MEMORANDUM FOR: J. M. Allan, Acting Regional Administrator

FROM: R. W. Starostecki, Director, DPRP

SUBJECT: CY 83 SALP SCHEDULE, REVISION 2

SALP schedules were previously provided by memorandums of November 26, 1982 and Revision on January 17, 1983. Some changes have been made for the latter part of 1983. The attached schedule is marked to show the dates that are revised.

All persons who contribute to the SALP report for a specific licensee are requested to provide input to the DPRP Section Chief, through their Branch management, 25 calendar days before the scheduled SALP Board date. The material provided to Section Chiefs should be written in the SALP format. The Oyster Creek Report dated April 19, 1983 and the Susquehanna report dated April 26, 1983 are representative of the quality desired.

By separate memo, Office Directors and Regional Administrators are provided a copy of this schedule.

King for

Richard W. Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs

Enclosure: As stated

cc w/enclosure: T. T. Martin Technical Assistants Branch Chiefs Section Chiefs Resident Inspectors PAO

8505170113 840914 PDR FDIA BARFIEL84-616 PDR

		CY 83 SALP PROGRAM SCHEDULE		
Facility	Assessment Period	Input Due to Section Chief	Board Meeting	Managem Meeting (Week o
Peach Bottom 2&3	3/1/82 - 2/28/83	3/17/83	5/16/83	6/6/83
Yankee	5/1/82 - 4/30/83	5/5/83	5/3 1/83	6/27/83
NMP-1	5/1/82 - 4/30/83	5/12/83	6/6/83	6/20/83
Vermont Yankee	5/1/82 - 4/30/83	5/19/83	6/13/83	6/27/83
Ginna	6/1/82 - 5/31/83	6/9/83	7/5/83	7/18/83
Maine Yankee	7/1/82 - 6/30/83	7/7/83	8/1/83	8/22/83
Seabrook	7/1/82 - 6/30/83	7/14/83	8/8/83	8/22/83
Pilgrim	7/1/82 - 6/30/83	7/28/83	8/22/83	9/6/83
Hope Creek 1	8/1/82 - 7/31/82	8/4/83	8/29/83	9/13/83
Millstone 3	9/1/82 - 8/31/83	9/22/83	10/17/83	11/14/83
Millstone 1&2	9/1/82 - 8/31/83	9/29/83	10/24/83	11/14/83
Haddam Neck	9/1/82 - 8/31/83	10/6/83	10/31/83	11/14/83
Salem 1&2	10/1/82 - 9/30/83	10/13/83	11/7/83	11/21/83
TMI-2	10/1/82 - 9/30/83	10/20/83	11/14/83	12/12/83
NMP-2	10/1/82 - 9/30/83	10/27/83	11/21/83	12/5/83
TMI-1	10/1/82 - 9/30/83	11/3/83	11/28/83	12/12/83
Calvert Cliffs 1&2	10/1/82 - 9/30/83	11/10/83	12/5/83	12/19/83
Limerick 182	12/1/82 - 11/30/83	12/15/83	1/16/84	1/30/84

* Revised schedule is underlined.



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

MAY 17 1983

Docket No. 50-255

Consumers Power Company ATTN: Mr. D. J. VandeWalle Nuclear Licensing Administrator 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter dated April 28, 1983, providing updated information relative to Licensee Event Report 83-06, including your proposed schedule for modifications to the Safety Injection Refueling Water (SIRW) tank support structure to bring the support structure into accordance with the FSAR and ACI Code.

In response to LER 83-06 dated February 17, 1983 a member of the NRC Region III staff and the NRC Resident Inspector conducted an independent inspection of the SIRW tank support structure (Reference Inspection Report No. 50-255/83-08). Additionally, the NRC Region III staff member met with personnel from Consumers Power Company and Bechtel to review their analysis of the support structure.

Based upon the updated information, the results of the inspection, review of your analysis of the existing support structure, your commitment to conduct quarterly inspections until the structure is modified, and considering the extent and number of activities already scheduled for the 1983 outage, Region III concurs with your plan to do the remedial work during the 1985 refueling outage.

We request that Consumers Power Company apprise Region III of the results of the quarterly inspection through the NRC Resident Inspector. It is also requested that the Region III staff participate in the initial quarterly inspection and a minimum of one additional inspection. Also, that the NRC Resident Inspector participate in any or all of the anticipated inspections.

quester Rein that Chloride content of water in area of separate thorough examination de performed and documented prior to commencing Repairs.

790

Consumers Power Company

- 2 -

.....

The Region III staff will be in contact with Consumers Power Company cognizant personnel to determine the availability for review of the necessary procedures, work packages, and method of repair for the modifications to the SIRW tank support structure.

We will gladly discuss any questions you may have regarding this matter.

Sincerely.

Word and the ser

.R. L. Spessard, Director Division of Engineering

cci R. W. Montross, Manager

cc w/ltr dtd 4/28/83: DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS) Resident Inspector, R III Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Commission

office R III	R III Danielson	R Jal	R III	RIII	
SURNAME Kencing/1c	Danielson	Little	Boyd	Spessard 5/n	
DAT 5/17/83		2/1		-7/1	*********



General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, MI 49201 + (517) 788-0550

April 28, 1983

James G Keppler, Administrator Region III US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -PALISADES PLANT - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-06 (SIRW TANK SUPPORT STUCTURE DISCREPANCIES) UPDATE

Consumers Power Company reported a discrepancy between the actual configuration and the as-built design documents for the Safety Injection Refueling Water (SIRW) tank support structure in licensee event report 83-06 dated February 17, 1983. Specifically, thirteen three-foot square openings and one 26 inch by 38 inch opening are present in the concrete beams as compared to the nine openings identified on the as-built documentation. Our evaluation has concluded that although the existing condition is not in accordance with the FSAR and ACI Code, sufficient capacity to resist specified loadings is maintained. Consumers Power Company also committed to provide specific information relative to the design and schedule for proposed modifications to bring the support structure into compliance with the Palisades Plant FSAR and ACI Code. The purpose of this letter is to provide Consumers Power Company's schedule for modifications. Design details will be available for inspection about June, 1983. Please identify your documentation needs so that a design review package can be prepared and forwarded to you when it becomes available.

The currently selected optimum design fix would involve relieving the stress in the SIRW tank support beams by draining most of the water from the SIRW tank and filling the eight openings in the north-south beams of the support structure with concrete and steel reinforcement bars to provide adequate shear capacity in the SIRW tank support beams. Steel reinforcing bars would be doweled into the beam webs to transfer the shear force from the existing web to the repair. Conduit and piping presently routed through the foundation would be rerouted for accessibility. Engineering design efforts are presently ongoing and currently scheduled to be complete about June 1983. Subsequent efforts include: review of the design by Consumers Power Company, the development of construction work packages, the performance of pre-outage work such as the procurement of materials, the fabrication and installation of piping and supports on the building roof, preparation of electrical conduit and wiring for dismantling and rearranging and the commencement of core drilling in SIRW tank support beams to accommodate the aforementioned dowel pins. These preparatory activities are estimated to take about 12 weeks to complete. Actual

OC0483-0012A-NL02

8305060477

MAY 21983

JGKeppler, Administrator Palisades Plant LER 83-06 UPDATE April 28, 1983

outage work is estimated to take 10 weeks to complete with concrete curing controlling much of the critical path because the SIRW tank must be empty during that time.

Currently we have accelerated the start date of the 1983 Palisades refueling ouatage from October 15, 1983 to August 13, 1983. This is due to the excellent plant availability that Palisades has demonstrated in the past eight months (>97%) and our extensive outage planning effort which has scheduled all outage work for the contigency of an early start by as much as 60 to 90 days.

This refueling outage includes several projects and programs critical to the continued safe operation of Palisades such as the 10-year Inservice Inspection including the mechanized reactor vessel exams and core barrel removal and associated exams, installation of a third auxiliary feedwater pump, completion of the control room habitability modifications and upgrades, remedying the leaking safety injection bottle check valves, completing the Systematic Evaluation Program modifications as previously committed in the Integrated Assessment, and performing other significant activities including the sipping of a majority of the nuclear fuel, steam generator inspections, major turbine inspections and main electrical generator availability improvement modifications. Although complete manpower loadings for all work are not now available, it is estimated that there will be 1100 to 1400 personnel working on site during peak periods of the outage.

To allow for more detailed planning of the actual implementation of the proposed SIRW tank support structure design, to provide sufficient lead time for all materials, and to accommodate evaluating alternative engineering fixes, the merits of planning this fix for the 1985 Palisades refueling outage are extremely attractive.

In light of these considerations and based upon our detailed analyses which indicate that the existing structure does not adversely affect the health and safety of the public, Consumers Power Company is proceeding with planning the SIRW tank structural design fix as an integral part of the 1985 refueling outage. In the interim, Consumers Power Company intends to conduct quarterly inspections of the structure by a team of structural engineers. The purpose of this inspection will be to identify significant changes in structure that may have a potential for adversely affecting structural adequacy.

avid & Vande Walle

David J GandeWalle Nuclear Licensing Administrator

CC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement NkC Resident Inspector - Palisades 2

Zile,



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

MAY 17 1983

Docket No. 50-255)

Consumers Power Company ATTN: Mr. D. J. VandeWalle Nuclear Licensing Administrator 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter dated April 28, 1983, providing updated information relative to Licensee Event Report 83-06, including your proposed schedule for modifications to the Safety Injection Refueling Water (SIRW) tank support structure to bring the support structure into accordance with the FSAR and ACI Code.

In response to LER 83-06 dated February 17, 1983 a member of the NRC Region III staff and the NRC Resident Inspector conducted an independent inspection of the SIRW tank support structure (Reference Inspection Report No. 50-255/83-08). Additionally, the NRC Region III staff member met with personnel from Consumers Power Company and Bechtel to review their analysis of the support structure.

Based upon the updated information, the results of the inspection, review of your analysis of the existing support structure, your commitment to conduct quarterly inspections until the structure is modified, and considering the extent and number of activities already scheduled for the 1983 outage, Region III concurs with your plan to do the remedial work during the 1985 refueling outage.

We request that Consumers Power Company apprise Region III of the results of the quarterly inspection through the NRC Resident Inspector. It is also requested that the Region III staff participate in the initial quarterly inspection and a minimum of one additional inspection. Also, that the NRC Resident Inspector participate in any or all of the anticipated inspections. Consumers Power Company

- 2 -

MAY 17 1:13

R III

Spessard

RII

Boyd

The Region III staff will be in contact with Consumers Power Company cognizant personnel to determine the availability for review of the necessary procedures, work packages, and method of repair for the modifications to the SIRW tank support structure.

We will gladly discuss any questions you may have regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

may interested

.R. L. Spessard, Director Division of Engineering

cc: R. W. Montross, Manager

R III

0/10

5/17/83

Teon.

OFFICE

DATE

SURNA

cc w/ltr dtd 4/28/83: DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS) Resident Inspector, R III Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Commission



General Offices 212 Wast Michigan Avenue, Jeckson, MI 49201 + (517) 788 0650

April 28, 1983

James G Keppler, Administrator Region III US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glam Ellyn, IL 60137

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -PALISADES PLANT - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-06 (SIRW TANK SUPPORT STUCTURE DISCREPANCIES) UPDATE

COPY

Consumers Power Company reported a discrepancy between the actual configuration and the as-built design documents for the Safety Injection Refueling Water (SIRW) tank support structure in licensee event report 83-06 dated February 17, 1983. Specifically, thirteen three-foot square openings and one 26 inch by 38 inch opening are present in the concrete beams as compared to the mine openings identified on the as-built documentation. Our evaluation has concluded that although the existing condition is not in accordance with the FSAR and ACI Code. sufficient capacity to resist specified loadings is maintained. Consumers Power Company also committed to provide specific information relative to the design and schedule for proposed modifications to bring the support structure into compliance with the Palisades Plant FSAR and ACI Code. The purpose of this letter is to provide Consumers Power Company's schedule for modifications. Design details will be available for inspection about June, 1983. Please identify your documentation needs so that a design review package can be prepared and iorwarded to you when it becomes available.

The currently selected optimum design fix would involve relieving the stress in the SIRW tank support beams by draining most of the water from the SIRW tank and filling the eight openings in the north-south beams of the support structure with concrete and steel reinforcement bars to provide adequate shear capacity in the SIRW tank support beams. Steel reinforcing bars would be doweled into the beam webs to transfer the shear force from the existing web to the repair. Conduit and piping presently routed through the foundation would be rerouted for accessibility. Engineering design efforts are presently ongoing and currently scheduled to be complete about June 1983. Subsequent efforts include: review of the design by Consumers Power Company, the development of construction work packages, the performance of pre-outage work such as the procurement of materials, the fabrication and installation of piping and supports on the building roof, preparation of electrical conduit and wiring for dismentling and rearranging and the commencement of core drilling in SIRK tank support beams to accommodate the aforementioned dowel pins. These preparatory activities are estimated to take about 12 weeks to complete. Actual

209

OC0483-0012A-NL02

X30506047

JCKeppler, Administrator Palisades Plant LER 83-06 UPDATE April 28, 1983

outage work is estimated to take 10 weeks to complete with concrete curing controlling much of the critical path because the SIRW tank must be empty during that time.

Currently we have accelerated the start date of the 1983 Palisades refueling ouatage from October 15, 1983 to August 13, 1963. This is due to the excellent plant availability that Palisades has demonstrated in the past eight months (> 972) and our extensive outage planning effort which has scheduled all outage work for the contigency of an early start by as much as 60 to 90 days.

This refueling outage includes several projects and programs critical to the continued safe operation of Palisades such as the 10-year Inservice Inspection including the mechanized reactor vessel exams and core barrel removal and associated exams, installation of a third auxiliary feedwater pump, completion of the control room habitability modifications and upgrades, remedying the leaking safety injection bottle check valves, completing the Systematic Evaluation Program modifications as previously committed in the Integrated Assessment, and performing other significant activities including the sipping of a majority of the nuclear fuel, steam generator inspections, major turbine inspections and main electrical generator availability improvement modifications. Although complete manpower loadings for all work are not now available, it is estimated that there will be 1100 to 1400 personnel working on site during peak periods of the outage.

To allow for more detailed planning of the actual implementation of the proposed SIRW tank support structure design, to provide sufficient lead time for all materials, and to accommodate evaluating alternative engineering fixes, the merits of planning this fix for the 1985 Palisades refueling outage are extremely attractive.

In light of these considerations and based upon our detailed analyses which indicate that the existing structure does not adversely affect the health and safety of the public. Consumers Power Company is proceeding with planning the SIRW tank structural design fix as an integral part of the 1985 refueling outage. In the interim, Consumers Power Company intends to conduct quarterly inspections of the structure by a team of structural engineers. The purpose of this inspection will be to identify significant changes in structure that may have a potential for adversely affecting structural adequacy.


David J VandeWalle (Signed)

David J Vandekalle Ruclear Licensing Administrator

CC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades

OC0483-0012A-KL02

Consumers Power company General Offices 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, MI 49201 . (517) 788-0550 February 17, 1983 James G Keppler, Administrator Region III US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -PALISADES PLANT - LICENSEE DPR-20 -LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-06 (SIRWT SUPPORT STRUCTUR. On the reverse please find Licensee Event Report 83-06 (SIRWT Support Structure Discrepancies) which is reportable to the NRC Der Technical On the reverse please find Licensee Event Report 83-06 (SIRWT Support Specification 6.9.2.a(9). which is reportable to the NRC per Technical Brian D Johnson (Signed) Brian D Johnson Staff Licensing Engineer CC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Nac Resident Inspector - Palisades NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades



100

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PALISADES PLANT - 50-255 IPLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 10 10 13 8 10 7 NRC FORM 366 2 01 the 01 01 CONTROL BLOCK vieer. 01 0 3 t E CONSEQUENCES 01 REPOR CONT SOURCE AND EVENT DESCRIPTION OI LDUR OB Laursont OI Leouare SUBCODE I III COMP 16 REVISION OIG LEINE COMPONENT CODE NC DI LCBEBC COMPONENT WANUFACTUR SUBCOD OCCURRENCE 10 CAUSE (13) 2101 C NEC 1 (12) CODE 18 (25) 24 2 19 HOURS LEA RO REPORT NUMBER 1 0 67 ACTIONS RE ACTION CORRECTIVE AND CAUSE DESCRIPTION L'O LCause 32 DISCOVERY DESCR المعادمة ilat 213 36 NETWOD DE DISCOVERY LOCATION OF RELEASE nen (30) OTHER STATUS 00 11 LSC ANOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 E. POVIER ... 9 STAT CONTENT 1 E TIVIT DESCRIPTION 39 (33 OSURES 16 38 DESCRIPTION -----17 PERSONNEL L 0 ANAGE TO FACILITY 1 0 AVALICITY SELECTION (3) 19 10

(1-0064846115 04/25183 IT's imposite own UINDE DE-25 D.T. O. COT MULT ICS IMMULES 乳汁療養み方面送出するに良小/こと・ほう THE CONSPORT OWN 267 Lundon RS PLACE AND MILEN M. 1015 / 155 09-25 64.8 1950 新闻客 网络帕尔特拉 医骨髓后颌 医骨髓下的 网络拉德斯 FILTERNES PLT SEC SHIET The ALMISEDERT PART Road GLEN LEXYN YN 8013. (A I HATLAND TOOLDSTATE AUGUMENTING A í. WU 1201 SF (85-69) COS A & DEWITT, F-16-1175. ACKSON 每一时,它们就能完成44日之间。 单一型第一台上的第三人称单数的现在分词 THE SECTION PROPERTY AND TRACESSORY THE AND SECTION PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE The average start for share 20, 1993, 19 alian with all the second of λ. 经济保险 计可能的 化硫化化 制度 一致 法法公司 人名法法法法意 有些 再生成熟的的现在分词有关的 医下颌的 黄疸的生产的变化,这些有些有些的变化,不是一个的是一个实际,不是不是一个人们不能能能。这些希望就是一种的话,就是这 AT IL IT THE WARK , TOL I THE WART TO FROM TO THE WART PROVIDENT ARTICLES man states have been ble The sectors 830503.5042 183 5161 NU 1201 SF 185 69

410/83 VMA332(1637)(1-010530A041)PD 02/10/83 1256 ICS IPMMVIV MVN Paliedes 00941 02-10 1153A CST MVIW ICS IPMVM12 FR 1-0055310041 02/10/83 TLX CONSPOWER JKN 141 CONSUMERS POWER JACKSON MI 12:07 EST 02-10 PMS Bh 14533 US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CC / 11:11 PALISADES PLT SECTION CHIEF 799 ROOSEVELT AVENUE GLENN ELLYN IL 60137 MSG # PLA259

TO: U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

FEB 1 4 1983

799 ROOSEVELT AVENUE GLENN ELLYN, ILLINOIS ATTN: PALISADES PLANT SECTION CHIEF

FROM: R M KRICH, PALISADES

CC: R B DEWITT, P26-117B, JACKSON D J VANDEWALLE, P24-614B, JACKSON

THIS CONFIRMS PROMPT NOTIFICATION OF AN OCCURRENCE REPORTABLE PER IS 6.9.2.A.(2). ON JANUARY 29, 1983, OPERATORS DISCOVERED THAT THE THERMAL OVERLOADS FOR ONE ROOM COOLER FAN IN EACH OF THE ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ROOMS WAS TRIPPED, PREVENTING THE FANS FROM STARTING ON A HIGH ROOM TEMPERATURE SIGNAL. A SECOND FAN IN ONE OF THE ES ROOMS



WAS ALSO FOUND TO HAVE BEEN WIRED INCORRECTLY, ON JANUARY 31, 1983, RESULTING IN THE FAN RUNNING BACKWARDS. CONDITION REPORTABLE PER TS 3.3.2.F. THE THERMAL OVERLOADS WERE RESET ON JANUARY 29, 1983, AND THE WIRING WAS CORRECTED ON JANUARY 31, 19835 REPORTABILITY DETERMINED ON FEBRUARY 9, 1983. INITIAL REPORT TO NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR, J HELLER, ON FEBRUARY 9, 1983.

1251 EST

FEB 1 4 1983

WU 1201-SF (R5-69)



General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, MI 49201 + (517) 788-0550

February 17, 1983

225/8307

James G Keppler, Administrator Region III US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -PALISADES PLANT - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-07 (LESS THAN DESIGN AIRFLOW FOR ENGINEERING SAFEGUARDS ROOM AIR COOLER)

On the reverse please find Licensee Event Report 83-07 (Less Than Design Airflow For Engineering Safeguards Room Air Cooler) which is reportable to the NRC per Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(9).

Draw D. John

Brian D Johnson Staff Licensing Engineer

CC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades

FEB 22 17

8302280386

..

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

.

NRC FOR	w 366	LICENSEE EVE	NT REPORT		
	CONTROL BLOCK		PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE	ALL REQUIRED INFORMATI	ION)
01	MITIPLATINOLO	01-101010101	ما -اماماً	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 57	LT I
CONT	60 61 DOCI	LET NUMBER	0 12 10 14 18 13		
012	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE	Topics, it was	determined that	following a LOC	<u>A with</u>
[0]3]	concurrent loss of of	f-site and loss	of either D-G.	only one fan in	each
	Longineered safemuard	room cooler wi	11 operate. Cu	rrent design 100	
	I much that one fan fr	om each cooler i	is connected to	alternate D/Gs.	Initial
0 5	i contractive calcula	tions indicated	that both fans	in each room s a	DAILERS
0 6	L cooler would have to	operate to main	ntain the room b	elow FSAR limit	of 1350F.
0 7	LReportable per TS 6.	0 2 e(0). No t	hreat to public	health/safety r	esulted.
0 18	S SVETEN CAUS	CAUSE	COMPONENT CODE	SUBCODE SUBCODE	
69			<u>z z z z z </u>		REVISION
,	TEVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	CODE		0
	1 NUMBER 21 23		21 ATTACHMENT	30 SIL	32 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
	TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT TAKEN ACTION 17 3 27 3 27 20 33 35 25 CRIPTION AND CORRECT	TIVE ACTIONS 2			
	Cause attributed to	an arrarent de	eign deficiency	which placed int	have been I
T	Cooler fans on alte			cooler should }	
1	D Lon the same D/G. P	reliminary eval	ustion based upo	on test data ind:	ICALES
		ach cooler is a	dequate to maint	tain required ro	OT LEASES
_	I ature. Notificatio	n will be provi	ded if final and	alysis is to the	contrary.
Ļ	A BEUFE HOULIGE	-	ETHOD OF	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	3
T	با الم الما الله الما ال	NA	SEP Re		••
'	ACTIVITY CONTENT	UNT OF ACTIVITY 35	I NA	LOCATION OF RELEASE	2
Ļ			45		1.1.1.1.1
D I	7 10 10 10 10 10 2 38	NA			80
-	B PERSONNEL INJURIES 13)			
Ē		NA			
-	LOSS OF OR DAWAGE TO PACILITY CONSCIENTION	D NA			
Ļ	10	1			1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2	TO	NA			80
,	8 9 10				

8302280378-

Se .. 14

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366 0 771 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION 10 CONTROL BLOCK 10 10 O LOLO LO 3 I PLAILLI OLO 0 1 LICENSEE CODE OLO12 10 14 18 13 O 0 12 117 8 310 CON'T REPORT JOL015 155 012 0 0 1 BOUNCE VENT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES LOCA During review of SEP Topics, it was determined that following a with 02 [0]] L concurrent loss of off-site and loss of either one far eac D-G only [] Lengineered safemierds room cooler w111 Cummon operate off I such that one fan from each cooler is connected Gs ternate to 8 [0]6] [conservative calculations indicated that fans each both L cooler would have to operate to maintain the room below FSAR 13=0 0 7 Reportable per TS 6.9.2.a(9). health/safety resulted No threat to public CB SUBCODE SUBCODE SUBCODE CODE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE LZI (6 105 22222 10 (12) 0 09 REVISION OCCURRENCE SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. CODE NO 10 11 0 010 171 0 REPORT COMPONENT MANUFACTURES SUPPLIER METHOD ACTION FUTURE HOURS 22 01 0 0 N 24 25 26 23 A 20 20 18) (19) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) TC design deficiency which mlaned ar:srent 1 0 Cause ettributed to an fans for each cooler alternate D/Gs Both I cooler fans [12] Lon the same D/G. Preliminary evaluation based upon test data ind cates I that one fan from each cooler is adequate to maintain. requ 1 2 if final analysis is to the Notification will be provided ature. 1 4 DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 OTHER STATUS (30) STATUS S POWER CO SEP Revi 0100 128 01 = 1 5 80 13 CTIVITY CONTENT LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) OF RELEASE RELEASED, NA NA 1 6 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39 0 3 2 3 TYPE UMBEP NA 0 1 7 .. PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) UMBER 00 NA 0 1 2 DES DE OR DAWAGE TO FACILITY 1(2) 12 NA 19 10 NAC USE ONLY SUED DESCRIPTION (1) PUBLICITY NA

Commonwealth Edison One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690

May 24, 1983

origti

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator Directorate of Inspection and Enforcement - Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Dresden Station Unit 2 Subject: Main Steam Line Snubber Failure NRC Docket No. 50-237

Reference (a): B. Rybak letter to J. G. Keppler dated May 13, 1983.

Dear Mr. Keppler:

onelson Ear inspection efford

needs to address our

the XETTER

3

As delineated in our May 13, 1983 response (Reference (a)) T mathe concerning the Dresden Station Unit 2 <u>Snubber Action Plan</u> the following items were to be sent to you on May 20, 1983:

- 1) Correlation of test data with analysis,
- Determine why there was a mismatch and why it was not identified,
- 3) Provide MSIV analysis results,
- 4) Compare SRV test results to MSIV analyzed loads.
- 5) Plan for performing interference checks on the MSIV line snubber pipe clamps during the 62 day technical specification snubber inspection.

Response to items 1) and 3) is in the form of attachments to this letter which were provided by Sargent and Lundy. As stated in their test correlation report, here is an ongoing effort to determine potential reasons for the discrepancy between expected values and actual test values of the line thermal movements. It should be pointed out, however, that the growth even though different than expected do not present a safety concern. This was addressed in detail in our May 13, 1983 submittal. We will provide an update of the further investigation to resolve the thermal growth discrepancies with our May 27, 1983 submittal.



MAY 2 5 1983

J. G. Keppler

The results of the MSIV closure analysis indicate that the loads generated during that event are on the same order of magnitude as those measured during the SRV discharge event. Considering, then, that piping analyses are conservative and that the analyzed MSIV closure loads are on the same order of magnitude as the measured SRV loads, which were in themselves very low, we still feel that the MSIV closure event is not the cause of the snubber failure. The information which could be gained by actually performing a MSIV isolation does not justify the challenge to the plant safety systems.

In response to item 2 the Dresden Quality Control Department performed an investigation of the type of pipe clamps that were installed with the MSIV snubbers. As stated in our May 13 response it appears that all the pipe clamps are NPS clamps, and not the required Pacific Scientific clamps. These clamps were purchased and installed by Phillips Getschow Co.

In a documentation review, it was discovered that Phillips Getschow had ordered Pacific Scientific clamps from NPS Industries. In addition, they required a "Certificate of Conformance" as Quality Assurance documentation. Their receiving documents include a Certificate of Compliance to a material specification. They had received the clamps with the assumption that they were Pacific Scientific clamps. We acquired photographs of the installed clamps that were taken by NUTECH. The pictures showed that the clamps were not Pacific Scientific. At that time, a telephone call to NPS was made to try to determine which type of clamp was shipped. NPS confirmed they had shipped NPS clamps and not the Pacific Scientific clamps that were ordered. Furthermore, they said it was a common practice of theirs to make this type of substitution.

In our opinion, there were three problems with the purchasing and receiving of these clamps. First, NPS should not have made a substitution without informing Phillips Getschow. Second, Phillips Getschow's purchase order should have required a Certificate of Conformance to a Pacific Scientific part number. Third, while receiving the clamps it should have been noted that the Certificate of Compliance did not certify that the clamps were Pacific Scientific. It only certified the material type of the clamps.

Again, as stated in our May 13 response this does not present an immediate safety concern. Non-conformance reports, however, are being written by both the contractor and our Station Construction Departments to address corrective for the specific problem and to prevent recurrence.

Finally, we committed to have a plan for checking for clamp interference during the Dresden Unit 2 62 day snubber inspection. We would like to defer this submittal until June 3 to enable us to review the results of the binding study which is due May 27 and incorporate the binding study will provide valuable information for defining the specific areas for inspection depending on the of binding postulated. J. G. Keppler

- 3 -

May 24, 1983

If there are any questions on the above, please contact this office. Per the action plan the next transmittal will be May 27, 1983.

Very truly yours,

B. Kylerk B. Rybak

Nuclear Licensing Administrator

1m

•

cc: NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Dresden w/o Att. R. Gilbert - NRR w/Att.

Attachments

6639N

SARGENT & LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO ATTACHMENT A

A forced vibration time history analysis was performed to determine the effects on the main steam header C and the associated SRV piping resulting from dynamic loads acting on the main steam piping due to Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure. Based on the information contained in the FSAR, the steam flow rate through the valve was taken as 2.45 x 10⁶ lb/hr at a pressure of 965 psia. The valve closure from 100% to 0% flow was taken as a linear function of time and the closure time was taken as 1.8 sec (provided by Commonwealth Edison Company). The force time history was generated using in-house computer program 'HYTRAN'. The resulting piping support loads caused by the MSIV closure event are given in the attached table. From the table, it is seen that the MSIV closure loads are bounded by the SRV discharge loads. It should be noted that the SRV discharge loads given in the attached table were obtained with a relatively slow valve opening time of 280 mSec. With a faster opening time of 60 mSec for the SRV, the MSIV closure loads will become insignificant relative to the SRV transient loads.

SARGENT & LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO

• • • •

TABLE

COMPARISON BETWEEN SRV DISCHARGE AND MSIV CLOSURE LOADS

(MS-C SUBSYSTEM)

Snubber ID	SRV Discharge Load (Valve Opening Time = 280 aSec)	MSIV Closure Load Closing Time = 1.8 Sec
#50 2-3001C-S1 (M-564G-1) NP 27 (X-Skew)	(1bs) 1560	(3hs) 785
#51 2-3001C-S2 (M-564G-2) NP 28 (X-Skew)	1822	1514
#44 2-3001C-S3 (M-564G-3) NF 55B (X-Glob)	1617	719
#54 2-3019C-S2 (M-564G-9) NP 119 (X-Skew)	1141	149
#55 2-3019C-S1 (M-564G-8) NP 120 (Z-Skew)	632	83