MAY 13 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. M. Allan, Acting Regional Administrator

FROM: R. W. Starostecki, Director, DPRP

SUBJECT: CY 83 SALP SCHEDULE, REVISION 2

SALP schedules were previously provided by memorandums of November 26, 1982 and Revision on January 17, 1983. Some changes have been made for the latter part of 1983. The attached schedule is marked to show the dates that are revised.

All persons who contribute to the SALP report for a specific licensee are requested to provide input to the DPRP Section Chief, through their Branch management, 25 calendar days before the scheduled SALP Board date. The material provided to Section Chiefs should be written in the SALP format. The Oyster Creek Report dated April 19, 1983 and the Susquehanna report dated April 26, 1983 are representative of the quality desired.

By separate memo, Office Directors and Regional Administrators are provided a copy of this schedule.

Richard W. Starostecki, Director
Division of Project and Resident Programs

Enclosure:
As stated

cc w/enclosure:
T. T. Martin
Technical Assistants
Branch Chiefs
Section Chiefs
Resident Inspectors
PAO

CY 83 SALP
PROGRAM SCHEDULE

Facility	Assessment Period	Input Due to Section Chief	Board Meeting	Management Meeting (Week of
Peach Bottom 2&3	3/1/82 - 2/28/83	3/17/83	5/16/83	6/6/83
Yankee	5/1/82 - 4/30/83	5/5/83	5/31/83	6/27/83
NMP-1	5/1/82 - 4/30/83	5/12/83	6/6/83	6/20/83
Vermont Yankee	5/1/82 - 4/30/83	5/19/83	6/13/83	6/27/83
Ginna	6/1/82 - 5/31/83	6/9/83	7/5/83	7/18/83
Maine Yankee	7/1/82 - 6/30/83	7/7/83	8/1/83	8/22/83
Seabrook	7/1/82 - 6/30/83	7/14/83	8/8/83	8/22/83
Pilgrim	7/1/82 - 6/30/83	7/28/83	8/22/83	9/6/83
Hope Creek 1	8/1/82 - 7/31/82	8/4/83	8/29/83	9/13/83
Millstone 3	9/1/82 - 8/31/83	9/22/83	10/17/83	11/14/83
Millstone 1&2	9/1/82 - 8/31/83	9/29/83	10/24/83	11/14/83
Haddam Neck	9/1/82 - 8/31/83	10/6/83	10/31/83	11/14/83
Salem 1&2	10/1/82 - 9/30/83	10/13/83	11/7/83	11/21/83
TMI-2	10/1/82 - 9/30/83	10/20/83	11/14/83	12/12/83
NMP-2	10/1/82 - 9/30/83	10/27/83	11/21/83	12/5/83
TMI-1	10/1/82 - 9/30/83	11/3/83	11/28/83	12/12/83
Calvert Cliffs 1&2	10/1/82 - 9/30/83	11/10/83	12/5/83	12/19/83
Limerick 1&2	12/1/82 - 11/30/83	12/15/83	1/16/84	1/30/84

* Revised schedule is underlined.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

Keating
5/18/83
~~Requested~~ Suggested to Paul Klein that Chloride content of water in area of Repair be checked and that a thorough examination of ~~Joint~~ exposed surf. be performed and documented prior to commencing Repairs.

MAY 17 1983

Docket No. 50-255

Consumers Power Company
ATTN: Mr. D. J. VandeWalle
Nuclear Licensing
Administrator
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, Michigan 49201

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter dated April 28, 1983, providing updated information relative to Licensee Event Report 83-06, including your proposed schedule for modifications to the Safety Injection Refueling Water (SIRW) tank support structure to bring the support structure into accordance with the FSAR and ACI Code.

In response to LER 83-06 dated February 17, 1983 a member of the NRC Region III staff and the NRC Resident Inspector conducted an independent inspection of the SIRW tank support structure (Reference Inspection Report No. 50-255/83-08). Additionally, the NRC Region III staff member met with personnel from Consumers Power Company and Bechtel to review their analysis of the support structure.

Based upon the updated information, the results of the inspection, review of your analysis of the existing support structure, your commitment to conduct quarterly inspections until the structure is modified, and considering the extent and number of activities already scheduled for the 1983 outage, Region III concurs with your plan to do the remedial work during the 1985 refueling outage.

We request that Consumers Power Company apprise Region III of the results of the quarterly inspection through the NRC Resident Inspector. It is also requested that the Region III staff participate in the initial quarterly inspection and a minimum of one additional inspection. Also, that the NRC Resident Inspector participate in any or all of the anticipated inspections.

The Region III staff will be in contact with Consumers Power Company cognizant personnel to determine the availability for review of the necessary procedures, work packages, and method of repair for the modifications to the SIRW tank support structure.

We will gladly discuss any questions you may have regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

R. L. Spessard, Director
Division of Engineering

cc: R. W. Montross, Manager

cc w/ltr dtd 4/28/83:
DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, R III
Ronald Callen, Michigan
Public Service Commission

OFFICE	R III	R III	R III	R III	R III		
SURNAME	Keating/lc	Danielson	Little	Boyd	Spessard		
DATE	5/17/83		5/17		5/17		

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

#8

Consumers Power Company

General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, MI 49201 • (517) 788-0550

April 28, 1983

James G Keppler, Administrator
Region III
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -
PALISADES PLANT - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-06 (SIRW TANK SUPPORT STUCTURE DISCREPANCIES) UPDATE

Consumers Power Company reported a discrepancy between the actual configuration and the as-built design documents for the Safety Injection Refueling Water (SIRW) tank support structure in licensee event report 83-06 dated February 17, 1983. Specifically, thirteen three-foot square openings and one 26 inch by 38 inch opening are present in the concrete beams as compared to the nine openings identified on the as-built documentation. Our evaluation has concluded that although the existing condition is not in accordance with the FSAR and ACI Code, sufficient capacity to resist specified loadings is maintained. Consumers Power Company also committed to provide specific information relative to the design and schedule for proposed modifications to bring the support structure into compliance with the Palisades Plant FSAR and ACI Code. The purpose of this letter is to provide Consumers Power Company's schedule for modifications. Design details will be available for inspection about June, 1983. Please identify your documentation needs so that a design review package can be prepared and forwarded to you when it becomes available.

The currently selected optimum design fix would involve relieving the stress in the SIRW tank support beams by draining most of the water from the SIRW tank and filling the eight openings in the north-south beams of the support structure with concrete and steel reinforcement bars to provide adequate shear capacity in the SIRW tank support beams. Steel reinforcing bars would be doweled into the beam webs to transfer the shear force from the existing web to the repair. Conduit and piping presently routed through the foundation would be rerouted for accessibility.Engineering design efforts are presently ongoing and currently scheduled to be complete about June 1983. Subsequent efforts include: review of the design by Consumers Power Company, the development of construction work packages, the performance of pre-outage work such as the procurement of materials, the fabrication and installation of piping and supports on the building roof, preparation of electrical conduit and wiring for dismantling and rearranging and the commencement of core drilling in SIRW tank support beams to accommodate the aforementioned dowel pins. These preparatory activities are estimated to take about 12 weeks to complete. Actual

MAY 2 1983

outage work is estimated to take 10 weeks to complete with concrete curing controlling much of the critical path because the SIRW tank must be empty during that time.

Currently we have accelerated the start date of the 1983 Palisades refueling ouatage from October 15, 1983 to August 13, 1983. This is due to the excellent plant availability that Palisades has demonstrated in the past eight months (> 97%) and our extensive outage planning effort which has scheduled all outage work for the contigency of an early start by as much as 60 to 90 days.

This refueling outage includes several projects and programs critical to the continued safe operation of Palisades such as the 10-year Inservice Inspection including the mechanized reactor vessel exams and core barrel removal and associated exams, installation of a third auxiliary feedwater pump, completion of the control room habitability modifications and upgrades, remedying the leaking safety injection bottle check valves, completing the Systematic Evaluation Program modifications as previously committed in the Integrated Assessment, and performing other significant activities including the sipping of a majority of the nuclear fuel, steam generator inspections, major turbine inspections and main electrical generator availability improvement modifications. Although complete manpower loadings for all work are not now available, it is estimated that there will be 1100 to 1400 personnel working on site during peak periods of the outage.

To allow for more detailed planning of the actual implementation of the proposed SIRW tank support structure design, to provide sufficient lead time for all materials, and to accommodate evaluating alternative engineering fixes, the merits of planning this fix for the 1985 Palisades refueling outage are extremely attractive.

In light of these considerations and based upon our detailed analyses which indicate that the existing structure does not adversely affect the health and safety of the public, Consumers Power Company is proceeding with planning the SIRW tank structural design fix as an integral part of the 1985 refueling outage. In the interim, Consumers Power Company intends to conduct quarterly inspections of the structure by a team of structural engineers. The purpose of this inspection will be to identify significant changes in structure that may have a potential for adversely affecting structural adequacy.

David J. VandeWalle

David J VandeWalle
Nuclear Licensing Administrator

CC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades

OC0483-0012A-NL02

Files

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

MAY 17 1983

Docket No. 50-255

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ATTN: Mr. D. J. VandeWalle
Nuclear Licensing
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212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, Michigan 49201

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We request that Consumers Power Company apprise Region III of the results of the quarterly inspection through the NRC Resident Inspector. It is also requested that the Region III staff participate in the initial quarterly inspection and a minimum of one additional inspection. Also, that the NRC Resident Inspector participate in any or all of the anticipated inspections.

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2pp

The Region III staff will be in contact with Consumers Power Company cognizant personnel to determine the availability for review of the necessary procedures, work packages, and method of repair for the modifications to the SIRW tank support structure.

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Sincerely,

R. L. Spessard, Director
Division of Engineering

cc: R. W. Montross, Manager

cc w/ltr dtd 4/28/83:
DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, R III
Ronald Callen, Michigan
Public Service Commission

OFFICE	R III	R III	R III	R III	R III		
SURNAME	Keating/lc	Danielson	Little	Boyd	Spessard		
DATE	5/17/83		5/17		5/17		

Consumers Power Company

General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, MI 49201 • (517) 788-0550

COPY

April 28, 1983

James G Keppler, Administrator
Region III
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -
PALISADES PLANT - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-06 (SIRW TANK SUPPORT STUCTURE DISCREPANCIES) UPDATE

Consumers Power Company reported a discrepancy between the actual configuration and the as-built design documents for the Safety Injection Refueling Water (SIRW) tank support structure in licensee event report 83-06 dated February 17, 1983. Specifically, thirteen three-foot square openings and one 26 inch by 38 inch opening are present in the concrete beams as compared to the nine openings identified on the as-built documentation. Our evaluation has concluded that although the existing condition is not in accordance with the FSAR and ACI Code, sufficient capacity to resist specified loadings is maintained. Consumers Power Company also committed to provide specific information relative to the design and schedule for proposed modifications to bring the support structure into compliance with the Palisades Plant FSAR and ACI Code. The purpose of this letter is to provide Consumers Power Company's schedule for modifications. Design details will be available for inspection about June, 1983. Please identify your documentation needs so that a design review package can be prepared and forwarded to you when it becomes available.

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8305060177 2pp

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David J VandeWalle (Signed)

David J VandeWalle
Nuclear Licensing Administrator

CC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades

OC0483-0012A-NL02

General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, MI 49201 • (517) 788-0550

February 17, 1983

James G Keppler, Administrator
Region III
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

50a

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -
PALISADES PLANT - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-06 (SIRWT SUPPORT STRUCTURA
DISCREPANCIES)

On the reverse please find Licensee Event Report 83-06 (SIRWT Support Structure Discrepancies) which is reportable to the NRC per Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(9).

Brian D Johnson (Signed)

Brian D Johnson
Staff Licensing Engineer

CC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades

OC0283-0016A-NL02

8302280365

PALISADES PLANT - 50-255

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1)

01 | LICENSEE CODE: M I P A L 1 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT: (5)

CON'T 01 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 5 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 2 0 4 8 3 (8) | REPORT DATE: 0 2 1 7 8 3 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During A/E review of the SIRWT support structure, discrepancies between the

03 support structure and as built documents were noted. Specifically, 14 3 ft.

04 square openings are present in the concrete beams vs 9 openings identified

05 on as built documentation. Evaluation has concluded that although the exis-

06 ting condition is not in accordance with the FSAR and ACI Code, sufficient

07 capacity to resist specified loading is maintained. Event reportable per

08 TS 6.9.2.a(9). No threat to public health/safety results.

09 | SYSTEM CODE: Z Z (11) | CAUSE CODE: B (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: C (13) | COMPONENT CODE: Z Z Z Z Z Z (14) | COMP SUBCODE: Z (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR: 8 3 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 0 6 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 1 | REPORT TYPE: T | — | REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: X (18) | FUTURE ACTION: X (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: [illegible] (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS: 0 0 0 0 (22) | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: N (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB: N (24) | PRIME COMP SUPPLIER: Z (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Cause attributed to failure to document construction changes in as built

11 documentation. Modification proposals are currently under evaluation wh

12 will bring the SIRWT support structure into compliance with the Palisa

13 FSAR and ACI Code. Specific information relative to modification des

14 schedule will be provided when available.

15 | FACILITY STATUS: E (28) | % POWER: 1 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS: NA (30) | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: D (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Notification From A/E (32)

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA (35) | LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA (36)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

17 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION: NA (39)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

18 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION: NA (41)

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

19 | TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA (43)

PUBLICITY

20 | ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45)

8302280283

1p

western union **Telegram**

1-00[illegible] 04/25/85
ICS [illegible]
[illegible] 04-25 [illegible]
ICS [illegible]
1-00[illegible] 04/25/8[illegible]
TLX CONSPOWER [illegible]
[illegible] CONSUMERS POWER [illegible] 04-25
PMS
U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [illegible]
[illegible]
799 ROOSEVELT ~~[illegible]~~ Road
GLEN ELLYN IL 60137

19509

312 932-2500
DC
4-25
19
1213P

[illegible]

TO: U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

W U 1201-SF (R5-69)

western union **Telegram**

CC: [illegible] DEWITT, P-26-117B, JACKSON
[illegible], P-2[illegible], JACKSON

[illegible] CONFIRMS PROMPT NOTIFICATION OF AN OCCURRENCE REPORTABLE [illegible]
[illegible], ON APRIL 2[illegible], 1985, AT [illegible], WITH SAFETY INJECTION
[illegible]
[illegible] ADDITIONAL [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] REPORT WAS [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] APRIL 2[illegible] [illegible] THE NRC [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 8505030[illegible]

APR 2[illegible]

W U 1201 SF (R5-69)

western union Telegram

VMA332(1637)(1-010530A041)PD 02/10/83 1256
ICS IPMMVIV MVN
00941 02-10 1153A CST MVIW
ICS IPMVM12
1-008831C041 02/10/83
TLX CONSPOWER JKN
141 CONSUMERS POWER JACKSON MI 12:07 EST 02-10
PMS
US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
PALISADES PLT SECTION CHIEF
799 ROOSEVELT AVENUE
GLENN ELLYN IL 60137

2/10/83
Palisades
LER

BR 12552
CC( ) ✓
3/2 932 2500
RR
2/10/83 4477

MSG # PLA259

TO: U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

FEB 14 1983

WU 1201-SF (RS-69)

western union Telegram

799 ROOSEVELT AVENUE
GLENN ELLYN, ILLINOIS
ATTN: PALISADES PLANT SECTION CHIEF

FROM: R M KRICH, PALISADES

CC: R B DEWITT, P26-117B, JACKSON
D J VANDEWALLE, P24-614B, JACKSON

THIS CONFIRMS PROMPT NOTIFICATION OF AN OCCURRENCE REPORTABLE PER TS 6.9.2.A.(2). ON JANUARY 29, 1983, OPERATORS DISCOVERED THAT THE THERMAL OVERLOADS FOR ONE ROOM COOLER FAN IN EACH OF THE ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ROOMS WAS TRIPPED, PREVENTING THE FANS FROM STARTING ON A HIGH ROOM TEMPERATURE SIGNAL. A SECOND FAN IN ONE OF THE ES ROOMS

WU 1201-SF (RS-69)

western union Telegram

WAS ALSO FOUND TO HAVE BEEN WIRED INCORRECTLY, ON JANUARY 31, 1983, RESULTING IN THE FAN RUNNING BACKWARDS. CONDITION REPORTABLE PER TS 3.3.2.F. THE THERMAL OVERLOADS WERE RESET ON JANUARY 29, 1983, AND THE WIRING WAS CORRECTED ON JANUARY 31, 19835 REPORTABILITY DETERMINED ON FEBRUARY 9, 1983. INITIAL REPORT TO NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR, J HELLER, ON FEBRUARY 9, 1983.

1251 EST
NNNN

FEB 14 1983

Consumers
Power
Company

General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, MI 49201 • (517) 788-0550

February 17, 1983

50-255/83-07

James G Keppler, Administrator
Region III
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -
PALISADES PLANT - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-07 (LESS THAN DESIGN AIRFLOW FOR ENGINEERING SAFEGUARDS ROOM AIR COOLER)

On the reverse please find Licensee Event Report 83-07 (Less Than Design Airflow For Engineering Safeguards Room Air Cooler) which is reportable to the NRC per Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(9).

Brian D Johnson

Brian D Johnson
Staff Licensing Engineer

CC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades

FEB 22

8302280386

OC0283-0015A-NL02

PALISADES PLANT - 50-255

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | LICENSEE CODE: M I P A L 1 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT (5)

CON'T 01 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 5 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 2 0 4 8 3 (8) | REPORT DATE: 0 2 1 7 8 3 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During review of SEP Topics, it was determined that following a LOCA with
03 concurrent loss of off-site and loss of either D-G, only one fan in each
04 engineered safeguards room cooler will operate. Current design logic is
05 such that one fan from each cooler is connected to alternate D/Gs. Initial
06 conservative calculations indicated that both fans in each room's single
07 cooler would have to operate to maintain the room below FSAR limit of 135°F.
08 Reportable per TS 6.9.2.a(9). No threat to public health/safety resulted.

09 | SYSTEM CODE: Z Z (11) | CAUSE CODE: B (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: A (13) | COMPONENT CODE: Z Z Z Z Z Z (14) | COMP SUBCODE: Z (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR: 8 3 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 0 7 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 1 | REPORT TYPE: T | — | REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: Z (18) | FUTURE ACTION: Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS: 0 0 0 0 (22) | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: N (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: Z (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 0 0 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Cause attributed to an apparent design deficiency which placed the ES room
11 cooler fans on alternate D/Gs. Both fans for each cooler should have been
12 on the same D/G. Preliminary evaluation based upon test data indicates
13 that one fan from each cooler is adequate to maintain required room temper-
14 ature. Notification will be provided if final analysis is to the contrary.

15 | FACILITY STATUS: E (28) | % POWER: 1 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS: NA (30) | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: C (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): SEP Review

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA

20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): NA | NRC USE ONLY

8302280393

NRC FORM 366 (7 77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | M I P A L 1 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)

LICENSEE CODE | LICENSE NUMBER | LICENSE TYPE | CAT

CON'T

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 5 (7) | 0 2 0 4 8 3 (8) | 0 2 1 7 8 3 (9)

DOCKET NUMBER | EVENT DATE | REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During review of SEP Topics, it was determined that following a LOCA with

0 3 | concurrent loss of off-site and loss of either D-G, only one fan in each

0 4 | engineered safeguards room cooler will operate. Current design logic is

0 5 | such that one fan from each cooler is connected to alternate D/Gs. Initial

0 6 | conservative calculations indicated that both fans in each room's single

0 7 | cooler would have to operate to maintain the room below FSAR limit of 135°F.

0 8 | Reportable per TS 6.9.2.a(9). No threat to public health/safety resulted.

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE Z Z (11) | CAUSE CODE B (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE A (13) | COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z (14) | COMP SUBCODE Z (15) | VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)

(17) LER RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR 8 3 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 0 7 | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1 | REPORT TYPE T | REVISION NO 0

ACTION TAKEN Z (18) | FUTURE ACTION Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21) | HOURS (22) 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED N (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB N (24) | PRIME COMP SUPPLIER Z (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 0 0 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | Cause attributed to an apparent design deficiency which placed the FS room

1 1 | cooler fans on alternate D/Gs. Both fans for each cooler should have been

1 2 | on the same D/G. Preliminary evaluation based upon test data indicates

1 3 | that one fan from each cooler is adequate to maintain required room temper-

1 4 | ature. Notification will be provided if final analysis is to the contrary.

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS E (28) | % POWER 1 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30) NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY C (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) SEP Review

1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39) NA

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41) NA

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z (42) | DESCRIPTION (43) NA

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45) NA | NRC USE ONLY

Commonwealth Edison
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690

(5)

May 24, 1983



orig+1

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
Directorate of Inspection and
Enforcement - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

A RLS
Streeter
Little
Donaldson

Subject: Dresden Station Unit 2
Main Steam Line Snubber Failure
NRC Docket No. 50-237

Reference (a): B. Rybak letter to J. G. Keppler dated May 13, 1983.

Our inspection effort needs to address our evaluation, follow-up, and documentation of matter

Dear Mr. Keppler:

As delineated in our May 13, 1983 response (Reference (a)) concerning the Dresden Station Unit 2 Snubber Action Plan the following items were to be sent to you on May 20, 1983:

1) Correlation of test data with analysis,
2) Determine why there was a mismatch and why it was not identified,
3) Provide MSIV analysis results,
4) Compare SRV test results to MSIV analyzed loads.
5) Plan for performing interference checks on the MSIV line snubber pipe clamps during the 62 day technical specification snubber inspection.

Response to items 1) and 3) is in the form of attachments to this letter which were provided by Sargent and Lundy. As stated in their test correlation report, here is an ongoing effort to determine potential reasons for the discrepancy between expected values and actual test values of the line thermal movements. It should be pointed out, however, that the growth even though different than expected do not present a safety concern. This was addressed in detail in our May 13, 1983 submittal. We will provide an update of the further investigation to resolve the thermal growth discrepancies with our May 27, 1983 submittal.

MAY 25 1983

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The results of the MSIV closure analysis indicate that the loads generated during that event are on the same order of magnitude as those measured during the SRV discharge event. Considering, then, that piping analyses are conservative and that the analyzed MSIV closure loads are on the same order of magnitude as the measured SRV loads, which were in themselves very low, we still feel that the MSIV closure event is not the cause of the snubber failure. The information which could be gained by actually performing a MSIV isolation does not justify the challenge to the plant safety systems.

In response to item 2 the Dresden Quality Control Department performed an investigation of the type of pipe clamps that were instalied with the MSIV snubbers. As stated in our May 13 response it appears that all the pipe clamps are NPS clamps, and not the required Pacific Scientific clamps. These clamps were purchased and installed by Phillips Getschow Co.

In a documentation review, it was discovered that Phillips Getschow had ordered Pacific Scientific clamps from NPS Industries. In addition, they required a "Certificate of Conformance" as Quality Assurance documentation. Their receiving documents include a Certificate of Compliance to a material specification. They had received the clamps with the assumption that they were Pacific Scientific clamps. We acquired photographs of the installed clamps that were taken by NUTECH. The pictures showed that the clamps were not Pacific Scientific. At that time, a telephone call to NPS was made to try to determine which type of clamp was shipped. NPS confirmed they had shipped NPS clamps and not the Pacific Scientific clamps that were ordered. Furthermore, they said it was a common practice of theirs to make this type of substitution.

In our opinion, there were three problems with the purchasing and receiving of these clamps. First, NPS should not have made a substitution without informing Phillips Getschow. Second, Phillips Getschow's purchase order should have required a Certificate of Conformance to a Pacific Scientific part number. Third, while receiving the clamps it should have been noted that the Certificate of Compliance did not certify that the clamps were Pacific Scientific. It only certified the material type of the clamps.

Again, as stated in our May 13 response this does not present an immediate safety concern. Non-conformance reports, however, are being written by both the contractor and our Station Construction Departments to address corrective for the specific problem and to prevent recurrence.

Finally, we committed to have a plan for checking for clamp interference during the Dresden Unit 2 62 day snubber inspection. We would like to defer this submittal until June 3 to enable us to review the results of the binding study which is due May 27 and incorporate the binding study will provide valuable information for defining the specific areas for inspection depending on the of binding postulated.

If there are any questions on the above, please contact this office. Per the action plan the next transmittal will be May 27, 1983.

Very truly yours,

B. Rybak

B. Rybak
Nuclear Licensing Administrator

lm

cc: NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Dresden w/o Att.
R. Gilbert - NRR w/Att.

Attachments

6639N

ATTACHMENT A

A forced vibration time history analysis was performed to determine the effects on the main steam header C and the associated SRV piping resulting from dynamic loads acting on the main steam piping due to Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure. Based on the information contained in the FSAR, the steam flow rate through the valve was taken as 2.45×10^6 lb/hr at a pressure of 965 psia. The valve closure from 100% to 0% flow was taken as a linear function of time and the closure time was taken as 1.8 sec (provided by Commonwealth Edison Company). The force time history was generated using in-house computer program 'HYTRAN'. The resulting piping support loads caused by the MSIV closure event are given in the attached table. From the table, it is seen that the MSIV closure loads are bounded by the SRV discharge loads. It should be noted that the SRV discharge loads given in the attached table were obtained with a relatively slow valve opening time of 280 mSec. With a faster opening time of 60 mSec for the SRV, the MSIV closure loads will become insignificant relative to the SRV transient loads.

TABLE

COMPARISON BETWEEN SRV DISCHARGE AND MSIV CLOSURE LOADS

(MS-C SUBSYSTEM)

Snubber ID	SRV Discharge Load (Valve Opening Time = 280 mSec)	MSIV Closure Load Closing Time = 1.8 Sec
	(lbs)	(lbs)
#50 2-3001C-S1 (M-564G-1) NP 27 (X-Skew)	1560	785
#51 2-3001C-S2 (M-564G-2) NP 28 (X-Skew)	1822	1514
#44 2-3001C-S3 (M-564G-3) NP 55B (X-Glob)	1617	719
#54 2-3019C-S2 (M-564G-9) NP 119 (X-Skew)	1141	149
#55 2-3019C-S1 (M-564G-8) NP 120 (Z-Skew)	632	83