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May 20, 1996 Docket No. 50-352 License No. NPF-39

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report Limerick Generating Station - Unit 1

This LER concerns pressure setpoint drift of eleven (11) Main Steam System safety relief valves (SRV) primarily caused by corrosion induced bonding within the SRVs. This resulted in a condition where a common cause resulted in more than two independent trains becoming inoperable in a single safety system.

> Reference: Report Number: Revision Number: Event Date: Report Date: Facility:

Docket No. 50-352 1-96-009 01 April 22, 1996 May 20, 1996 Limerick Generating Station P.O. Box 2300, Sanatoga, PA 19464-2300

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii). This revision provides the test results of the remaining eight (8) SRVs removed during the sixth Unit 1 refueling outage. The test results for these eight (8) SRVs were received following the initial submittal of this LER. Changes are indicated by a revision bar in the right hand margin.

Very truly yours, ne DMS: cah

cc: T. T. Martin, Administrator Region I, USNRC N. S. Perry, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, LGS

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRL Form 366A) (17)

Unit Conditions Prior to the Event:

Unit 1 was in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation) at 100% power level. There were no structures, systems, or components out of service which contributed to this event.

Background:

During the sixth Unit 1 refueling outage (1R06) which commenced on February 5, 1996, fourteen (14) Main Steam System safety relief valve pilot valve assemblies (SRV, EIIS:RV) were replaced with refurbished spares. Per Technical Specifications Section 4.4.2.2, only seven (7) of the fourteen (14) SRVs are required to be setpoint tested or replaced each refueling outage.

The SRVs are Target Rock Corporation, Model 7567F, pilot operated two stage SRVs, which have a generic issue regarding setpoint drifting within the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) industry. Corrosion induced bonding of the pilot disc has been found to cause the first lift of the SRV to be above specification.

As-found testing is normally done to recertify the pilot valves for reuse. During 1R06, six (6) SRV pilot valve assemblies were sent to an offsite testing facility to provide needed spares at the Limerick Generating Station (LGS). On March 14, 1996, station Engineering was notified that the as-found setpoint tests for five (5) of these six (6) SRVs were found outside of their required pressure ranges. As-found testing of one (1) SRV was found within specification (#529). Following 1R06, the remaining eight (8) SRV pilot valve assemblies were sent to an offsite testing facility.

Description of the Event:

On April 22, 1996, station Engineering was notified that the asfound setpoint test results for six (6) of the remaining eight (8) SRVs tested following 1R06 were found outside of the required pressure ranges. Two (2) of these pilot valves tested within

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requires sp pressure se follows:	ecific setpoints tpoint results f	with a \pm 1% or the fourte	toler en (1	ance. The (4) SRVs a:	e as-f re as	ound	1	
Valve Location	Pilot Valve #	Setpoint Required		As-found Setpoint		% Drift		
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3.4.2 required at least eleven (11) of fourteen (14) SRVs to be operable, with four (4) valves set at 1130 psig, five (5) valves at 1140 psig, and five (5) valves at 1150 psig. The SRVs during the previous operating cycle were required to be within \pm 1% tolerance of these nominal setpoints. The overpressure protection system is designed to prevent the primary coolant system from exceeding the ASME Section III Level B Service (i.e., upset) limit. This limit is 110% of the 1250 psig design pressure, or 1375 psig.

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On March 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996, reportability evaluations for the two (2) separate SRV test results (i.e., six (6) SRVs and eight (8) SRVs respectively) were completed. There is no recommended method of verifying functional operability of an installed SRV during plant operation. Therefore, end-of-cycle testing is performed to determine whether the SRVs are in compliance with TS Section 3.4.2. This testing does not provide identification as to whether the SRVs may have drifted outside the TS \pm 1% tolerance during the operating cycle when the TS limit applied. It is therefore concluded that the SRVs were out of the setpoint tolerance just prior to removal and the TS actions of TS Section 3.4.2 were met.

Ten (10) of the eleven (11) SRVs were found to have setpoints out of tolerance due to corrosion induced bonding. Both incidents of SRV setpoint drift did result in more than two (2) independent trains of a single safety system inoperable due to a common cause. This report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii).

Analysis:

There were no actual adverse consequences associated with the SRV setpoint drifting since no overpressure transients occurred during the fifth Unit 1 operating cycle. Also, the Reactor Protection System and the main turbine bypass systems were fully operable during the fifth Unit 1 operating cycle and would have aided in the mitigation of a reactor over pressurization transient.

Setpoint drift would have had no affect on the Automatic Depressurization System or remote manual operation of the Main Steam System SRVs. These functions were previously analyzed by GE for the BWR Owners Group (BWROG). These functions utilize a pneumatic actuator to remove set spring pressure force from the pilot disc, allowing the SRV to open. In the event of an overpressure transient on the reactor vessel, Operation's emergency procedures and training direct the use of SRVs to maintain control of reactor pressure if normal pressure relief flow paths are unavailable.

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The generic concern of SRV setpoint drift is currently being addressed by the BWROG Setpoint Drift Fix Committee. A sensitivity study of BWR plants using the Target Rock Corporation, Model 7567F, pilot operated two stage SRVs was performed by GE as documented in Report No. NED0-22210. This study enveloped LGS and determined that sufficient overpressure protection margin existed at all plants to tolerate an upward total average setpoint drift of 10% for 14 SRVs during the limiting pressurization transient. The most severe pressurization transient event was conservatively assumed to be the simultaneous closure of all Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) with a coincident failure of the MSIV position scram signal. In this case, a reactor scram subsequently occurs on a high neutron flux signal. Since the SRV pressure setpoint data is bounded by this sensitivity study, peak reactor vessel pressure would have remained well below the 1375 psig design pressure rating, even considering the fact that SRV #504 did not lift. This analysis assumes that the SRVs would have performed as tested. Therefore, there were no safety consequences regarding over pressurization protection as a result of the eleven (11) SRVs being out-of-tolerance.

Cause of the Event:

The cause of setpoint drift on ten (10) (i.e., SRVs #504, #508, #518, #528, #534, #511, #520, #505, #501, #533) of the eleven (11) SRVs was corrosion induced bonding of the pilot disc to its seat. The corrosion arises from oridation build-up in the presence of moisture and the heated environment. The eleventh SRV (i.e., SRV #519) first lifted slightly below the acceptable limit; however, the next three lifts were within tolerance. This setpoint drift is not due to corrosion induced bonding.

Nine (9) SRV pilots (i.e., SRVs #501, #502, #505, #511, #518, #520, #528, #533, #534) which lifted at high setpoints lifted much closer to the required setpoints in subsequent lifts. SRV pilot #504 which did not lift due to severe corrosion induced bonding, was inspected with no additional damage indicated. SRV #504 was then reconditioned and subsequently tested satisfactorily. SRV pilot #508, which has the modified platinum catalyst pilot disc, was found to have a lower degree of corrosion induced bonding.

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Corrective Actions:

To resolve the occurrence of SRV setpoint drift, PECO Energy Company is currently implementing the solution recommended by the BWROG Setpoint Drift Fix Committee. PECO Energy Company has recently installed a special 'modified' pilot disc in several SRVs. The modified disc contains a platinum catalyst which inhibits the corrosion formation between the pilot disc seating surfaces. If this special pilot disc option does not resolve the occurrence of SRV setpoint drift, then the secondary BWROG Setpoint Drift Fix Committee option will be pursued. The second option is to investigate having the SRVs actuate using an automatic pressure switch. Below is a listing of the completed and future actions to address the SRV setpoint drift concern.

Completed Actions:

 During 1R06, fourteen (14) Unit 1 SRVs were replaced with certified spare pilot valves meeting the required setpoint. Six (6) of these fourteen (14) SRVs contained the modified platinum catalyst pilot valves.

On March 24, 1996, Unit 1 entered a planned outage (i.e., 1E07) and two (2) of the six (6) modified SRVs were removed and replaced with non-modified pilot valves. Currently, four (4) out of the fourteen (14) SRVs have the modified platinum catalyst pilot valves installed.

 Seven (7) Unit 2 SRVs currently have modified platinum catalyst pilot valves installed.

Future Actions:

- Seven (7) spare SRVs will be modified with platinum catalyst pilot valves for use on Unit 2.
- Three (3) spare SRVs which have the modified platinum catalyst pilot valves will be repaired for installation in either unit.

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3. Test results from the industry will be analyzed to determine the success of the BWROG Setpoint Drift Fix Committee's recommendation to utilize modified SRVs containing platinum catalyst pilot valves.

Previous Similar Occurrence:

1. 1. 1

LGS LERs 1-87-034, 1-91-015, 1-92-017, 2-92-010, 2-95-009, and 1-95-009 report Main Steam System SRV setpoint drift.

The cause of each of these events is primarily the same and the issue of resolving the SRV setpoint drift problem is being addressed by the BWROG SRV Setpoint Drift Fix Committee.