02601		
		CR-19-03866		

Inspection	Туре	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or
Procedure				Date
		CR-19-03945		
		CR-19-04201		
		CR-20-00490		
	Miscellaneous		MRule Expert Panel (MREP) Agenda 20200220	
			MRule Evaluation for CR-19-04154	
			MRule Evaluation for CR-20-00046	
	Procedures	MMP-460.038	Inspection, Cleaning and Lubrication of Reactor Building Cooling Units XAA0001A/B and XAA0002A/B	Revision 1, Change A
		OAP-106.1	Operating Rounds	Revision 17
		SAP-0157	Maintenance Rule Program	Revision 2
		SOP-306	Emergency Diesel Generator	Revision 19
		STP-116.001	Reactor Building Cooling Unit Functional and Iodine Removal Removal System Test	Revision 7
	Work Orders	1806817 1806949 1820586 2003059		
		1912424		
71111.13	Corrective Action Documents	CR-19-03361 CR-20-00727 CR-20-00682 CR-20-00690		
	Procedures	ICP-500.026	Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) Maintenance and Troubleshooting Procedure	Revision 2, Change C
		MMP-300.015	Turbine Maintenance, Emergency Feedwater Pump	Revision 19

Inspection	Туре	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or
Procedure				Date
			TPP0008	
		OAP-114.1	Protected Equipment Program	Revision 2
		STP-345.037	Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay Test Train A	Revision 19
	Work Orders	1914629-005		
		1918095		
71111.15	Corrective Action	CR-19-02358		
	Documents	CR-20-00162		
		CR-19-04191		
		CR-19-04308		
		CR-20-00329		
		CR-20-00082		
		CR-19-03018		
		CR-20-00665		
		CR-19-01499		
		CR-18-01093		
		CR-20-00830		
	Miscellaneous	IB-6	HVAC Chilled Water System	Revision 19
	Procedures	GOP-2	Plant Startup and Heatup (Mode 5 to 3)	Revision 18
		OAP-106.3	Locked Valve Program	Revision 7H
		SAP-1800	Plant Issue Management	Revision 0
		SOP-201	Main Steam System	Revision 15G
		STP-115.001	Penetration Isolation Verification	Revision 15

Inspection	Туре	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or
Procedure		C C		Date
		STP-135.001	Post Accident Monitoring Instruments Channel Check	Revision 11
		STP-345.045B	ITM00499B, RCS Core Subcooling Margin Monitor Calibration B Train	Revision 2
	Work Orders	163122		
		1906654		
		1908952		
		1911675		
71111.19	Corrective Action	CR-19-04154		
	Documents	CR-20-00046		
		CR-20-00743		
		CR-20-00744		
		CR-20-00820		
		CR-20-00826		
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR-20-00470		
	Procedures	EOP-1.2	Safety Injection Termination	Revision 20
		GTP-215	Troubleshooting Plan Development	Revision 3
		OAP-100.5	Guidelines for Configuration Control and Operation of Plant Equipment	Revision 4
		SOP-102	Chemical and Volume Control System	Revision 25A
		SOP-211	Emergency Feedwater System	Revision 14
		STP-125.002A	Diesel Generator A Operability Test	Revision 2
	Work Orders	2000604		

Inspection	Туре	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or
Procedure		2000600		Date
		2000609		
71111.22	Corrective Action	CR-20-00147		
	Documents	CR-20-01115		
	Drawings	D-302-781	Steam Generator Blowdown	Revision 31
	Procedures	GTP-302	Inservice Testing of Valves Fourth Ten Year Interval	Revision 17
		MTP-E- 50733.003B	EDG Train B: Baseline Phase Rotation Testing	Revision 0, Change B
		SOP-212	Steam Generator Blowdown	Revision 18
		STP-123.003B	Train B Service Water System Valve Operability Test	Revision 8
		STP-125.002B	Diesel Generator B Operability Test	Revision 3
		STP-136.001	Steam Generator Blowdown Valve Operability Test	Revision 9
		STP-220.07	Backup Air Supply Check Valve Test for Emergency Feedwater Valves	Revision 7
		STP-302.002	Delta T-TAVG Protection Loop B Operational Test Critical Surveillance Test Category I	Revision 13, Change K
	Work Orders	1916665		
		1916875, Steps		
		001 and 002		
		1918065-001		02/19/2020
71152	Corrective Action			
	Documents	CR-19-03437		
		CR-19-03444		
		CR-19-01287		
		CR-19-01802		

Inspection Procedure	Туре	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		CR-19-04328 CR-19-04499		
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from	CR-20-00638		
71153	Inspection Corrective Action Documents	CR-19-02144		
		CR-19-04201		
	Procedures	MMP-406.038	Inspection, Cleaning and Lubrication of Reactor Building Cooling Units XAA0001A/B and XAA0002A/B	Revision 1, Change A
		STP-114.002	Operational Leakage Calculation	Revision 12
		STP-116.001	Reactor Building Cooling Unit Functional and Iodine Removal System Test	Revision 7