



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400  
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

NOV 13 1992

Docket No. STN 50-482  
License No. NPF-42

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation  
ATTN: Bart D. Withers  
President and Chief Executive Officer  
P.O. Box 411  
Burlington, Kansas 66839

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-482/92-14

Thank you for your letter of November 3, 1992, in response to the emergency preparedness weakness 482/9214-01 identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/92-14 dated September 30, 1992. We have examined your reply and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our inspection report. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection.

Sincerely,

A. Bill Beach, Director  
Division of Reactor Projects

cc:  
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.  
ATTN: Otto Maynard, Director  
Plant Operations  
P.O. Box 411  
Burlington, Kansas 66839

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge  
ATTN: Jay Silberg, Esq.  
2300 M Street, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20037

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Wolf Creek Nuclear  
Operating Corporation

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Public Service Commission  
ATTN: C. John Renken  
Policy & Federal Department  
P.O. Box 360  
Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Regional Administrator, Region III  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.  
ATTN: Kevin J. Moles  
Manager Regulatory Services  
P.O. Box 611  
Burlington, Kansas 66839

Kansas Corporation Commission  
ATTN: Robert Elliot, Chief Engineer  
Utilities Division  
1500 SW Arrowhead Rd.  
Topeka, Kansas 66604-4027

Office of the Governor  
State of Kansas  
Topeka, Kansas 66612

Attorney General  
1st Floor - The Statehouse  
Topeka, Kansas 66612

Chairman, Coffey County Commission  
Coffey County Courthouse  
Burlington, Kansas 66839-1798

Kansas Department of Health  
and Environment  
Bureau of Air Quality & Radiation  
Control  
ATTN: Gerald Allen, Public  
Health Physicist  
Division of Environment  
Forbes Field Building 321  
Topeka, Kansas 66620

Kansas Department of Health and Environment  
ATTN: Robert Eye, General Counsel  
LSOB, 9th Floor  
900 SW Jackson  
Topeka, Kansas 66612

Wolf Creek Nuclear  
Operating Corporation

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Program Manager  
FEMA Region 7  
911 Walnut Street, Room 200  
Kansas City, Missouri 64106

Wolf Creek Nuclear  
Operating Corporation

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DMB - Original (IE35)

bcc with copy of licensee's letter dated November 3, 1991

J. L. Milhoan, RA

L. J. Callan, DRSS

J. P. Jaudon, DRSS

B. Murray, FIPS

D. B. Spitzberg, FIPS

Resident Inspector, OPS - Wolf Creek

A. Howell, Section Chief, DRP/D

Lisa Shea, RM/ALF (MS 4503)

Section Chief, (RIII, DRP/3C)

Callaway, RIII

FIPS File

RIV File

DRP

M. Satorius, Project Engineer, DRP/D

DRS

MIS System

RSTS Operator

R. Erickson, NRR (MS 9 H15)

C. A. Hackney, SLO

RIV:FIPS <del>DRS</del>	C:FIPS	D:DRSS	D:DRP	
DBSpitzberg:nh	BMurray	JCallan	ABBeach	
11/10/92	11/10/92	11/10/92	11/12/92	

Wolf Creek Nuclear  
Operating Corporation

-4-

DMB - Original (IE35)

bcc with copy of licensee's letter dated November 3, 1992:

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~~FIPS File~~

RIV File

DRP

M. Satorius, Project Engineer, DRP/D

DRS

MIS System


RSTS Operator

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11/10/92	11/10/92	11/10/92	11/12/92	

**WOLF CREEK**  
NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION



Bart D. Withers  
President and  
Chief Executive Officer

November 3, 1992

WM 92-0179

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Mail Station P1-137  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference: Letter dated September 30, 1992 from A. B. Beach,  
NRC, to B. D. Withers, WCNOG  
Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Response to Exercise Weaknesses  
482/9214-01

Gentlemen:

This letter provides Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation's (WCNOG) response to Exercise Weakness 482/9214-01. Exercise Weakness 482/9214-01 involved delays in making initial notifications to the State and County and in activating the Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (316) 364-8831, extension 4000 or K. J. Moles of my staff at extension 4565.

Very truly yours,

Bart D. Withers  
President and  
Chief Executive Officer

BDW/jad

Attachment

cc: A. T. Howell (NRC), w/a  
J. L. Milhoan (NRC), w/a  
G. A. Pick (NRC), w/a  
W. D. Reckley (NRC), w/a  
D. B. Spitzberg (NRC), w/a

Exercise Weakness (482/9214-01): Delay in Making Initial Notifications to the State and County and Subsequent Delay in Activating Group Paging System to Activate the Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center

Response: On September 1, 1992, the day of the Exercise, at approximately 1900 CDT, Electrical Maintenance personnel were completing the performance of Maintenance Procedure MPE BA-006, "5-Year Battery Capacity Test," on Battery CS-016, the battery back-up system for the hub Computerized Branch Exchange (CBX). Following completion of the test, Electrical Maintenance personnel reconnected the battery to the battery charger while the battery charger was loaded. It is believed that a spike was generated when Electrical Maintenance personnel were reconnecting the leads to the battery which caused a transient to the Central Processing Unit for the CBX. It is believed that this spike caused the corruption of some of the data files in the CBX database, specifically a portion of the long distance dialing files, which made it difficult to complete long distance calling through the CBX. The problem then became evident on September 1, 1992, at 2038 CDT, at the start of the Exercise when the Offsite Communicator could not complete the long distance notification call to the State of Kansas. The Offsite Communicator, who did not refer to Emergency Plan Procedure EPP 01-3.1, "Immediate Notifications," was not sure of the methods available for accessing an outside line following the failure of the CBX. In addition, at the start of the Exercise, the Offsite Communicator notified Security of the Alert and requested initiation of the call-out of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). When the Security Officer also failed at getting an outside line through the CBX, he tried the direct outside line in the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS). Because this line included a rotary phone, which precludes its use in activating the Automatic Dialing System, this method was also unsuccessful. The Offsite Communicator contacted the State of Kansas at approximately 2059 CDT when an outside telephone operator was reached who assisted in completing the call. Security personnel using the microwave link to Wichita activated the call-out via the Automatic Dialing System at approximately 2100 CDT. The CBX was restored at approximately 2115 CDT.

To prevent recurrence, procedure revisions have been issued instructing Electrical Maintenance personnel to contact Communications personnel before starting the test and before reconnecting the batteries. Incorporating steps into the Maintenance procedures to contact Communications personnel during their work on the CBX will allow Communications personnel to perform diagnostic tests to ensure the operability of the system. Revisions to Emergency Plan Procedures EPP 01-1.0, "Control Room Organization," EPP 01-3.1, "Immediate Notifications," and EPP 01-3.2, "Follow-up Notifications," will be made to incorporate a reference on the notification forms to refer to the "Phone Use Instructions," contained in Section 0 of the Radiological Emergency Telephone Directory when telephone system problems are encountered. This reference to alternate methods for accessing long distance lines to the Communicators will enhance their ability to notify offsite authorities. These procedure revisions will be issued by December 1, 1992, and required reading for Communicators will be completed within 60 days of Required Reading Notices issuance. The rotary phone in SAS was replaced with a touch-tone phone on September 2, 1992. A touch-tone phone in SAS as a direct outside line will enable Security personnel to activate the call-out system in case of a CBX failure.



Additionally, the activation checklists for the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) contain steps which require the completion of tasks by or require input from ERO positions which are not required to be staffed for facility activation. This caused additional delays in activating the facilities. The appropriate activation checklists for the TSC, OSC and EOF will be revised to restructure the assignment of responsibilities by December 18, 1992. Even though the majority of the TSC and OSC positions were staffed within 60 minutes of the Alert declaration, activation was delayed because of the checklist requirements. Revising these checklists as described above will result in the activation of the facilities in a more timely manner.

The actions taken and to be taken in response to this Exercise Weakness should preclude recurrence of the delays associated with the CBX system and activation of the facilities.