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Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/4

Bases (Sections 3.4-3.10)

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PREFACE

This NUREG contains improved Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for General Electric (GE) BWR/4 plants and documents the positions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) based on the BWR Owners Group's proposed STS. This document is the result of extensive technical meetings and discussions among the NRC staff, the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Owners Groups, the NSSS vendors, and the Nuclear Management and Resources Council. The improved STS were developed based on the criteria in the interim Commission Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors, dated February 6, 1987. The improved STS will be used as the basis for developing improved plant-specific technical specifications by individual nuclear power plant licensees.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

B 3.4 B 3.4.1 B 3.4.2 B 3.4.3 B 3.4.4 B 3.4.5 B 3.4.6 B 3.4.7 B 3.4.8 B 3.4.9 B 3.4.9 B 3.4.10	REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)BBBBRecirculation Loops OperatingBBBBJet PumpsBBBBBJet PumpsCCBBBSafety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)BBBBRCS Operational LEAKAGEBBBBRCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) LeakageBBBRCS Leakage Detection InstrumentationBBBRCS Specific ActivityCCBBResidual Heat Removal (RHR) ShutdownCooling System—Hot ShutdownBBCooling System—Cold ShutdownCBBCooling System—Cold ShutdownCBBCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) LimitsBBA-42
B 3.4.11	Reactor Steam Dome Pressure
B 3.5 B 3.5.1 B 3.5.2 B 3.5.3	EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM
B 3.6 B 3.6.1.1 B 3.6.1.2 B 3.6.1.3 B 3.6.1.4 B 3.6.1.5 B 3.6.1.6 B 3.6.1.7	CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
B 3.6.1.8 B 3.6.1.9	Breakers
B 3.6.2.1 B 3.6.2.2 B 3.6.2.3	Control System (LCS)
B 3.6.2.4	Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray
B 3.6.2.5 B 3.6.3.1 B 3.6.3.2 B 3.6.3.3 B 3.6.3.4 B 3.6.4.1 B 3.6.4.2 B 3.6.4.3	Drywell-to-Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure



(continued)

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BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

¥

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B 3.7 B 3.7.1	PLANT SYSTEMS
0 7 7 9	(RHRSW) System
0 3.7.6	Heat Sink [UHS]]
B 3.7.3	Diesel Generator (DG) [1B] Standby Service Water (SSW) System
B 3.7.4	[Main Control Room Environmental Control
	(MCKEC)] System
8 3.7.5	[Control Room Air Conditioning (AC)] System B 3.7-25
B 3.7.6	Main Condenser Offgas
B 3.7.7	Main Turbine Bypass System
B 3.7.8	Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level
	opene fact ocorage foot nater ceret i i i i i i o off-of
B 3.8	ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
B 3.8.1	AC Sources-Operating
B 3.8.2	AC Sources-Shutdown
B 3 8 3	Diesel Fuel Oil Lube Oil and Starting Air B 3 8-41
B 3 8 A	De Sources Operating All D 3.0-41
0 2.0.4	DC Sources
6 3.8.5	DC Sources—Snutdown
8 3.8.6	Battery Cell Parameters
B 3.8.7	Inverters—Operating
8 3.8.8	Inverters-Shutdown
B 3.8.9	Distribution Systems-Operating
B 3.8.10	Distribution Systems-Shutdown
R 3.9	REFUELING OPERATIONS
B 3.9.1	Refueling Equipment Interlocks
B 3.9.2	Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock
B 3.9.3	Control Rod Position
B 3.9.4	Control Rod Position Indication R 3 0-12
RRQE	Control Pod OPEDARILITY Defueling
0 2 0 6	Departon Departure Versel (DDV) Versel (2001)
p 3:3:0	Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level
	[Irradiated Fuel]
8 3.9.7	Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level-
	New Fuel or Control Rods
B 3.9.8	Residual Heat Removal (RHR) High Water Level B 3.9-25
B 3.9.9	Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level B 3 9-29
	Restaut field Kenoral (King-Low Mater Level D 5.5-25
B 3.10	SPECIAL OPERATIONS
B 3.10.1	Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing
	Operation
8 3 10 2	Reacton Mode Switch Interlock Tecting
B 3 10 2	Single Control Ded Withdravel Het Chutden B 3.10-0
0 3.10.3	Single control Kod withdrawal - Mot Shutdown B 3.10-11
8 3.10.4	Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Cold Shutdown B 3.10-15
B 3.10.5	Single Control Rod Drive (CRD)
	Removal-Refueling
B 3.10.6	Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal-Refueling

(continued)

1.

BWR/4 STS



TABLE OF CONTENTS

B	3.10	SPECIAL OPERATIONS (continued)
B	3.10.7	Control Rod Testing-Operating
B	3.10.8	SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test-Refueling B 3.10-32
8	3.10.9	Recirculation Loops-Testing
8	3.10.10	Training Startups



Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Reactor Coolant Recirculation System is designed to provide a forced coolant flow through the core to remove heat from the fuel. The forced coolant flow removes more heat from the fuel than would be possible with just natural circulation. The forced flow, therefore, allows operation at significantly higher power than would otherwise be possible. The recirculation system also controls reactivity over a wide span of reactor power by varying the recirculation flow rate to control the void content of the moderator. The Reactor Coolant Recirculation System consists of two recirculation pump loops external to the reactor vessel. These loops provide the piping path for the driving flow of water to the reactor vessel jet pumps Each external loop contains one variable speed motor driven recirculation pump, a motor generator (MG) set to control pump speed and associated piping, jet pumps, valves, and instrumentation. The recirculation loops are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and are located inside the drywell structure. The jet pumps are reactor vessel internals.

The recirculated coolant consists of saturated water from the steam separators and dryers that has been subcooled by incoming feedwater. This water passes down the annulus between the reactor vessel wall and the core shroud. A portion of the coolant flows from the vessel, through the two external recirculation loops, and becomes the driving flow for the jet pumps. Each of the two external recirculation loops discharges high pressure flow into an external manifold, from which individual recirculation inlet lines are routed to the jet pump risers within the reactor vessel. The remaining portion of the coolant mixture in the annulus becomes the suction flow for the jet pumps. This flow enters the jet pump at suction inlets and is accelerated by the driving flow. The drive flow and suction flow are mixed in the jet pump throat section. The total flow then passes through the jet pump diffuser section into the area below the core (lower plenum), gaining sufficient head in the process to drive the required flow upward through the core. The subcooled water enters the bottom of the fuel channels and contacts the fuel cladding, where heat



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued) is transferred to the coolant. As it rises, the coolant begins to boil, creating steam voids within the fuel channel that continue until the coolant exits the core. Because of reduced moderation, the steam voiding introduces negative reactivity that must be compensated for to maintain or to increase reactor power. The recirculation fice control allows operators to increase recirculation flow and sweep some of the voids from the fuel channel, overcoming the negative reactivity void effect. Thus, the reason for having variable recirculation flow is to compensate for reactivity effects of boiling over a wide range of power generation (i.e., 55 to 100% of RTP) without having to move control rods and disturb desirable flux patterns.

Each recirculation loop is manually started from the control room. The MG set provides regulation of individual recirculation loop drive flows. The flow in each loop is manually controlled.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The operation of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System is an initial condition assumed in the design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) (Ref. 1). During a LOCA caused by a recirculation loop pipe break, the intact loop is assumed to provide coolant flow during the first few seconds of the accident. The initial core flow decrease is rapid because the recirculation pump in the broken loop ceases to pump reactor coolant to the vessel almost immediately. The pump in the intact loop coasts down relatively slowly. This pump coastdown governs the core flow response for the next several seconds until the jet pump suction is uncovered (Ref. 1). The analyses assume that both loops are operating at the same flow prior to the accident. If a LOCA occurs with a flow mismatch between the two loops, the analysis conservatively assumes the pipe break is in the loop with the higher flow. The flow coastdown and core response are potentially more severe in this case, since the intact loop is starting at a lower flow rate and the core response is the same as if both loops were operating at the lower flow rate. The recirculation system is also assumed to have sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal margins during abnormal operational transients (Ref. 2), which are analyzed in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.

(continued)

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PASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) A plant specific LOCA analysis has been performed assuming only one operating recirculation loop. This analysis has demonstrated that, in the event of a LOCA caused by a pipe break in the operating recirculation loop, the Emergency Core Cooling System response will provide adequate core cooling, provided the APLHGR requirements are modified accordingly (Ref. 3).

The transient analyses of Chapter 15 of the FSAR have also been performed for single recirculation loop operation (Ref. 3) and demonstrate sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintair fuel thermal margins during the abnormal operational transients analyzed provided the MCPR requirements are modified. During single recirculation loop operation, modification to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) average power range monitor (APRM) instrument setpoints is also required to account for the different relationships between recirculation drive flow and :eactor core flow. The APLHGR and MCPR setpoints for single loop operation are specified in the COLR. The APRM flow biased simulated THERMAL POWER setpoint is in LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation."

Recirculation loops operating satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

Two recirculation loops are required to be in operation with their flows matched within the limits specified in SR 3.4.1.1 to ensure that during a LOCA caused by a break of the piping of one recirculation loop the assumptions of the LOCA analysis are satisfied. With the limits specified in SR 3.4.1.1 not met, the recirculation loop with the lower flow must be considered not in operation. With only one recirculation loop in operation, modifications to the required APLHGR limits (LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER KATIO (MCPR)"), and APRM Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power—High setpoint (LCO 3.3.1.1) may be applied to allow continued operation consistent with the assumptions of Reference 3.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, requirements for operation of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System are necessary since there is considerable energy in the reactor core and the limiting design basis transients and accidents are assumed to occur.

In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the consequences of an accident are reduced and the coastdown characteristics of the recirculation loops are not important.

ACTIONS

A.1

With the requirements of the LCO not met, the recirculation loops must be restored to operation with matched flows within 24 hours. A recirculation loop is considered not in operation when the pump in that loop is idle or when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than required limits. The loop with the lower flow must be considered not in operation. Should a LOCA occur with one recirculation loop not in operation, the core flow coastdown and resultant core response may not be bounded by the LOCA analyses. Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable loop to operating status.

Alternatively, if the single loop requirements of the LCO are applied to operating limits and RPS setpoints, operation with only one recirculation loop would satisfy the requirements of the LCO and the initial conditions of the accident sequence.

The 24 hour Completion Time is based on the low proba ility of an accident occurring during this time period, on a reasonable time to complete the Required Action, and on frequent core monitoring by operators allowing abrupt changes in core flow conditions to be quickly detected.

This Required Action does not require tripping the recirculation pump in the lowest flow loop when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than the required limits. However, in cases where large flow mismatches occur, low flow or reverse flow can occur in the low flow loop jet pumps, causing vibration of the jet pumps. If zero or reverse flow is detected, the condition should be alleviated by changing pump speeds to re-establish forward flow or by tripping the pump.





ACTIONS (continued)

With no recirculation loops in operation or the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. In this condition, the recirculation loops are not required to be operating because of the reduced severity of DBAs and minimal dependence on the recirculation loop coastdown characteristics. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.1.1

8.1

This SR ensul is the recirculation loops are within the allowable limits for mismatch. At low core flow (i.e., < [70]% of rated core flow), the MCPR requirements provide larger margins to the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit such that the potential adverse effect of early boiling transition during a LOCA is reduced. A larger flow mismatch can therefore be allowed when core flow is < [70]% of rated core flow. The recirculation loop jet pump flow, as used in this Surveillance, is the summation of the flows from all of the jet pumps associated with a single recirculation loop.

The mismatch is measured in terms of percent of rated core flow. If the flow mismatch exceeds the specified limits, the loop with the lower flow is considered inoperable. The SR is not required when both loops are not in operation since the mismatch limits are meaningless during single loop or natural circulation operation. The Surveillance must be performed within 24 hours after both loops are in operation. The 24 hour Frequency is consistent with the Surveillance Frequency for jet pump OPERABILITY verification and has been shown by operating experience to be adequate to detect off normal jet pump loop flows in a timely manner.



Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1



BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [6.3.3.4].

- 2. FSAR, Section [5.5.1.4].
- 3. [Plant specific analysis for single loop operation.]



B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.2 Jet Pumps

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Reactor Coolant Recirculation System is described in the Background section of the Bases for LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating," which discusses the operating characteristics of the system and how these characteristics affect the Design Basis Accident (DBA) analyses.

The jet pumps are part of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System and are designed to provide forced circulation through the core to remove heat from the fuel. The jet pumps are located in the annular region between the core shroud and the vessel inner wall. Because the jet pump suction elevation is at two-thirds core height, the vessel can be reflooded and coolant level maintained at two-thirds core height even with the complete break of the recirculation loop pipe that is located below the jet pump suction elevation.

Each reactor coolant recirculation loop contains ten jet pumps. Recirculated coolant passes down the annulus between the reactor vessel wall and the core shroud. A portion of the coolant flows from the vessel, through the two external recirculation loops, and becomes the driving flow for the jet pumps. Each of the two external recirculation loops discharges high pressure flow into an external manifold from which individual recirculation inlet lines are routed to the jet pump risers within the reactor vessel. The remaining portion of the coolant mixture in the annulus becomes the suction flow for the jet pumps. This flow enters the jet pump at suction inlets and is accelerated by the drive flow. The drive flow and suction flow are mixed in the jet pump throat section. The total flow then passes through the jet pump diffuser section into the area below the core (lower plenum), gaining sufficient head in the process to drive the required flow upward through the core.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Jet pump OPERABILITY is an explicit assumption in the design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analysis evaluated in Reference 1.

(continued)



BWR/4 STS

Jet Pumps B 3.4.2

BASES			
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	The capability of reflooding the _ore to two-thirds core height is dependent upon the structural integrity of the jet pumps. If the structural system, including the beam holding a jet pump in place, fails, jet pump displacement and performance degradation could occur, resulting in an increased flow area through the jet pump and a lower core flooding elevation. This could adversely affect the water level in the core during the reflood phase of a LOCA as well as the assumed blowdown flow during a LOCA.		
	Jet pumps satisfy Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.		
LCO	The structural failure of any of the jet pumps could cause significant degradation in the ability of the jet pumps to allow reflooding to two-thirds core height during a LOCA. OPERABILITY of all jet pumps is required to ensure that operation of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System will be consistent with the assumptions used in the licensing basis analysis (Ref. 1).		
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1 and 2, the jet pumps are required to be OPERABLE since there is a large amount of energy in the reactor core and since the limiting DBAs are assumed to occur in these MODES. This is consistent with the requirements for operation of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System (LCO 3.4.1).		
	In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the Reactor Coolart Recirculation System is not required to be in operation, and when not in operation, sufficient flow is not available to evaluate jet pump OPERABILITY.		
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u>		
	An inoperable jet pump can increase the blowdown area and reduce the capability of reflooding during a design basis LOCA. If one or more of the jet pumps are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours. The Completion Time of 12 hours is		
	(continued)		



Jet Pumps B 3.4.2

ACTIONS A.1 (continued)

reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

BASES

SR 3.4.2.1

This SR is designed to detect significant degradation in jet pump performance that precedes jet pump failure (Ref. 2). This SR is required to be performed only when the loop has forced recirculation flow since surveillance checks and measurements can only be performed during jet pump operation. The jet pump failure of concern is a complete mixer displacement due to jet pump beam failure. Jet pump plugging is also of concern since it adds flow resistance to the recirculation loop. Significant degradation is indicated if the specified criteria confirm unacceptable deviations from established patterns or relationships. The allowable deviations from the established patterns have been developed based on the variations experienced at plants during normal operation and with jet pump assembly failures (Refs. 2 and 3). Each recirculation loop must satisfy one of the performance criteria provided.

The recirculation pump speed operating characteristics (pump flow and loop flow versus pump speed) are determined by the flow resistance from the loop suction through the jet pump nozzles. A change in the relationship indicates a plug, flow restriction, loss in pump hydraulic performance, leakage, or new flow path between the recirculation pump discharge and jet pump nozzle. For this criterion, the pump flow and loop flow versus pump speed relationship must be verified.

Individual jet pumps in a recirculation loop normally do not have the same flow. The unequal flow is due to the drive flow manifold, which does not distribute flow equally to all risers. The flow (or jet pump diffuser to lower plenum differential pressure) pattern or relationship of one jet pump to the loop average is repeatable. An appreciable change in this relationship is an indication that increased (or reduced) resistance has occurred in one of the jet



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SR 3.4.2.1 (continued)

SURVEILLANCE - REQUIREMENTS

pumps. This may be indicated by an increase in the relative flow for a jet pump that has experienced beam cracks.

The deviations from normal are considered indicative of a potential problem in the recirculation drive flow or jet pump system (Ref. 2). Normal flow ranges and established jet pump flow and differential pressure patterns are established by plotting historical data as discussed in Reference 2.

The 24 hour Frequency has been shown by operating experience to be timely for detecting jet pump degradation and is consistent with the Surveillance Frequency for recirculation loop OPERABILITY verification.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows this Surveillance not to be performed until 4 hours after the associated recirculation loop is in operation, since these checks can only be performed during jet pump operation. The 4 hours is an acceptable time to establish conditions appropriate for data collection and evaluation.

Note 2 allows this SR not to be performed when THERMAL POWER is $\leq 25\%$ of RTP. During low flow conditions, jet pump noise approaches the threshold response of the associated flow instrumentation and precludes the collection of repeatable and meaningful data.

REFERENCES	1. FSAR, Section [6.3].
	2. GE Service Information Letter No. 330, June 9, 1990.
	3. NUREG/CR-3052, November 1984.





B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)

BASES

BACKGROUND The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requires the reactor pressure vessel be protected from overpressure during upset conditions by self-actuated safety valves. As part of the nuclear pressure relief system, the size and number of S/RVs are selected such that peak pressure in the nuclear system will not exceed th. ASME Code limits for the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB).

> The S/RVs are located on the main steam lines between the reactor vessel and the first isolation valve within the drywell. The S/RVs can actuate by either of two modes: the safety mode or the relief mode. In the safety mode (or spring mode of operation), the spring locoed pilot valve opens when steam pressure at the valve inlet overcomes the spring force holding the pilot valve closed. Opening the pilot valve allows a pressure differential to develop across the main valve piston and opens the main valve. This satisfies the Code requirement.

> Each S/RV discharges steam through a discharge lin to a point below the minimum water level in the suppress on pool. The S/RVs that provide the relief mode are the low-tw set (LLS) valves and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) valves. In the ADS mode, valves may be opened manually or automatically at the selected preset pressure. The LLS requirements are specified in LCO 3.6.1.6, "Low-Low Set (LLS) Valves," and the ADS requirements are specified in LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS-Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The overpressure protection system must accommodate the most severe pressurization transient. Evaluations have determined that the most severe transient is the closure of all main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), followed by reactor scram on high neutron flux (i.e., failure of the direct scram associated with MSIV position) (Ref. 1). For the purpose of the analyses, [11] S/RVs are assumed to operate in the safety mode. The analysis results demonstrate that the design S/RV capacity is capable of maintaining reactor pressure below the ASME Code limit of 110% of vessel design



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

S/RVs B 3.4.3

BASES				
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	pressure (110% x 1250 psig = 1375 psig). This LCO helps to ensure that the acceptance limit of 1375 psig is met during the Design Basis Event.			
	Reference 2 discusses additional events that are expected to actuate the S/RVs. From an overpressure standpoint, these events are bounded by the MSIV closure with flux scram event described above.			
	S/RVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.			
LCO	The safety function of [11] S/RVs are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the assumptions of the safety analysis (Refs. 1 and 2). The requirements of this LCO are applicable only to the capability of the S/RVs to mechanically open to relieve excess pressure when the lift setpoint is exceeded (safety function).			
	The S/RV setpoints are established to ensure that the ASME Code limit on peak reactor pressure is satisfied. The ASME Code specifications require the lowest safety value thous to be at or below vessel design pressure (1250 psig) and the highest safety value to be set so that the total accumulated pressure does not exceed 110% of the design pressure for overpressurization conditions. The transient evaluations in the FSAR are based on these setpoints, but also include the additional uncertainties of \pm 1% of the nominal setpoint drift to provide an added degree of conservatism.			
	Operation with fewer valves OPERABLE than specified, or with setpoints outside the ASME limits, could result in a more severe reactor response to a transient than predicted, possibly resulting in the ASME Code limit on reactor pressure being exceeded.			
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, all S/RVs must be OPERABLE, since considerable energy may be in the reactor core and the limiting design basis transients are assumed to occur in			

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, all S/RVs must be OPERABLE, since considerable energy may be in the reactor core and the limiting design basis transients are assumed to occur in these MODES. The S/RVs may be required to provide pressure relief to discharge energy from the core until such time that the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is capable of dissipating the core heat.

S/RVs B 3.4.3

APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODE 4, decay heat is low enough for the RHR System to provide adequate cooling, and reactor pressure is low enough that the overpressure limit cannot be approached by assumed operational transients or accidents. In MODE 5, the reactor vessel head is unbolted or removed and the reactor is at atmospheric pressure. The S/RV function is not needed during these conditions.

ACTIONS

A.1

With the safety function of one [or two] [required] S/RV[s] inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE S/RVs are capable of providing the necessary overpressure protection. Because of additional design margin, the ASME Code limits for the RCPB can also be sa isfied with two S/RVs inoperable. However, the overall reliability of the pressure relief system is reduced because additional failures in the remaining OPERABLE S/RVs could result in failure to adequately relieve pressure during a limiting event. For this reason, continued operation is permitted for a limited time only.

The 14 day Completion Time to restore the inoperable required S/RVs to OPERABLE status is based on the relief capability of the remaining S/RVs, the low probability of an event requiring S/RV actuation, and a reasonable time to complete the Required Action.

B.1 and B.2

With less than the minimum number of required S/RVs OPERABLE, a transient may result in the violation of the ASME Code limit on reactor pressure. If the safety function of the inoperable required S/RVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time of Required Action A.1, or if the safety function of [three] or more [required] S/RVs is inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

S/RVs B 3.4.3

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.4.3.1</u>

This Surveillance requires that the [required] S/RVs will open at the pressures assumed in the safety analysis of Reference 1. The demonstration of the S/RV safe lift settings must be performed during shutdown, since this is a bench test[, to be done in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program]. The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures. The S/RV setpoint is ± [3]% for OPERABILITY; however, the valves are reset to ± 1% during the Surveillance to allow for drift.

The 18 month Frequency was selected because this Surveillance must be performed during shutdown conditions and is based on the time between refuelings.

SR 3.4.3.2

A manual actuation of each [required] S/RV is performed to verify that, mechanically, the valve is functioning properly and no blockage exists in the valve discharge line. This can be demonstrated by the response of the turbine control valves or bypass valves, by a change in the measured steam flow, or by any other method suitable to verify steam flow. Adequate reactor steam dome pressure must be available to perform this test to avoid damaging the valve. Sufficient time is therefore allowed after the required pressure is achieved to perform this test. Adequate pressure at which this test is to be performed is [920] psig (the pursure recommended by the valve manufacturer). Plant startup is allowed prior to performing this test because valve OPERABILITY and the setpoints for overpressure protection are verified, per ASME Code requirements, prior to valve installation. Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note that states the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is ≥ [920] psig. The 12 hours allowed for manual actuation after the required pressure is reached is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides a reasonable time to complete the SR. If a valve fails to actuate due only to the failure of the solenoid but is capable of opening on overpressure, the safety function of the S/RV is considered OPERABLE.





BASES	
SURVEILLANCE	<u>SR 3.4.3.2</u> (continued)
REQUIREMENTS	The Frequency is consistent with SR 3.4.3.1 to ensure that the S/RVs are manually actuated following removal for refurbishment and/or lift setpoint testing.
REFERENCES	1. FSAR, Section [5.2.2.4].
	2. FSAR, Section [15].





B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE

BASES

BACKGROUND

The RCS includes systems and components that contain or transport the coolant to or from the reactor core. The pressure containing components of the RCS and the portions of connecting systems out to and including the isolation valves define the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The joints of the RCPB components are welded or bolted.

During plant life, the joint and valve interfaces can produce varying amounts of reactor coolant LEAKAGE, through either normal operational wear or mechanical deterioration. The purpose of the RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO is to limit LEAKAGE from these sources to amounts that do not compromise safety. This LCO specifies the types and limits of LEAKAGE.

10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 30 (Ref. 1), requires means for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the source of reactor coolant LEAKAGE.

The safety significance of RCS LEAKAGE from the RCPB varies widely depending on the source, rate, and duration. Therefore, detection of LEAKAGE in the primary containment is necessary. Methods for quickly separating the identified LEAKAGE from the unidentified LEAKAGE are necessary to provide the operators quantitative information to permit them to take corrective action should a leak occur that is detrimental to the safety of the facility or the public.

A limited amount of leakage inside primary containment is expected from auxiliary systems that cannot be made 100% leaktight. Leakage from these systems should be detected and isolated from the primary containment atmosphere, if possible, so as not to mask RCS operational LEAKAGE detection.

This LCO deals with protection of the RCPB from degradation and the core from inadequate cooling, in addition to preventing the accident analyses radiation release assumptions from being exceeded. The consequences of violating this LCO include the possibility of a loss of coolant accident.

(Care

BWR/4 STS

B 3.4-16

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The allowable RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are based on the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of pipe cracks. The normally expected background LEAKAGE due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system LEAKAGE were also considered. The evidence from experiments suggests that, for LEAKAGE even greater than the specified unidentified LEAKAGE limits, the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such LEAKAGE would grow rapidly.

> The unidentified LEAKAGE flow limit allows time for corrective action before the RCPB could be significantly compromised. The 5 gpm limit is a small fraction of the calculated flow from a critical crack in the primary system piping. Crack behavior from experimental programs (Refs. 2 and 3) shows that leakage rates of hundreds of gallons per minute will precede crack instability (Ref. 4).

The low limit on increase in unidentified LEAKAGE assumes a failure mechanism of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) that produces to cracks. This flow increase limit is capable of proving an early warning of such deterioration.

No applicable safety analysis assumes the total LEAKAGE limit. The total LEAKAGE limit considers RCS inventory makeup capability and drywell floor sump capacity.

RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

a. <u>Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE</u>

No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material degradation. LEAKAGE of this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration, resulting in higher LEAKAGE. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.

0



BASES

Unidentified LEAKAGE b.

LCO (continued)

The 5 gpm of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring, drywell sump level monitoring, and containment air cooler condensate flow rate monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.

Total LEAKAGE C.

The total LEAKAGE limit is based on a reasonable minimum detectable amount. The limit also accounts for LEAKAGE from known sources (identified LEAKAGE). Violation of this LCO indicates an unexpected amount of LEAKAGE and, therefore, could indicate new or additional degradation in an RCPB component or system.

Unidentified LEAKAGE Increase d.

An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within the previous [4] hour period indicates a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be guickly evaluated to determine the source and extent of the LEAKAGE. The increase is measured relative to the steady state value; temporary changes in LEAKAGE rate as a result of transient conditions (e.g., startup) are not considered. As such, the 2 gpm increase limit is only applicable in MODE 1 when operating pressures and temperatures are established. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the RCS operational . EAKAGE LCO APPLICABILITY applies, because the potential for KCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the reactor is pressurized.

> In MODES 4 and 5, RCS operational LEAKAGE limits are not required since the reactor is not pressurized and stresses in the RCPB materials and potential from LEAKAGE are reduced.



BASES (continued)



ACTIONS

A.1

With RCS unidentified or total LEAKAGE greater than the limits, actions must be taken to reduce the leak. Because the LEAKAGE limits are conservatively below the LEAKAGE that would constitute a critical crack size, 4 hours is allowed to reduce the LEAKAGE rates before the reactor must be shut down. If an unidentified LEAKAGE has been identified and quantified, it may be reclassified and considered as identified LEAKAGE; however, the total LEAKAGE limit would remain unchanged.

B.1 and B.2

An unidentified LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within a 4 hour period is an indication of a potential flaw in the RCPB and must be quickly evaluated. Although the increase does not necessarily violate the absolute unidentified LEAKAGE limit, certain susceptible components must be determined not to be the source of the LEAKAGE within the required Completion Time. For an unidentified LEAKAGE increase greater than required limits, an alternative to reducing LEAKAGE to within limits is to evaluate service sensitive type 304 and type 316 austenitic stainless steel piping that is subject to high stress or that contains relatively stagnant or intermittent flow fluids and eliminate it as the source of the increased LEAKAGE. This type piping is very susceptible to IGSCC.

The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable to properly verify the source before the reactor must be shut down without unduly jeopardizing plant safety.

C.1 and C.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met or if pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems.



BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.4.1

The RCS LEAKAGE is monitored by a variety of instruments designed to provide alarms when LEAKAGE is indicated and to quantify the various types of LEAKAGE. Leakage detection instrumentation is discussed in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation." Sump level and flow rate are typically monitored to determine actual LEAKAGE rates; however, any method may be used to quantify LEAKAGE within the guidelines of Reference 5. In conjunction with alarms and other administrative controls, an 8 hour Frequency for this Surveillance is appropriate for identifying LEAKAGE and for tracking required trends (Ref. 6).

REFERENCES

- 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 30.
- 2. GEAP-5620, April 1968.
- 3. N"'REG-76/067, October 1975.
- 4. FSAR, Section [5.2.7.5.2].
- 5. Regulatory Guide 1.45.
- 6. Generic Letter 88-01, Supplement 1.

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.5 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Le kage

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of RCS PIVs is to separate the high pressure RCS from an attached low pressure system. This protects the RCS pressure boundary described in 10 CFR 50.2, 10 CFR 50.55a(c), and GDC 55 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A (Refs. 1, 2, and 3). RCS PIVs are defined as any two normally closed valves in series within the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). PIVs are designed to meet the requirements of Reference 4. During their lives, these valves can produce varying amounts of r stor coolant leakage through either normal operational sear or mechanical deterioration.

The RCS PIV LCO allows RCS high pressure operation when leakage through these valves exists in amounts that do not compromise safety. The PIV leakage limit applies to each individual valve. Leakage through these valves is not included in any allowable LEAKAGE specified in LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Operational LEAKAGE."

Although this specification provides a limit on allowable PIV leakage rate, its main purpose is to prevent overpressure failure of the low pressure portions of connecting systems. The leakage limit is an indication that the PIVs between the RCS and the connecting systems are degraded or degrading. PIV leakage could lead to overpressure of the low pressure piping or components. Failure consequences could be a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) outside of containment, an unanalyzed event that could degrade the ability for low pressure injection.

A study (Ref. 5) evaluated various PIV configurations to determine the probability of intersystem LOCAs. This study concluded that periodic leakage testing of the PI/s can substantially reduce intersystem LOCA probability.

PIVs are provided to isolate the RCS from the following typically connected systems:

a. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System;

b. Core Spray System;

(continued)



BWR/4 STS



BACKGROUND	c. High Pressure Coolant Injection System; and
(continued)	d. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.
	The PIVs are listed in Reference 6.
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APFLICABLE Reference 5 evaluated various PIV configurations, leakage SAFETY ANALYSE. testing of the valves, and operational changes to determine the effect on the probability of intersystem LOCAs. This study concluded that periodic leakage testing of the PIVs can substantially reduce the probability of an intersystem LOCA.

> PIV leakage is not considered in any Design Basis Accident analyses. This Specification provides for monitoring the condition of the RCPB to detect PIV degradation that has the rotential to cause a LOCA outside of containment. RCS PIV leakage satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

BASES

RCS PIV leakage is leakage into closed systems connected to the P^S. Isolation valve leakage is usually on the order of drops per minute. Leakage that increases significantly suggests that something is operationally wrong and corrective action must be taken. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of a PIV, which could lead to overpressurization of a low pressure system and the loss of the integrity of a fission product barrier.

The LCO PIV leakage limit is 0.5 gpm per nominal inch of valve size with a maximum limit of 5 gpm (Ref. 7).

Reference 7 permits leakage testing at a lower pressure differential than between the specified maximum RCS pressure and the normal pressure of the connected system during RCS operation (the maximum pressure differential). The observed rate may be adjusted to the maximum pressure differential by assuming leakage is directly proportional to the pressure differential to the one-half power.



BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, this LCO applies because the PIV leakage potential is greatest when the RCS is pressurized. In MODE 3, valves in the RHR shutdown cooling flow path are not required to meet the requirements of this LCO when in the shutdown cooling mode of operation.

> In MODES 4 and 5, leakage limits are not provided because the lower reactor coolant pressure results in a reduced potential for leakage and for a LOCA outside the containment. Accordingly, the potential for the consequences of reactor coolant leakage is far lower during these MODES.

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note 1 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RCS PIV flow paths. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent trains, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for the Condition of RCS PIV leakage limits exceeded provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate affected RCS PIV flow paths. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each affected RCS PIV flow path. Note 2 requires an evaluation of affected systems if a PIV is inoperable. The leakage may have affected system OPERABILITY, or isolation of a leaking flow path with an alternate valve may have degraded the ability of the interconnected system to perform its safety function. As a result, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by PIVs must be entered. This ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, for the affected systems.

A.1 and A.2

If leakage from one or more RCS PIVs is not within limit, the flow path must be isolated by at least one closed manual, deactivated, automatic, or check valve within 4 hours.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Required Action A.1 and Required Action A.2 are modified by a Note stating that the valves used for isolation must meet the same leakage requirements as the PIVs and must be on the RCPB [or the high pressure portion of the system].

Four hours provides time to reduce leakage in excess of the allowable limit and to isolate the flow path if leakage cannot be reduced while corrective actions to reseat the leaking PIVs are taken. The 4 hours allows time for these actions and restricts the time of operation with leaking valves.

Required Action A.2 specifies that the double isolation barrier of two valves be restored by closing another valve qualified for isolation or restoring one leaking PIV. The 72 hour Completion Time considers the time required to complete the action, the low probability of a second valve failing during this time period, and the low probability of a pressure boundary rupture of the low pressure ECCS piping when overpressurized to reactor pressure (Ref. 8).

B.1 and B.2

If leakage cannot be reduced or the system isolated, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO ques not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours and MODE 4 within 36 hours. This action may reduce the leakage and also reduces the potential for a LOCA outside the containment. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to achieve the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE

SR 3.4.5.1

Performance of leakage testing on each RCS PIV is required to verify that leakage is below the specified limit and to identify each leaking valve. The leakage limit of 0.5 gpm per inch of nominal valve diameter up to 5 gpm maximum applies to each valve. Leakage testing requires a stable pressure condition. For the two PIVs in series, the leakage



BASES

SURVEILLANCE SR REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.5.1 (continued)

requirement applies to each valve individually and not to the combined leakage across both valves. If the PIVs are not individually leakage tested, one valve may have failed completely and not be detected if the other valve in series meets the leakage requirement. In this situation, the protection provided by redundant valves would be lost.

The 18 month Frequency required by the Inservice Testing Program is within the ASME Code, Section XI, Frequency requirement and is based on the need to perform this Surveillance during an outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

This SR is modified by a Note that states the leakage Surveillance is not required to be performed in MODE 3. Entry into MODE 3 is permitted for leakage testing at high differential pressures with stable conditions not possible in the lower MODES.

REFERENCES	1.	10 CFR 50 °.
	2.	10 CFR 50.55a(c).
	3,	10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 55.
	4.	ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, IWV.
	5.	NUREG-0677, May 1980.
	6.	FSAR, Section [].
	7.	ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, IWV-3423(e).
	8.	NEDC-31339, November 1986.



RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.6

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.6 PCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

BASES BACKGROUND GDC 30 of 10 CrR 50, Appendix A (Ref. 1), requires means for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of RCS LEAKAGE. Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Ref. 2) describes acceptable methods for selecting leakage detection systems. Limits on LEAKAGE from the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) are required so that appropriate action can be taken before the integrity of the RCPB is impaired (Ref. 2). Leakage detection systems for the RCS are provided to alert the operators when leakage rates above normal background levels are detected and also to supply quantitative measurement of leakage rates. The Bases for LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Operational LEAKAGE," discuss the limits on RCS LEAKAGE rates. Systems for separating the LEAKAGE of an identified source from an unidentified source are necessary to provide prompt and quantitative information to the operators to permit them to take immediate corrective action. LEAKAGE from the RCPB inside the drywell is detected by at least one of two or three independently monitored variables, such as sump level changes and drywell gaseous and particulate radioactivity levels. The primary means of quantifying LEAKAGE in the drywell is the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system. The drywell floor drain sump monitoring system monitors the

LEAKAGE collected in the floor drain sump monitoring system monitors the unidentified LEAKAGE consists of LEAKAGE from control rod drives, valve flanges or packings, floor drains, the Closed Cooling Water System, and drywell air cooling unit condensate drains, and any LEAKAGE not collected in the drywell equipment drain sump. The primary containment floor drain sump has transmitters that supply level indications in the main control room.

The floor drain sump level indicators have switches that start and stop the sump pumps when required. A timer starts each time the sump is pumped down to the low level setpoint.





RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.6

BASES

BACKGRO . (Sound) If the unp fills to the high level setpoint before the timer costs an alarm sounds in the control room, indicating , this, ate into the sump in excess of a preset limit.

. flow indicator in the discharge line of the drywell floor rain sump pumps provides flow indication in the control room. The pumps can also be started from the control room.

The primary containment air monitoring systems continuously monitor the primary containment atmosphere for airborne particulate and gaseous radioactivity. A sudden increase of radioactivity, which may be attributed to RCPB steam or reactor water LEAKAGE, is annunciated in the control room. The primary containment atmosphere particulate and gaseous radioactivity monitoring systems are not capable of quantifying LEAKAGE rates, but are sensitive enough to indicate increased LEAKAGE rates of 1 gpm within 1 hour. Larger changes in LEAKAGE rates are detected in proportionally shorter times (Ref. 3).

Condensate from four of the six primary containment coolers is routed to the primary containment floor drain sump and is monitored by a flow transmitter that provides indication and alarms in the control room. This primary containment air cooler condensate flow rate monitoring sy. .em serves as an added indicator, but not quantifier, of RCS unidentified LEAKAGE.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

BWR/4 STS

A threat of significant compromise to the RCPB exists if the barrier contains a crack that is large enough to propagate rapidly. LEAKAGE rate limits are set low enough to detect the LEAKAGE emitted from a single crack in the RCPB (Refs. 4 and 5). Each of the leakage detection systems inside the drywell is designed with the capability of detecting LEAKAGE less than the established LEAKAGE rate limits and providing appropriate alarm of excess LEAKAGE in the control room.

A control room alarm allows the operators to evaluate the significance of the indicated LEAKAGE and, if necessary, shut down the reactor for further investigation and corrective action. The allowed LEAKAGE rates are well below the rates predicted for critical crack sizes (Ref. 6). Thurefore, these actions provide adequate response before a significant break in the RCPB can occur.

(continued)

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RCS	Leakage	Detection	Instrumentation
			B 3.4.6

4

BASES	
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	RCS leakage detection instrumentation satisfies Criterion 1 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO	The drywell floor drain sump monitoring system is required to quantify the unidentified LEAKAGE from the RCS. Thus, for the system to be considered OPERABLE, either the flow monitoring or the sump level monitoring portion of the system must be OPERABLE. The other monitoring systems provide early alarms to the operators so closer examination of other detection systems will be made to determine the extent of any corrective action that may be required. With the leakage detection systems inoperable, monitoring for LEAKAGE in the RCPB is degraded.
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, leakage detection systems are required to be OPERABLE to support LCO 3.4.4. This Applicability is consistent with that for LCU 3.4.4.
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u>
	With the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system inoperable, no other form of sampling can provide the equivalent information to quantify leakage. However, the primary containment atmospheric activity monitor [and the primary containment air cooler condensate flow rate monitor] will provide indication of changes in leakage.
	With the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system inoperable, but with RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE being determined every 8 hours (SR 3.4.4.1), operation may continue for 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time of Required Action A.1 is acceptable, based on operating experience, considering the multiple forms of leakage detection that are still available. Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note that states that the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system is inoperable. This allowance is provided because other instrumentation is available to monitor RCS leakage.
	(continued)

BWR/4 STS

B 3.4-28

Rev. 0, 09/28/92



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BASES

ACTIONS

(continued)

B.1 and B.2

With both gaseous and particulate primary containment atmospheric monitoring channels inoperable, grab samples of the primary containment atmosphere must be taken and analyzed to provide periodic leakage information. [Provided a sample is obtained and analyzed once every 12 hours, the plant may be operated for up to 30 days to allow restoration of at least one of the required monitors.] [Provided a sample is obtained and analyzed every 12 hours, the plant may continue operation since at least one other form of drywell leakage detection (i.e., air cooler condensate flow rate monitor) is available.]

The 12 hour interval provides periodic information that is adequate to detect LEAKAGE. The 30 day Completion Time for restoration recognizes that at least one other form of leakage detection is available.

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that states that the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when both the gaseous and particulate primary containment atmospheric monitoring channels are inoperable. This allowance is provided because other instrumentation is available to monitor RCS leakage.

C.1

With the required primary containment air cooler condensate flow rate monitoring system inoperable, SR 3.4.5.1 must be performed every 8 hours to provide periodic information of activity in the primary containment at a more frequent interval than the routine Frequency of SR 3.4.7.1. The 8 hour interval provides periodic information that is adequate to detect LEAKAGE and recognizes that other forms of leakage detection are available. However, this Required Action is modified by a Note that allows this action to be not applicable if the required primary containment atmospheric monitoring system is inoperable. Consistent with SR 3.0.1, Surveillances are not required to be performed on inoperable equipment.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS
BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1 and D.2

With both the primary containment gaseous and particulate atmospheric monitor channels and the primary containment air cooler condensate flow rate monitor inoperable, the only means of detecting LEAKAGE is the drywell floor drain sump monitor. This condition does not provide the required diverse means of leakage detection. The Required Action is to restore either of the inoperable monitors to OPERABLE status within 30 days to regain the intended leakage detection diversity. The 30 day Completion Time ensures that the plant will not be operated in a degraded configuration for a lengthy time period.

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that states that the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when both the gaseous and particulate primary containment atmospheric monitoring channels and air cooler condensate flow rate are inoperable. This allowance is provided because other instrumentation is available to monitor RCS leakage.

E.1 and E.2

If any Required Action of Condition 4, B, [C, or D] cannot be met within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the actions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1

With all required monitors inoperable, no required automatic means of monitoring LEAKAGE are available, and immediate plant shutdown in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 is required.



BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.6.1

This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK of the required primary containment atmospheric monitoring system. The check gives reasonable confidence that the channel is operating properly. The Frequency of 12 hours is based on instrument reliability and is reasonable for detecting off normal conditions.

SR 3.4.6.2

This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the required RCS leakage detection instrumentation. The test ensures that the monitors can perform their function in the desired manner. The test also verifies the alarm setpoint and relative accuracy of the instrument string. The Frequency of 31 days considers instrument reliability, and operating experience has shown it proper for detecting degradation.

SR 3.4.6.3

This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of required leakage detection instrumentation channels. The calibration verifies the accuracy of the instrument string, including the instruments located inside containment. The Frequency of [18] months is a typical refueling cycle and considers channel reliability. Operating experience has proven this Frequency is acceptable.

REFERENCES	1. IO CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 30.
	2. Regulatory Guide 1.45, May 1973.
	3. FSAR, Section [5.2.7.2.1].
	4. GEAP-5620, April 1968.
	5. NUREG-75/067, October 1975.

6. FSAR, Section [5.2.7.5.2].



B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.7 RCS Specific Activity

BASES

BACKGROUND

During circulation, the reactor coolant acquires radioactive materials due to release of fission products from fuel leaks into the reactor coolant and activation of corrosion products in the reactor coolant. These radioactive materials in the reactor coolant can plate out in the RCS, and, at times, an accumulation will break away to spike the normal level of radioactivity. The release of coolant during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) could send radioactive materials into the environment.

Limits on the maximum allowable level of radioactivity in the reactor coolant are established to ensure that in the event of a release of any radioactive material to the environment during a DBA, radiation doses are maintained within the limits of 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 1).

This LCO contains both iodine and gross specific activity limits. The iodine isotopic activities per gram of reactor coolant are expressed in terms of a DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131. Total specific reactor coolant activity is limited on the basis of the weighted average beta and gamma energy levels in the coolant. The allowable leve's are intended to limit the 2 hour radiation dose to an individual at the site boundary to a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 limit.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Analytical methods and assumptions involving radioactive material in the primary coolant are presented in the FSAR (Ref. 2). The specific activity in the reactor coolant (the source term) is an initial condition for evaluation of the consequences of an accident due to a main steam line break (MSLB) outside containment. No fuel damage is postulated in the MSLB accident, and the release of radioactive material to the environment is assumed to end when the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) close completely.

> This MSLB release forms the basis for determining offsite doses (Ref. 2). The limits on the specific activity of the primary coolant ensure that the 2 hour thyroid and whole body doses at the site boundary, resulting from an MSLB

> > (continued)



BWR/4 STS

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) outside containment during steady state operation, will not exceed 10% of the dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100.

The limits on specific activity are values from a parametric evaluation of typical site locations. These limits are conservative because the evaluation considered more restrictive parameters than for a specific site, such as the location of the site boundary and the meteorological conditions of the site.

RCS specific activity satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

The specific iodine activity is limited to $\leq [0.2] \mu Ci/gm$ DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, and the gross specific activity is limited to $100/\bar{E} \mu Ci/gm$. These limits ensure the source term assumed in the safety analysis for the MSLB is not exceeded, so any release of radioactivity to the environment during an MSLB is less than a small fraction of the 1C CFR 1CO limits.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 1, and MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated, limits on the primary coolant radioactivity are applicable since there is an escape path for release of radioactive material from the primary coolant to the environment in the event of an MSLB outside of primary containment.

In MODES 2 and 3 with the MSIVs closed, such limits do not apply since an escape path does not exist. In MODES 4 and 5, no limits are required since the reactor is not pressurized and the potential for leakage is reduced.

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

When the reactor coolant specific activity exceeds the LCO DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 limit, but is $\leq 4.0 \ \mu$ Ci/gm, samples must be analyzed for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 at least once every 4 hours. In addition, the specific activity must be restored to the LCO limit within 48 hours. The Completion



RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.7

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Time of once every 4 hours is based on the time needed to take and chalyze a sample. The 48 hour Completion Time to restore the activity level provides a reasonable time for temporary coolant activity increases (iodine spikes or crud bursts) to be cleaned up with the normal processing systems.

B.1, B.2.1, B.2.2.1, and B.2.2.2

If the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 cannot be restored to $\leq 0.2 \ \mu$ Ci/gm within 48 hours, or if at any time it is > 4.0 μ Ci/gm, it must be determined at least once every 4 hours and all the main steam lines must be isolated within 12 hours. Isolating the main steam lines precludes the possibility of releasing radioactive material to the environment in an amount that is more than a small fraction of the requirements of 10 CFR 100 during a postulated MSLB accident.

Alternatively, the plant can be placed in MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. This option is provided for those instances when isolation of main steam lines is not desired (e.g., due to the decay heat loads). In MODE 4, the requirements of the LCO are no longer applicable.

The Completion Time of once every 4 hours is the time needed to take and analyze a sample. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to isolate the main steam lines in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. Also, the allowed Completion Times for Required Actions B.2.2.1 and B.2.2.2 for placing the unit in MODES 3 and 4 are reasonable, based on operating experience, to achieve the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1, C.2.1, and C.2.2

When the reactor coolant specific activity is > $100/\bar{E}$ μ Ci/gm, all main steam lines must be isolated within 12 hours. Closing the MSIVs eliminates the potential

(continued)

Rev. 0, 09/28/92



ACTIONS

C.1, C.2.1, and C.2.2 (continued)

radioactivity release path to the environment during an MSLB event.

Alternatively, the plant can be placed in MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. This option is provided for those instances when isolation of main steam lines is not desired (e.g., due to the decay heat loads). In MODE 4, the requirements of the LCO are no longer applicable.

The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to isolate the main steam lines, without challenging plant systems. Also, the allowed Completion Times for Required Actions C.2.1 and C.2.2 are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE

SR 3.4.7.1

This SR requires performing a gamma isotopic analysis as a measure of the gross specific activity of the reactor coolant at least once per 7 days. While basically a quantitative measure of radionuclides with half lives longer than 15 minutes, excluding iodines, this measurement is the sum of the degassed gamma activities and the gaseous gamma activities in the sample taken. This Surveillance provides an indication of any increase in gross specific activity.

Trending the results of this Surveillance allows proper remedial action to be taken before reaching the LCO limit under normal operating conditions. The 7 day Frequency considers the unlikelihood of a gross fuel failure during this short time frame.

SR 3.4.7.2

This Surveillance is performed to ensure iodine remains within limit during normal operation. The 31 day Frequency is adequate to trend changes in the iodine activity level



(continued)

Rev. 0, 09/28/92



BASES

ACTIONS

RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.7

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.7.2 (continued)

considering gross specific activity is monitored every 7 days.

This SR is modified by a Note that requires this Surveillance to be performed only in MODE 1 because the level of fission products generated in other MODES is much less.

SR 3.4.7.3

A radiochemical analysis for Ē determination is required every 184 days with the plant operating in MODE 1 with equilibrium conditions. The Ē determination directly relates to the LCO and is required to verify plant operation within the gross specific activity LCO limit. The analysis for Ē is a measurement of the average energies per disintegration for isotopes with half lives longer than 15 minutes, excluding iodines. Operating experience has shown that Ē does not change rapidly and the Frequency of 184 days recognizes this.

This SR has been modified by a Note that states that sampling is required to be performed within 31 days after a minimum of 2 effective full power days and 20 days of MODE 1 operation have elapsed since the reactor was last subcritical for at least 48 hours. This ensures the radioactive materials are at equilibrium so the analysis for E is representative and not skewed by a crud burst or other similar abnormal event.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 100.11, 1973.

2. FSAR, Section [15.1.40].

RHR Shutdown Cooling System—Hot Shutdown B 3.4.8

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND

Irradiated fuel in the shutdown reactor core generates heat during the decay of fission products and increases the temperatute of the reactor coolant. This decay heat must be removed to reduce the temperature of the reactor coolant to $\leq 200^{\circ}$ F. This decay heat removal is in preparation for performing refueling or maintenance operations, or for keeping the reactor in the Hot Shutdown condition.

The two redundant, manually controlled shutdown cooling subsystems of the RHR System provide decay heat removal. Each loop consists of two motor driven pumps, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. Both loops have a common suction from the same recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, afte circulation through the respective heat exchanger, to the reactor via the associated recirculation loop. The RHR heat exchangers transfer heat to the RHR Service Water System (LCO 3.7.1, "Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System").

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Decay heat removal by operation of the RHR System in the shutdown cooling mode is not required for mitigation of any event or accident evaluated in the safety analyses. Decay heat removal is, however, an important safety function that must be accomplished or core damage could result. Although the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem does not meet a specific criterion of the NRC Policy Statement, it was identified in the NRC Policy Statement as a significant contributor to risk reduction. Therefore, the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is retained as a Technical Specification.

LCO

Two RHR shutdown cooling subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and when no recirculation pump is in operation, one shutdown cooling subsystem must be in operation. An OPERABLE RHR shutdown cooling subsystem consists of one OPERABLE RHR pump, one heat exchanger, and the associated piping and valves. The two subsystems have a common suction source and are allowed to have a common heat exchanger and

RHR Shutdown Cooling System—Hot Shutdown B 3.4.8



BASES

(continued)

common discharge piping. Thus, to meet the LCO, both pumps in one loop or one pump in each of the two loops must be OPERABLE. Since the piping and heat exchangers are passive components that are assumed not to fail, they are allowed to be common to both subsystems. Each shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. In MODE 3, one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem can provide the required cooling, but two subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy. Operation of one subsystem can maintain or reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required.

Note 1 permits both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems to be shut down for a period of 2 hours in an 8 hour period provided one subsystem is OPERABLE. Note 2 allows one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem to be inoperable for up to 2 hours for performance of Surveillance tests provided the remaining RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is OPERABLE. These tests may be on the affected RHR System or on some other plant system or component that necessitates placing the RHR System in an inoperable status during the performance. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the RHR subsystems or other operations requiring RHR flow interruption and loss of redundancy.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with reactor steam dome pressure above [the RHR cut in permissive pressure], this LCO is not applicable. Operation of the RHR System in the shutdown cooling mode is not allowed above this pressure because the RCS pressure may exceed the design pressure of the shutdown cooling piping. Decay heat removal at reactor pressures above the RHR cut in permissive pressure is typically accomplished by condensing the steam in the main condenser. Additionally, in MODE 2 below this pressure, the OPERABILITY requirements for the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) (LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS—Operating") do not allow placing the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem into operation.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS

RHR Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown B 3.4.8

BASES

ACTIONS

APPLICABILITY In MODE 3 with reactor steam dome pressure below [the RHR (continued) cut in permissive pressure] (i.e., the actual pressure at which the interlock resets) the RHR System may be operated in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat to reduce or maintain coolant temperature.

> The requirements for decay heat removal in MODES 4 and 5 are discussed in LCO 3.4.9, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System—Cold Shutdown"; LCO 3.9.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)—High Water Level"; and LCO 3.9.9, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)—Low Water Level."

A.1, A.2, and A.3

With one or both required RHR shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable for decay heat removal, the inoperable subsystem(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status without delay. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE subsystem can provide the necessary decay heat removal. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced RHR shutdown cooling capability.

With one of the two required RHR shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable, the remaining subsystem is capable of providing the required decay heat removal. However, the overall reliability is reduced. Therefore, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided. With both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided in addition to that provided for the initial RHR shutdown cooling subsystem inoperability. This re-establishes backup decay heat removal capabilities, similar to the requirements of the LCO. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities.

The required cooling capacity of the alternate method should be ensured by verifying (by calculation or demonstration) its capability to maintain or reduce temperature. Decay heat removal by ambient losses can be considered as contributing to the alternate method capability. Alternate methods that can be used include (but are not limited to)



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101

BWR/4 STS

B 3.4-39

RHR Shutdown Cooling System—Hot Shutdown B 3.4.8

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued)

the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System and the Reactor Water Cleanup System.

However, due to the potentially reduced reliability of the alternate methods of decay heat removal, it is also required to reduce the reactor coolant temperature to the point where MODE 4 is entered.

B.1, B.2, and B.3

With no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem and no recirculation pump in operation, except as permitted by the LCO Note, reactor coolant circulation by the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump must be restored without delay.

Until RHR or recirculation pump operation is re-established, an alternate method of reactor coolant circulation must be placed into service. This will provide the necessary circulation for monitoring coolant temperature and pressure. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the coolant circulation function and is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation. Furthermore, verification of the functioning of the alternate method must be reconfirmed every 12 hours thereafter. This will provide assurance of continued temperature monitoring capability.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR Shutdown Cooling System), the reactor coolant temperature and pressure must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.8.1

This Surveillance verifies that one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is





RHR Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown B 3.4.8

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SURVE1LLANCE

REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.8.1 (continued)

determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the RHR subsystem in the control room.

This Surveillance is modified by a Note allowing sufficient time to align the RHR System for shutdown cooling operation after clearing the pressure interlock that isolates the system, or for p. sing a recirculation pump in operation. The Note takes exception to the requirements of the Surveillance being met (i.e., forced coolant circulation is not required for this initial 2 hour period), which also allows entry into the Applicability of this Specification in accordance with SR 3.0.4 since the Surveillance will not be "not met" at the time of entry into the Applicability.

REFERENCES

None.



RHR Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown B 3.4.9

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3,4,9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND Irradiated fuel in the shutdown reactor core generates heat during the decay of fission products and increases the temperature of the reactor coolant. This decay heat must be removed to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant ≤ 200°F. This decay heat removal is in preparation for performing refueling or maintenance operations, or for keeping the reactor in the Cold Shutdown condition.

> The two redundant, manually controlled shutdown cooling subsystems of the RHR System provide decay heat removal. Each loop consists of two motor driven pumps, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. Both loops have a common suction from the same recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after circulation through the respective heat exchanger, to the reactor via the associated recirculation loop. The RHR heat exchangers transfer heat to the RHR Service Water System (LCO 3.7.1, "Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System").

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Decay heat removal by operation of the RHR System in the shutdown cooling mode is not required for mitigation of any event or accident evaluated in the safety analyses. Decay heat removal is, however, an important safety function that must be accomplished or core damage could result. Although the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem does not meet a specific criterion of the NRC Policy Statement, it was identified in the Policy Statement as a significant contributor to risk reduction. Therefore, the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is retained as a Technical Specification.

> Two RHR shutdown cooling subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and when no recirculation pump is in operation, one subsystem must be in operation. An OPERABLE RHR shutdown cooling subsystem consists of one OPERABLE RHR pump, one heat exchanger, and the associated piping and valves. The two subsystems have a common suction source and are allowed to have a common heat exchanger and common

> > (continued)

BWR/4 STS

LCO



RHR Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown B 3.4.9

BASES

(continued)

discharge piping. Thus, to meet the LCO, both pumps in one loop or one pump in each of the two loops must be OPEKABLE. Since the piping and heat exchangers are passive component. that are assumed not to fail, they are clowed to be component. to both subsystems. In MODE 4, the Sky cross tie valve (2E11-F010) may be opened to allow pur s in one loop to discharge through the opposite recirculation loop to make a complete subsystem. Additionally each shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. In MOLE 4, one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem can provide the required cooling, but two subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy. Operation of one subsystem can maintain or reduce the reactor coolani temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required.

Note 1 permits both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems to be shut down for a period of 2 hours in an 8 hour period, provided one subsystem is OPERABLE. Note 2 allows one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem to be inoperable for up to 2 hours for performance of Surveillance tests provided the other loop is OPERABLE and in operation. These tests may be on the affected RHR System or on some other plant system or component that necessitates placing the RHR System in an inoperable status during the performance. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the RHR subsystems or other operations requiring RHR flow interruption and loss of redundancy.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with reactor 'team dome pressure above the RHR cut in permissive pressure, this LCO is not applicable. Operation of the RHR System in the shutdown cooling mode is not allowed above this pressure because the RCS pressure may exceed the design pressure of the shutdown cooling piping. Decay heat removal at reactor pressures above the RHR cut in permissive pressure is typically accomplished by condensing the steam in the main condenser. Additionally, in MODE 2 below this pressure, the OPERABILITY requirements for the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) (LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS-Operating") do not allow

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BWR/4 STS

RHR Shuidown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown B 3.4.9

0

APPLICABILITY (continued)

BASES

placing the low pressure RHR shutdown cooling subsystem into operation.

In MODE 4, the RHR System ma, be operated in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat to maintain coolant temperature below 200°F.

The requirements for decay heat removal in MODE 3 below the cut in permissive pressure and in MODE 5 are discussed in LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System—Hot Shutdown"; LCO 3.9.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)—High Water Level"; and LCO 3.9.9, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)—Low Water Level."

ACTIONS

A.1

With one of the two required RHR shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable, the remaining subsystem is capable of providing the required decay heat removal. However, the overall reliability is reduced. Therefore, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided. With both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided in addition to that provided for the initial RHR shutdown cooling subsystem inoperability. This re-establishes backup decay heat removal capabilities, similar to the requirements of the LCO. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore, verification of the functional availability of these alternate method(s) must be reconfirmed every 24 hours thereafter. This will provide assurance of continued heat removal capability.

The required cooling capacity of the alternate method should be ensured by verifying (by calculation or demonstration) its capability to maintain or reduce temperature. Decay heat removal by ambient losses can be considered as contributing to the alternate method capability. Alternate methods that can be used include (but are not limited to) the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System and the Reactor Water Cleanup System.



RHR Shutdown Cooling System-Cold Shutdown B 3.4.9

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

With no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem and no recirculation pump in operation, except as permitted by the LCO Note, and until RHR or recirculation pump operation is re-established, an alternate method of reactor coolant circulation must be placed into service. This will provide the necessary circulation for monitoring coolant temperature. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the coolant circulation function and is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation. Furthermore, verification of the functioning of the alternate method must be reconfirmed every 12 hours thereafter. This will provide assurance of continued temperature monitoring capability.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR Shutdown Cooling System), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.9.1

This Surveillance verifies that one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the RHR subsystem in the control room.

REFERENCES

None.



B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.10 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits

BASES

BACKGROUND

All components of the RCS are designed to withstand effects of cyclic loads due to system pressure and temperature changes. These loads are introduced by startup (heatup) and shutdown (cooldown) operations, power transients, and reactor trips. This LCO limits the pressure and temperature changes during RCS heatup and cooldown, within the design assumptions and the stress limits for cyclic operation.

The PTLR contains P/T limit curves for heatup, cooldown, and inservice leakage and hydrostatic testing, and data for the maximum rate of change of reactor coolant temperature. The heatup curve provides limits for both heatup and criticality.

Each P/T limit curve defines an acceptable region for normal operation. The usual use of the curves is operational guidance during heatup or cooldown maneuvering, when pressure and temperature indications are monitored and compared to the applicable curve to determine that operation is within the allowable region.

The LCO establishes operating limits that provide a margin to brittle failure of the reactor vessel and piping of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The vessel is the component most subject to brittle failure. Therefore, the LCO limits apply mainly to the vessel.

10 CFR 50, Appendix G (Ref. 1), requires the establishment of P/T limits for material fracture toughness requirements of the RCPB materials. Reference 1 requires an adequate margin to brittle failure during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and system hydrostatic tests. It mandates the use of the ASME Code, Section III, Appendix G (Ref. 2).

The actual shift in the RT_{NDT} of the vessel material will be established periodically by removing and evaluating the irradiated reactor vessel material specimens, in accordance with ASTM E 135 (Ref. 3) and Appendix H of 10 CFR 50 (Ref. 4). The operating P/T limit curves will be adjusted.



BACKGROUND (continued)

as necessary, based on the evaluation findings and the recommendations of Reference 5.

The P i limit curves are composite curves established by superimposing limits derived from stress analyses of those portions of the reactor vessel and head that are the mort restrictive. At any specific pressure, temperature, an temperature rate of change, one location within the reactor vessel will dictate the most restrictive limit. Across the span of the P/T limit curves, different locations are more restrictive, and, thus, the curves are composites of the most restrictive regions.

The heatup curve represents a different set of restrictions than the cooldown curve because the directions of the thermal gradients through the vessel wall are reversed. The thermal gradient reversal alters the location of the tensile stress between the outer and inner walls.

The criticality limits include the Reference 1 requirement that they be at least 40°F above the heatup curve or the cooldown curve and not lower than the minimum permissible temperature for the inservice leakage and hydrostatic testing.

The consequence of violating the LCO limits is that the RCS has been operated under conditions that can result in brittle failure of the RCPB, possibly leading to a nonisolable leak or loss of coolant accident. In the event these limits are exceeded, an evaluation must be performed to determine the effect on the structural integrity of the RCPB components. ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. 6), provides a recommended methodology for evaluating an operating event that causes an excursion outside the limits.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The P/T limits are not derived from Design Basis Accident (DBA) analyses. They are prescribed during normal operation to avoid encountering pressure, temperature, and temperature rate of change conditions that might cause undetected flaws to propagate and cause nonductile failure of the RCPB, a condition that is unanalyzed. Reference 7 establishes the methodology for determining the F/T limits. Since the P/T limits are not derived from any DBA, there are no acceptance



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

B 3.4-47

RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.10

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	limits related to the P/T limits. Rather, the P/T limits are acceptance limits themsrlves since they preclude operation in an unanalyzed condition.
	RCS P/T limits satisfy Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO	The elements of this LCO are:

- a. RCS pressure, temperature, and heatup or cooldown rate are within the limits specified in the PTLR.
- b. The temperature difference between the reactor vessel bottom head coolant and the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) coolant is within the limit of the PTLR during recirculation pump startup.
- c. The temperature difference between the reactor coolant in the respective recirculation loop and in the reactor vessel meets the limit of the PTLR during pump startup.
- d. RCS pressure and temperature are within the criticality limits specified in the PTLR.
- e. The reartor vessel flange and the head flange temperatures are within the limits of the PTLR when reactor vessel head bolting studs are tensioned.

These limits define allowable operating regions and permit a large number of operating cycles while also providing a wide margin to nonductile failure.

The rate of change of temperature limits control the thermal gradient through the vessel wall and are used as inputs for calculating the heatup, cooldown, and inservice leakage and hydrostatic testing P/T limit curves. Thus, the LCO for the rate of change of temperature restricts stresses caused by thermal gradients and also ensures the validity of the P/T limit curves.

Violation of the limits places the reactor vessel outside of the bounds of the stress analyses and can increase stresses

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BWR/4 STS

BASES

	RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.10
BASES	
LCO (continued)	in other RCS components. The consequences depend on several factors, as follows:
	 The severity of the departure from the allowable operating pressure temperature regime or the severity of the rate of change of temperature;
	b. The length of time the limits were violated (longer violations allow the temperature gradient in the thick vessel walls to become more pronounced); and
	c. The existences, sizes, and orientations of flaws in the vessel material.
APPLICABILITY	The potential for violating a P/T limit exists at all times. For example, P/T limit violations could result from ambient temperature conditions that result in the reactor vessel metal temperature being less than the minimum allowed temperature for boltup. Therefore, this LCO is applicable even when fuel is not loaded in the core.
ACTIONS	The ACTIONS designated by this Specification are based on the premise that a violation of the limits occurred during normal plant maneuvering. Severe violations caused by abnormal transients, which may be accompanied by equipment failures, may also require additional actions based on

A.1 and A.2

Operation outside the P/T limits while in MODES 1, 2, and 3 must be corrected so that the RCPB is returned to a condition that has been verified by stress analyses.

The 30 minute Completion Time reflects the urgency of restoring the parameters to within the analyzed range. Most violations will not be severe, and the activity can be accomplished in this time in a controlled manner.

Besides restoring operation within limits, an evaluation is required to determine if RCS operation can continue. The

(continued)



B 3.4-49

emergency operating procedures.

BASES

ACTIONS A.1 and A 2 (continued)

evaluation must verify the RCPB integrity remains acceptable and must be completed if continued operation is desired. Several methods may be used, including comparison with pre-analyzed transients in the stress analyses, new analyses, or inspection of the components.

ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. 6), may be used to support the evaluation. However, its use is restricted to evaluation of the vessel toltline.

The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable to accomplish the evaluation of a mild violation. More severe violations may require special, event specific stress analyses or inspections. A favorable evaluation must be completed if continued operation is desired.

Condition A is modified by a Note requiring Required Action A.2 be completed whenever the Condition is entered. The Note emphasizes the need to perform the evaluation of the effects of the excursion outside the allowable limits. Restoration alone per Required Action A.1 is insufficient because higher than analyzed stresses may have occurred and may have affected the RCPB integrity.

B.1 and B.2

If a Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, the plant must be placed in a lower MODE because either the RCS remained in an unacceptable P/T region for an extended period of increased stress, or a sufficiently severe event caused entry into an unacceptable region. Either possibility indicates a need for more careful examination of the event, best accomplished with the RCS at reduced pressure and temperature. With the reduced pressure and temperature conditions, the possibility of propagation of undetected flaws is decreased.

Pressure and temperature are reduced by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.



BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2

(continued)

Operation outside the :/T limits in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3 (including defueled conditions) must be corrected so that the RCPB is returned to a condition that has been verified by stress analyses. The Required Action must be initiated without delay and continued until the limits are restored.

Besides restoring the P/T limit parameters to within limits, an evaluation is required to determine if RCS operation is allowed. This evaluation must verify that the RCPB integrity is acceptable and must be completed before approaching criticality or heating up to > 200°F. Several methods may be used, including comparison with pre-analyzed transients, new analyses, or inspection of components. ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. 6' y be used to support the evaluation; however, its use is restricted to evaluation of the beltline.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.10.1

Verification that operation is within PTLR limits is required every 30 minutes when RCS pressure and temperature conditions are undergoing planned changes. This Frequency is considered reasonable in view of the control room indication available to monitor RCS status. Also, since temperature rate of change limits are specified in hourly increments, 30 minutes permits a reasonable time for assessment and correction of minor deviations.

Surveillince for heatup, cooldown, or inservice leakage and hydrostatic testing may be discontinued when the criteria given in the relevant plant procedure for ending the activity are satisfied.

This SR has been modified with a Note that requires this Surveillance to be performed only during system heatup and cooldown operations and inservice leakage and hydrostatic testing.

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BWR/4 STS

RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.10

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.4.10.2

A separate limit is used when the reactor is approaching criticality. Consequently, the RCS pressure and temperature must be verified within the appropriate limits before withdrawing control rods that will make the reactor critical.

Performing the Surveillance within 15 minutes before control rod withdrawal for the purpose of achieving criticality provides adequate assurance that the limits will not be exceeded between the time of the Surveillance and the time of the control rod withdrawal.

SR 3.4.10.3 and SR 3.4.10.4

Differential temperatures within the applicable PTLR limits ensure that thermal stresses resulting from the startup of an idle recirculation pump will not exceed design allowances. In aduition, compliance with these limits ensures that the assumptions of the analysis for the startup of an idle recirculation loop (Ref. 8) are satisfied.

Performing the Surveillance within 15 minutes before starting the idle recirculation pump provides adequate assurance that the limits will not be exceeded between the time of the Surveillance and the time of the idle pump start.

An acceptable means of demonstrating compliance with the temperature differential requirement in SR 3.4.10.4 is to compare the temperatures of the operating recirculation loop and the idle loop.

SR 3.4.10.3 has been modified by a Note that requires the Surveillance to be performed only in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 with reactor steam dome pressure \geq 25 psig. In MODE 5, the overall stress on limiting components is lower. Therefore, ΔT limits are not required.

SR 3.4.10.5, SR 3.4.10.6, and SR 3.4.10.7

Limits on the reactor vessel flange and head flarge temperatures are generally bounded by the other P/T limits



RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.10

BASES

SR 3.4.10.5, SR 3.4.10.6, and SR 3.4.10.7 (continued) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS during system heatup and cooldown. However, operations approaching MUDE 4 from MODE 5 and in MODE 4 with RCS temperature less than or equal to certain specified values require assurance that these temperatures meet the LCO limits. The flange temperatures must be verified to be above the limits 30 minutes before and while tensioning the vessel head bolting studs to ensure that once the head is tensioned the limits are satisfied. When in MODE 4 with RCS temperature ≤ 80°F, 30 minute checks of the flange temperatures are required because of the reduced margin to the limits. When in MODE 4 with RCS temperature ≤ 100°F, monitoring of the flange temperature is required every 12 hours to ensure the temperature is within the limits specified in the PTLR. The 30 minute Frequency reflects the urgency of maintaining the temperatures within limits, and also limits the time that the temperature limits could be exceeded. The 12 hour Frequency is reasonable based on the rate of temperature change possible at these temperatures. REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G. 2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G. 3. ASTM E 185-82, July 1982. 4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix H. 5. Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 1988. 6. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Appendix E. 7. NEDO-21778-A, December 1978. FSAR, Section [15.1.26]. 8.



BWR/4 STS

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.11 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure

BASES

- BACKGROUND The reactor steam dome pressure is an assumed initial condition of design basis accidents and transients and is also an assumed value in the determination of compliance with reactor pressure vessel overpressure protection criteria.
- APPLICABLE The reactor steam dome pressure of ≤ [1020] psig is an SAFETY ANALYSES initial condition of the vessel overpressure protection analysis of Reference 1. This analysis assumes an initial maximum reactor steam dome pressure and evaluates the response of the pressure relief system, primarily the safety/relief valves, during the limiting pressurization transient. The determination of compliance with the overpressure criteria is dependent on the initial reactor steam dome pressure; therefore, the limit on this pressure ensures that the assumptions of the overpressure protection analysis are conserved. Reference 2 also assumes an initial reactor steam dome pressure for the analysis of design basis accidents and transients used to determine the limits for fuel cladding integrity (see Bases for LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") and 1% cladding plastic strain (see Bases for LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)").

Reactor steam dome pressure satisfies the requirements of Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO The specified reactor steam dome pressure limit of ≤ [1020] psig ensures the plant is operated within the assumptions of the transient analyses. Operation above the limit may result in a transient response more severe than analyzed.

APPLICABILITY IN MODES 1 and 2, the reactor steam dome pressure is required to be less than or equal to the limit. In these

(continued)



BWR/4 STS



APPLICABILITY MODES, the reactor may be generating significant steam and (continued) the design basis accidents and transients are bounding.

> In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the limit is not applicable because the reactor is shut down. In these MODES, the reactor pressure is well below the required limit, and no anticipated events will challenge the overpressure limits.

ACTIONS

BASES

A.1

With the reactor steam dome pressure greater than the limit, prompt action should be taken to reduce pressure to below the limit and return the reactor to operation within the bounds of the analyses. The 15 minute Completion Time is reasonable considering the importance of maintaining the pressure within limits. This Completion Time also ensures that the probability of an accident occurring while pressure is greater than the limit is minimized. If the operator is unable to restore the reactor steam dome pressure to below the limit, then the reactor should be placed in MODE 3 to be operating within the assumptions of the transient analyses.

B.1

If the reactor steam dome pressure cannot be restored to within the limit within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.11.1

Verification that reactor steam dome pressure is ≤ [1020] psig ensures that the initial conditions of the design basis accidents and transients are met. Operating experience has shown the 12 hour Frequency to be sufficient for identifying trends and verifying operation within safety analyses assumptions.



BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Reactor Steam Dome Pressure B 3.4.11



BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [5.2.2.4].

2. FSAR, Section [15].





B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

B 3.5.1 ECCS-Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The ECCS is designed, in conjunction with the primary and secondary containment, to limit the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The ECCS uses two independent methods (flooding and spraying) to cool the core during a LOCA. The ECCS network consists of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, the Core Spray (CS) System, the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). The suppression pool provides the required source of water for the ECCS. Although no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the condensate storage tank (CST), it is capable of providing a source of water for the HPCI and CS systems.

On receipt of an initiation signal, ECCS pumps automatically start; simultaneously, the system aligns and the pumps inject water, taken either from the CST or suppression pool, into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) as RCS pressure is overcome by the discharge pressure of the ECCS pumps. Although the system is initiated, ADS action is delayed, allowing the operator to interrupt the timed sequence if the system is not needed. The HPCI pump discharge pressure almost immediately exceeds that of the RCS, and the pump injects coolant into the vessel to cool the core. If the break is small, the HPCI System will maintain coolant inventory as well as vessel level while the RCS is still pressurized. If HPCI fails, it is backed up by ADS in combination with LPCI and CS. In this event, the ADS timed sequence would be allowed to time out and open the selected safety/relief valves (S/RVs) depressurizing the RCS, thus allowing the LPCI and CS to overcome RCS pressure and inject coolant into the vessel. If the break is large, RCS pressure initially drops rapidly and the LPCI and CS cool the core.

Water from the break returns to the suppression pool where it is used again and again. Water in the suppression pool is circulated through a heat exchanger cooled by the RHR Service Water System. Depending on the location and size of

(continued)



BWR/4 STS

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

the break, portions of the ECCS may be ineffective; however, the overall design is effective in cooling the core regardless of the size or location of the piping break. Although no credit is taken in the safety analysis for the RCIC System, it performs a similar function as HPCI, but has reduced makeup capability. Nevertheless, it will maintain inventory and cool the core while the RCS is still pressurized following a reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation.

All ECCS subsystems are designed to ensure that no single active component failure will prevent automatic initiation and successful operation of the minimum required ECCS equipment.

The CS System (Ref. 1) is composed of two independent subsystems. Each subsystem consists of a motor driven pump, a spray sparger above the core, and piping and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the sparger. The CS System is designed to provide cooling to the reactor core when reactor pressure is low. Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the CS pumps in both subsystems are automatically started when AC power is available. When the RPV pressure drops sufficiently, CS System flow to the RPV begins. A full flow test line is provided to route water from and to the suppression pool to allow testing of the CS System without spraying water in the RPV.

LPCI is an independent operating mode of the RHR System. There are two LPCI subsystems (Ref. 2), each consisting of two motor driven pumps and piping and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the RPV via the corresponding recirculation loop. The two LPCI subsystems can be interconnected via the RHR System cross tie valve; however, the cross tie valve is maintained closed with its power removed to prevent loss of both LPCI subsystems during a LOCA. The LPCI subsystems are designed to provide core cooling at low RPV pressure. Upon receipt of an initiation signal, all four LPCI pumps are automatically started (B pump immediately when AC power is available, and A, C, and D pumps approximately 10 seconds after AC power is available). RHR System valves in the LPCI flow path are automatically positioned to ensure the proper flow path for water from the suppression pool to inject into the recirculation loops. When the RPV pressure drops sufficiently, the LPCI flow to the RPY, via the





BASES

BACKGROUND (continued) corresponding recirculation loop, begins. The water then enters the reactor through the jet pumps. Full flow test lines are provided for the four LPCI pumps to route water from the suppression pool, to allow testing of the LPCI pumps without injecting water into the RPV. These test lines also provide suppression pool cooling capability, as described in LCO 3.6.2.3, "RHR Suppression Pool Cooling."

The HPCI System (Ref. 3) consists of a steam driven turbine pump unit, piping, and valves to provide steam to the turbine, as well as piping and valves to transfer water from the suction source to the core via the feedwater system line, where the coolant is distributed within the RPV through the feedwater sparger. Suction piping for the system is provided from the CST and the suppression pool. Pump suction for HPCI is normally aligned to the CST source to minimize injection of suppression pool water into the RPV. However, if the CST water supply is low, or if the suppression pool level is high, an automatic transfer to the suppression pool water source ensures a water supply for continuous operation of the HPCI System. The steam supply to the HPCI turbine is piped from a main steam line upstream of the associated inboard main steam isolation valve.

The HPCI System is designed to provide core cooling for a wide range of reactor pressures (162 psid to 1135 psid, vessel to pump suction). Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the HPCI turbine stop valve and turbine control valve open simultaneously and the turbine accelerates to a specified speed. As the HPCI flow increases, the turbine governor valve is automatically adjusted to maintain design flow. Exhaust steam from the HPCI turbine is discharged to the suppression pool. A full flow test line is provided to route water from and to the CST to allow testing of the HPCI System during normal operation without injecting water into the RPV.

The ECCS pumps are provided with minimum flow bypass lines, which discharge to the suppression pool. The valves in these lines automatically open to prevent pump damage due to overheating when other discharge line valves are closed. To ensure rapid delivery of water to the RPV and to minimize water hammer effects, all ECCS pump discharge lines are filled with water. The LPCI and CS System discharge lines are kept full of water using a "keep fill" system (jockey pump system). The HPCI System is normally aligned to the



(continued)

BASES					
BACKGROUND (continued)	CST. The height of water in the CST is sufficient to maintain the piping full of water up to the first isolation valve. The relative height of the feedwater line connection for HPCI is such that the water in the feedwater lines keeps the remaining portion of the HPCI discharge line full of water. Therefore, HPCI does not require a "keep fill" system.				
	The ADS (Ref. 4) consists of 7 of the 11 S/RVs. It is designed to provide depressurization of the RCS during a small break LOCA if HPCI fails or is unable to maintain required water level in the RPV. ADS operation reduces th RPV pressure to within the operating pressure range of the low pressure ECCS subsystems (CS and LPCI), so that these subsystems can provide coolant inventory makeup. Each of the S/RVs used for automatic depressurization is equipped with one air accumulator and associated inlet check valves The accumulator provides the pneumatic power to actuate th valves.				
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The ECCS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for a postulated LOCA. The accidents for which ECCS operation is required are presented in References 5, 6, and 7. The required analyses and assumptions are defined in Reference 8. The results of these analyses are also described in Reference 9.				
	This LCO helps to ensure that the following acceptance criteria for the ECCS, established by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 10), will be met following a LOCA, assuming the worst case single active component failure in the ECCS:				
	a. Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is ≤ 2200°F				
	b. Maximum cladding oxidation is ≤ 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation;				
	c. Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is ≤ 0.01 times the hypothetical amcunt that would be generated if all of the metal in the claddin surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react;				
	d. The core is maintained in a coolable geometry; and				





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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

(continued)

BASES

LCO

e. Adequate long term cooling capability is maintained.

The limiting single failures are discussed in Reference 11. For a large discharge pipe break LOCA, failure of the LPCI valve on the unbroken recirculation loop is considered the most severe failure. For a small break LOCA, HPCI failure is the most severe failure. One ADS valve failure is analyzed as a limiting single failure for events requiring ADS operation. The remaining OPERABLE ECCS subsystems provide the capability to adequately cool the core and prevent excessive fuel damage.

The ECCS satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

Each ECCS intection/spray subsystem and seven ADS valves are required to OPERABLE. The ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the two CS subsystems, the two LPCI subsystems, and one HPCI System. The low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the two CS subsystems and the two LPCI subsystems.

With less than the required number of ECCS subsystems OPERABLE, the potential exists that during a limiting design basis LOCA concurrent with the worst case single failure, the limits specified in Reference 10 could be exceeded. All ECCS subsystems must therefore be OPERABLE to satisfy the single failure criterion required by Reference 10. The ECCS is supported by other systems that provide automatic ECCS initiation signals (LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) Instrumentation"); service water to cool pumps and ECCS equipment rooms (LCO 3.7.2, "Plant Service Water (PSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)"); electrical power (LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating"); and (LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-Operating").

A LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal when below the actual RHR cut in permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. At these low pressures and decay heat levels, a reduced complement of ECCS subsystems can provide the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation of an RHR shutdown cooling loop when necessary.

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY All ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, and 3, when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling would be required to prevent fuel damage in the event of a break in the primary system piping. In MODES 2 and 3, when reactor steam dome pressure is ≤ 150 psig, ADS and HPCI are not required to be OPERABLE because the low pressure ECCS subsystems can provide sufficient flow below this pressure. ECCS requirements for MODES 4 and 5 are specified in LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS—Shutdown."

ACTIONS

If any one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE subsystems provide adequate core cooling during a LOCA. However, overall ECCS reliability is reduced, because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE subsystems, concurrent with a LOCA, may result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended safety function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study (Ref. 12) that evaluated the impact on ECCS availability, assuming various components and subsystems were taken out of service. The results were used to calculate the average availability of ECCS equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA as a function of allowed outage times (i.e., Completion Times).

B.1 and B.2

A.1

If the inoperable low pressure ECCS subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.





BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

C.1 and C.2

If the HPCI System is inoperable and the RCIC System is immediately verified to be OPERABLE, the HPCI System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days. In this Condition, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diverse low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems in conjunction with ADS. Also, the RCIC System will automatically provide makeup water at most reactor operating pressures. Immediate verification of RCIC OPERABILITY is therefore required when HPCI is inoperable. This may be performed as an administrative check by examining logs or other information to determine if RCIC is out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the RCIC System. If the OPERABILITY of the RCIC System cannot be immediately verified, however, Condition G must be immediately entered. If a single active component fails concurrent with a design basis LOCA, there is a potential, depending on the specific failure, that the minimum required ECCS equipment will not be available. A 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 12 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

D.1 and D.2

If any one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable in addition to an inoperable HPCI System, the inoperable low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the HPCI System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of the ADS and the remaining low pressure ECCS subsystems. However, the overall ECCS reliability is significantly reduced because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE subsystems concurrent with a design besis LOCA may result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended safety function. Since both a high pressure system (HPCI) and a low pressure subsystem are inoperable, a more restrictive Completion Time of 72 hours is required to restore either the HPCI System or the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status. This Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 12 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.



BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

<u>E.1</u>

The LCO requires seven ADS valves to be OPERABLE in order to provide the ADS function. Reference 13 contains the results of an analysis that evaluated the effect of one ADS valve being out of service. Per this analysis, operation of only six ADS valves will provide the required depressurization. However, overall reliability of the ADS is reduced, because a single failure in the OPERABLE ADS valves could result in a reduction in depressurization capability. Therefore, operation is only allowed for a limited time. The 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 12 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

F.1 and F.2

If any one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable in addition to one inoperable ADS valve, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of HPCI and the remaining low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem. However, overall ECCS reliability is reduced because a single active component failure concurrent with a design basis LOCA could result in the minimum required ECCS equipment not being available. Since both a high pressure system (ADS) and a low pressure subsystem are inoperable, a more restrictive Completion Time of 72 hours is required to restore either the low pressure ECCS subsystem or the ADS valve to OPERABLE status. This Completion Time is based on a reliability study cited in Reference 12 and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

G.1 and G.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C, D, E, or F is not met, or if two or more ADS valves are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and reactor steam dome pressure reduced to ≤ 150 psig within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.



ACTIONS (continued) H.1

When multiple ECCS subsystems are inoperable, as stated in Condition H, the plant is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

BASES

<u>SR 3.5.1.1</u>

The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCI System, CS System, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the RCS upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines are full is to vent at the high points. The 31 day Frequency is based on the gradual nature of void buildup in the ECCS piping, the procedural controls governing system operation, and operating experience.

SR 3.5.1.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated. and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. For the HPCI System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.

The 31 day Frequency of this SR was derived from the Inservice Testing Program requirements for performing valve


ECCS-Operating B 3.5.1



DASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.5.1.2</u> (continued)

testing at least once every 92 days. The Frequency of 31 days is further justified because the valves are operated under procedural control and because improper valve position would only affect a single subsystem. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

This SR is modified by a Note that allows a LPCI subsystem to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the RHR cut in permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. This allows operation in the RHR shutdown cooling mode during MODE 3, if necessary.

SR 3.5.1.3

Verification every 31 days that ADS air supply header pressure is \geq [90] psig ensures adequate air pressure for reliable ADS operation. The accumulator on each ADS valve provides pneumatic pressure for valve actuation. The design pneumatic supply pressure requirements for the accumulator are such that, following a failure of the pneumatic supply to the accumulator, at least two valve actuations can occur with the drywell at 70% of design pressure (Ref. 11). The ECCS safety analysis assumes only one actuation to achieve the depressurization required for operation of the low pressure ECCS. This minimum required pressure of \geq [90] psig is provided by the ADS instrument air supply. The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration administrative controls over operation of the air system and alarms for low air pressure.

SR 3.5.1.4

Verification every 31 days that the RHR System cross tie valve is closed and power to its operator is disconnected ensures that each LPCI subsystem remains independent and a failure of the flow path in one subsystem will not affect the flow path of the other LPCI subsystem. Acceptable methods of removing power to the operator include de-energizing breaker control power or racking out or



SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.4 (continued)

removing the breaker. If the RHR System cross tie valve is open or power has not been removed from the valve operator, both LPCI subsystems must be considered inoperable. The 31 day Frequency has been found acceptable, considering that these valves are under strict administrative controls that will ensure the valves continue to remain closed with either control or motive power removed.

SR 3.5.1.5

Verification every 31 days that each LPCI inverter output has a voltage of \geq [570] V and \leq [630] V while supplying its respective bus demonstrates that the AC electrical power is available to ensure proper operation of the associated LPCI inboard injection and minimum flow valves and the recirculation pump discharge valve. Each inverter must be CPERABLE for the associated LPCI subsystem to be OPERABLE. The 31 day Frequency has been found acceptable based on engineering judgment and operating experience.

SR 3.5.1.6

Cycling the recirculation pump discharge [and bypass] valves through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically OPERABLE and will close when required. Upon initiation of an automatic LPCI subsystem injection signal, these valves are required to be closed to ensure full LPCI subsystem flow injection in the reactor via the recirculation jet pumps. De-energizing the valve in the closed position will also ensure the proper flow path for the LPCI subsystem. Acceptable methods of de-energizing the valve include de-energizing breaker control power, racking out the breaker or removing the breaker.

The specified Frequency is once per 31 days. However, this SR is modified by a Note that states the Surveillance is only required to be performed during reactor startup after THERMAL POWER > 25% RTP. Verification during reactor startup prior to reaching > 25% RTP is an exception to the normal Inservice Testing Program generic valve cycling Frequency of 92 days, but is considered acceptable due to the demonstrated reliability of these valves. If the valve



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.1



SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

BASES

SR 3.5.1.6 (continued)

is inoperable and in the open position, the associated LPCI subsystem must be declared inoperable.

SR 3.5.1.7, SR 3.5.1.8, and SR 3.5.1.9

The performancy requirements of the low pressure ECCS pumps are determined through application of the 10 CFR 50, Appendix K criteria (Ref. 8). This periodic Surveillance is performed (in accordance with the ASME Code, Section XI, requirements for the ECCS pumps) to verify that the ECCS pumps will develop the flow rates required by the respective analyses. The low pressure ECCS pump flow rates ensure that adequate core cooling is provided to satisfy the acceptance criteria of Reference 10. The pump flow rates are verified against a system head equivalent to the RPV pressure expected during a LOCA. The total system pump outlet pressure is adequate to overcome the elevation head pressure between the pump suction and the vessel discharge, the piping friction losses, and RPV pressure present during a LOCA. These values may be established during preoperational testing.

The flow tests for the HPCI System are performed at two different pressure ranges such that system capability to provide rated flow is tested at both the higher and lower operating ranges of the system. Since the reactor steam dome pressure must be ≥ [920] psig to perform SR 3.5.1.8 and ≥ [150] psig to perform SR 3.5.1.9, sufficient time is allowed after adequate pressure is achieved to perform these tests. Reactor startup is allowed prior to performing the low pressure Surveillance test because the reactor pressure is low and the time allowed to satisfactorily perform the Surveillance test is short. The reactor pressure is allowed to be increased to normal operating pressure since it is assumed that the low pressure test has been satisfactorily completed and there is no indication or reason to believe that HPCI is inoperable. Therefore, SR 3.5.1.8 and SR 3.5.1.9 are modified by Notes that state the Surveillances are not required to be performed until 12 hours after the specified reactor steam dome pressure is reached.

(continued)



BWR/4 STS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.7, SR 3.5.1.8, and SR 3.5.1.9 (continued)

The Frequency for SR 3.5.1.7 and SR 3.5.1.8 is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program requirements. The 18 month Frequency for SR 3.5.1.9 is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for unplanned transients if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

<u>SR 3.5.1.10</u>

The ECCS subsystems are required to actuate automatically to perform their design functions. This Surveillance verifies that, with a required system initiation signal (actual or simulated), the automatic initiation logic of HPCI, CS, and LPCI will cause the systems or subsystems to operate as designed, including actuation of the system throughout its emergency operating sequence, automatic pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. This SR also ensures that the HPCI System will automatically restart on an RPV low water level (Level 2) signal received subsequent to an RPV high water level (Level 8) trip and that the suction is automatically transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.1 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection/spray during the Surveillance. Since all active

(continued)



BWR/4 STS

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.1

SURVEILLANCE

SR 3.5.1.10 (continued)

components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance.

SR 3.5.1.11

The ADS designated S/RVs are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals. A system functional test is performed to demonstrate that the mechanical portions of the ADS function (i.e., solenoids) operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated initiation signal, causing proper actuation of all the required components. SR 3.5.1.12 and the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.1 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation. This prevents an RPV pressure blowdown.

SR 3.5.1.12

A manual actuation of each ADS valve is performed to verify that the valve and solenoid are functioning properly and that no blockage exists in the S/RV discharge lines. This is demonstrated by the response of the turbine control or bypass valve or by a change in the measured steam flow or by any other method suitable to verify steam flow. Adequate reactor steam dome pressure must be available to perform this test to avoid damaging the valve. Sufficient time is therefore allowed after the required pressure is achieved to perform this SR. Adequate pressure at which this SR is to



ECCS - Operating B 3.5.1

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.12 (continued)

be performed is [920] psig (the pressure recommended by the valve manufacturer). Reactor startup is allowed prior to performing this SR because valve OPERABILITY and the setpoints for overpressure protection are verified, per ASME requirements, prior to valve installation. Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note that states the Surveillance is not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is \geq [920] psig. The 12 hours allowed for manual actuation after the required pressure is reached is sufficient to achieve stable conditions and provides adequate time to complete the Surveillance. SR 3.5.1.11 and the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.1 overlap this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS ensures that both solenoids for each ADS valve are alternately tested. The Frequency is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

- 1. FSAR, Section [6.3.2.2.3].
- 2. FSAR, Section [6.3.2.2.4].
- 3. FSAR, Section [6.3.2.2.1].
- 4. FSAR, Section [6.3.2.2.2].
- 5. FSAR, Section [15.2.8].
- 6. FSAR, Section [15.6.4].
- 7. FSAR, Section [15.6.5].
- 8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.



ECCS-Operating B 3.5.1

BASES		
REFERENCES (continued)	9.	FSAR, Section [6.3.3].
	10.	10 CFR 50.46.
	11.	FSAR, Section [7.3.1.2.2].
	12.	Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.
	13.	FSAR, Section [0.3.3.3].





B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

B 3.5.2 ECCS-Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND A description of the Core Spray (CS) System and the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS—Operat .g."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The ECCS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The long term cooling analysis following a design basis LOCA (Ref. 1) demonstrates that only one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is required, post LOCA, to maintain the peak cladding temperature below the allowable limit. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5. Two OPERABLE low pressure ECCS subsystems also ensure adequate vessel inventory makeup in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown.

The low pressure ECCS subsystems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

Two low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. The low pressure ECCS injection/ spray subsystems consist of two CS subsystems and two LPCI subsystems. Each CS subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or condensate storage tank (CST) to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). Each LPCI subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the RPV. Only a single LPCI pump is required per subsystem because of the larger injection capacity in relation to a CS subsystem. In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System cross tie valve is not required to be closed.

One LPCI subsystem may be aligned for decay heat removal and considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function, if it can be

(continued)

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ECCS-Shutdown B 3.5.2

- 61				а
- 62				3
- 52				9
				r
- 23	10		97	

LCO (continued)	manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and is not otherwise inoperable. Because of low pressure and low temperature conditions in MODES 4 and 5, sufficient time will be available to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel uncovery.
APPLICABILITY	OPERABILITY of the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems is required in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure adequate coolant inventory and sufficient heat removal capability for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the vessel. Requirements for ECCS OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3 are discussed in the Applicability section of the Bases for LCO 3.5.1. ECCS subsystems are not required to be OPERABLE during MODE 5 with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed and the water level maintained at ≥ 23 ft above the RPV flange. This provides sufficient coolant inventory to allow operator action to terminate the inventory loss prior to fuel uncovery in case of an inadvertent draindown.
	The Automatic Depressurization System is not required to be OPERABLE during MODES 4 and 5 because the RPV pressure is ≤ 150 psig, and the CS System and the LPCI subsystems can provide core cooling without any depressurization of the

The High Pressure Coolant Injection System is not required to be OPERABLE during MODES 4 and 5 since the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the vessel.

ACTIONS

BASES

A.1 and B.1

primary system.

If any one required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restared to OPERABLE status in 4 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE subsystem can provide sufficient vessel flooding capability to recover from an inadvertent vessel draindown. However, overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining OPERABLE subsystem concurrent with a vessel draindown could result in

(continued)



BWR/4 STS

ACTIONS

A.1 and B.1 (continued)

the ECCS not being able to perform its intended function. The 4 hour Completion Time for restoring the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status is based on engineering judgment that considered the remaining available subsystem and the low probability of a vessel draindown event.

With the inoperable subsystem not restored to OPERABLE status in the required Completion Time, action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

C.1, C.2, D.1, D.2, and D.3

With both of the required ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable, all coolant invento makeup capability may be unavailable. Therefore, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. One ECCS injection/spray subsystem must also be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours.

If at least one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the 4 hour Completion Time, additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes initiating immediate action to restore the following to OPERABLE status: secondary containment, one standby gas treatment subsystem, and one isolation valve and associated instrumentation in each associated penetration flow path not isolated. OPERABILITY may be verified by an administrative check, or by examining logs or other information, to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. Verification does not require performing the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the Surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to



ECCS-Shutdown B 3.5.2

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1, C.2, D.1, D.2, and D.3 (continued)

OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

The 4 hour Completion Time to restor at least one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action will be taken to provide the required cooling capacity or to initiate actions to place the plant in a condition that minimizes any potential fission product release to the environment.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2

The minimum water level of [12 ft 2 inches] required for the suppression pool is periodically verified to ensure that the suppression pool will provide adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the CS System and LPCI subsystem pumps, recirculation volume, and vortex prevention. With the suppression pool water level less than the required limit, all ECCS injection/spray subsystems are inoperable unless they are aligned to an OPERABLE CST.

When suppression pool level is < [12 ft 2 inches], the CS System is considered OPERABLE only if it can take suction from the CST, and the CST water level is sufficient to provide the required NPSH for the CS pump. Therefore, a verification that either the suppression pool water level is \geq [12 ft 2 inches] or that CS is aligned to take suction from the CST and the CST contains \geq [150,000] gallons of water, equivalent to 12 ft, ensures that the CS System can supply at least [50,000] gallons of makeup water to the RPV. The CS suction is uncovered at the [100,000] gallon level. However, as noted, only one required CS subsystem may take credit for the CST option during OPDRVs. During OPDRVs, the volume in the CST may not provide adequate makeup if the RPV were completely drained. Therefore, only one CS subsystem is allowed to use the CST. This ensures the other required ECCS subsystem has adequate makeup volume.

The 12 hour Frequence of these SRs was developed considering operating experience related to suppression pool water level and CST water level variations and instrument drift during the applicable MODES. Furthermore, the 12 hour Frequency is





SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 (continued)

considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool or CST water level condition.

SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.6

The Bases provided for SR 3.5.1.1, SR 3.5.1.7, and SR 3.5.1.10 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.6, respectively.

SR 3.5.2.4

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The 31 day Frequency is appropriate because the valves are operated under procedural control and the probability of their being mispositioned during this time period is low.

In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System may operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Therefore, RHR valves that are required for LPCI subsystem operation may be aligned for decay heat removal. Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note that allows one LPCI subsystem of the RHR System to be considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function if all the required valves in the LPCI flow path can be manually realigned (remote or local) to allow injection into the RFV, and the system is not



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

BASES		
SURVEILLANCE	SR 3.5.2.4 (continued)	
REQUIREMENTS	otherwise inoperable. This will ensure adequate core cooling if an inadvertent RPV draindown should occur.	
REFERENCIS	1. FSAR, Section [6.3.2].	



B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

8 3.5.3 RCIC System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The RCIC System is not part of the ECCS; however, the RCIC System is included with the ECCS section because of their similar functions.

The RCIC System is designed to operate either automatically or manually following reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation accompanied by a loss of coolant flow from the feedwater system to provide adequate core cooling and control of the RPV water level. Under these conditions, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and RCIC systems perform similar functions. The RCIC System design requirements ensure that the criteria of Reference 1 are satisfied.

The RCIC System (Ref. 2) consists of a steam driven turbine pump unit, piping, and valves to provide steam to the turbine, as well as piping and valves to transfer water from the suction source to the core via the feedwater system line, where the coolant is distributed within the RPV through the feedwater sparger. Suction piping is provided from the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool. Pump suction is normally aligned to the CST to minimize injection of suppression pool water into the RPV. However, if the CST water supply is low, or the suppression pool level is high, an automatic transfer to the suppression pool water source ensures a water supply for continuous of eration of the RCIC System. The steam supply to the turbine is piped from a main steam line upstream of the associated inboard main steam line isolation valve.

The RCIC System is designed to provide core cooling for a wide range of reactor pressures [165 psig to 1155 psig]. Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the RCIC turbine accelerates to a specified speed. As the RCIC flow increases, the turbine control valve is automatically adjusted to maintain design flow. Exhaust steam from the RCIC turbine is discharged to the suppression pool. A full flow test line is provided to route water from and to the CST to allow testing of the RCIC System during normal operation without injecting water into the RPV.

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BWR/4 STS

B 3.5-23

BACKGROUND (continued)	The RCIC pump is provided with a minimum flow bypass line, which discharges to the suppression pool. The valves in this line automatically open to prevent pump damage due to overheating when other discharge line valves are closed. To ensure rapid delivery of water to the RPV and to minimize water hammer effects, the RCIC System discharge piping is kept full of water. The RCIC System is normally aligned to the CST. The height of water in the CST is sufficient to maintain the piping full of water up to the first isolation valve. The relative height of the feedwater line connection for RCIC is such that the water in the feedwater lines keeps the remaining portion of the RCIC discharge line full of water. Therefore, RCIC does not require a "keep fill" system.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The function of the RCIC System is to respond to transient events by providing makeup coolant to the reactor. The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safety Feature System and no credit is taken in the safety analyses for RCIC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, however, the system is included in the Technical Specifications, as required by the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO	The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System provides adequate core cooling such that actuation of any of the low pressure ECCS subsystems is not required in the event of RPV isolation accompanied by a loss of feedwater flow. The RCIC System has sufficient capacity for maintaining RPV inventory during an isolation event.
APPLICABILITY	The RCIC System is required to be OPERABLE during MODE 1, and MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, since RCIC is the primary non-ECCS water source for core cooling when the reactor is isolated and pressurized. In MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure ≤ 150 psig, and in MCDES 4 and 5, RCIC is not required to be OPERABLE since the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the RPV.

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

BASES





RCIC System B 3.5.3

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

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A.1 and A.2

If the RCIC System is inoperable during MODE 1, or MCDE 2 or 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > [150] nsig, and the HPCI System is immediately verified to be OPERABLE, the RCIC System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days. In this Condition, loss of the RCIC System will not affect the overall plant capability to provide makeup inventory at high reactor pressure since the HPCI System is the only high pressure system assumed to function during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). OPERABILITY of HPCI is therefore immediately verified when the RCIC System is inoperable. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information, to determine if HPCI is out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean it is necessary to perform the Surveillances needed ty demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the HPCI System. If the OPE ABILITY of the HPCI System cannot be immediately verified, however, Condition B must be immediately entered. For transients and certain abnormal events with no LOCA. RCIC (as opposed to HPCI) is the preferred source of makeup coolant because of its relatively small capacity, which allows easier control of the RPV water level. Therefore, a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable RCIC to OPERABLE status.

The 14 day Completion Time is based on a reliability study (Ref. 3) that evaluated the impact on ECCS availability, assuming various components and subsystems were taken out of service. The results were used to calculate the average availability of ECCS equipment needed to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA as a function of allowed outage times (AOTs). Because of similar functions of HPCI and RCIC, the AOTs (i.e., Completion Times) determined for HPCI are also applied to RCIC.

B.1 and B.2

If the RCIC System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or if the HPCI System is simultaneously inoperable, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and reactor steam dome pressure reduced to \$\le [150] psig within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times



(continued)

ACTIONS

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.3.1

The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge line of the RCIC System full of water ensures that the system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the Reactor Coolant System upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring the line is full is to vent at the high points. The 31 day Frequency is based on the gradual nature of void buildup in the RCIC piping, the procedural controls governing system operation, and operating experience.

SR 3.5.3.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RCIC flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path will exist for RCIC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. For the RCIC System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.

The 31 day Frequency of this SR was derived from the Inservice Testing Program requirements for performing valve testing at least once every 92 days. The Frequency of



SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.3.2 (continued)

31 days is further justified because the valves are operated under procedural control and because improper valve position would affect only the RCIC System. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.5.3.3 and SR 3.5.3.4

The RCIC pump flow rates ensure that the system con maintain reactor coolant inventory during pressurized conditions with the RPV isolated. The flow tests for the RCIC System are performed at two different pressure ranges such that system capability to provide rated flow is tested both at the higher and lower operating ranges of the system. Since the required reactor steam dome pressure must be available to perform SR 3.5.3.3 and SR 3.5.3.4, sufficient time is allowed after adequate pressure is achieved to perform these SRs. Reactor startup is allowed prior to performing the low pressure Surveiliance because the reactor pressure is low and the time allowed to satisfactorily perform the Surveillance is short. The reactor pressure is allowed to be increased to normal operating pressure since it is assumed that the low pressure Surveillance has been satisfactorily completed and there is no indication or reason to believe that RCIC is inoperable. Therefore, these SRs are modified by Notes that state the Surveillances are not required to be performed until 12 hours after the specified reactor steam dome pressure is reached.

A 92 day Frequency for SR 3.5.3.3 is consistent with the Inservice Testing Program requirements. The 18 month Frequency for SR 3.5.3.4 is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

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BWR/4 STS

RCIC System B 3.5.3

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

BASES

SR 3.5.3.5

The RCIC System is required to actuate automatically in order to verify its design function satisfactorily. This Surveillance verifies that, with a required system initiation signal (actual or simulated), the automatic initiation logic of the RCIC System will cause the system to operate as designed, including actuation of the system throughout its emergency operating sequence; that is, automatic pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions. This test also ensures the RCIC System will automatically restart on an RPV low water level (Level 2) signal received subsequent to an RPV high water level (Level 8) trip and that the suction is automatically transferred from the CST to the suppression pool. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST performed in LCO 3.3.5.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection during the Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance.

REFERENCES	1.	10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 33.
	2.	FSAR, Section [5.5.6].
	3.	Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS

Components," December 1, 1975.



B 3.5-28

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment

GASES

EACKGROUND The function of the primary containment is to isolate and contain fission products released from the Reactor Primary System following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material. The primary containment consists of a steel lined, reinforced concrete vessel, which surrounds the Reactor Primary System and provides an essentially leak tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment.

> The isolation devices for the penetrations in the primary containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

- a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
 - capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic Containment Isolation System, or
 - closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)";
- b. The primary containment air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.2, "Primary Containment Air Lock";
- c. The pressurized sealing mechanism associated with a penetration is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.[].

This Specification ensures that the performance of the primary containment, in the event of a DBA, meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.



Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the primary containment is that SAFETY ANALYSES it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

> The DSA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage.

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary containment are presented in References 1 and 2. The safety analyses assume a nonmechanistic fission product release following a DBA, which forms the basis for determination of offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, based on an assumed leakage rate from the primary containment. OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L_s) is [1.2]% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the maximum peak containment pressure (P_s) of [57.5] psig or [0.84]% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the reduced pressure of P_t ([28.8] psig) (Ref. 1).

Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

Primary containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to within the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3). Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses.

Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.2.

B 3.6-2

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.

ACTIONS

A.1

In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2

If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.1

Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions. Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (SR 3.6.1.2.1), [secondary containment bypass leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.12),] [resilient seal primary containment purge valve leakage testing (SR 3.6.1.3.7),]



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BWR/4 STS

REQUIREMENTS

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS <u>SR 3.6.1.1.1</u> (continued)

main steam isolation valve leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.13), or hydrostatically tested valve leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.14) does not necessarily result in a failure of this SR. The impact of the failure to meet these SRs must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. The Frequency is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions. Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.

SR 3.6.1.1.2

Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR measures drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure during a [10] minute period to ensure that the leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.

Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression chamber or the drywell does not change by more than [0.25] inch of water per minute over a 10 minute period. The leakage test is performed every [18 months]. The [18 month] Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in view of the fact that component failures that might have affected this test are identified by other primary containment SRs. Two consecutive test failures, however, would indicate unexpected primary containment degradation; in this event, as the Note indicates, increasing the Frequency to once every [9 months] is required until the situation is remedied as evidenced by passing two consecutive tests.

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1

BASES (continued)

REFERENCES	1.	FSAR, Section [6.2].
	2.	FSAR, Section [15.1.39].
	3.	10 CFR 50, Appendix J.



BWR/4 STS

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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Lock

BASES

BACKGROUNC

One double door primary containment air lock has been built into the primary containment to provide personnel access to the drywell and to provide primary containment isolation during the process of personnel entering and exiting the drywell. The air lock is designed to withstand the same loads, temperatures, and peak design internal and external pressures as the primary containment (Ref. 1). As part of the primary containment, the air lock limits the release of radioactive material to the environment during normal unit operation and through a range of transients and accidents up to and including postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).

Each air lock door has been designed and tested to certify its ability to withstand a pressure in excess of the maximum expected pressure following a DBA in primary containment. Each of the doors contains double gasketed seals and local leakage rate testing capability to ensure pressure integrity. To effect a leak tight seal, the air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e., an increase in primary containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door).

Each air lock is nominally a right circular cylinder, 10 ft in diameter, with doors at each end that are interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening. The air lock is provided with limit switches on both doors that provide control room indication of door position. [Additionally, control room indication is provided to alert the operator whenever an air lock interlock mechanism is defeated.] During periods when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent primary containment entry is necessary. Under some conditions as allowed by this LCO, the primary containment may be accessed through the air lock, when the interlock mechanism has failed, by manually performing the interlock function.

The primary containment air lock forms part of the primary containment pressure boundary. As such, air lock integrity and leak tightness are essential for maintaining primary

(continued)



BWR/4 STS



Primary Containment Air Lock B 3.6.1.2

BACKGRUJND	containment leakage rate to within limits in the event of a
(continued)	DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness
	may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in
	the unit safety analysis. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate
	requirements conform with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 2), as
	modified by approved exemptions.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage. The primary containment is designed with a maximum allowable leakage rate (L_) of 1.2% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at the calculated maximum peak containment pressure (P_) of 57.5 psig (Ref. 3). This allowable leakage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.

> Primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is also required to minimize the amount of fission product gases that may escape primary containment through the air lock and contaminate and pressurize the secondary containment.

The primary containment air lock satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

As part of primary containment, the air lock's safety function is related to control of containment leakage rates following a DBA. Thus, the air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.

The primary containment air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door to be opened at a time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of primary containment does not exist when primary containment is required to be



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Primary Containment Air Lock B 3.6.1.2

BASES	
LCO (continued)	OPERABLE. Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events. Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry and exit from primary containment.
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the primary containment air lock is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.
ACTIONS	The ACTIONS are modified by Note 1, which allows entry and exit to perform repairs of the affected air lock component. If the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily accessed to repair. If the inner door is the one that is inoperable, however, then a short time exists when the containment boundary is not intact (during access through the outer door). The ability to open the OPERABLE door, even if it means the primary containment boundary is temporarily not intact, is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the primary containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door is expected to be open. The OPERABLE door must be immediately closed after each entry and exit.
	The ACTICHS are modified by a second Note, which ensures appropriate remedial measures are taken when necessary. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, actions are not required, even if primary containment is exceeding its leakage limit. Therefore, the Note is added to require ACTIONS for LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment,' to be taken in this event.
	A.1. A.2. and A.3
	With one primary containment air lock door inoperable, the OPERABLE door must be verified closed (Required Action A.1) in the air lock. This ensures that a leak tight primary
	(continued)



BWR/4 STS

ACTIONS

BASES

A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued)

containment barrier is maintained by the use of an OPERABLE air lock door. This action must be completed within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

In addition, the air lock penetration must be isolated by locking closed the OPERABLE air lock door within the 24 hour Completion Time. The 24 hour Completion Time is considered reasonable for locking the OPERABLE air lock door, considering that the OPERABLE door is being maintained closed.

Required Action A.3 ensures that the air lock with an inoperable door has been isolated by the use of a locked closed OPERABLE air lock door. This ensures that an acceptable primary containment leakage boundary is maintained. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the low likelihood of a locked door being mispositioned and other administrative controls. Required Action A.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas or areas with limited access due to inerting and allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the appropriate remedial actions. Note 2 allows use of the air lock for entry and exit for 7 days under administrative controls. Primary containment entry may be required to perform Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillances and Required Actions, as well as other activities on equipment inside primary containment that are required by TS or activities on equipment that support TS-required equipment. This Note is



(continued)

BWR/4 STS



ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued)

not intended to preclude performing other activities (i.e., non-TS-related activities) if the primary containment was entered, using the inoperable air lock, to perform an allowed activity listed above. This allowance is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the primary containment during the short time that the OPERABLE door is expected to be open.

B.1, B.2, and B.3

With an air lock interlock mechanism inoperable, the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are consistent with those specified in Condition A.

The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are the appropriate remedial actions. Note 2 allows entry into and exit from the primary containment under the control of a dedicated individual stationed at the air lock to ensure that only one door is opened at a time (i.e., the individual performs the function of the interlock).

Required Action B.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas or areas with limited access due to inerting and that allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper position, is small.

C.1. C.2. and C.3

If the air lock is inoperable for reasons other than those described in Condition A or B, Required Action C.1 requires action to be immediately initiated to evaluate containment overall leakage rates using current air lock leakage test



ACTIONS.

C.1, C.2, and C.3 (continued)

results. An evaluation is acceptable since it is overly conservative to immediately declare the primary containment inoperable if both doors in an air lock have failed a seal test or if the overall air lock leakage is not within limits. In many instances (e.g., only one seal per door has failed), primary containment remains OPERABLE, yet only 1 hour (according to LCO 3.6.1.1) would be provided to restore the air lock door to OPERABLE status prior to requiring a plant shutdown. In addition, even with both doors failing the seal test, the overall containment leakage rate can still be within limits.

Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the primary containment air lock must be verified closed. This action must be completed within the 1 hour Completion Time. This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, which require that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

Additionally, the air lock must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable for restoring an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status considering that at least one door is maintained closed in the air lock.

D.1 and D.2

If the inoperable primary containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reaconable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

BWR/4 STS

SR 3.6.1.2.1

Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of

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B 3.6-11

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.6.1.2.1</u> (continued)

10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 2), as modified by approved exemptions. This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established [during initial air lock and primary containment OPERABILITY testing]. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 2), as modified by approved exemptions. Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.

The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an incperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR, requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate.

SR 3.6.1.2.2

The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when primary containment is entered, this test is only required to be performed upon entering primary containment, but is not required more frequently than 184 days when primary containment is de-inerted. The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is

(continued)

BWR/4 STS

BASES				
SURVEILLANCE	<u>SR 3.6.1.2.2</u> (continued) considered adequate in view of other administrative controls [such as indications of interlock mechanism status, available to operations personnel].			
KEQUIKEMENIS				
REFERENCES	1. FSAR, Section [3.8.2.8.2.2].			
	2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.			





B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the PCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) to within limits. Primary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a DBA.

The OPERABILITY requirements for PCIVs help ensure that adequate primary containment leak tightness is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential leakage paths to the environment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that primary containment leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses will not be exceeded. These isolation devices are either passive or active (automatic). Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), blind flanges, and closed systems are considered passive devices. Check valves, or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident, are considered active devices. Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration so that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analyses. One of these barriers may be a closed system.

The primary containment purge lines are [18] inches in diameter; vent lines are [18] inches in diameter. The [18] inch primary containment purge valves are normally maintained closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure leak tightness. The isolation valves on the [18] inch vent lines have [2] inch bypass lines around them for use during normal reactor operation. Two additional redundant excess flow isolation dampers are provided on the vent line upstream of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System filter trains. These isolation dampers, together with the PCIVs, will prevent high pressure from reaching the SGT System filter trains in

BACKGROUND the unlikely event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) (continued) during venting. Closure of the excess flow isolation dampers will not prevent the SGT System from performing its design function (that is, to maintain a negative pressure in the secondary containment). To ensure that a vent path is available, a [2] inch bypass line is provided around the dampers.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The PCIV's LCO was derived from the requirements related to the control of leakage from the primary containment during major accidents. This LCO is intended to ensure that primary containment leakage rates do not exceed the values assumed in the safety analyses. As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment. Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to this LCO.

The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within primary containment are a LOCA and a main steam line break (MSLB). In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or close within the required isolation times following event initiation. This ensures that potential leakage paths to the environment through PCIVs (and primary containment purge valves) are minimized. Of the events analyzed in Reference 1, the MSLB is the most limiting event due to radiological consequences. The closure time of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) is the most significant variable from a radiological standpoint. The MSIVs are required to close within 3 to 5 seconds; therefore, the 5 second closure time is assumed in the analysis. The safety analyses assume that the purge valves were closed at event initiation. Likewise, it is assumed that the primary containment is isolated such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage.

The DBA analysis assumes that within 60 seconds of the accident, isolation of the primary containment is complete and leakage is terminated, except for the maximum allowable leakage rate, L. The primary containment isolation total response time of 60 seconds includes signal delay, diesel generator startup (for loss of offsite power), and PCIV struke times.



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BWR/4 STS

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3



APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

BASES

The single failure criterion required to be imposed in the conduct of unit safety analyses was considered in the original design of the primary containment purge valves. Two valves in series on each purge line provide assurance that both the supply and exhaust lines could be isolated even if a single failure occurred.

[The primary containment purge valves may be unable to close in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, each of the purge valves is required to remain sealed closed during MODES 1, 2, and 3.] In this case, the single failure criterion remains applicable to the primary containment purge valve due to failure in the control circuit associated with each valve. Again, the primary containment purge valve design precludes a single failure from compromising primary containment OPERABILITY as long as the system is operated in accordance with this LCO.

PCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

PCIVs form a part of the primary containment boundary. The PCIV safety function is related to control of primary containment leakage rates during a DBA.

The power operated, automatic isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The [18] inch purge valves must be maintained sealed closed [or blocked to prevent full opening]. The valves covered by this LCO are listed with their associated stroke times in Reference 2.

The normally closed isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed, automatic valves are de-activated and secured in their closed position, blind flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves and devices are those listed in Reference 2.

Purge valves with resilient seals, secondary bypass valves, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must meet additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type C testing.

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BWR/4 STS

B 3.6-16



LCO (continued) This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to control leakage from the primary containment during accidents.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs are not equired to be OPERABLE and the primary containment purge valves are not required to be sealed closed in MODES 4 and 5. Certain valves, however, are required to be OPERABLE to prevent inadvertent reactor vessel draindown. These valves are those whose associated instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation." (This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) [except for purge valve flow path(s)] to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated. Due to the size of the primary containment purge line penetration and the fact that those penetrations exhaust directly from the containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these valves is not allowed to be opened under administrative controls. A single purge valve in a penetration flow path may be opened to effect repairs to an inoperable valve, as allowed by the Note to SR 3.6.3.1.

A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

The ACTIONS are modified by a third Note, which ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling Systems subsystem is

(continued)

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3

BWR/4 STS

B 3.6-17
PCIVs B 3.6.1.3

BASES

ACTIONS (continued) inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require that the proper actions are taken.

A.1 and A.2

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable [except for purge valve leakage not within limit], the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured. For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the valve used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time (8 hours for main steam lines). The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the fime required to isolate the penetration and the relative

Jortance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. For main steam lines, an 8 hour Completion Time is allowed. The Completion Time of 8 hours for the main steam lines allows a period of time to r' tore the MSIVs to OPERABLE status given the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown.

For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, and no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those valves outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "once



ACTIONS

BASES

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the valves inside primary containment, the time period specified "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the valves and other administrative controls ensuring that valve misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

Condition A is codified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two PCIVs For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C on des the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

8.1

With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to constrain flow paths with two PCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

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12

BWR/4 S >

B 3.6-19

1.12





PCIV: B 3.6.1.3

BASES

ACTIONS

(continued)

C.1 and C.2

with one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the [4] hour Completion Time. The Completion Time of [4] hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable considering the instrument and the small pipe diameter of penetration (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment enetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate beck e the valves are operated under administrative controls ... the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV. For penetration flow paths with two PCIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Reguired Actions.

Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by adm nistrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

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BWR/4 STS

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B 3.6-20

ACTIONS (continued) 0.1

with the secondary containment bypass leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions of the . fety analysis are not met. Therefore, the leakage must be isstored to within limit within 4 hours. Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is 'solated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration and the relative importance of secondary containment bypass leakage to the overall containment function.

E.1, E.2, and E.3

In the event one or more containment purge valves are not within the purge valve leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits or the affected penetration must be isolated. The method of isolation must be by the use of a least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a [closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, and blind flange]. A purge valve with resilient seals utilized to satisfy Required Action E.1 must have been demonstrated to meet the leakage requirements of SR 3.6.1.3.7. The specified Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one containment purge valve remains closed (refer to the Note to SR 3.6.1.3.1) so that a gross breach of containment does not exist.

In accordance with Required Action E.2, this penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. The periodic verification is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, which are no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not

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B 3.6-21

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1, E.2, and E.3 (continued)

require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those isolation devices outside containment and potentially capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as "prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

For the containment purge valve with resilient seal that is isolated in accordance with Required Action E.1. SR 3.6.1.3.7 must be performed at least once every [] days. This provides assurance that degradation of the resilient seal is detected and confirms that the leakage rate of the containment purge valve does not increase during the time the penetration is isolated. The normal Frequency for SR 3.6.1.3.7, 184 days, is based on an NRC initiative, Generic Issue B-20 (Ref. 3). Since more reliance is placed on a single valve while in this Condition, it is prudent to perform the SR more often. Therefore, a Frequency of once per [] days was chosen and has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience.

F.1 and F.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systeme

G.1, H.1, I.1, and I.2

If any ^p quired Action and a sociated Completion Time cannot be met, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the



ACTIONS

G.1, H.1, I.1, and I.2 (continued)

LCO does not apply. If suplicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fiss on product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended and valve(s) are restored to OPERABLE status. If suspending an OPDRV would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valve(s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.

SURVEILLANCE

<u>SR 3.6.1.3.1</u>

Each [18] inch primary containment purge valve is required to be verified sealed closed at 31 day intervals. This SR is designed to ensure that a gross breach of primary containment is not caused by an inadvertent or spurious opening of a primary containment purge valve. Detailed analysis of the purge valves failed to conclusively acmonstrate their ability to close during a LOCA in time to offsite doses. Primary containment purge valves that aled closed must have motive power to the valve operator remained. This can be accomplished by de-energizing the source of electric power or removing the air supply to the weive operator. In this application, the term "sealed" has my connotation of leak tightness. The 31 day Frequency result of an NRC initiative, Generic Issue B-24 (Ref. 4), related to primary containment purge valve use during unit operations.

This SR allows a valve that is open under administrative controls to not meet the SR during the time the valve is open. Opening a purge valve under administrative controls is restricted to one valve in a penetration flow path at a given time (refer to discussion for Note 1 of the ACTIONS)

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BWR/4 STS

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.6.1.3.1</u> (continued)

in order to effect repairs to that valve. This allows one purge valve to be opened without resulting in a failure of the Surveillance and resultant entry into the ACTIONS for this purge valve, provided the stated restrictions are met. Condition E must be entered during this allowance, and the valve opened only as necessary for effecting repairs. Each purge valve in the penetration flow path may be alternately opened, provided one remains sealed closed, if necessary, to complete repairs on the penetration.

The SR is modified by a Note stating that primary containment purge valves are only required to be sealed closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves may not be capable of closing before the pressure pulse affects systems downstream of the purge valves or the release of radioactive material will exceed limits prior to the closing of the purge valves. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are allowed to be open.

SR 3.6.1.3.2

This SR ensures that the primary containment purge valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. [The SR is also modified by a Note (Note 1), stating that primary containment purge valves are only required to be closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves may not be capable of closing before the pressure pulse affects systems downstream of the purge valves, or the release of radioactive material will exceed limits prior to the purge valves closing. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are allowed to be open.] The SR is modified by a Note (Note 2) stating that the SR is not required to be met when the purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may be opened for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open. The

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BWR/4 STS



SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

F SR 3.6.1.3.2 (continued)

[18] inch purge valves are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other PCIV requirements discussed in SR 3.6.1.3.3.

SR 3.6.1.3.3

This SR verifies that each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.

This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those valves outside primary containment, and capable of being mispositioned, are in the correct position. Since verification of valve position for valves outside primary containment is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the valves are in the correct positions.

Two Notes h ve been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have teen verified to be in the proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the valves are open.

SR 3.6.1.3.4

This SR verifies that each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and is required to be closed during

(continued)



Rev. 0, 09/28/92

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.3.4 (continued)

accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits. For valves inside primary containment, the Frequency defined as "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these valves and flanges are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that valves that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the valves are open.

SR 3.6.1.3.5

The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Surveillance of explosive charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will actuate when required. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience that has demonstrated the reliability of the explosive charge continuity.

SR 3.6.1.3.6

Verifying the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV full closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.7. The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the



SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.1.3.6 (continued)

safety analyses. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are [in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program or 92 days].

SR 3.6.1.3.7

For primary containment purge valves with resilient seals, additional leakage rate testing beyond the test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 5), is required to ensure OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types. Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining this penetration leak tight (due to the direct path between primary containment and the environment), a Frequency of 184 days was established as part of the NRC resolution on Generic Issue B-20 (Ref. 3).

Additionally, this SR must be performed once within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that which occurs to a valve that has not been opened). Thus, decreasing the interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve has been opened.

The SR is modified by a Note stating that the primary containment purge valves are only required to meet leakage rate testing requirements in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, purge valve leakage must be minimized to ensure offsite radiological release is within limits. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are allowed to be open.

A second Note has been added to this SR requiring that the results be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that primary containment purge valve leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.6.1.3.8

Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the DBA analyses. This ensures that the calculated radiological consequences of these events remain within 10 CFR 100 limits. The Frequency of this SR is [in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program or 18 months].

SR 3.6.1.3.9

Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a D3A. This SR ensures that each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.3.7 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The [18] month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed only during a unit outage since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt the normal operation of many critical components. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.1.3.10

This SR requires a demonstration that each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve (EFCV) is OPERABLE by verifying that the valve [reduces flow to ≤ 1 gph on a simulated instrument line break]. This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform so that predicted radiological consequences will not be exceeded during the postulated instrument line break event evaluated in Reference 6. The [18] month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating



SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.6.1.3.10</u> (continued)

experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.1.3.11

The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.5).

SR 3.6.1.3.12

This SR ensures that the leakage rate of secondary containment bypass leakage paths is less than the specified leakage rate. This provides assurance that the assumptions in the radiological evaluations of Reference 7 are met. The leakage rate of each bypass leakage path is assumed to be the maximum pathway leakage (leakage through the worse of the two isolation valves) unless the penetration is isolated by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. In this case, the leakage rate of the isolated bypass leakage path is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed, the actual leakage rate is the lesser leakage rate of the two valves. This method of quantifying maximum pathway leakage is only to be used for this SR (i.e., Appendix J maximum pathway leakage limits are to be quantified in accordance with Appendix J). The [18] month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed only during plant outage. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the [18] month



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.6.1.3.12</u> (continued)

Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. [A Note has been added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that secondary containment bypass leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate.]

SR 3.6.1.3.13

The analyses in References 2 and 6 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be $\leq [11.5]$ sofh when tested at $\geq P_t$ ([28.8] psig). The MSIV leakage rate must be verified to be in accordance with the leakage test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 5), as modified by approved exemptions. A Note has been added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that MSIV leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions; thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.

SR 3.6.1.3.14

Surveillance of hydrostatically tested lines provides assurance that the calculation assumptions of Reference 2 are met. Note also that dual function valves must pass all applicable SRs, including the Type C leakage rate test (SR 3.6.1.1.1), if appropriate. The combined leakage rates must be demonstrated in accordance with the leakage rate test requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 5), as modified by approved exemptions.

This SR has been modified by two Notes. [Note 1 states that these valves are only required to meet the combined leakage rate in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since this is when the Reactor Coolant System is pressurized and primary containment is required. In some instances, the valves are required to be capable of automatically closing during MODES other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. However, their leak tightness under

(continued)

BWR/4 STS

B 3.6-30

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

BASES

<u>SR 3.6.1.3.14</u> (continued)

accident conditions is not required in these other MODES or conditions.] Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that these valves are properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate.

SR 3.6.1.3.15

Reviewer's Note: This SR is only required for those plants with purge valves with resilient seals allowed to be open during [MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4] and having blocking devices that are not permanently installed on the valves.

Verifying each [] inch primary containment purge valve is blocked to restrict opening to ≤ [50]% is required to ensure that the valves can close under DBA conditions within the times assumed in the analysis of References 2 and 6. [The SR is modified by a Note stating that this SR is only required to be met in MODES 1, 2, and 3.] If a LOCA occurs, the purge valves must close to maintain containment leakage within the values assumed in the accident analysis. At other times when purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies), pressurization concerns are not present, thus the purge valves can be fully open. The [18] month Frequency is appropriate because the blocking devices are typically removed only during a refueling outage.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter [15].

- 2. FSAR, Table [6.2-5].
- Generic Issue B-20, "Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration."
- 4. Generic Issue B-24.
- 5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

SASES				
REFERENCES (continued)	6.	FSAR,	Section	[6.2].
	7.	FSAR,	Section	[15.1.39].





B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.4 Drywell Pressure

BASES The drywell pressure is limited during normal operations to BACKGROUND preserve the initial conditions assumed in the accident analysis for a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or loss of coolant accident (LOCA). APPLICABLE Primary containment performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for postulated LOCAs (Ref. 1). SAFETY ANALYSES Among the inputs to the DBA is the initial primary containment internal pressure (Ref. 1). Analyses assume an initial drywell pressure of [0.75 psig]. This limitation ensures that the safety analysis remains valid by maintaining the expected initial conditions and ensures that the peak LOCA drywell internal pressure does not exceed the maximum allowable of [62] psig. The maximum calculated drywell pressure occurs during the reactor blowdown phase of the DBA, which assumes an instantaneous recirculation line break. The calculated peak drywell pressure for this limiting event is [57.5] psig (Ref. 1).

Drywell pressure satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO In the event of a DBA, with an initial drywell pressure ≤ [0.75 psig], the resultant peak drywell accident pressure will be maintained below the drywell design pressure.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, maintaining drywell pressure within limits is not required in MODE 4 or 5.



(continued)



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Drywell Pressure B 3.6.1.4

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1

With drywell pressure not within the limit of the LCO, drywell pressure must be restored within 1 hour. The Required Action is necessary to return operation to within the bounds of the primary containment analysis. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

B.1 and B.2

If drywell pressure cannot be restored to within limit within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.



SR 3.5.1.4.1

Verifying that drywell pressure is within limit ensures that unit operation remains within the limit assumed in the primary containment analysis. The 12 hour Frequency of this SR was developed, based on operating experience related to trending of drywell pressure variations during the applicable MODES. Furthermore, the 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal drywell pressure condition.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section [6.2].

Drywell Air Temperature B 3.6.1.5

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature

BASES

BACKGROUND The drywell contains the reactor vessel and piping, which add heat to the airspace. Drywell coolers remove heat and maintain a suitable environment. The average airspace temperature affects the calculated response to postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). The limitation on the drywell average air temperature was developed as reasonable, based on operating experience. The limitation on drywell air temperature is used in the Reference 1 safety analyses.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Primary containment performance is evaluated for a spectrum of break sizes for postulated loss for coolant accidents (LOCAs) (Ref. 1). Among the inputs to the design basis analysis is the initial drywell average air temperature (Ref. 1). Analyses assume an initial average drywell air temperature of [135]°F. This limitation ensures that the safety analysis remains valid by maintaining the expected initial conditions and ensures that the peak LOCA drywell temperature loes not exceed the maximum allowable of [340]°F (Ref. 2). Exceeding this design temperature may result in the degradation of the primary containment structure under accident loads. Equipment inside primary containment required to mitigate the effects of a DBA is designed to operate and be capable of operating under environmental conditions expected for the accident.

The most severe drywell temperature condition occurs as a result of a small Reactor Coolant System rupture above the reactor water level, which results in the blowdown of reactor steam to the drywell. The drywell temperature analysis considers main steam line breaks occurring inside the drywell and having break areas 0.01 ft², 0.1 ft², and 0.5 ft². The maximum calculated drywell average temperature of [326]°F occurs for the 0.1 ft² break (Ref. 3).

Drywell air temperature satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

Drywell Air Temperature B 3.6.1.5

BASES (continued)

LCO In the event of a DBA, with an initial drywell average air temperature less than or equal to the LCO temperature limit, the resultant peak accident temperature is maintained below the drywell design temperature. As a result, the ability of primary containment to perform its design function is ensured.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, maintaining drywell average air temperature within the limit is not required in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

With drywell average air temperature not within the limit of the LCO, drywell average air temperature must be restored within 8 hours. The Required Action is necessary to return operation to within the bounds of the primary containment analysis. The 8 hour Completion Time is acceptable, considering the sensitivity of the analysis to variations in this parameter, and provides sufficient time to correct minor problems.

B.1 and B.2

A.1

If the drywell average air temperature cannot be restored to within limit within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.





Drywell Air Temperature B 3.6.1.5

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.5.1

Verifying that the drywell average air temperature is within the LCO limit ensures that operation remains within the limits assumed for the primary containment analyses. Drywell air temperature is monitored in all quadrants and at various elevations (referenced to mean sea level). Due to the shape of the drywell, a volumetric average is used to determine an accurate representation of the actual average temperature.

The 24 hour Frequency of the SR was developed based on operating experience related to drywell average air temperature variations and temperature instrument drift during the applicable MODES and the low probability of a DBA occurring between surveillances. Furthermore, the 24 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal drywell air temperature condition.

REFERENCES

- 1. FSAR, Section [6.2].
- 2. FSAR, Section [6.2.1.4.1].
- 3. FSAR, Section [6.2.1.4.5].



B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.6 Low-Low Set (LLS) Valves

BASES

BACKGROUND

The safety/relief valves (S/RVs) can actuate in either the safety mode, the Automatic Depressurization System mode, or the LLS mode. In the LLS mode (or power actuated mode of operation), a pneumatic diaphragm and stem assembly overcomes the spring force and opens the pilot valve. As in the safety mode, opening the pilot valve allows a differential pressure to develop across the main valve piston and opens the main valve. The main valve can stay open with valve inlet steam pressure as low as [50] psig. Below this pressure, steam pressure may not be sufficient to hold the main valve open against the spring force of the pilot valves. The pneumatic operator is arranged so that its malfunction will not prevent the valve disk from lifting if steam inlet pressure exceeds the safety mode pressure setpoints.

[Four] of the S/RVs are equipped to provide the LLS function. The LLS logic causes the LLS valves to be opened at a lower pressure than the relief or safety mode pressure setpoints and stay open longer, so that reopening more than one S/RV is prevented on subsequent actuations. Therefore, the LLS function prevents excessive short duration S/RV cycles with valve actuation at the relief setpoint.

Each S/RV discharges steam through a discharge line and quencher to a location near the bottom of the suppression pool, which causes a load on the suppression pool wall. Actuation at lower reactor pressure results in a lower load.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The LLS relief mode Conctions to ensure that the containment design basis of one S/RV operating on "subsequent actuations" is met. In other words, multiple simultaneous openings of S/RVs (following the initial opening), and the corresponding higher loads, are avoided. The safety analysis demonstrates that the LLS functions to avoid the induced thrust loads on the S/RV discharge line resulting from "subsequent actuations" of the S/RV during Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). Furthermore, the LLS function justifies the primary containment analysis assumption that



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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	simultaneous S/RV openings occur only on the initial actuation for DBAs. Even though [four] LLS S/RVs are specified, all [four] LLS S/RVs do not operate in any DBA analysis.					
	LLS valves satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.					
LCO	[Four] LLS valves are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the assumptions of the safety analyses (Ref. 1). The requirements of this LCO are applicable to the mechanical and electrical/pneumatic capability of the LLS valves to function for controlling the opening and closing of the S/RVs.					
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, an event could cause pressurization of the reactor and opening of S/RVs. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the LLS valves OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5.					
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u>					
	With one LLS valve inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE LLS valves are adequate to perform the designed function. However, the overall reliability is reduced. The 14 day Completion Time takes into account the redundant capability afforded by the remaining LLS valves and the low probability of an event in which the remaining LLS valve capability would be inadequate.					
	R 1 and R 2					

If two or more LLS valves are inoperable or if the inoperable LLS valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The



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Rev. 0, 09/28/92

LLS Valves B 3.6.1.6

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE

<u>SR 3.6.1.6.1</u>

A manual actuation of each LLS valve is performed to verify that the valve and solenoids are functioning properly and no blockage exists in the valve discharge line. This can be demonstrated by the response of the turbine control or bypass valve, by a change in the measured steam flow, or by any other method that is suitable to verify steam flow. Adequate reactor steam dome pressure must be available to perform this test to avoid damaging the valve. The [18] month Frequency was based on the S/RV tests required by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI (Ref. 2). The [18] month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

Since steam pressure is required to perform the Surveillance, however, and steam may not be available during a unit outage, the Surveillance may be performed during the startup following a unit outage. Unit startup is allowed prior to performing the test because valve OPERABILITY and the setpoints for overpressure protection are verified by Reference 2 prior to valve installation. After the required reactor steam dome pressure is reached 12 hours is allowed to prepare for and perform the test. Adequate pressure at which this test is to be performed is \geq [920] psig (the pressure recommended by the valve manufacturer).



LLS Valves B 3.6.1.6

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

(continued)

BASES

SR 3.6.1.6.2

The LLS designated S/RVs are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals. A system functional test is performed to verify that the mechanical portions (i.e., solenoids) of the LLS function operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.3.7 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation. This prevents a reactor pressure vessel pressure blowdown.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section [5.5.17].

2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.



B 3.6 CON AINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.7 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers is to relieve vacuum when primary containment depressurizes below reactor building pressure. If the drywell depressurizes below reactor building pressure, the negative differential pressure is mitigated by flow through the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers and through the suppression-chamber-todrywell vacuum breakers. The design of the external (reactor building-to-suppression chamber) vacuum relief provisions consists of two vacuum breakers (a vacuum breaker and an air operated butterfly valve), located in series in each of two lines from the reactor building to the suppression chamber airspace. The butterfly valve is actuated by differential pressure. The vacuum breaker is self actuating and can be remotely operated for testing purposes. The two vacuum breakers in series must be closed to maintain a leak tight primary containment boundary.

A negative differential pressure across the drywell wall is caused by rapid depressurization of the drywell. Events that cause this rapid depressurization are cooling cycles, inadvertent primary containment spray actuation, and steam condensation in the event of a primary system rupture. Reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers prevent an excessive negative differential pressure across the primary containment boundary. Cooling cycles result in minor pressure transients in the drywell, which occur slowly and are normally controlled by heating and ventilation equipment. Inadvertent spray actuation results in a more significant pressure transient and becomes important in sizing the external (reactor building-to-suppression chamber) vacuum breakers.

The external vacuum breakers are sized on the basis of the air flow from the secondary containment that is required to mitigate the depressurization transient and limit the maximum negative containment (drywell and suppression chamber) pressure to within design limits. The maximum depressurization rate is a function of the primary containment spray flow rate and temperature and the assumed initial conditions of the primary containment atmosphere.



BASES

BACKGROUND Low spray temperatures and atmospheric conditions that yield the minimum amount of contained noncondensible gases are assumed for conservatism.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Analytical methods and assumptions involving the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers are presented in Reference 1 as part of the accident response of the containment systems. Internal (suppression-chamberto-drywell) and external (reactor building-to-suppression chamber) vacuum breakers are provided as part of the primary containment to limit the negative differential pressure across the drywell and suppression chamber walls, which form part of the primary containment boundary.

The safety analyses assume the external vacuum breakers to be closed initially and to be fully open at [0.5] psid (Ref. 1). Additionally, of the two reactor building-tosuppression chamber vacuum breakers, one is assumed to fail in a closed position to satisfy the single active failure criterion. Design Basis Accident (DBA) analyses require the vacuum breakers to be closed initially and to remain closed and leak tight with positive primary containment pressur-

Five cases were considered in the safety analyses to determine the adequacy of the external vacuum breakers:

- A small break loss of coolant accident followed by actuation of both primary containment spray loops;
- Inadvertent actuation of one primary containment spray loop during normal operation;
- Inadvertent actuation of both primary containment spray loops during normal operation;
- d. A postulated DBA assuming Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) runout flow with a condensation effectiveness of 50%; and
- e. A postulated DBA assuming ECCS runout flow with a condensation effectiveness of 100%.

The results of these five cases show that the external vacuum breakers, with an opening setpoint of [0.5] psid, are



BWR/4 STS

B 3.6-43

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	capable of maintaining the differential pressure within design limits.					
	The reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.					
LCO	All reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the assumptions used in the safety analyses. The requirement ensures that the two vacuum breakers (vacuum breaker and air operated butterfly valve) in each of the two lines from the reactor building to the suppression chamber airspace are closed (except during testing or when performing their intended function). Also, the requirement ensures both vacuum breakers in each line will open to relieve a negative pressure in the suppression chamber.					
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the Suppression Pool Spray System is required to be OPERABLE to mitigate the effects of a DBA. Excessive negative pressure inside primary containment could occur due to inadvertent initiation of this system. Therefore, the vacuum breakers are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, when the Suppression Pool Spray System is required to be OPERABLE, to mitigate the effects of inadvertent actuation of the Suppression Pool Spray System.					
	Also, in MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could result in excessive negative differential pressure across the drywell wall caused by the rapid depressurization of the drywell. The event that i ults in the limiting rapid depressurization of the drywell is the primary system rupture, which purges the drywell of air and fills the drywell free airspace with steam. Subsequent condensation of the steam would result in depressurization of the drywell. The limiting pressure and temperature of the primary system prior to a DBA occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.					
	In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining reactor					
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BWR/4 STS

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8 3.6-44

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

BASES

APPLICABILITY building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers OPERABLE is (continued) not required in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

A.1

With one or more vacuum breakers not closed, the leak tight primary containment boundary may be threatened. Therefore, the inoperable vacuum breakers must be restored to OPERABLE status or the open vacuum breaker closed within 72 hours. The 72 hour Completion Time is consistent with requirements for inoperable suppression-chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers in LCO 3.6.1.8, "Suppression-Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers." The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the redundancy capability afforded by the remaining breakers, the fact that the OPERABLE breaker in each of the lines is closed, and the low probability of an event occurring that would require the vacuum breakers to be OPERABLE during this period.

B.1

With one or more lines with two vacuum breakers not closed, primary containment integrity is not maintained. Therefore, one open vacuum breaker must be closed within 1 hour. This Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

<u>C.1</u>

With one line with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, the leak tight primary containment boundary is intact. The ability to mitigate an event that causes a containment depressurization is threatened, however, if both vacuum breakers in at least one vacuum breaker penetration are not OPERABLE. Therefore, the inoperable vacuum breaker



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BWR/4 STS

B 3.6-45

Rev. 0, 09/28/92



BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. This is consistent with the Completion Time for Condition A and the fact that the leak tight primary containment boundary is being maintained.

D.1

With two [or more] lines with one or more vacuum breakers inoperable for opening, the primary containment boundary is intact. However, in the event of a containment depressurization, the function of the vacuum breakers is lost. Therefore, all vacuum breakers in [one] line must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. This Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.5.1.1, which requires that primary containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.

E.1 and E.2

If all the vacuum breakers in [one] line cannot be closed or restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.7.1

Each vacuum breaker is verified to be closed except when being tested (i.e., in accordance with SR 3.6.1.7.2 or when performing their intended function), to ensure that a potential breach in the primary containment boundary is not present. This Surveillance is performed by observing local or control room indications of vacuum breaker position or by verifying a differential pressure of [0.5] psid is maintained between the reactor building and suppression chamber. The 14 day Frequency is based on engineering



BASES

SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.7.1 (continued)

judgment, is considered adequate in view of other indications of vacuum breaker status available to operations personnel, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.6.1.7.2

Each vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens properly to perform its design function and returns to its fully closed position. This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The [92] day Frequency of this SR was developed based upon Inservice Testing Program requirements to perform valve testing at least once every [92] days.

SR 3.6.1.7.3

Demonstration of vacuum breaker opening setpoint is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of ≤ [0.5] psid is valid. The [18] month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. For this unit, the [18] month Frequency has been shown to be acceptable, based on operating experience, and is further justified because of other surveillances performed at shorter Frequencies that convey the proper functioning status of each vacuum breaker.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [6.2].



Suppression-Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.8

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.8 Suppression-Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers

BASES

BACKGROUND

The function of the suppression-chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers is to relieve vacuum in the drywell. There are [12] internal vacuum breakers located on the vent header of the vent system between the drywell and the suppression chamber, which allow air and steam flow from the suppression chamber to the drywell when the drywell is at a negative pressure with respect to the suppression chamber. Therefore, suppression-chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers prevent an excessive negative differential pressure across the wetwell drywell boundary. Each vacuum breaker is a self actuating valve, similar to a check valve, which can be remotely operated for testing purposes.

A negative differential pressure across the drywell wall is caused by rapid depressurization of the drywell. Events that cause this rapid depressurization are cooling cycles, inadvertent drywell spray actuation, and steam condensation from sprays or subcooled water reflood of a break in the event of a primary system rupture. Cooling cycles result in minor pressure transients in the drywell that occur slowly and are normally controlled by heating and ventilation equipment. Spray actuation or spill of subcooled water out of a break results in more significant pressure transients and becomes important in sizing the internal vacuum breakers.

In the event of a primary system rupture, steam condensation within the drywell results in the most severe pressure transient. Following a primary system rupture, air in the drywell is purged into the suppression chamber free airspace, leaving the drywell full of steam. Subsequent condensation of the steam can be caused in two possible ways, namely, Emergency Core Cooling Systems flow from a recirculation line break, or containment spray actuation following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). These two cases determine the maximum depressurization rate of the drywell.

In addition, the waterleg in the Mark I Vent System downcomer is controlled by the drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure. If the drywell pressure is

(continued)

BWR/4 STS



BACKGROUND less than the suppression chamber pressure, there will be an increase in the vent waterleg. This will result in an increase in the water clearing inertia in the event of a postulated LOCA, resulting in an increase in the peak drywell pressure. This in turn will result in an increase in the pool swell dynamic loads. The internal vacuum breakers limit the height of the waterleg in the vent system during normal operation.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Analytical methods and assumptions involving the suppression-chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers are presented in Reference 1 as part of the accident response of the primary containment systems. Internal (suppressionchamber-to-drywell) and external (reactor buildingto-suppression chamber) vacuum breakers are provided as part of the primary containment to limit the negative differential pressule across the drywell and suppression chamber walls that form part of the primary containment boundary.

The safety analyses assume that the internal vacuum breakers are closed initially and are fully open at a differential pressure of [0.5] psid (Ref. 1). Additionally, 3 of the 12 internal vacuum breakers are assumed to fail in a closed position (Ref. 1). The results of the analyses show that the design pressure is not exceeded even under the worst case accident scenario. The vacuum breaker opening differential pressure setpoint and the requirement that [9] of [12] vacuum breakers be OPERABLE are a result of the requirement placed on the vacuum breakers to limit the vent system waterleg height. The total cross sectional area of the main vent system between the drywell and suppression chamber needed to fulfill this requirement has been established as a minimum of [51.5] times the total break area (Ref. 1). In turn, the vacuum relief capacity between the drywell and suppression chamber should be [1/16] of the total main vent cross sectional area, with the valves set to operate at [0.5] psid differential pressure. Design Basis Accident (DBA) analyses require the vacuum breakers to be closed initially and to remain closed and leak tight, with the suppression pool at a positive pressure relative to the drywell.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Suppression-Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.8

BASES	
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	The suppression-chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO	Only [9] of the [12] vr tuum breakers must be OPERABLE for opening. All suppression-chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers, however, are required to be closed (except during testing or when the vacuum breakers are performing their intended design function). The vacuum breaker OPERABILITY requirement provides assurance that the drywell- to-suppression chamber negative differential pressure remains below the design value. The requirement that the vacuum breakers be closed ensures that there is no excessive bypass leakage should a LOCA occur.
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the Suppression Pool Spray System is required to be GRERABLE to mitigate the effects of a DBA. Excessive negative pressure inside the drywell could occur due to inadvertent actuation of this system. The vacuum breakers, therefore, are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, when the Suppression Pool Spray System is required to be OPERABLE, to mitigate the effects of inadvertent actuation of the Suppression Pool Spray System.
	Also, in MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could result in excessive negative differential pressure across the drywell wall caused by the rapid depressurization of the drywell. The event that results in the limiting rapid depressurization of the drywell is the primary system rupture that purges the drywell of air and fills the drywell free airspace with steam. Subsequent condensation of the steam would result in depressurization of the drywell. The limiting pressure and temperature of the primary system prior to a DBA occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.
	In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced by the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES; therefore, maintaining suppression-chamber-to-drywell vacuum breakers OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

B 3,6-50

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1

with one of the required vacuum breakers inoperable for opening (e.g., the vacuum breaker is not open and may be stuck closed or not within its opening setpoint limit, so that it would not function as designed during an event that depressurized the drywell), the remaining [eight] OPERABLE vacuum breakers are capable of providing the vacuum relief function. However, overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in one of the remaining vacuum breakers could result in an excessive suppression-chamberto-drywell differential pressure during a DBA. Therefore, with one of the [nine] required vacuum breakers inoperable, 72 hours is allowed to restore at least one of the inoperable vacuum breakers to OPERABLE status so that plant conditions are consistent with those assumed for the design basis analysis. The 72 hour Completion Time is considered acceptable due to the low probability of an event in which the remaining vacuum breaker capability would not be adequate.

E.1

An open vacuum breaker allows communication between the drywe and suppression chamber airspace, and, as a result, there is the potential for suppression chamber overpressurization due to this bypass leakage if a LOCA were to occur. Therefore, the open vacuum breaker must be closed. A short time is allowed to close the vacuum breaker due to the low probability of an event that would pressurize primary containment. If vacuum breaker position indication is not reliable, an alternate method of verifying that the vacuum breakers are closed is to verify that a differential pressure of [0.5] psid between the suppression chamber and drywell is maintained for 1 hour without makeup. The required 2 hour Completion Time is considered adequate to perform this test.

C.1 and C.2

If the inoperable suppression-chamber-to-drywell vacuum breaker cannot be closed or restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To

Suppression-Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers B 3.6.1.8

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating $\exp\epsilon$ ince, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.8.1

Each vacuum breaker is verified closed (except when being tested in accordance with SR 3.6.1.8.2 or when performing its intended function) to ensure that this potential large bypass leakage path is not present. This Surveillance is performed by observing the vacuum breaker position indication or by verifying that a differential pressure of [0.5] psid between the suppression chamber and drywell is maintained for 1 hour without makeup. The 14 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is considered adequate in view of other indications of vacuum breaker status available to operations personnel, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. This verification is also required within ? nours after any discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the safety/relief valves or any operation that causes the drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure to be reduced by \ge [0.5] psid. A footnote is added to provide additional assurance of closure if position indicating instruments indicate one or more vacuum breakers are not closed.

SR 3.6.1.8.2

Each required vacuum breaker must be cycled to ensure that it opens adequately to perform its design function and returns to the fully closed position. This ensures that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The 31 day Frequency of this SR was developed, based on Inservice Testing Program requirements to perform valve testing at least once every 92 days. A 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide additional assurance that the vacuum breakers are OPERABLE, since they are located in a harsh environment (the suppression chamber airspace). In addition, this functional



BWR/4 STS





SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.8.2 (continued)

test is required within 12 hours after either a discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the safety/relief valves or after an operation that causes any of the vacuum breakers to open.

SR 3.6.1.8.3

Verification of the vacuum breaker opening setpoint is necessary to ensure that the safety analysis assumption regarding vacuum breaker full open differential pressure of [0.5] psid is valid. The [18] month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. For this facility, the [18] month Frequency has been shown to be acceptable, based on operating experience, and is further justified because of other surveillances performed at shorter Frequencies that convey the proper functioning status of each vacuum breaker.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section [6.2].


MSIV LCS B 3.6.1.9

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.9 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Control System (LCS)

BASES	
BACKGROUND	The MSIV LCS supplements the isolation function of the MSIVs by processing the fission products that could leak through the closed MSIVs after a Design Basis Accident (DBA) loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
	The MSIV LCS consists of two independent subsystems: an inboard subsystem, connected between the inboard and outboard MSIVs, and an outboard subsystem, connected immediately downstream of the outboard MSIVs. Each subsystem is capable of processing leakage from MSIVs following a DBA LOCA. Each subsystem consists of blowers (one blower for the inboard subsystem and two blowers for the outboard subsystem), valves, piping, and heaters (for the inboard subsystem only). Four electric heaters in the inboard subsystem are provided to boil off any condensate prior to the gas mixture passing through the flow limiter.
	Each subsystem operates in two process modes: depressurization and bleedoff. The depressurization process reduces the steam line pressure to within the operating capability of equipment used for the bleedoff mode. During bleedoff (long term leakage control), the blowers maintain a negative pressure in the main steam lines (Ref. 1). This ensures the leakage through the closed MSIVs is collected and processed by the MSIV LCS. In both process modes, the effluent is discharged to the secondary containment and ultimately filtered by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System.
	The MSIV LCS is manually initiated approximately 20 minutes following a DBA LOCA (Ref. 2).
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The MSIV LCS mitigates the consequences of a DBA LOCA by ensuring that fission products that may leak from the closed

ensuring that fission products that may leak from the closed MSIVs are diverted to the secondary containment and ultimately filtered by the SGT System. The operation of the MSIV LCS prevents a release of untreated leakage for this type of event.



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BASES		
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	The MSIV LCS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.	
LCO	One MSIV LCS subsystem can provide the required processing of the MSIV leakage. To ensure that this capability is available, assumi q worst case single failure, two MSIV LCS subsystems must be OPERABLE.	
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment. Therefore, MSIV LCS OPERABILITY is required during these MODES. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the MSIV LCS OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or frequences MSIV leakage is processed.	
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u>	
	With one MSIV LCS subjystem inoperable, the inoperable MSIV LCS subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE MSIV LCS subsystem is adequate to perform the required leakage control function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining subsystem could result in a total loss of MSIV leakage control function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the redundant capability afforded by the remaining OPERABLE MSIN LCS subsystem and the low probability of a DBA LOCA occurring during this period.	
	<u>B.1</u>	
	With two MSIV LCS subsystems inoperable, at least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of the occurrence of a DBA LOCA.	



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BWR/4 STS

B 3.6-55 Rev. 0, 09/28/92

ACTIONS (continued) C.1 and C.2

If the MSIV LCS subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEIL_ANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.6.1.9.1</u>

Each MSIV LCS blower is operated for \geq [15] minutes to verify OPERABILITY. The 31 day Frequency was developed considering the known reliability of the LCS blower and controls, the two subsystem redundancy, and the low probability of a significant degradation of the MSIV LCS subsystems occurring between surveillances and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.6.1.9.2

The electrical continuity of each inboard MSIV LCS subsystem heater is verified by a resistance check, by verifying that the rate of temperature increase meets specifications, or by verifying that the current or wattage draw meets specifications. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience that has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at this Frequency.

SR 3.6.1.9.3

A system functional test is performed to ensure that the MSIV LCS will operate through its operating sequence. This includes verifying that the automatic positioning of the valves and the operation of each interlock and timer are correct, that the blowers start and develop the required flow rate and the necessary vacuum, and that the upstream heaters meet current or wattage draw requirements (if not used to verify electrical continuity in SR 3.6.1.9.2). The



BASES

REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.9.3 (continued)

[18] month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [6.5].

2. Regulatory Guide 1.96, Revision [1].



BWR/4 STS

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature

BASES

BACKGROUND

The suppression chamber is a toroidal shaped, steel pressure vessel containing a volume of water called the suppression pool. The suppression pool is designed to absorb the decay heat and sensible energy released during a reactor blowdown from safety/relief valve discharges or from Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). The suppression pool must quench all the steam released through the downcomer lines during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). This is the essential mitigative feature of a pressure suppression containment that ensures that the peak containment pressure is maintained below the maximum allowable pressure for DBAs ([62] psig). The suppression pool must also condense steam from steam exhaust lines in the turbine driven systems (i.e., the High Pressure Coolant Injection System and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System). Suppression pool average temperature (along with LCO 3.6.2.2, "Suppression Pool Water Level") is a key indication of the capacity of the suppression pool to fulfill these requirements.

The technical concerns that lead to the development of suppression pool average temperature limits are as follows:

- Complete steam condensation—the original limit for the end of a LOCA blowdown was 170°F, based on the Bodega Bay and Humboldt Bay Tests;
- b. Primary containment peak pressure and temperature design pressure is [62] psig and design temperature is [340]°F (Ref. 1);
- c. Condensation oscillation loads—maximum allowable initial temperature is [110]°F; and
- d. Chugging loads—these only occur at < [135]°F; therefore, there is no initial temperature limit because of chugging.



BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The postulated DBA against which the primary containment performance is evaluated is the entire spectrum of postulated pipe breaks within the primary containment. Inputs to the safety analyses include initial suppression pool water volume and suppression pool temperature (Reference 1 for LOCAs and Reference 2 for the pool temperature analyses required by Reference 3). An initial pool temperature of [95] °F is assumed for the Reference 1 and Reference 2 analyses. Reactor shutdown at a pool temperature of [110] °F and vessel depressurization at a pool temperature of [120] °F are assumed for the Reference 2 analyses. The limit of [105] °F, at which testing is terminated, is not used in the safety analyses because DBAs are assumed to not initiate during unit testing.

Suppression pool average temperature satisfies Criteria 2 and 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

A limitation on the suppression pool average temperature is required to provide assurance that the containment conditions assumed for the safety analyses are met. This limitation subsequently ensures that peak primary containment pressures and temperatures do not exceed maximum allowable values during a postulated DBA or any transient resulting in heatup of the suppression pool. The LCO requirements are:

- a. Average temperature ≤ [95] °F when any OPERABLE intermediate range monitor (IRM) channel is > [25/40] divisions of full scale on Range 7 and no testing that adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed. This requirement ensures that licensing bases initial conditions are met.
- b. Average temperature ≤ [105]°F when any OPERABLE IRM channel is > [25/40] divisions of full scale on Range 7 and testing that adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed. This required value ensures that the unit has testing flexibility, and was selected to provide margin below the [110]°F limit at which reactor shutdown is required. When testing ends, temperature must be restored to ≤ [95]°F within 24 hours according to Required Action A.2. Therefore, the time period that the temperature is > [95]°F is

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0, 09/28/92

Suppression Pool Average Temperature B 3.6.2.1

BASES	
LCO (continued)	short enough not to cause a significant increase in unit risk.
	c. Average temperature ≤ [110]°F when all OPERABLE IRM channels are ≤ [25/40] divisions of full scale on Range 7. This requirement ansures that the unit will be shut down at > [110]°F. The pool is designed to absorb decay heat and sensible heat but could be heated beyond design limits by the steam generated if the reactor is not shut down.
	Note that [25/40] divisions of full scale on IRM Range 7 is a convenient measure of when the reactor is producing power essentially equivalent to 1% RTP. At this power level, heat input is approximately equal to normal system heat losses.
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause significant heatup of the suppression pool. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining suppression pool average temperature within limits is not required in MODE 4 or 5.
ACTIONS	A.1 and A.2
	With the suppression pool average temperature above the specified limit when not performing testing that adds heat to the suppression pool and when above the specified power indication, the initial conditions exceed the conditions assumed for the Reference 1, 3, and 4 analyses. However, primary containment cooling capability still exists, and the primary containment pressure suppression function will occur at temperatures well above those assumed for safety analyses. Therefore, continued operation is allowed for a limited time. The 24 hour Completion Time is adequate to allow the suppression pool average temperature to be restored below the limit. Additionally, when suppression pool temperature is > [95]°F, increased monitoring of the suppression pool temperature is required to ensure that it remains \$ [110]°F. The once per hour Completion Time is

(continued)

adequate based on past experience, which has shown that pool temperature increases relatively slowly except when testing

ACTIONS

BASES

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

that adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed. Furthermore, the once per hour Completion Time is considered adequate in view of other indications in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool average temperature condition.

<u>B.1</u>

If the suppression pool average temperature cannot be restored to within limits within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the power must be reduced to < [25/40] divisions of full scale on Range 7 for all OPERABLE IRMs within 12 hours. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce power from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

<u>C.1</u>

Suppression pool average temperature is allowed to be > [95] °F when any OPERABLE IRM channel is > [25/40] divisions of full scale on Range 7, and when testing that adds heat to the suppression pool is being performed. However, if temperature is > [105] °F, all testing must be immediately suspended to preserve the heat absorption capability of the suppression pool. With the testing suspended, Condition A is entered and the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are applicable.

D.1 and D.2

Suppression pool average temperature > [110] °F requires that the reactor be shut down immediately. This is accomplished by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Additionally, when suppression pool temperature is > [110] °F, increased monitoring of pool temperature is required to ensure that it remains ≤ [120] °F. The once per 30 minute Completion Time is adequate, based on operating experience. Given the high suppression pool average temperature in this Condition, the monitoring Frequency is



BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

increased to twice that of Condition A. Furthermore, the 30 minute Completion Time is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool average temperature condition.

E.1 and E.2

If suppression pool average temperature cannot be maintained at $\leq [120]$ °F, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the reactor pressure must be reduced to $\leq [200]$ psig within 12 hours, and the plant must be brought to at least MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Continued addition of heat to the suppression pool with suppression pool temperature > [120] °F could result in exceeding the design basis maximum allowable values for primary containment temperature or pressure. Furthermore, if a blowdown were to occur when the temperature was > [120] °F, the maximum allowable bulk and local temperatures could be exceeded very quickly.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.1.1

The suppression pool average temperature is regularly monitored to ensue that the required limits are satisfied. The average temperature is determined by taking an arithmetic average of OPERABLE suppression pool water temperature channels. The 24 hour Frequency has been shown, based on oper ling experience, to be acceptable. When heat is being added to the suppression pool by testing, however, it is necessary to monitor suppression pool temperature more frequently. The 5 minute Frequency during testing is justified by the rates at which tests will heat up the suppression pool, has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience, and provides assurance that allowable pool temperatures are not exceeded. The requencies are



Suppression Pool Average Temperature B 3.6.2.1

BASES	
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<u>SR_3.6.2.1.1</u> (continued)
	further justified in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool average temperature condition.
REFERENCES	1. FSAR, Section [6.2].
	2. FSAR, Section [15.1].
	3. NUREG-0783.
	4. [Mark I Containment Program.]



B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND The su vessel pool.

The suppression chamber is a toroidal shaped, steel pressure vessel containing a volume of water called the suppression pool. The suppression pool is designed to absorb the energy associated with decay heat and sensible heat released during a reactor blowdown from safety/relief valve (S/RV) discharges or from a Design Basis Accident (DBA). The suppression pool must quench all the steam released through the downcomer lines during a loss of coolant accident. (LOCA). This is the essential mitigative feature of a pressure suppression containment, which ensures that the peak containment pressure is maintained below the maximum allowable pressure for DBAs ([62] psig). The suppression pool must also condense steam from the steam exhaust lines in the turbine driven systems (i.e., High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System) and provides the main emergency water supply source for the reactor vessel. The suppression pool volume ranges between [87,300] ft^3 at the low water level limit of [12 ft 2 inches] and [90,550] ft^3 at the high water level limit of [12 ft 6 inches].

If the suppression pool water level is too low, an insufficient amount of water would be available to adequately condense the steam from the S/RV quenchers, main vents, or HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust lines. Low suppression pool water level could also result in an inadequate emergency makeup water source to the Emergency Core Choling System. The lower volume would also absorb less steam energy before heating up excessively. Therefore, a minimum suppression pool water level is specified.

If the suppression pool water level is too high, it could result in excessive clearing loads from S/RV discharges and excessive pool swell loads during a DBA LOCA. Therefore, a maximum pool water level is specified. This LCO specifies an acceptable range to prevent the suppression pool water level from being either too high or too low.



BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92



Suppression Pool Water Level B 3.6.2.2

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE Initial suppression pool water level affects suppression SAFETY ANALYSES pool temperature response calculations, calculated drywell pressure during vent clearing for a DBA, calculated pool swell loads for a DBA LOCA, and calculated loads due to S/RV discharges. Suppression pool water level must be maintained within the limits specified so that the safety analysis of Reference 1 remains valid.

Suppression pool water level satisfies Criteria 2 and 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO A limit that suppression pool water level be ≥ [12 ft 2 inches] and ≤ [12 ft 6 inches] is required to ensure that the primary containment conditions assumed for the safety analyses are met. Either the high or low water level limits were used in the safety analyses, depending upon which is more conservative for a particular calculation.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA would cause significant loads on the primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining suppression pool water level within limits is not required in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With suppression pool water level outside the limits, the conditions assumed for the safety analyses are not met. If water level is below the minimum level, the pressure suppression function still exists as long as main vents are covered, iPCI and RCIC turbine exhausts are covered, and S/RV quenchers are covered. If suppression pool water level is above the maximum level, protection against overpressurization still exists due to the margin in the peak containment pressure analysis and the capability of the Drywell Spray System. Therefore, continued operation for a limited time is allowed. The 2 hour Completion Time is sufficient to a store suppression pool water level to within



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

limits. Also, it takes into account the low probability of an event impacting the suppression pool water level occurring during this interval.

B.1 and B.2

If suppression pool water level cannot be restored to within limits within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.2.1

Verification of the suppression pool water level is to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The 24 hour Frequency of this SR was developed considering operating experience related to trending variations in suppression pool water level and water level instrument drift during the applicable MODES and to assessing the proximity to the specified LCO level limits. Furthermore, the 24 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal suppression pool water level condition.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [6.2].



B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling

BASES

BACKGROUND Following a Design Basis Accident (DBA), the RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System removes heat from the suppression pool. The suppression pool is designed to absorb the sudden input of heat from the primary system. In the long term, the pool continues to absorb residual heat generated by fuel in the reactor core. Some means must be provided to remove heat from the suppression pool so that the temperature inside the primary containment remains within design limits. This function is provided by two redundant RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems. The purpose of this LCO is to ensure that both subsystems are OPERABLE in applicable MODES.

> Each RHR subsystem contains two pumps and one heat exchanger and is manually initiated and independently controlled. The two subsystems perform the suppression pool cooling function by circulating water from the suppression pool through the RHR heat exchangers and returning it to the suppression pool. RHR service water, circulating through the tube side of the heat exchangers, exchanges the with the suppression pool water and discharges this heat to the external heat sink.

> The heat removal capability of one RHR pump in one subsystem is sufficient to meet the overall DBA pool cooling requirement for loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and transient events such as a turbine trip or stuck open safety/relief valve (S/RV). S/RV leakage and high pressure core injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System testing increase suppression pool temperature more slowly. The RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System is also used to lower the suppression pool water bulk temperature following such events.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Reference 1 contains the results of analyses used to predict primary containment pressure and temperature following large and small break LOCAs. The intent of the analyses is to demonstrate that the heat removal capacity of the RHK Suppression Pool Cooling System is adequate to maintain the primary containment conditions within design limits. The



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling B 3.6.2.3

BÁSES	
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	suppression pool temperature is calculated to remain below the design limit.
(continued)	The RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO	During a DBA, a minimum of one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is required to maintain the primary containment peak pressure and temperature below design limits (Ref. 1). To ensure that these requirements are met, two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems must be OPERABLE with power from two safety related independent power supplies. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one subsystem is OPERABLE assuming the worst case single active iailure. An RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is OPERABLE when one of the pumps, the heat exchanger, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls are OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment and cause a heatup and pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, the RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 or 5.
ACTIONS	A.1

With one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment cooling function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment cooling capability. The 7 day Completion Time is acceptable in light of the redundant RHR suppression pool

(continued)

BWR/4 STS

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B 3.6-68

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling B 3.6.2.3

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

cooling capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

8.1 and 8.2

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A cannot be met within the required Completion Time or if two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.3.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RHR suppression pool cooling mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the accident analysis. This is acceptable since the RHR suppression pool cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any test or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Frequency of 31 days is justified because the valves are operated under procedural control, improper valve position would affect only a single subsystem, the probability of an event requiring initiation of the system is low, and the subsystem is a manually initiated system. This Frequency



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 8 3.6.2.3



REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section [6.2].

2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.



B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray

BASES

BACKGROUND

Following a Design Basis Accident (DBA), the RHR Suppression Pool Spray System removes heat from the suppression chamber airspace. The suppression pool is designed to absorb the sudden input of heat from the primary system from a DBA or a rapid depressurization of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) through safety/relief valves. The heat addition to the suppression pool results in increased steam in the suppression chamber, which increases primary containment pressure. Steam blowdown from a DBA can also bypass the suppression pool and end up in the suppression chamber airspace. Some means must be provided to remove heat from the suppression chamber so that the pressure and temperature inside primary containment remain within analyzed design limits. This function is provided by two redundant RHR suppression pool spray subsystems. The purpose of this LCO is to ensure that both subsystems are OPERABLE in applicable MODES.

Each of the two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems contains two pumps and one heat exchanger, which are manually initiated and independently controlled. The two subsystems perform the suppression pool spray function by circulating water from the suppression pool through the RHR heat exchangers and returning it to the suppression pool spray spargers. The spargers only accommodate a small portion of the total RHR pump flow; the remainder of the flow returns to the suppression pool through the suppression pool cooling return line. Thus, both suppression pool cooling and suppression pool spray functions are performed when the Suppression Pool Spray System is initiated. RHR service water, circulating through the tube side of the heat exchangers, exchanges heat with the suppression pool water and discharges this heat to the external heat sink. Either RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is sufficient to condense the steam from small bypass leaks from the drywell to the suppression chamber airspace during the postulated DBA.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS

B 3.6-71

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

RHR Suppression Pool Spray B 3.6.2.4

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Reference 1 contains the results of analyses used to predict primary containment pressure and temperature following large and small break loss of coolant accidents. The intent of the analyses is to demonstrate that the pressure reduction capacity of the RHR Suppression Pool Spray System is adequate to maintain the primary containment conditions within design limits. The time history for primary containment pressure is calculated to demonstrate that the maximum pressure remains below the design limit.

The RHR Suppression Pool Spray System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

In the event of a DBA, a minimum of one RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is required to mitigate potential bypass leakage paths and maintain the primary containment peak pressure below the design limits (Ref. 1). To ensure that these requirements are met, two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems must be OPERABLE with power from two safety related independent power supplies. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one subsystem is OPERABLE assuming the worst case single active failure. An RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is OPERABLE when one of the pumps, the heat exchanger, and associated pipiel, valves, instrumentation, and controls are GERABLE.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining RHR suppression pool spray subsystems OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one RHR suppression pool spray subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment bypass leakage mitigation function.



RHR Suppression Pool Spray B 3.6.2.4

BASES

AC1 LONS

A.1 (continued)

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment bypass mitigation capability. The 7 day Completion Time was chosen in light of the redundant RHR suppression pool spray capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1

With both RHR suppression pool spray subsystems inoperable, at least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. In this Condition, there is a substantial loss of the primary containment bypass leakage mitigation function. The 8 hour Completion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and because alternative methods to remove heat from primary containment are available.

C.1 and C.2

If the inoperable RHR suppression pool spray subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.4.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RHR suppression pool spray mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A

RHR Suppression Pool Spray B 3.6.2.4

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.6.2.4.1</u> (continued)

valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the accident a alysis. This is acceptable since the RHR suppression pool cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Frequency of 31 days is justified because the valves are operated under procedural control, improper valve position would affect only a single subsystem, the probability of an event requiring initiation of the system is low, and the subsystem is a manually initiated system. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience.

SR 3.6.2.4.2

1.

Verifying each RHR pump develops a flow rate ≥ [400] gpm while operating in the suppression pool spray mode with flow through the heat exchanger ensures that pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow is a normal test of centrifugal pump performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref. 2). This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice inspections confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is [in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program, but the Frequency must not exceed 92 days].

REFERENCES

FSAR, Section [6.2].

2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.



Drywell-to-Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure B 3.6.2.5

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.2.5 Drywell-to-Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure

BASES

BACKGROUND The toroidal shaped suppression chamber, which contains the suppression pool, is connected to the drywell (part of the primary containment) by [eight] main vent pipes. The main vent pipes exhaust into a continuous vent header, from which [96] downcomer pipes extend into the suppression pool. The pipe exit is [4] ft below the minimum st pression pool water level required by LCO 3.6.2.2, "Suppression Pool Water Level." During a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the increasing drywell pressure will force the waterleg in the downcomer pipes into the suppression pool at substantial velocities as the "blowdown" phase of the event begins. The length of the waterleg has a significant effect on the resultant primary containment pressures and loads.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The purpose of maintaining the drywell at a slightly higher pressure with respect to the suppression chamber is to minimize the drywell pressure increase necessary to clear the downcomer pipes to commence condentation of steam in the suppression pool and to minimize the mass of the accelerated water leg. This reduces the hydrodynamic loads on the torus during the LOCA blowdown. The required differential pressure results in a downcomer waterleg of [3.06 to 3.58] ft.

> Initial drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure affects both the dynamic pool loads on the suppression chamber and the peak drywell pressure during downcomer pipe clearing during a Design Basis Accident LOCA. Drywell-tosuppression chamber differential pressure must be maintained within the specified limits so that the safety analysis remains valid.

Drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

A drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure limit of [1.5] psid is required to ensure that the containment

BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Drywell-to-Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure B 3.6.2.5

LCO (continued)	conditions assumed in the safety analyses are met. A drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure of < [1.5] psid corresponds to a downcomer water leg of > [3.58] ft. Failure to maintain the required differential pressure could result in excessive forces on the suppression chamber due to higher water clearing loads from downcomer vents and higher pressure buildup in the drywell.
AFPLICABILITY	Drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure must be controlled when the primary containment is inert. The primary containment must be inert in MODE 1, since this is the condition with the highest probability for an event that could produce hydrogen. It is also the condition with the highest probability of an event that could impose large loads on the primary containment.
	Inerting primary containment is an operational problem because it prevents primary containment access without an appropriate breathing apparatus. Therefore, the primary containment is inerted as late as possible in the unit startup and is de-inerted as soon as possible in the unit shutdown. As long as reactor power is < [15]% RTP, the probability of an event that generates hydrogen or excessive loads on primary containment occurring within the first [24] hours following a startup or within the last [24] hours prior to a shutdown is low enough that these "windows," with the primary containment not inerted, are also justified. The [24] hour time period is a reasonable amount time to allow plant personnel to perform inerting or de-inerting.

ACTIONS

A.1

If drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure is not within the limit, the conditions assumed in the safety analyses are not met and the differential pressure must be restored to within the limit within 8 hours. The 8 hour Completion Time provides sufficient time to restory differential pressure to within limit and takes into account the low probability of an event that would create excessive suppression chamber loads occurring during this time period.

(continued)



B 3.6-76



Drywell-to-Suppression	Chamber	Differential	Pressure
			B 3.6.2.5

ACTIONS	<u>B.1</u>
(continued)	If the differential pressure cannot be restored to within limits within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by reducing power to ≤ [15]% RTP within 12 hours. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce reactor power from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE	<u>SR_3.6.2.5.1</u>
REQUIREMENTS	The drywell-to-suppression chamber differential pressure is regularly monitored to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The 12 hour Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience relative to differential pressure variations and pressure instrument drift during applicable MODES and by assessing the proximity to the specified LCO differential pressure limit. Furthermore, the 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal pressure condition.
REFERENCES	None.



Primary Containment Hydrogen Recombiners B 3.6.3.1

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.3.1 Primary Containment Hydrogen Recomminers

BASES

BACKGROUND

The primary containment hydrogen recombiner eliminates the potential breach of primary containment due to a hydrogen oxygen reaction and is part of combustible gas control required by 10 CFR 50.44, "Standards for Ccuabustible Gas Control Systems in Light-Water-Cooled Reactors" (Ref. 1), and GDC 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup" (Ref. 2). The primary containment hydrogen recombining is required to reduce the hydrogen concentration in the primary containment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The primary containment hydrogen recombiner accomplishes this by recombining hydrogen and oxygen to form water vapor. The vapor remains in the primary containment, thus eliminating any discharge to the environment. The primary containment hydrogen recombiner is manually initiated since flammability limits would not be reached until several days after a Design Basis Accident (DBA).

The primary containment hydrogen recombiner functions to maintain the hydrogen gas concentration within the containment at or below the flammability limit of 4.0 volume percent (v/o) following a postulated LOCA. It is fully redundant and consists of two 100% capacity subsystems. Each primary containment hydrogen recombiner consists of an enclosed blower assembly, heater section, reaction chamber, direct contact water spray gas cooler, water separator, and associated piping, valves, struments. The primary containment hydrogen recombine. 11 be manually initiated from the main control room when the hydrogen gas concentration in the primary containment reaches [3.3] v/o. When the primary containment is inerted (oxygen concentration < 4.0 v/o), the primary containment hydrogen recombiner will only function until the oxygen is used up (2.0 v/o hydrogen combines with 1.0 v/o oxygen). Two recombiners are provided to meet the requirement for redundancy and independence. Each recombiner is powered from a separate Engineered Safety Feature bus and is provided with separate power panel and control panel.

The process gas circulating through the heater, the reaction chamber, and the cooler is automatically regulated to [150] scfm by the use of an orifice plate installed in the

(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Primary Containment Hydrogen Recombiners B 3.6.3.1

BACKGROUND (continued)	cooler. The process gas is heated to [1200]°F. The hydrogen and oxygen gases are recombined into water vapor, which is then condensed in the water spray gas cooler by the associated residual heat removal subsystem and discharged with some of the effluent process gas to the suppression chamber. The majority of the cooled, effluent process gas is mixed with the incoming process gas to dilute the incoming gas prior to the mixture entering the heater section.
	section.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

BASES

The primary containment hydrogen recombiner provides the capability of controlling the bulk hydrogen concentration in primary containment to less than the lower flammable concentration of 4.0 v/o following a DBA. This control would prevent a primary containment wide hydrogen burn, thus ensuring that pressure and temperature conditions assumed in the analysis are not exceeded. The limiting DBA relative to hydrogen generation is a LOCA.

Hydrogen may accumulate in primary containment following a LOCA as a result of:

- a. A metal steam reaction between the zirconium fuel rod cladding and the reactor coolant; or
- Radiolytic decomposition of water in the Reactor Coolant System.

To evaluate the potential for hydrogen accumulation in primary containment following a LOCA, the hydrogen generation is calculated as a function of time following the initiation of the accident. Assumptions recommended by Reference 3 are used to maximize the amount of hydrogen calculated.

The calculation confirms that when the mitigating systems are actuated in accordance with emergency procedures, the peak hydrogen concentration in the primary containment is < 4.0 v/o (Ref. 4).

The primary containment hydrogen recombiners satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

BASES (continued)

LCO

Two primary containment hydrogen recombiners must be OPERABLE. This ensures operation of at least one primary containment hydrogen recombiner subsystem in the event of a worst case single active failure.

Operation with at least one primary containment hydrogen recombiner subsystem ensures that the post-LOCA hydrogen concentration can be prevented from exceeding the flammability limit.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, the two primary containment hydrogen recombiners are required to control the hydrogen concentration within primary containment below its flammability limit of 4.0 v/o following a LOCA, assuming a worst case single failure.

In MODE 3, both the hydrogen production rate and the total hydrogen produced after a LOCA would be less than that calculated for the DBA LOCA. Also, because of the limited time in this MODE, the probability of an accident requiring the primary containment hydrogen recombiner is low. Therefore, the primary containment hydrogen recombiner is not required in MODE 3.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are low due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, the primary containment hydrogen recembiner is not required in these MODES.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one primary containment hydrogen recombiner inoperable, the inoperable recombiner must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE recombiner is adequate to perform the hydrogen control function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE recombiner could result in reduced hydrogen control capability. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit, the amount of time available after the event for operator action



BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

to prevent exceeding this limit, and the low probability of failure of the OPERABLE primary containment hydrogen recombiner.

Required Action A.1 has be modified by a Note indicating that the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when one recombiner is inoperable. This allowance is provided because of the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit, the low probability of the failure of the OPERABLE subsystem, and the amount of time available after a postulated LOCA for operator action to prevent exceeding the flammability limit.

B.1 and B.2

Reviewer's Note: This Condition is only allowed for units with an alternate hydrogen control system acceptable to the technical staff.

With two primary containment hydrogen recombiners inoperable, the ability to perform the hydrogen control function via alternate capabilities must be verified by administrative means within 1 hour. The alternate hydrogen control capabilities are provided by the [Primary Containment Inerting System or one subsystem of the Containment Atmosphere Dilution System]. The 1 hour Completion Time allows a reasonable period of time to verify that a loss of hydrogen control function does not exist. [Reviewer's Note: The following is to be used if a non-Technical Specification alternate hydrogen control function is used to justify this Condition. In addition, the alternate hydrogen control system capability must be verified every 12 hours thereafter to ensure its continued availability.] [Both] the [initial] verification [and all subsequent verifications] may be performed as an administrative check by examining logs or other information to determine the availability of the alternate hydrogen control system. It does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the alternate hydrogen control system. If the ability to perform the hydrogen control function is maintained,



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BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Primary Containment Hydrogen Recombiners B 3.6.3.1



BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

continued operation is permitted with two hydrogen recombiners inoperable for up to 7 days. Seven days is a reasonable time to allow two hydrogen recombiners to be inoperable because the hydrogen control function is maintained and because of the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit.

C.1

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 "ours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.3.1.1

Performance of a system functional test for each primary containment hydrogen recombiner ensures that the recombiners are OPERABLE and can attain and sustain the temperature necessary for hydrogen recombination. In particular, this SR verifies that the minimum heater sheath temperature increases to $\geq [1200]$ °F in $\leq [1.5]$ hours and that it is maintained $\geq [1150]$ °F and < [1300]°F for $\geq [4]$ hours thereafter to check the ability of the recombiner to function properly (and to make sure that significant heater elements are not burned out). Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.3.1.2

This SR ensures there are no physical problems that could affect recombiner operation. Since the recombiners are



Primary Containment Hydrogen Recombiners B 3.6.3.1

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.6.3.1.2</u> (continued)

mechanically passive, except for the blower assemblies, they are subject to only minimal mechanical failure. The only credible failures involve loss of power or blower function, blockage of the internal flow path, missile impact, etc.

A visual inspection is sufficient to determine abnormal conditions that could cause such failures. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.3.1.3

This SR requires performance of a resistance to ground test of each heater phase to make sure that there are no detectable grounds in any heater phase. This is accomplished by verifying that the resistance to ground for any heater phase is \geq [10,000] ohms.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.44.

2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.7, Revision [1].

4. FSAR, Section [6.2.5].



B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.3.2 [Drywell Cooling System Fans]

BASES		
BACKGROUND	The [Drywell Cooling System fans] ensure a uniformly mixed post accident primary containment atmosphere, thereby minimizing the potential for local hydrogen burns due to a pocket of hydrogen above the flammable concentration.	
	The [Drywell Cooling System fans] are an Engineered Safety Feature and are designed to withstand a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in post accident environments without loss of function. The system has two independent subsystems consisting of fans, fan coil units, motors, controls, and ducting. Each subsystem is sized to circulate [500] scfm. The [Drywell Cooling System fans] employ both forced circulation and natural circulation to ensure the proper mixing of hydrogen in primary containment. The recirculation fans provide the forced circulation to mix hydrogen while the fan coils provide the natural circulation by increasing the density through the cooling of the hot gases at the top of the drywell causing the cooled gases to gravitate to the bottom of the drywell. The two subsystems are initiated manually since flammability limits would not be reached until several days after a LOCA. Each subsystem is powered from a separate emergency power supply. Since each subsystem can provide 100% of the mixing requirements, the system will provide its design function with a worst case single active failure.	
	The [Drywell Cooling System fans] use the Drywell Cooling System recirculating fans to mix the drywell atmosphere. The fan coil units and recirculation fans are automatically disengaged during a LOCA but may be restored to service manually by the operator. In the event of a loss of offsite power, all fan coil units, recirculating fans, and primary	

power, all fan coil units, recirculating fans, and primary containment water chillers are transferred to the emergency diesels. The fan coil units and recirculating fans are started automatically from diesel power upon loss of offsite power.



BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92





[Drywell Cooling System Fans] B 3.6.3.2

BASES (continued)

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The [Drywell Cooling System fans] provide the capability for reducing the local hydrogen concentration to approximately the bulk average concentration following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). The limiting DBA relative to hydrogen generation is a LOCA.
	Hydrogen may accumulate in primary containment following a LOCA as a result of:
	 A metal steam reaction between the zirconium fuel rod cladding and the reactor coolant; or
	 Radiolytic decomposition of water in the Peactor Coolant System.
	To evaluate the potential for hydrogen accumulation in primary containment following a LOCA, the hydrogen generation as a function of time following the initiation of the accident is calculated. Conservative assumptions recommended by Reference 1 are used to maximize the amount of hydrogen calculated.
	The Reference 2 calculations show that hydrogen assumed to be released to the drywell within 2 minutes following a DBA LOCA raises drywell hydrogen concentration to over 2.5 volume percent (v/o). Natural circulation phenomena result in a gradient concentration difference of less then 0.5 v/o in the drywell and less than 0.1 v/o in the suppression chamber. Even though this gradient is acceptably small and no credit for mechanical mixing was assumed in the analysis, two [Drywell Cooling System fans] are [required] to be OPERABLE (typically four to six fans are required to keep the drywell cool during operation in MODE 1 or 2) by this LCO.
	The [Drywell Cooling System fans] satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO	Two [Drywell Cooling System fans] must be OPERABLE to ensure operation of at least one fan in the event of a worst case single active failure. Each of these fans must be powered from an independent safety related bus.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

[Drywell Cooling System Fans] B 3.6.3.2

BASES	
LCO (continued)	Operation with at least one fan provides the capability of controlling the bulk hydrogen concentration in primary containment without exceeding the flammability limit.
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1 and 2, the two [Drywell Cooling System fans] ensure the capability to prevent localized hydrogen concentrations above the flammability limit of 4.0 v/o in drywell, assuming a worst case single active failure.
	In MODE 3, both the hydrogen production rate and the total hydrogen produced after a LOCA would be less than that calculated for the DBA LOCA. Also, because of the limited time in this MODE, the probability of an accident requiring the [Drywell Cooling System fans] is low. Therefore, the [Drywell Cooling System fans] are not required in MODE 3.
	In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, the [Drywell Cooling System fans] are not required in these MODES.
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u>

With one [required] [Drywell Cooling System fan] inoperable, the inoperable fan must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE fan is adequate to perform the hydrogen mixing function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE fan could result in reduced hydrogen mixing capability. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the availability of the second fan, the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit, the amount of time available after the event for operator action to prevent exceeding this limit, and the availability of the Primary Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System and the Containment Atmosphere Dilution System.

Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note indicating that the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when one [Drywell Cooling System fam] is inoperable. This allowance is provided



BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

because of the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit, the low probability of the failure of the OPERABLE fan, and the amount of time available after a postulated LOCA for operator action to prevent exceeding the flammability limit.

B.1 and B.2

Reviewer's Note: This Condition is only allowed for units with an alternate hydrogen control system acceptable to the technical staff.

With two [Drywell Cooling System fans] inoperable, the ability to perform the hydrogen control function via alternate capabilities must be verified by administrative means within 1 hour. The alternate hydrogen control capabilities are provided by the [Primary Containment Inerting System or one subsystem of the Containment Atmosphere Dilution System]. The 1 hour Completion Time allows a reasonable period of time to verify that a loss of hydrogen control function does not exist. [Reviewer's Note: The following is to be used if a non-Technical Specification alternate hydrogen control function is used to justify this Condition: In addition, the alternate hydrogen control system capability must be verified every 12 hours thereafter to ensure its continued availability.] [Both] the [initial] verification [and all subsequent verifications] may be performed as an administrative check by examining logs or other information to determine the availability of the alternate hydrogen control system. It does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the alternate hydrogen control system. If the ability to perform the hydrogen control function is maintained, continued operation is permitted with two [Drywell Cooling System fans] inoperable for up to 7 days. Seven days is a reasonable time to allow two [Drywell Cooling System fans] to be inoperable because the hydrogen control function is maintained and because of the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit.

0



[Drywell Cooling System Fans] B 3.6.3.2



BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.3.2.1

C.1

Operating each [required] [Drywell Cooling System fan] for ≥ 15 minutes ensures that each subsystem is OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. The 92 day Frequency is consistent with the Inservice Testing Program Frequencies, operating experience, the known reliability of the fan motors and controls, and the two redundant fans available.

SR 3.6.3.2.2

Verifying that each [required] [Drywell Cooling System fan] flow rate is ≥ [500] scfm ensures that each fan is capable of maintaining localized hydrogen concentrations below the flammability limit. The [18] month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.7, Revision [1].

2. FSAR, Section [6.2.5].

Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration B 3.6.3.3

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.3.3 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration

BASES

BACKGROUND

All nuclear reactors must be designed to withstand events that generate hydrogen either due to the zirconium metai water reaction in the core or due to radiolysis. The primary method to control hydrogen is to inert the primary containment. With the primary containment inert, that is, oxygen concentration < 4.0 volume percent (v/o), a combustible mixture cannot be present in the primary containment for any hydrogen concentration. The capability to inert the primary containment and maintain oxygen < 4.0 v/o works together with the Hydrogen Recombiner System (LCO 3.6.3.1, "Primary Containment Hydrogen Recombiners") and the [Drywell Cooling System fans] (LCO 3.6.3.2, "[Drywell Cooling System Fans]") to provide redundant and diverse methods to mitigate events that produce hydrogen. For example, an event that rapidly generates hydrogen from zirconium metal water reaction will result in excessive hydrogen in primary containment, but oxygen concentration will remain < 4.0 v/o and no combustion can occur. Long term generation of both hydrogen and oxygen from radiolytic decomposition of water may eventually result in a combustible mixture in primary containment, except that the hydrogen recombiners remove hydrogen and oxygen gases faster than they can be produced from radiolysis and again no combustion can occur. This LCO ensures that oxygen concentration does not exceed 4.0 v/o during operation in the applicable conditions.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The Reference 1 calculations assume that the primary containment is inerted when a Design Basis Accident loss of coolant accident occurs. Thus, the hydrogen assumed to be released to the primary containment as a result of metal water reaction in the reactor core will not produce combustible gas mixtures in the primary containment. Oxygen, which is subsequently generated by radiolytic decomposition of water, is recombined by the hydrogen recombiners (LCO 3.6.3.1) more rapidly than it produced.

> Primary containment oxygen concentration satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.


Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration B 3.6.3.3

BASES (continued)

LCO

The primary containment oxygen concentration is maintained < 4.0 v/o to ensure that an event that produces any amount of hydrogen does not result in a combustible mixture inside primary containment.

The primary containment oxygen concentration must be within APPLICABILITY the specified limit when primary containment is inerted, except as allowed by the relaxations during startup and shutdown addressed below. The primary containment must be inert in MODE 1, since this is the condition with the highest probability of an event that could produce hydrogen.

> Inerting the primary containment is an operational problem because it prevents containment access without an appropriate breathing apparatus. Therefore, the primary containment is inerted as late as possible in the plant startup and de-inerted as soon as possible in the plant shutdown. As long as reactor power is < 15% RTP, the potential for an event that generates significant hydrogen is low and the primary containment need not be inert. Furthermore, the probability of an event that generates hydrogen occurring within the first [24] hours of a startup, or within the last [24] hours before a shutdown, is low enough that these "windows," when the primary containment is not inerted, are also justified. The [24] hour time period is a reasonable amount of time to allow plant personnel to perform inerting or de-inerting.

ACTIONS

A.1

If oxygen concentration is \geq 4.0 v/o at any time while operating in MODE 1, with the exception of the relaxations allowed during startup and shutdown, oxygen concentration must be restored to < 4.0 v/o within 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time is allowed when oxygen concentration is ≥ 4.0 v/o because of the availability of other hydrogen mitigating systems (e.g., hydrogen recombiners) and the low probability and long duration of an event that would generate significant amounts of hydrogen occurring during this period.







ACTIONS (continued)

BASES

<u>B.1</u>

If oxygen concentration cannot be restored to within limits within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, power must be reduced to $\leq [15]$ % RTP within 8 hours. The 8 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce reactor power fr m full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.3.3.1

The primary containment must be determined to be inert by verifying that oxygen concentration is < 4.0 v/o. The 7 day Frequency is based on the slow rate at which oxygen concentration can change and on other indications of abnormal conditions (which would lead to more frequent checking by operators in accordance with plant procedures). Also, this Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [6.2.5].



B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.3.4 Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) System

BASES

The CAD System functions to maintain combustible gas BACKGROUND concentrations within the primary containment at or below the flammability limits following a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA) by diluting hydrogen and oxygen with nitrogen. To ensure that a combustible gas mixture does not occur, oxygen concentration is kept < [5.0] volume percent (v/o), or hydrogen concentration is kept < 4.0 v/o. The CAD System is manually initiated and consists (two independent, 100% capacity subsystems. Each subsystem includes a liquid nitrogen supply tank, ambient vaporizer, electric heater, and connected piping to supply the drywell and suppression chamber volumes. The nitrogen storage tanks each contain \ge [4350] gal, which is adequate for [7] days of CAD subsystem operation. The CAD System operates in conjunction with emergency operating procedures that are used to reduce primary containment pressure periodically during CAD System operation. This combination results in a feed and bleed approach to maintaining hydrogen and oxygen concentrations below combustible levels. APPLICABLE To evaluate the potential for hydrogen and oxygen SAFETY ANALYSES accumulation in primary containment following a LOCA. hydrogen and oxygen generation is calculated (as a function of time following the initiation of the accident). The assumptions stated in Reference 1 are used to maximize the amount of hydrogen and oxygen generated. The calculation confirms that when the mitigating systems are actuated in accordance with emergency operating procedures, the peak oxygen concentration in primary containment is < [5.0] v/o(Ref. 2). Hydrogen and oxyge. may accumulate within primary containment following a LOCA as a result of: A metal water reaction between the zirconium fuel rod a. cladding and the reactor coolant; or (continued)



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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	b.	Radiolytic Coolant Sy	decompos /stem.	ition of	water	in the R	leactor
	The State	CAD System ement.	satisfies	Criterio	on 3 of	the NRC	Policy

LCO

BASES

Two CAD subsystems must be OPERABLE. This ensures operation of at least one CAD subsystem in the event of a worst case single active failure. Operation of at least one CAD subsystem is designed to maintain primary containment post-LOCA oxygen c "centration < 5.0 v/o for 7 days.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, the CAD System is required to maintain the oxygen concentration within primary containment below the flammability limit of 5.0 v/o following a LOCA. This ensures that the relative leak tightness of primary containment is adequate and prevents damage to safety related equipment and instruments located within primary containment.

In MODE 3, both the hydrogen and oxygen production rates and the total amounts produced after a LOCA would be less than those calculated for the Design Basis Accident LOCA. Thus, if the analysis were to be performed starting with a LOCA in MODE 3, the time to reach a flammable concentration would be extended beyond the time conservatively calculated for MODES 1 and 2. The extended time would allow hydrogen removal from the primary containment atmosphere by other means and also allow repair of an inoperable CAD subsystem, if CAD were not available. Therefore, the CAD System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 3.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the CAD System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5.



BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1

If one CAD subsystem is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CAD subsystem is adequate to perform the oxygen control function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced oxygen control capability. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen and oxygen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit, the amount of time available after the event for operator action to prevent exceeding this limit, and the availability of the OPERABLE CAD subsystem and other hydrogen mitigating systems.

Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that indicates that the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when one CAD subsystem is inoperable. This allowance is provided because of the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen and oxygen in amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit, the low probability of the failure of the OPERABLE subsystem, the amount of time available after a postulated LOCA for operator action to prevent exceeding the flammability limit, and the availability of other hydrogen mitigating systems.

B.1 and B.2

Reviewer's Note: This Condition is only allowed for plants with an alternate hydrogen control system acceptable to the technical staff.

With two CAD subsystems inoperable, the ability to perform the hydrogen control function via alternate capabilities must be verified by administrative means within 1 hour. The alternate hydrogen control capabilities are provided by the [Primary Containment Inerting System or one hydrogen recombiner and one Drywell Cooling System fan]. The 1 hour Completion Time allows a reasonable period of time to verify that a loss of hydrogen control function does not exist. [Reviewer's Note: The following is to be used if a non-Technical Specification aiternate hydrogen control function is used to justify this Condition: In addition.



ACTIONS B.1 a

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

the alternate hydrogen control system capability must be verified every 12 hours thereafter to ensure its continued availability.] [Both] the [initial] verification [and all subsequent verifications] may be performed as an administrative check by examining logs or other information to determine the availability of the alternate hydrogen control system. It does not mean to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the alternate hydrogen control system. If the ability to perform the hydrogen control function is maintained. continued operation is permitted with two CAD subsystems inoperable for up to 7 days. Seven days is a reasonable time to allow two CAD subsystems to be inoperable because the hydrogen control function is maintained and because of the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exceeding the fiammability limit.

With two CAD subsystems inoperable, one CAD subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of the occurrence of a LOCA that would generate hydrogen in the amounts capable of exceeding the flammability limit, the amount of time available after the event for operator action to prevent exceeding this limit, and the availability of other hydrogen mitigating systems.

<u>C.1</u>

If any Required Action cannot be met within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.



BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.3.4.1

Verifying that there is ≥ [4350] gal of liquid nitrogen supply in the CAD System will ensure at least [7] days of post-LOCA CAD operation. This minimum voluce a liquid nitrogen allows sufficient time after an action to replenish the nitrogen supply for long term i...rting. This is verified every 31 days to ensure that the system is capable of performing its intended function when required. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience, which has shown 31 days to be an acceptable period to verify the liquid nitrogen supply and on the availability of other hydrogen mitigating systems.

SR 3.6.3.4.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in each of the CAD subsystem flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.

A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the accident analysis. This is acceptable because the CAD System is manually initiated. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The 31 day Frequency is appropriate because the valves are operated under procedural control, improper valve position would only affect a single subsystem, the probability of an event requiring initiation of the system is low, and the system is a manually initiated system.

REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.7, Revision [2].

2. FSAR, Section [].



B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.o.4.1 [Secondary] Containment

BASES

BACKGROUND The function of the [secondary] containment is to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and closure of certain valves whose lines penetrate the [secondary] containment, the [secondary] containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations that take place inside primary containment is, when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment.

> The [secondary] containment is a structure that completely encloses the primary containment and those components that may be postulated to contain primary system fluid. This structure forms a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products. It is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the environmental pressure (e.g., due to pump and motor heat load additions). To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the [secondary] containment to be designed as a conventional structure, the [secondary] containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure. Requirements for these systems are specified separately in LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES There are two principal accidents for which credit is taken for [secondary] containment OPERABILITY. These are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident inside [secondary] containment (Ref. 2). The [secondary] containment performs no active function in response to each of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission



[Secondary] Containment B 3.6.4.1

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An extension of the second sec	
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	products entrapped within the [secondary] containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.
	[Secondary] containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO	An OPERABLE [secondary] containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in [secondary] containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the [secondary] containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness t ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission produc release to primary containment that leaks to [secondary] containment. Therefore, [secondary] containment OPERABILIT is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.
	In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining [secondary] containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situation for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment.
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u>
	If [secondary] containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of
	(continued

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

maintaining [secondary] containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring [secondary] containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where [secondary] containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2

If [secondary] containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1, C.2, and C.3

Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the [secondary] containment. In such cases, the [secondary] containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment. CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the [secondary] containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend

(continued)



[Secondary] Containment B 3.6.4.1

RASES

C.1, C.2, and C.3 (continued)

ACTIONS

movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.4.1.1

This SR ensures that the [secondary] containment boundary is sufficiently leak tight to preclude exfiltration under expected wind conditions. The 24 hour Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience related to [secondary] containment vacuum variations during the applicable MODES and the low probability of a DBA occurring between surveillances.

Furthermore, the 24 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal [secondary] containment vacuum condition.

SR 3.5.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3

Verifying that [secondary] containment equipment hatches and access doors are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the [secondary] containment will not occur. Maintaining [secondary] containment OPERABILITY requires verifying each door in the access opening is closed, except when the access opening is being used for normal transient entry and exit (then at least one door must remain closed). The 31 day Frequency for these SRs has been shown to be adequate, based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other indications of door and hatch status that are available to the operator.

[SR 3.6.4.1.4 and] SR 3.6.4.1.5

The SGT System exhausts the [secondary] containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment

(continued)



SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

[SR 3.6.4.1.4 and] SR 3.6.4.1.5 (continued)

equipment. To ensure that all fission products are treated. SR 3.6.4.1.4 verifies that the SGT System will rapidly establish and maintain a pre-sure in the [secondary] containment that is less than the lowest postulated pressure external to the [secondary] containment boundary. This is confirmed by demonstrating that one SGT subsystem will draw down the [secondary] containment to ≥ [0.25] inches of vacuum water gauge in ≤ [120] seconds. This cannot be accomplished if the [secondary] containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.5 demonstrates that one SGT subsystem can maintain \geq [0.25] inches of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour at a flow rate ≤ [4000] cfm. The 1 hour test period allows [secondary] containment to be in the mal equilibrium at steady state conditions. Therefore, these two tests are used to ensure [secondary] containment boundary integrity. Since these SRs are [secondary] containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, either SGT subsystem will perform this test. The [18] month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [15.1.39].

2. FSAR, Section [15.1.41].



SCIVs B 3.6.4.2

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment [lation Valves (SCIVs)

BASES				
BACKGROUND	The function of the SCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1). Secondary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment following a DBA, or that are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE or take place outside primary containment, are maintained within applicable limits.			
	The OPERABILITY requirement for SCIVs help ensure that adequate [secondary] containment leak tightness is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. These isolation devices consist of either passive devices or active (automatic) devices. Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), and blind flanges are considered passive devices.			
	Automatic SCIVs close on a [secondary] containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of untreated radioactive material from [secondary] containment following a DBA or other accidents.			
	Other penetrations are isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges.			
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure that [secondary] containment is a leak tight barrier to fission product releases. The principal accidents for which [secondary] containment leak tightness is required are a loss of coolant accident (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident inside [secondary] containment (Ref. 2). The [secondary] containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events, but its leak tightness is required to ensure that leakage from the primary containment			



APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System before being released to the environment.

Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside [secondary] containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

SCIVs form a part of the [secondary] containment boundary. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The power operated isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Reference 3.

The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed, automatic valves are de-activated and secured in their closed position, and blind flanges are in place. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Reference 3.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the [secondary] containment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment. Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.



SCIVs B 3.5.4.2

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the valve. In this way, the pene ratio can be rapidly isolated when a need for [secondary] containment isolation is indicated.

The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV.

A.1 and A.2

In the event that there are one or more penetration flow paths with one SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration. flow path(s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the valve used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to [secondary] containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to isola. the penetration, and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time is very low.

For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required action A.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that [secondary] containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, but no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is appropriate because the valves are operated under



ACTIONS

A.1 and A.? (continued)

administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is loc. This Required Action does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that the affected penetration remains isolated.

Required Action A. is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

<u>B.1</u>

With two SCIVs in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 4 hours. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time, is very low.

The Condition has been modified by a Note stating that Condition B is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two isolation valves. This clarifies that only Condition A is entered if one SCIV is inoperable in each of two penetrations.

C.1 and C.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the

(continued)



BWR/4 STS

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.1, D.2, and D.3

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of a component must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not prerlude completion of movement of a component to a safe positio. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fissi... product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action D.1 has been modified by a Note stating that _CO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS <u>SR 3.6 .1</u>

This SR is fies that each secondary containment manual isolation alve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the [ar indary] containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves in [secondary] containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

Since the convolves are readily accessible to personnel during normal operation and verification of their position is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to



and the second second

SURVIILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS

BASES

SR 3.6.4.2.1 (continued)

provide added assurance that the valves are in the correct positions.

Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

A second Note has been included to clarify that SCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the valves are open.

SR 3.6.4.2.2

Verifying that the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic SCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are [in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program or 2 days].

SR 3.6.4.2.3

Verifying that each automatic SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from [secondary] containment following a DBA or other accidents. This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a [secondary] containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.6 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The [18] month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2

- 60.0		
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SURVEILLANCE	<u>SR 3.6.4.2.3</u> (continued)				
REQUIREMENTS	the Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.				
REFERENCES	1. FSAR, Section [15.1.39].				
	2. FSAR, Section [15.1.41].				
	3. FSAR, Section [].				





B 3.6.4.3

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas T.eatment (SGT) System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The SGT System is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41, "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup" (Ref. 1). The function of the SGT System is the sure that radioactive materials that leak from the prime intainment into the [secondary] containment follo Design Basis Accident (DBA) are filtered and adscription to exhausting to the environment.

The SGT System consists of two fully redundant subsystems, each with its own set of ductwork, dampers, charcoal filter train, and controls.

Each charcoal filter train consists of (components listed in order of the direction of the air flow):

- A demister or moisture separator;
- b. An electric heater;
- c. A prefilter;
- d. A high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter:
- e. A charcoal adsorber:
- f. A second HEPA filter; and
- g. A centrifugal fan.

The sizing of the SGT System equipment and components is based on the results of an infiltration analysis, as well as an exfiltration analysis of the [secondary] containment. The internal pressure of the SGT System boundary region is maintained at a negative pressure of [0.25] inches water gauge when the system is in operation, which represents the internal pressure required to ensure zero exfiltration of air from the building when exposed to a [10] mph wind blowing at an angle of [45]° to the building.

The demister is provided to remove entrained water in the air, while the electric heater reduces the relative humidity

BWR/4 STS

B 3.6-109

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

SGT System B 3.6.4.3

BASES	
BACKGROUND (continued)	of the airstream to less than [70]% (Ref. 2). The prefilter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter removes fine particulate matter and protects the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorber removes gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA f. ter collects any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.
	The SGT System automatically starts and operates in response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system. Following initiation, both charcoal filter train fans start. Upon verification that both subsystems are operating, the redundant subsystem is normally shut down.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The design basis for the SGT System is to mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel nandling accidents (Ref. 2). For all events analyzed, the SGT System is shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.
	The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO	Following a DBA, a minimum of one SGT subsystem is required to maintain the [secondary] containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for two OPERABLE subsystems ensures operation of at least one SGT subsystem in the event of a single active failure.
APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.
	In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT
	(continued)

BWR/4 STS

APPLICABILITY System in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5, (continued) except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment.

ACTIONS

BASES

A.1

With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status in 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT System and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2

If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, in the [secondary] containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem should immediately be placed in operation. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have



B 3.6.4.3

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1. C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3 (continued)

occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the [secondary] containment, thus placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities must not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until GPDRVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

D.1, D.2, and D.3

When two SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in [secondary] containment must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potencial for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action D.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor





SGT System B 3.6.4.3

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1, D.2, and D.3 (continued)

operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.3.1

Operating each SGT subsystem for \geq [10] continuous hours ensures that [both] subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation [with the heaters on (automatic heater cycling to maintain temperature)] for \geq [10] continuous hours every 31 days eliminates moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31 day Frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and controls and the redundancy available in the system.

SR 3.6.4.3.2

This SR verifies that the required SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The SGT System filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 3). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.6.4.3.3

This SR verifies that each SGT subsystem starts on receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.6 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

SGT System B 3.6.4.3

BASES

SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.4.3.3 (continued)

function. Therefore, the Frequency was found to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.4.3.4

This SR verifies that the filter cooler bypass damper can be opened and the fan started. This ensures that the ventilation mode of SGT System operation is available. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was found to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

- 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41.
- 2. FSAR, Section [6.2.3].

Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. [2]. 3.

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.1 Residual Heai Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The RHRSW System is designed to provide cooling water for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System heat exchangers, required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. The RHRSW System is operated whenever the RHR heat exchangers are required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode or in the suppression pool cooling or spray mode of the RHR System.

The RHRSW System consists of two independent and redundant subsystems. Each subsystem is made up of a header, two [4000] gpm pumps, a suction source, valves, piping, heat exchanger, and associated instrumentation. Either of the two subsystems is capable of providing the required cooling capacity with one pump operating to maintain safe shutdown conditions. The two subsystems are separated from each other by normally closed motor operated cross tie valves, so that failure of one subsystem will not affect the OPERABILITY of the other subsystem. The RHRSW System is designed with sufficient redundancy so that no single active component failure can prevent it from achieving its design function. The RHRSW System is described in the FSAR, Section [9.2.7], Reference 1.

Cooling water is pumped by the RHRSW pumps from the [Altamaha River] through the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers, and discharges to the [circulating water flume]. A minimum flow line from the pump discharge to the intake structure prevents the pump from overheating when pumping against a closed discharge valve.

The system is initiated manually from the control room. If operating during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the system is automatically tripped to allow the diesel generators to automatically power only that equipment necessary to reflood the core. The system can be manually started any time 10 minutes after the LOCA, or manually started any time the LOCA signal is manually overridden or clears.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

RHRSW System 8 3.7.1

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE

The RHRSW System removes heat from the suppression pool to SAFETY ANALYSES limit the suppression pool temperature and primary containment pressure following a LOCA. This ensures that the primary containment can perform its function of limiting the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a LOCA. The ability of the RHRSW System to support long term cooling of the reactor or primary containment is discussed in the FSAR, Chapters [6] and [15] (Refs. 2 and 3, respectively). These analyses explicitly assume that the RHRSW System will provide adequate cooling support to the equipment required for safe shutdown. These analyses include the evaluation of the long term primary containment response after a design basis LOCA.

> The safety analyses for long term cooling were performed for various combinations of RHR System failures. The worst case single failure that would affect the performance of the RHRSW System is any failure that would disable one subsystem of the RHRSW System. As discussed in the FSAR, Section [6.2.1.4.3] (Ref. 4) for these analyses, manual initiation of the OPERABLE RHRSW subsystem and the associated RHR System is assumed to occur [10] minutes after a DBA. The RHRSW flow assumed in the analyses is [4000] gpm per pump with two pumps operating in one loop. In this case, the maximum surpression chamber water temperature and pressure are [206.4] 'F and [36.59] psig, respectively, well below the design temperature of [340] °F and maximum allowable pressure of [62] psig.

The RHRSW System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

Two RHRSW subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

An RHRSW subsystem is considered OPERABLE when:

a. Two pumps are OPERABLE; and

(continued)



LCO

(continued)

b.

An OPERABLE flow path is capable of taking suction from the intake structure and transferring the water to the RHR heat exchangers at the assumed flow rate. Additionally, the RHRSW cross tie valves (which allow the two RHRSW loops to be connected) must be closed so that failure of one subsystem will not affect the OPERABILIT' of the other subsystems."

An adequate suction source is not addressed in this LCO since the minimum net positive suction head ([59] ft mean sea level in the pump well) is bounded by the plant service water pump requirements (LCO 3.7.2, "[Plant Service Water (PSW)] System and [Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)]").

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the RHRSW System is required to be OPERABLE to support the OPERABILITY of the RHR System for primary containment cooling (LCO 3.6.2.3, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling," and LCO 3.6.2.4, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray") and decay heat removal (LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shuta.wn Cooling System—Hot Shutdown"). The Applicability is therefore consistent with the requirements of these systems.

In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the RHRSW System are determined by the systems it supports.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one RHRSW pump inoperable, the inoperable pump must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE RHRSW pumps are adequate to perform the RHRSW heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced RHRSW capability. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the remaining RHRSW heat removal capability, including enhanced reliability afforded by manual cross connect capability, and the low probability of a DBA with concurrent worst case single failure.



ACTIONS (continued) B.1

With one RHRSW pump inoperable in each subsystem, if no additional failures occur in the RHRSW System, and the two OPERABLE pumps are aligned by opening the normally closed cross tie valves, then the remaining OPERABLE pumps and flow paths provide adequate heat removal capacity following a design basis LOCA. However, capability for this alignment is not assumed in long term containment response analysis and an additional single failure in the RHRSW System could reduce the system capacity below that assumed in the safety analysis. Therefore, continued operation is permitted only for a limited time. One inoperable pump is required to be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time for restoring one inoperable RHRSW pump to OPERABLE status is based on engineering judgment, considering the level of redundancy provided.

<u>C.1</u>

Required Action C.1 is intended to handle the inoperability of one RHRSW subsystem for reasons other than Condition A. The Completion Time of 7 days is allowed to restore the RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE RHRSW subsystem is adequate to perform the RHRSW heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE RHRSW subsystem could result in loss of RHRSW function. The Completion Time is based on the redundant RHRSW capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of an event occurring requiring RHRSW during this period.

The Required Action is modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.4.8, be entered and Required Actions taken if the inoperable RHRSW subsystem results in inoperable [RHR shutdown cooling]. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.

D.1

With both RHRSW subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition B (e.g., both subsystems with inoperable flow



RHRSW System B 3.7.1



BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 (continued)

paths, or one subsystem with an inoperable pump and one subsystem with an inoperable flow path), the RHRSW System is not capable of performing its intended function. At least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours. The 8 hour Completion Time for restoring one RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status, is based on the Completion Times provided for the RHR suppression pool cooling and spray functions.

The Required Action is modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.4.8, be entered and Required Actions taken if the inoperable RHRSW subsystem results in inoperable [RHR shutdown cooling]. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.

E.1 and E.2

If the RHRSW subsystems cannot be not restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Times, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.1.1

Verifying the correct alignment for each manual, power operated, and automatic value in each RHRSW subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for RHRSW operation. This SR does not apply to values that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these values are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A value is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be realigned to its accident position. This is acceptable because the RHRSW System is a manually initiated system.



SURVEILLANCE	<u>SR 3.7.1.1</u> (continued) This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.				
REQUIREMENTS					
	The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.				
REFERENCES	1. FSAR, Section [9.2.7].				
	2. FSAR, Chapter [6].				
	3. FSAR, Chapter [15].				
	4. FSAR, Section [6.2.1.4.3].				





B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.2 [Plant Service Water (PSW)] System and [Ultimate Heat Sink [UHS]]

BASES

BACKGROUND

The [PSW] System is d signed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from equipment, such as the diesel generators (DGs), residual heat removal (RHR) pump coolers, and room coolers for Emergency Core Cooling System equipment, required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. The [PSW] System also provides cooling to unit components, as required, during normal operation. Upon receipt of a loss of offsite power or loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal, nonessential loads are automatically isolated, the essential loads are automatically divided between [PSW] Divisions 1 and 2, and one [PSW] pump is automatically started in each division.

The [PSW] System consists of the [UHS] and two independent and redundant subsystems. Each of the two [PSW] subsystems is made up of a header, two [8500] gpm pumps, a suction source valves, piping and associated instrumentation. Either of the two subsystems is capable of providing the required cooling capacity to support the required systems with one pump operating. The two subsystems are separated from each other so failure of one subsystem will not affect the OPERABILITY of the other system.

Cooling water is pumped from the [Altamaha River] by the [PSW] pumps to the essential components through the two main headers. After removing heat from the components, the water is discharged to the circulating water flume to replace evaporation losses from the circulating water system, or directly to the river via a bypass valve.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Sufficient water inventory is available for all [PSW] System post LOCA cooling requirements for a 30 day period with no additional makeup water source available. The ability of the [PSW] System to support long term cooling of the reactor containment is assumed in evaluations of the equipment required for safe reactor shutdown presented in the FSAR, Chapter [4] and [6] (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively). These



[PSW] System and [UHS] B 3.7.2

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) analyses include the evaluation of the long term primary containment response after a design basis LOCA.

The ability of the [PSW] System to provide adequate cooling to the identified safety equipment is an implicit assumption for the safety analyses evaluated in References 1 and 2. The ability to provide onsite emergency AC power is dependent on the ability of the [PSW] System to cool the DGs. The long term cooling capability of the RHR, core spray, and RHR service water pumps is also dependent on the cooling provided by the [PSW] System.

The [PSW] System, together with the [UHS], satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

The [PSW] subsystems are independent of each other to the degree that each has separate controls, power supplies, and the operation of one does not depend on the other. In the event of a DBA, one subsystem of [PSW] is required to provide the minimum heat removal capability assumed in the safety analysis for the system to which it supplies cooling water. To ensure this requirement is met, two subsystems of [PSW] must be OPERABLE. At least one subsystem will operate, if the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

A subsystem is considered OPERABLE when it has an OPERABLE [UHS], two OPERABLE pumps, and an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the intake structure and transferring the water to the appropriate equipment.

The OPERABILITY of the [UHS] is based on having a minimum water level in the pump well of the intake structure of [60.7] ft mean sea level and a maximum water temperature of [90]°F.

The isolation of the [PSW] System to components or systems may render those components or systems inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the [PSW] System.

APPLICABILITY IN MODES 1, 2, and 3, the [PSW] System and [UHS] are required to be OPERABLE to support OPERABILITY of the



APPLICABILITY equipment serviced by the [PSW] System. Therefore, the (continued) [PSW] System and [UHS] are required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

> In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements the [PSW] System and [UHS] are determined by the systems they support.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one [PSW] pump inoperable in each subsystem, the inoperable pump must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE [PSW] pumps (even allowing for an additional single failure) are adequate to perform the [PSW] heat removal function; however, the overall reliability is reduced. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the remaining [PSW] heat removal capability to accommodate additional single failures, and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period.

B.1

With one [PSW] pump inoperable in each subsystem, one inoperable pump must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE [PSW] pumps are adequate to perform the [PSW] heat removal function; however, the overall reliability is reduced. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the remaining [PSW] heat removal capability to accommodate an additional single failure and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period.

<u>C.1</u>

If one or more cooling towers have one fan inoperable (i.e., up to one fan per cooling tower inoperable), action must be taken to restore the inoperable cooling tower fan(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an accident occurring during the 7 days that one cooling tower fan is inoperable in one or more cooling towers, the number of available systems, and



ACTIONS .

C.1 (continued)

the time required to reasonably complete the Required _ Action.

0.1

With one [PSW] subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition A and [Condition C] (e.g., inoperable flow path or both pumps inoperable in a loop), the [PSW] subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE [PSW] subsystem is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE [PSW] subsystem could result in loss of [PSW] function.

The 72 hour Completion Time is based on the redundant [PSW] System capabilities afforded by the "PERABLE subsystem, the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period, and is consistent with the allowed Completion Time for restoring an inoperable DG.

Required Action D.1 is modified by two Notes indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources— Operating," LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System—Hot Shutdown," be entered and Required Actions taken if the inoperable [PSW] subsystem results in an inoperable or RHR shutdown cooling, respectively. This is in accordance with LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.

E.1 and E.2

If the [PSW] subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or both [PSW] subsystems are inoperable for reasons other than Condition B and [Condition C], [or the [UHS] is determined inoperable for reasons other than Condition C] the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full



[PSW] System and [UHS] B 3.7.2

BASES

ACTIONS.

E.1 and E.2 (continued)

power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.2.1

This SR ensures adequate long term (30 days) cooling car. be maintained. With the [UHS] water source below the minimum level, the affected [PSW] subsystem must be declared inoperable. The 24 hour Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.

SR 3.7.2.2

This SR verifies the water level [in each pump well of the intake structure] to be sufficient for the proper operation of the [PSW] pumps (net positive suction head and pump vortexing are considered in determining this limit). The 24 hour Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.

SR 3.7.2.3

Verification of the [UHS] temperature ensures that the heat removal capability of the [PSW] System is within the assumptions of the DBA analysis. The 24 hour Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.

SR 3.7.2.4

Operating each cooling tower fan for \geq 15 minutes ensures that all fans are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that fan or motorfailure, or excessive vibration, can be detected for corrective action. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience, the known reliability of the fan units, the redundancy available, and the low probability of

B 3.7-11



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Ret. 0, 09/28/92

(continued)

BWR/4 STS
[PSW] System and [UHS] B 3.7.2

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.2.4 (continued)

significant degradation of the cooling tower fans occurring between surveillances.

SR 3.7.2.5

Verifying the correct alignment for each manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each [PSW] subsystem flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for [PSW] operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet considered in the correct position, provided it can be automatically realigned to its accident position within the required time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that isolation of the [PSW] System to components or systems may render those components or systems inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the [PSW] System. As such, when all [PSW] pumps, valves, and piping are OPERABLE, but a branch connection off the main header is isolated, the [PSW] System is still OPERABLE.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

SR 3.7.2.6

This SR verifies that the automatic isolation valves of the [PSW] System will automatically switch to the safety or emergency position to provide cooling water exclusively to the safety related equipment during an accident event. This is demonstrated by the use of an actual or simulated

(continued)



B 3.7-12

[PSW] System and [UHS] B 3.7.2 1

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BASES

REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.6 (continued)

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initiation signal. This SR also verifies the automatic start capability of one of the two [PSW] pumps in each subsystem.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the [18] month Frequency. Therefore, this Frequency is concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter [4].

2. FSAR, Chapter [6].





B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.3 Diesel Generator (DG) [1B] Standby Service Water (SSW) System

BASES The DG [1B] SSW System is designed to provide cooling water BACKGROUND for the removal of heat from the DG [1B]. DG [1B] is the only component served by the DG [1B] SSW System. The DG [1B] SSW pump autostarts upon receipt of a diesel generator (DG) start signal when power is available to the pump's electrical bus. Cooling water is pumped from the [Alternaha River] by the DG [1B] SSW pump to the essential DG components through the SSW supply header. After removing heat from the components, the water is discharged to the unit service water (PSW) discharge header. The capability exists to manually cross connect the PSW System to supply cooling to the DG [1B] during times when the SSW pump is inoperable. A complete description of the DG [1B] SSW System is presented in the FSAR, Section [9.5.5] (Ref. 1). The ability of the DG [1B] SSW System to provide adequate APPLICABLE. SAFETY ANALYSES cooling to the DG [18] is an implicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in the FSAR, Chapters [6] and [15] (Refs. 2 and 3, respectively). The ability to provide onsite emergency AC power is dependent on the ability of the DG [1B] SSW System to cool the DG [1B]. The DG [1B] SSW System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO The OPERABILITY of the DG [1B] SSW System is required to provide a coolant source to ensure effective operation of the DG [1B] in the event of an accident or transient. The OPERABILITY of the DG [1B] SSW System is based on having an OPERABLE pump and an OPERABLE flow path. An adequate suction source is not addressed in this LCO since the minimum net positive suction head of the DG [1B] SSW pump is bounded by the PSW requirements (LCO 3.7.2, "[Unit Service Water (PSW)] System and [Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)]").



BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

DG [1B] SSW System B 3./.3

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The requirements for OPERABILITY of the DG [1B] SSW System are governed by the required OPERABILITY of the DG [1B] (LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources—Operating," and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources—Shutdown").

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, and A.3

The Required Actions are modified by a Note indicating that the LCO 3.0.4 does not apply. As a result, a MODE change is allowed when the DG [1B] SSW System is inoperable, provided the DG [1B] has an adequate cooling water supply from the Unit [1] PSW.

If the DG [1B] SSW System is inoperable, the OPERABILITY of the DG [1B] is affected due to loss of its cooling source; however, the capability exists to provide cooling to DG [1B] from the PSW System of Unit [1]. Continued operation is allowed for 60 days if the OPERABILITY of a Unit 1 PSW System, with respect to its capability to provide cooling to the DG [1B], can be verified. This is accomplished by aligning cooling water to DG [1B] from the Unit 1 PSW System within 8 hours and verifying this lineup once every 31 days. The 8 hour Completion Time is based on the time required to reasonably complete the Required Action, and the low probability of an event occurring requiring DG [1B] during this period. The 31 day verification of the Unit [1] PSW lineup to the DG [1B] is consistent with the PSW valve lineup SRs. The 50 day Completion Time to restore the DG [1B] SSW System to OPERABLE status allows sufficient time to repair the system, yet prevents indefinite operation with cooling water provided from the Unit [1] PSW System.

<u>B.1</u>

If cooling water cannot be made available to the DG [1B] within the 8 hour Completion Time, or if cooling water cannot be verified to be aligned to DG [1B] from a Unit [1] PSW subsystem as required by the 31 day verification Required Action, the DG [1B] cannot perform its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable. In accordance with LCO 3.0.6, this also requires entering into the Applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.1 or LCO 3.8.2. Additionally, if the DG [1B] SSW System is



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

not restored to OPERABLE status within 60 days, DG [1B] must be immediately declared inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.3.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the DG [1B] SSW System flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for DG [1B] SSW System operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, and yet be considered in the correct position provided it can be automatically realigned to its accident position, within the required time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

SR 3.7.3.2

This SR ensures that the DG [1B] SSW System pump will automatically start to provide required cooling to the DG [1B] when the DG [1B] starts and the respective bus is energized.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the [18] month Frequency, which is based at the refueling cycle. Therefore, this Frequency is concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.



DG [1B] SSW System B 3.7.3

BASES (continue)

REFERENCES

FSAR, Section [9.5.5].
 FSAR, Chapter [6].
 FSAR, Chapter [15].





BWR/4 STS

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.4 [Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC)] System

BASES BACKGROUND The [MCREC] System provides a radiologically controlled environment from which the unit can be safely operated following a Design Basis Accident (DBA).

The safety related function of [MCREC] System includes two independent and redundant high efficiency air filtration subsystems for emergency treatment of recirculated air or outside supply air. Each subsystem consists of a demister, an electric heater, a prefilter, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section, a second HEPA filter, a booster fan, an air handling unit (excluding the condensing unit), and the associated ductwork and dampers. Demisters remove water droplets from the airstream. Prefilters and HEPA filters remove particulate matter, which may be radioactive. The charcoal adsorbers provide a holdup period for gaseous iodine, allowing time for decay.

The [MCREC] System is a standby system, parts of which also operate during normal unit operations to maintain the control room environment. Upon receipt of the initiation signal(s) (indicative of conditions that could result in radiation exposure to control room personnei), the [MCREC] System automatically switches to the pressurization mode of operation to prevent infiltration of contaminated air into the control room. A system of dampers isolates the control room, and a part of the recirculated air is routed through either of the two filter subsystems. Outside air is taken in at the normal ventilation intake and is mixed with the recirculated air before being passed through one of the charcoal adsorber filter subsystems for removal of airborne radioactive particles.

The [MCREC] System is designed to maintain the control room environment for a 30 day continuous occupancy after a DBA without exceeding 5 rem whole body dose. A single [MCREC] subsystem will pressurize the control room to about [0.1] inches water gauge to prevent infiltration of air from surrounding buildings. [MCREC] System operation in maintaining control room habitability is discussed in the FSAR, Chapters [6] and [9], (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The ability of the [MCREC] System to maintain the habitability of the control room is an explicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in the FSAR, Chapters [6] and [15] (Refs. 1 and 3, respectively). The pressurization mode of the [MCREC] System is assumed to operate following a loss of coolant accident, fuel handling accident, main steam line break, and control rod drop accident, as discussed in the FSAR, Section [6.4.1.2.2] (Ref. 4). The radiological doses to control room personnel as a result of the various DBAs are summarized in Reference 3. No single active or passive failure will cause the loss of outside or recirculated air from the control room.

The [MCREC] System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

Two redundant subsystems of the [MCREC] System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in exceeding a dos = of 5 rem to the control room operators in the event of a DBA.

The [MCREC] System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are OPERABLE in both subsystems. A subsystem is considered OPERABLE when its associated:

a. Fan is OPERABLE;

- b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and
- c. Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors.



[MCREC] System B 3.7.4

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY	In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the [MCREC] System must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release.
	In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Inerefore, maintaining the [MCREC] System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:
	 During operations with potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs);
	b. During CORE ALT: STORE; and
	c. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment.

ACTIONS

With one [MCREC] subsystem inoperable, the inoperable [MCREC] subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE [MCREC] subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced [MCREC] System capability. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

B.1 and B.2

A.1

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable [MCREC] subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.





BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3

The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. There, re, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDR.s, if the inoperable [MCREC] subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE [MCREC] subsystem may be placed in the pressurization mode. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note alerting the operator to [place the system in the toxic gas protection mode if the toxic gas automatic transfer capability is inoperable].

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

D.1

If both [MCREC] subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the [MCREC] System may not be capable of performing

(continued)



[MCREC] System B 3.7.4



BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 (continued)

the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

E 1, E.2, and E.3

The Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

ovement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the] containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during th two [MCREC] subsystems inoperable, action must mmediately to suspend activities that present a for releasing radioactivity that might require of the control room. This places the unit in a that minimizes risk.

an applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDVRs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE <u>SR 3.7.4.1</u> REQUIREMENTS

C

This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing eac' subsystem once every month provides an adequate check on this system. Monthly heater operation dries out any



BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.4.1 (continued)

moisture that has accumulated in the charcoal as a result of humidity in the ambient air. [Systems with heaters must be operated for ≥ 10 continuous hours with the heaters energized. Systems without heaters need only be operated for ≥ 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system.] Furthermore, the 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two subsystem redundancy available.

SR 3.7.4.2

This SR verifies that the required [MCREC] testing is performed in accordance with the [Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)]. The [MCREC] filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 5). The [VFTP] includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the [VFTP].

SR 3.7.4.3

This SR verifies that on an actual or simulated initiation signal, each [MCREC] subsystem starts and operates. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.7.1.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The [18] month Frequency is specified in Reference 5.

SR 3.7.4.4

This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas (the turbine building), is periodically tested to verify proper function of the [MCREC] System. During the emergency mode of operation, the [MCREC] System is designed to slightly pressurize the control room ≥ [0.1] inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to the turbine building to



[MCREC] System B 3.7.4

SURVLILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	SR 3.7.4.4 (continued) prevent unfiltered inleakage. The [MCREC] System is designed to maintain this positive pressure at a flow rate of ≤ [400] cfm to the control room in the pressurization mode. The Frequency of [18] months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with industry practice and other filtration systems SRs.
REFERENCES	1. FSAR, Chapter [6].
	2. FSAR, Chapter [9].
	3. FSAR, Chapter [15].
	4. FSAR, Section [6.4.1.2.2].
	5. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.





BASES

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.5 [Control Room Air Conditioning (AC)] System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The [Control Room AC] System provides temperature control for the control room following isolation of the control room.

The [Control Room AC] System consists of two independent, redundant subsystems that provide cooling and heating of recirculated control room air. Each subsystem consists of heating coils, cooling coils, fans, chillers, compressors, ductwork, dampers, and instrumentation and controls to provide for control room temperature control.

The [Control Room AC] System is designed to provide a controlled environment under both normal and accident conditions. A single subsystem provides the required temperature control to maintain a suitable control room environment for a sustained occupancy of 12 persons. The design conditions for the control room environment are 76°F and 50% relative humidity. The [Control Room AC] System operation in maintaining the control room temperature is discussed in the FSAR, Section [6.4] (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The design basis of the [Control Room AC] System is to maintain the control room temperature for a 30 day continuous occupancy.

The [Control Room AC] System components are arranged in redundant safety related subsystems. During emergency operation, the [Control Room AC] System maintains a habitable environment and ensures the OPERABILITY of components in the control room. A single failure of a component of the [Control Room AC] System, assuming a loss of offsite power, does not impair the ability of the system to perform its design function. Redundant detectors and controls are provided for control room temperature control. The [Control Room AC] System is designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements. The [Control Room AC] System is capable of removing sensible and latent heat loads from the control room, including consideration of equipment



[Control Room AC] System B 3,7.5

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	heat loads and personnel occupancy requirements to ensura equipment OPERABILITY. The [Control Room AC] System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO	Two independent and redundant subsystems of the [Control Room AC] System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exce ing limits.
	The [Control Room AC] System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to maintain the control room temperature are OPERABLE in both subsystems. These components include the cooling coils, fans, chillers, compressors, ductwork, dampers, and associated instrumentation and controls.
APPLICABILITY	In MODE 1, 2, or 3, the [Control Room AC] System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control room temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY limits following control room isolation.
	In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a Design Basis Accident are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the [Control Room AC] System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:
	 During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs);
	b. During CORE ALTERATIONS; and
	c. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment.



[Control Room AC] System B 3.7.5

SASES (continued)

ACTIONS



A.1

With one [control room AC] subsystem inoperable, the inoperable [control room AC] subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With two unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE [control room AC] subsystem is adequate to perform the control room air conditioning function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the control room air conditioning function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, the consideration that the remaining subsystem can provide the required protection, and the availability of alternate safety and nonsafety cooling methods.

B.1 and B.2

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable [control room AC] subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3

The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE [control room AC] subsystem may be placed immediately in operation. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE,

6

[Control Room AC] System B 3.7.5

ACTIONS

BASES

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3 (continued)

that no failures that would prevent actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

0.1

If both [control room AC] subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the [Control Room AC] System may not be capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

E.1, E.2, and E.3

The Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, with two [control room AC] subsystems inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might



BASES

ACTIONS E.1, E.2, and E.3 (continued)

require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and handling of irradiated fuel in the [secondary] containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.7.5.1</u>

This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the assumed heat load in the control room. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The [18] month Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the [Control Room AC] System is not expected over this time period.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section [6.4].



B 3./ PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.6 Main Condenser Offgas

BACKGROUND	During unit operation, steam from the low pressure turbine is exhausted directly into the condenser. Air and noncondensible gases are collected in the condenser, then exhausted through the steam jet air ejectors (SJAEs) to the Main Condenser Offgas System. The offgas from the main condenser normally includes radioactive gases.
	The Main Condenser Offgas System has been incorporated into the unit design to reduce the gaseous radwaste emission. This system uses a catalytic recombiner to recombine radiolytically dissociated hydrogen and oxygen. The gaseous mixture is cooled by the offgas condenser; the water and condensibles are stripped out by the offgas condenser and moisture separator. The radioactivity of the remaining gaseous mixture (i.e., the offgas recombiner effluent) is monitored downstream of the moisture separator prior to entering the holdup line.
A⊅PLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The main condenser offgas gross gamma activity rate is an initial condition of the Main Condenser Offgas System failure event, discussed in the FSAR, Section [15.1.35] (Ref. 1). The analysis assumes a gross failure in the Main Condenser Offgas System that results in the rupture of the Main Condenser Offgas System pressure boundary. The gross gamma activity rate is controlled to ensure that, during the event, the calculated offsite doses will be well within the limits of 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 2) or the NRC staff approved licensing basis.
	The main condenser offgas limits satisfy Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

To ensure compliance with the assumptions of the Main Condenser Offgas System failure event (Ref. 1), the fission product release rate should be consistent with a noble gas release to the reactor coolant of 100 μ Ci/MWt-second after decay of 30 minutes. The LCO is established consistent with

Main Condenser Offgas B 3.7.6



LCO	this requirement ([2436] MWt x 100 μCi/MWt-second =
(continued)	[240] mCi/second).
APPLICABILITY	The LCO is applicable when steam is being exhausted to the main condenser and the resulting noncondensibles are being processed via the Main Condenser Offgas System. This occur during MODE 1, and during MODES 2 and 3 with any [main ste line not isolated and] the SJAE in operation. In MODES 4 and 5, steam is not being exhausted to the main condenser and the requirements are not applicable.

ACTIONS

A.1

BASES

If the offgas radioactivity rate limit is exceeded, 72 hours is allowed to restore the gross gamma activity rate to within the limit. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, the time required to complete the Required Action, the large margins associated with permissible dose and exposure limits, and the low probability of a Main Condenser Offgas System rupture.

B.1, B.2, B.3.1, and B.3.2

If the gross gamma activity rate is not restored to within the limits in the associated Completion Time, [all main steam lines or] the SJAE must be isolated. This isolates the Main Condenser Offgas System from the source of the radioactive steam. The main steam lines are considered isolated if at least one main steam isolation valve in each main steam line is closed, and at least one main steam line drain valve in each drain line is closed. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the actions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

An alternative to Required Actions B.1 and B.2 is to place the unit in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The

(continued)



BWR/4 STS

Main Condenser Offgas B 3.7.6



BASES	
ACTIONS	B.1, B.2, B.3.1, and B.3.2 (continued)
	allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
SURVEILLANCE	<u>SR 3.7.6.1</u>
REQUIREMENTS	This SR, on a 31 day Frequency, requires an isotopic analysis of an offgas sample to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The noble gases to be sampled are Xe-133, Xe-135, Xe-138, Kr-85, Kr-87, and Kr-88. If the measured rate of radioactivity increases significantly (by \geq 50% after correcting for expected increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER), an isotopic analysis is also performed within 4 hours after the increase is noted, to ensure that the increase is not indicative of a sustained increase in the radioactivity rate. The 31 day Frequency is adequate in view of other instrumentation that continuously monitor the offgas, and is acceptable, based on operating experience.
	This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR is not required to be performed until 31 days after any [main steam line is not isolated and] the SJAE is in operation. Only in this condition can radioactive fission gases be in the Main Condenser Offgas System at significant rates.
REFERENCES	1. FSAR, Section [15.1.35].
	2. 10 CFR 100.



Main Turbine Bypass System B 3.7.7

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.7 Main Turbine Bypass System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Main Turbine Bypass System is designed to control steam pressure when reactor steam generation exceeds turbine requirements during unit startup, sudden load reduction, and cooldown. It allows excess steam flow from the reactor to the condenser without going through the turbine. The bypass capacity of the system is [25]% of the Nuclear Steam Supply System rated steam flow. Sudden load reductions within the capacity of the steam bypass can be accommodated without reactor scram. The Main Turbine Bypass System consists of three valves connected to the main steam lines between the main steam isolation valves and the turbine stop valve bypass valve chest. Each of these three valves is operated by hydraulic cylinders. The bypass valves are controlled by the pressure regulation function of the Turbine Electro Hydraulic Control System, as discussed in the FSAR, Section [7.7 4] (Ref. 1). The bypass valves are normally closed, and the pressure regulator controls the turbine control valves that direct all steam flow to the turbine. If the speed governor or the load limiter restricts steam flow to the turbine, the pressure regulator controls the system pressure by opening the bypass valves. When the bypass valves open, the steam flows from the bypass chest, through connecting piping, to the pressure breakdown assemblies, where a series of orinices are used to further reduce the steam pressure before the steam enters the condenser.

APPLICABLE The Main Turbine Bypass System is assumed to function during SAFETY ANALYSES The turbine generator load rejection transient, as discussed in the FSAR, Section [15.1.1] (Ref. 2). Opening the bypass valves during the pressurization event mitigates the increase in reactor vessel pressure, which affects the MCPR during the event. An inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System may result in an MCPR penalty.

The Main Turbine Bypass System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Main Turbine Bypass System B 3.7.7

BASES (continued)

1001

The Main Turbine Bypas. System is required to be OPERABLE to limit peak pressure in the main steam lines and maintain reactor pressure within acceptable limits during events that cause rapid pressurization, so that the Safety Limit MCPR is not exceeded. [With the Main Turbine Bypass System inoperable, modifications to the MLPR limits (LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") may be applied to allow this LCO to be met.] The MCPR limit for the inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System is specified in the COLR. An OPERABLE Main Turbine Bypass System requires the bypass valves to open in response to increasing main steam line pressure. This response is within the assumptions of the applicable analysis (Ref. 2).

APPLICABILITY The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to be OPERABLE at ≥ 25% RTP to ensure that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit and the cladding 1% plastic strain limit are not violated during the turbine generator load rejection transient. As discussed in the Bases for LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," and LCO 3.2.2, sufficient margin to these limits exists at < 25% RTP. Therefore, these requirements are only necessary when operating at or above this power level.

ACTIONS

<u>A.1</u>

If the Main Turbine Bypass System is inoperable (one or more bypass valves inoperable), or the MCPR limits for an inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System, as specified in the COLR, are not applied, the assumptions of the design basis transient analysis may not be met. Under such circumstances, prompt action should be taken to restore the Main Turbine Bypass System to OPERABLE status or adjust the MCPR limits accordingly. The 2 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on the time to complete the Required Action and the low probability of an event occurring during this period requiring the Main Turbine Bypass System.



Main Turbine Bypass System 3 3.7.7

BASES

ACTIONS (continued) 8.1

If the Main Turbine Bypass System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or the MCPR limits for an inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System are not applied, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 25% RTP. As discussed in the Applicability section, operation at < 25% RTP results in sufficient margin to the required limits, and the Main Turbine Bypass System is not required to protect fuel integrity during the turbine generator load rejection transient. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEYLLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.7.1

Cycling each main turbine bypass valve through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically OPERABLE and will function when required. The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 31 day Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.7.7.2

The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to actuate automatically to perform its design function. This SR demonstrates that, with the required system initiation signals, the valves will actuate to their required position. The [18] month Frequency is based on the need to perform thi Turveillance under the conditions that apply during a uni utage and because of the potential for an unplanned treactor at power. Operating experience has shown the [18] month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle, is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.



Main Turbine Bypass System B 3.7.7



BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 'continued)

SR 3.7.7.3

This SR ensures that the TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME is in compliance with the assumptions of the appropriate safety analysis. The response time limits are specified in [unit specific documentation]. The [18] month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and because of the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown the [18] month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle, is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

- 1. FSAR, Section [7.7.4].
- 2. FSAR, Section [15.1.1].



Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level B 3.7.8

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.8 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level

BASES	
BACKGROUND	The minimum water level in the spent fuel storage pool meets the assumptions of iodine decontamination factors following a fuel handling accident.
	A general description of the spent fuel storage pool design is found in the FSAR, Section [] (Ref. 1). The assumptions of the fuel handling accident are found in the FSAR, Section [15.1.4] (Ref. 2).
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The water level above the irradiated fuel assemblies is an explicit assumption of the fuel handling accident. A fuel handling accident is evaluated to ensure that the radiological consequences (calculated whole body and thyroid doses at the exclusion area and low population zone boundaries) are ≤ 25% of 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 3) exposure guidelines NUREG-0800 (Ref. 4). A fuel handling accident could release a fraction of the fission product inventory by breaching the fuel rod cladding as discussed in the Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 5).

The fuel handling accident is evaluated for the dropping of an irradiated fuel assembly onto the reactor core. The consequences of a fuel handling accident over the spent fuel storage pool are no more severe than those of the fuel handling accident over the reactor core, as discussed in the FSAR, Section [9.1.2.2.2] (Ref. 6). The water level in the spent fuel storage pool provides for absorption of water soluble fission product gases and transport slays of soluble and insoluble gases that must pass through the water before being released to the secondary containment atmosphere. This absorption and transport delay reduces the potential radioactivity of the release during a fuel handling accident.

The spent fuel storage pool water level satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.



Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level B 3.7.8



LCO	The specified water level preserves the assumptions of the fuel handling accident analysis (Ref. 2). As such, it is the minimum required for fuel movement within the spent fuel storage pool.
APPLICABILITY	This LCO applies during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool since the potential for a release of fission products exists.
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u>
	Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
	When the initial conditions for an accident cannot be met, action must be taken to preclude the accident from occurring. If the spent fuel storage pool level is less than required, the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool is suspended immediately. Suspension of this activity shall not preclude completion of movement of an irradiated iuel assembly to a safe position. This effectively precludes a spent fuel handling accident from occurring.
SURVEILLANCE	<u>SR 3.7.8.1</u>
REQUIREMENTS	This SR verifies that sufficient water is available in the event of a fuel handling accident. The water level in the spent fuel storage pool must be checked periodically. The 7 day Frequency is acceptable, based on operating experience, considering that the water volume in the pool is normally stable, and all water level changes are controlled



BASES (continued)

in the in the y. The ne pool is ontrolled by unit procedures.

Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level B 3.7.8

BASES (continued)

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section [].

- 2. FSAR, Section [15.1.4].
- 3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4, Revision 1, July 1981.
- 4. 10 CFR 100.
- 5. Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 1972.
- 6. FSAR, Section [9.1.2.2.2].





B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The unit Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources consist of the offsite power sources (preferred power sources, normal and alternates), and the onsite standby power sources (diesel generators (DGs) 2A, 2C, and 1B). As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref. 1), the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems.

The Class 1E AC distribution system is divided into redundant load groups, so loss of any one group does not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed. Each load group has connections to two preferred offsite power supplies and a single DG.

Offsite power is supplied to the 230 kV and 500 kV switchyards from the transmission network by eight transmission lines. From the 230 kV switchyards, two electrically and physically separated circuits provide AC power, through auxiliary transformers 2C and 2D, to 4.16 kV ESF buses 2E, 2F, and 2G. A detailed description of the offsite power network and circuits to the onsite Class 1E ESF buses is found in the FSAR, Section [8.2] (Ref. 2).

An offsite circuit consists of all breakers, transformers, switches, interrupting devices, cabling, and controls required to transmit power from the offsite transmission network to the onsite Class 1E ESF bus or buses.

Startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) 2D provides the normal source of power to the ESF buses 2E, 2F, and 2G. If any 4.16 kV ESF bus loses power, an automatic transfer from SAT 2D to SAT 2C occurs. At this time, 4.16 kV buses 2A and 2B and supply breakers from SAT 2C also trip open, disconnecting all nonessential loads from SAT 2C to preclude overloading of the transformer.

SATs 2C and 2D are sized to accommodate the simultaneous starting of all ESF loads on receipt of an accident signal without the need for load sequencing.

(continued)



BWR/4 STS

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The onsite standby power source for 4.16 kV ESF buses 2E. 2F, and 2G consists of three DGs. DGs 2A and 2C are dedicated to ESF buses 2E and 2G, respectively. DG 1B is a shared power source and can supply either Unit 1 ESF bus 1F or Unit 2 ESF bus 2F. A DG starts automatically on a less of coolant accident (LOCA) signal (i.e., low reactor water level signal or high drywell pressure signal) or on an ESF bus degraded voltage or undervoltage signal. After the DG has started, it automatically ties to its respective bus after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus undervoltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with a LOCA signal. The DGs also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the ESF bus on a LOCA signal alone. Following the trip of offsite power, a sequencer strips nonpermanent loads from the ESF bus. When the DG is tied to the ESF bus, loads are then sequentially connected to its respective ESF bus by the automatic sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG.

In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a LOCA.

Certain required plant loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading of the DGs in the process. Within 46 seconds after the initiating signal is received, all automatic and permanently connected loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.

Ratings for the DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). DGs 2A and 2C have the following ratings:

- a. 2850 kW-continuous,
- b. 3100 kW-2000 hours,
- c. 3250 kW-300 hours,
- d. 3500 kW-30 minutes.

(continued)



B 3.8-2

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BASES	
BACKGROUND	DG 1B has the following ratings:
(continued)	a. 2850 kW-continuous,
	b. 3250 kW-168 hours.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapte. [6] (Ref. 4) and Chapter [15] (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coclant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.
	The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of
	 An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and
	b. A worst case single failure.
	AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO	Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Distribution System and three separate and independent DGs (2A, 2C, and 1B) ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA.
	Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR, and are part of the licensing basis for the unit.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1

BASES

LCO (continued) addition, [one required automatic load sequencer per ESF bus] shall be OPERABLE.]

Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses. Each offsite circuit consists of incoming breaker and disconnect to the respective 2C and 2D SATs, the 2C and 2D transformers, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to 4.16 kV ESF buses. Feeder breakers from each circuit are required to the 2F ESF bus; however, if 2C SAT is connected to ESF bus 2E (or 2G) and 2D SAT is connected to 2G (or 2E), the remaining breakers to 2E and 2G are not required.

Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions, such as DG in standby with the engine hot, DG in standby with the engine at emicient ondition, and DG operating in parallel test mode.

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.

The AC sources must be separate and independent (to the extent possible) of other AC sources. For the DGs, the separation and independence are complete. For the offsite AC sources, the separation and independence are to the extent practical. A circuit may be connected to pore than one ESF bus, with fast transfer capability to t' other circuit OPERABLE, and not violate separation related to circuit that is not connected to an ESF bus is required to have OPERABLE fast transfer interlock mechanisms to at least two ESF buses to support OPERABILITY of that circuit.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources [and sequencers] are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that:



AC Sources-Operating 8 3.8.1



APPLICABILITY (continued)

a. . Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and

b. . Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The AC power requirements for MODES 4 and 5 are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown."

ACTIONS



To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the remaining required offsite circuit on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met. However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition C, for two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.

A.2

A.1

Required Action A.2, which only applies if the division cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure of the associated DG does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions (i.e., single division systems are not included). Redundant required features fatitres consist of inoperable features associated with a division redundant to the division that has no offsite power.

The Completion Time for Required Action A.2 is intended to allow time for the operator to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

BADES	
ACTIONS	A.2 (continued)
	 The division has no offsite power supplying its loads; and
	b. A required feature on the other division is inoperable.
	If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (one offsite circuit inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time would begin to be tracked.
	Discovering no offsite power to one 4160 V ESF bus of the onsite Class 1E Power Distribution System coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with any other ESF bus that has offsite power, results in starting the Completion Times for the Required Action. Twenty-four hours is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before the unit is subjected to transients associated with shutdown.
	The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection may have been lost for the required feature's function; however, function is not lost. The 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the component GPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
	<u>A.3</u>
	According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. With one offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the plant safety systems. In this condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE



BASES

ACTIONS

A.3 (continued)

offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System.

The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.3 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition A is entered while, for instance. a DG is inoperable, and that DG is subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 72 hours. This situation could lead to a total of 144 hours, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the offsite circuit. At this time, a DG could again become inoperable, the circuit restored OPERABLE, and an additional 72 hours (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 72 hours and 6 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.

As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This exception results in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time that Condition A was entered.

B.1

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one DG inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the required offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in

(continued)



BWR/4 STS



BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions must then be entered.

B.2

Required Action B.2 is intended to provide assurance that a losc of offsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions (i.e., single division systems are not included). Redundant required features failures consist of inoperable features associated with a division redundant to the division that has an inoperable DG.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. An inoperable DG exists; and
- A required feature on the other division (Division 1 or 2) is inoperable.

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (one DG inoperable), a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Discovering one required DG inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DG[s] results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.


ACTIONS

B.2 (continued)

The remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

8.3.1 and 8.3.2

The Note in Condition B indicates that Required Action B.3.1 or B.3.2 must be completed if Condition B is entered. The intent is that all DG inoperabilities must be investigated for common cause failures, regardless of how long the DG inoperability persists.

Required Action B.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), they are declared inoperable upon discovery, and Condition E of LCO 3.8.1 is entered. Once the failure is repaired, and the common cause failure no longer exists, Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG(s), performance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of those DGs.

According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7), [24] hours is a reasonable time to confirm that the OPERABLE DGs are not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.

B.4

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition B for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and

(continued)

3



BASES

ACTIONS

B.4 (continued)

offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onside Class 1E Distribution System. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.4 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occu ence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently restored OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 72 hours. This situation could lead to a total of 144 nours, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the DG. At this time, an offsite circuit could again become inoperable, the DG restored OPEKABLE, and an additional 72 hours (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 72 hour and 6 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

As in Required Action B.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allower outage time "clock." This exception results in establishing the "time zero" at the time that the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time that Condition B was entered.

C.1 and C.2

Required Action C.1 addresses actions to be taken in the event of inoperability of redundant required features concurrent with inoperability of two offsite circuits. Required Action C.1 reduces the vulnerability to a loss of function. The Completion Time for taking these actions is reduced to 12 hours from that allowed with one division



ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety divisions are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours is appropriate. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions, (i.e., single division systems are not included in the list). Redundant required isatures failures consist of any of these features that are inoperable because any inoperatility is on a division redundant to a division with inoperable offsite circuits.

The Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. All required offsite circuits are inoperable; and

b. A required feature is inoperable.

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (two offsite circuits inoperable), a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition C for a period that should not exceed 24 hours. This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This evel of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more



ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

BASES

severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more DGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this degradation level:

- a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and
- b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.

With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. In fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with the available offsite AC sources two less than required by the LCO, operation may continue for 24 hours. If two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours, unrestricted operation may continue. If only one offsite source is restored within 24 hours, power operation continues in accordance with Condition A.

D.1 and D.2

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it were inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition D is entered with no AC source to one ESF bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems-Operating," must be immediately entered. This



ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

allows Condition D to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit and one DG without regard to whether a division is de-energized. LCO 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized division.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 12 hours. In Condition D, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. Since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition C (loss of both required offsite circuits). This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

E.1

With two DGs inoperable, there is [one] remaining standby AC source. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for the majority of ESF equipment at this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown. (The immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power.) Since any inadvertent unit generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power. however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with both DGs inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours.

(continued)



BWR/4 STS

ACTIONS (continued) F.1

The sequencer(s) is an essential support system to [both the offsite circuit and the DG associated with a given ESF bus.] [Furthermore, the sequencer(s) is on the primary success path for most major AC electrically powered safety systems powered from the associated ESF bus.] Therefore, loss of an [ESF bus's sequencer] affects every major ESF System in the [division]. The [12] hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining sequencer OPERABILITY. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident requiring sequencer OPERABILITY occurring during periods when the sequencer is inoperable is minimal.

This Condition is preceded by a Note that allows the Condition to be deleted if the unit design is such that any sequencer failure mode only affects the ability of the associated DG to power its respective safety loads under any condition. Implicit in this Note is the concept that the Condition must be retained if any sequencer failure mode results in the inability to start all or part of the safety loads when required regardless of power availability, or results in overloading the offsite power circuit to a safety bus during an event thereby causing its failure. Also implicit in the Note is that the Condition is not applicable to any division that does not have a sequencer.

G.1 and G.2

If the inoperalle AC electrical power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

H.1

Condition H corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been



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BASES

ACTIONS

H.1 (continued)

lost. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and REQUIREMENTS testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, GDC 18 (Ref. 8). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions). The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 10), as addressed in the FSAR.

> Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following summary is applicable. The minimum steady state output voltage of [3740] V is 90% of the nominal 4160 V output voltage. This value, which is specified in ANSI C84.1 (Ref. 11), allows for voltage drop to the terminals of 4000 V motors whose minimum operating voltage is specified as 90% or 3600 V. It also allows for voltage drops to motors and other equipment down through the 120 V level where minimum operating voltage is also usually specified as 90% of name plate rating. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of [4756] V is equal to the maximum operating voltage specified for 4000 V motors. It ensures that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 4000 V motors is no more than the maximum rated operating voltages. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to ± 2% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations found in Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

SR 3.8.1.1

This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network

(continued)

BWR/4 STS

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.1 (continued)

and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and loads are connected to their preferred power source and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. The 7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the control room.

SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7

These SRs help to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition.

To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, these SRs have been modified by a Note (Note 2 for SR 3.8.1.2 and Note 1 for SR 3.8.1.7) to indicate that all DG starts for these Surveillances may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup prior to loading.

For the purposes of this testing, the DGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consisient with manufacturer recommendations.

In order to reduce stress and wear on diesel engines, some manufacturers recommend a modified start in which the starting speed of DGs is limited, warmup is limited to this lower speed, and the DGs are gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading. These start procedures are the intent of Note 3, which is only applicable when such modified start procedures are recommended by the manufacturer.

SR 3.8.1.7 requires that, at a 184 day Frequency, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves re-ired voltage and frequency within 12 seconds. The 12 second start requirement supports the assumptions in the design basis LOCA analysis of FSAR, Section [6.3] (Ref. 12). The 12 second start requirement is not applicable to SR 3.8.1.2

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7</u> (continued)

(see Note 3 of SR 3.8.1.2), when a modified start procedure as described above is used. If a modified start is not used, the 12 second start requirement of SR 3.8.1.7 applies.

Since SR 3.8.1.7 does requires a 12 second start, it is more restrictive than SR 3.8.1.2, and it may be performed in lieu of SR 3.8.1.2. This procedure is the intent of Note 1 of SR 3.8.1.2.

The normal 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 (see Table 3.8.1-1, "Diesel Generator Test Schedule") is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The 184 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.7 is a reduction in cold testing consistent with Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7). These Frequencies provide adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing.

SR 3.8.1.3

This Surveillance verifies that the .Gs are capable of synchronizing and accepting greater than or equal to the equivalent of the maximum expected accident loads. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.

Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between [0.8 lagging] and [1.0]. The [0.8] value is the design rating of the machine, while [1.0] is an operational limitation [to ensure circulating currents are minimized]. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

The normal 31 day Frequency for this Surveillance (see Table 3.8.1-1) is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).



(continued)

BWR/4 STS



SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.8.1.3</u> (continued)

Note 1 modifies this Surveillance to indicate that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized.

Note 2 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test.

Note 3 indicates that this Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations.

Note 4 stipulates a prerequisite requirement for performance of this SR. A successful DG start must precede this test to credit satisfactory performance.

SR 3.8.1.4

This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank [and engine mounted tank] is at or above the level at which fuel oil is automatically added. The level is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 1 nour of DG operation at full load plus 10%.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and facility operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.1.5

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day [and engine mounted] tanks once every [31] days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival.



SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.5 (continued)

This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fculing. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies are established by Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 10). This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided that accumulated water is removed during performance of this Surveillance.

SR 3.8.1.6

This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. It is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer systems are OPERABLE.

The Frequency for this SR is variable, depending on individual system design, with up to a [92] day interval. The [92] day Frequency corresponds to the testing requirements for pumps as contained in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI (Ref. 13); however, the design of fuel transfer systems is such that pumps operate automatically or must be started manually in order to maintain an adequate volume of fuel oil in the day [and engine mounted] tanks during cr following DG testing. In such a case, a 31 day Frequency is appropriate. Since proper operation of fuel transfer systems is an inherent part of DG OPERABILITY, the Frequency of this SR should be modified to reflect indiv 'ual designs.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

BASES

SR 3.8.1.7

REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE

See SR 3.8.1.2.

SR 3.8.1.8

Transfer of each 4.16 kV ESF bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The [18 month] Frequency of the Surveillance is based on engineering judgment taking into consideration the plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed on the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is chat, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Note 2 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

SR 3.8.1.9

Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. The largest single load for each DG is a residual heat removal service water pump (1225 bhp). As required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 14), the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower. For DGs 2A, 2C, and 1B, this represents



BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.8.1.9</u> (continued)

65.5 Hz, equivalent to 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint.

The time, voltage, and frequency tolerances specified in this SR are derived from Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) recommendations for response during load sequence intervals. The [6] seconds specified is equal to 60% of the 10 second load sequence interval associated with sequencing the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps during an undervoltage on the bus concurrent with a LOCA. The voltage and frequency specified are consistent with the design range of the equipment powered by the DG. SR 3.8.1.9.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.9.b and SR 3.8.1.9.c are steady state voltage and frequency values to which the system must recover following load rejection. The [18 month] Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9).

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor $\leq [0.9]$. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that, during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Note 2 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Reviewer's Note: The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable:

 Performance of the SR will not render any safety system or component inoperable;



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS <u>SR 3.8.1.9</u> (continued)

- b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems; and
- c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an AOO with attendant challenge to plant safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.10

This Surveillance demonstrates the EG capability to reject a full lead without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide DG damage protection. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event, and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor $\leq [0.9]$. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG would experience.

The [18 month] Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9) and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that would challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems.





BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS <u>SR 3.8.1.10</u> (continued)

Note 2 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Reviewer's Note: The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable:

- Performance of the SR will not render any safety system or component inoperable;
- b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems; and
- c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an AOO with attendant challenge to plant safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.11

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(1), this Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.

The DG auto-start time of 12 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis for responding to a design basis large break LOCA. The frequency should be restored to within 2% of nominal following a load sequence step. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.8.1.11</u> (continued)

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and auto-connected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, or high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of [18 months] is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(1), takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs shall be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Note 3 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

SR 3.8.1.12

This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time ([12] seconds, from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal) and operates for ≥ [5] minutes. The [5] minute period provides sufficient





SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.12 (continued)

time to demonstrate stability. SR 3.8.1.12.d and SR 3.8.1.12.e ensure that permanently connected loads and emergency loads are energized from the offsite electrical power system on a LOCA signal without loss of offsite power.

The req ...ement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and autoconnected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the loading logic for loading onto offsite power. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or RHR systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This tasting may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of [18 months] takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the [18 month] Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could potentially cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Note 3 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.



(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.1.13

This Surveillance demonstrates that DG non-critical protective functions (e.g., high jacket water temperature) are bypassed on an ECCS initiation test signal and critical protective functions (engine overspeed, generator differential current, and low lubricating oil pressure) trip the DG to avert substantial damage to the DG unit. The noncritical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.

The [18 month] Frequency is based on engineering judgment, takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the [18 month] Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

The SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DG from service. Note 2 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Reviewer's Note: The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable:

- Performance of the SR will not render any saf ty system or component inoperable;
- b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems; and

(continued)



BWR/4 STS

B 3.8-26

SURVEILLANCE <u>SR 3.8.1.13</u> (continued) REQUIREMENTS

> c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an AOO with attendant challenge to plant safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.14

Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(3), requires demonstration once per [18 months] that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours—22 hours of which is at a load equivalent to the continuous rating of the DG, and 2 hours of which is at a load equivalent to 110% of the continuous duty rating of the DG. Plant Hatch has taken an exception to this requirement and performs the 2 hour run at the 2000 hour rating (3100 kW). The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelube and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a power factor ≤ [0.9]. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG could experience. A load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

The [18 month] Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(3); takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance has been modified by threa otes. Fite 1 states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems



(continued)

BWR/4 STS



SURVEILLANCE <u>SR 3.8.1.14</u> (continued) REQUIREMENTS

that would challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, plant safety systems. Note 3 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

SR 3.8.1.15

This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within [12] seconds. The [12] second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The [18 month] Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(5).

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloads may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendation in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing.

SR 3.8.1.16

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(6), this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronization and automatic load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the auto-start logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be .n ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an

(continued)



BWR/4 STS



SR 3.8.1.16 (continued)

auto-close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset.

The Frequency of [18 months] is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(6), and takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Note 2 acknowledges that credit may be taken for . planned events that satisfy this SR.

SR 3.8.1.17

Demonstration of the test mode override ensures that the UG availability under accident conditions is not compromised as the result of testing. Interlocks to the LOCA sensing circuits cause the DG to automatically reset to ready-to-load operation if an ECCS initiation signal is received during operation in the test mode. Ready-to-load operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage with the DG output breaker open. These provisions for automatic switchover are required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 14), paragraph 6.2.6(2).

The requirement to automatically energize the emergency loads with offsite power is essentially identical to that of SR 3.8.1.12. The intent in the requirements associated with SR 3.8.1.17.b is to show that the emergency loading is not affected by the DG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The [18 month] Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.1... (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(8); take into consideration plant conditions

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

BWP/4 STS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIPTMENTS

<u>SR 3.8.1.17</u> (continued)

required to perform the Surveillance; and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Note 2 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

SR 3.8.1.18

As required by Regulatory Guide 1 108 (Ref. 9). paragraph 2.a.(2), each DG is required to demonstrate proper operation for the DBA loading sequence to ensure that voltage and frequency are maintained within the required limits. Under accident conditions, prior to connecting the DGs to their respective bus, all loads are shed except load center feeders and those motor control centers that power Class 1E loads (referred to as "permanently connected" loads). Upon reaching 90% rated voltage and frequency, the DGs are then connected to their respective bus. Loads are then sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent over'oading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents. The [10]% load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. Reference 2 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.

The Frequency of [18 months] is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.a.(2); takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance: and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Note 2



REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.18 (continued)

acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.

Reviewer's Note: The above MODE restrictions may be deleted if it can be demonstrated to the staff, on a plant specific basis, that performing the SR with the reactor in any of the restricted MODES can satisfy the following criteria, as applicable:

- Performance of the SR will not render any safety system or component inoperable;
- b. Performance of the SR will not cause perturbations to any of the electrical distribution systems that could result in a challenge to steady state operation or to plant safety systems; and
- c. Performance of the SR, or failure of the SR, will not cause, or result in, an AOO with attendant challenge to plant safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.19

In the event of a DBA coincide t with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

This Surveillance demonstrates DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.11, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ECCS initiation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of [18 months] sees into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of [18 months].

(continued)



BWR/4 STS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.8.1.19</u> (continued)

This SR is modified by three Motes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Note 3 acknowledges that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy th's SR.

SR 3.8.1.20

This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously.

The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendation, of Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), paragraph 2.b, and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 10), paragraph C.2.f. This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

Diesel Generator Test Schedule

The DG test schedule (Table 3.8.1-1) implements the recommendations of Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The purpose of this test schedule is to provide timely test data to establish a confidence level associated with the goal to maintain DG reliability at > 0.95 per test.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Revision 3, each DG unit should be tested at least once every 31 days. Whenever a DG has experienced 4 or more valid failures in the last 25 valid tests, the maximum time between tests is





SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

Diesel Generator Test Schedule (continued)

reduced to 7 days. Four failures in 25 valid tests is a failure rate of 0.16, or the threshold of acceptable DG performance, and hence may be an early indication of the degradation of DG reliability. When considered in the light of a long history of tests, however, 4 failures in the last 25 valid tests may only be a statistically probable distribution of random events. Increasing the test Frequency allows a more timely accumulation of additional test data upon which to base judgment of the reliability of the DG. The increased test Frequency must be maintained until seven consecutive failure free tests have been performed.

The Frequency for accelerated testing is 7 days, but no less than 24 hours. Therefore, the interval between tests should be no less than 24 hours, and no more than 7 days. A successful test at an interval of less than 24 hours should be considered an invalid test and not count towards the seven consecutive failure free starts. A test interval in excess of 7 days constitutes a failure to meet SRs.

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REFERENCES	1.	10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
	2.	FSAR, Section [8.2].
	3.	Regulatory Guide 1.9.
	4.	FSAR, Chapter [6].
	5.	FSAR, Chapter [15].
	6,	Regulatory Guio+ 1.93.
	7.	Generic Letter 84-15.
	8.	10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.
	9.	Regulatory Guide 1.108.
	10.	Regulatory Guide 1.137.
	11.	ANSI C84.1, 1982.

(continued)

BASES		
REFERENCES (continued)	12.	FSAR, Section [6.3].
	13.	ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.
	14.	IEEE Standard 308.



B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown

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DMJEJ	
BACKGROUND	A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources—Operating."
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 and 5 ensures that:
	 The facility can be maintaired in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
	b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
	c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fue ³ handling accident.
	In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical Specifications requirement, ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single ailure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are

During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed within the ACTIONS. This allowance is in recognition that

analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant

temperature and pressure, and corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrences significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required

(continued)

systems.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	certain testing and maintenance activities must be conducted, provided an acceptable level of risk is not exceeded. During MODES 4 and 5, performance of a significant number of required testing and maintenance activities is also required. In MODES 4 and 5, the activities are generally planned and administratively controlled. Relaxations from typical MODES 1, 2, and 3 LCO requirements are acceptable during shutdown MODES, based on:	
	a. The fact that time in an outage is limited. This is a risk prudent goal as well as a utility economic consideration.	
	b. Requiring appropriate compensatory measures for certain conditions. These may include administrative controls, reliance on systems that do not necessarily meet typical design requirements applied to systems credited in operation MODE analyses, or both.	
	c. Prudent utility consideration of the risk associated with multiple activities that could affect multiple systems.	
	d. Maintaining, to the extent practical, the ability to perform required functions (even if not meeting MODES 1, 2, and 3 OPERABILITY requirements) with systems assumed to function during an event.	
	In the event of an accident during shutdown, this LCO ensures the capability of supporting systems necessary for avoiding immediate difficulty, assuming either a loss of all offsite power or a loss of all onsite (diesel generator (DG)) power.	
	The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.	
LCO	One offsite circuit capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E	

One offsite circuit capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) of LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems—Shutdown," ensures that all required loads are powered from offsite power. An OPERABLE DG, associated with a Distribution System Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) bus required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10, ensures that a diverse power source is available for providing electrical power



LCO (continued)

BASES

support assuming a loss of the offsite circuit. Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit and DG ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of posculated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and reactor vessel draindown).

The qualified offsite circuit(s) must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to their respective ESF bus(es), and of accepting required loads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. [The offsite circuit consists of incoming breaker and disconnect to the 2C or 2D startup auxiliary transformer (SAT), associated 2C or 2D SAT, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to all 4.16 kV ESF buses required by LCO 3.8.10.]

The required DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads. This sequence must be accomplished within [12] seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with engine hot, DG in standby with engine at ambient conditions, and DG operating in parallel test mode.

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY. [In addition, proper sequence operation is an integral part of offsite circuit OPERABILITY if its inoperability in any way impacts the ability to start and maintain energized any loads required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10.]

it is acceptable for divisions to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required divisions. No fast transfer capability is required for offsite circuits to be considered OPERABLE.



BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The AC sources are equired to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment to provide assurance that: a. Systems providing adequate coolant inventory makeup

- a. Systems providing adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is valiable for monitoring and maintaining the unit is a du shutdown condition or refueling condition

AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.



A.1

An offsite circuit is considered increable if it is not available to one required ESF division. If two or more ESF 4.16 kV buses are required per LCO 3.8.10, one division with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By the allowance of the option to declare required features incperable with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the affected required feature(s) LCOs' ACTIONS.

A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4

With the offsite circuit not available to all required divisions, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for

(continued)



ACTIONS

ACTIONS

A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 (continued)

sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment, and activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, the plant is still without sufficient AC power sources to operate in a safe manner. Therefore, action must be initiated to restore the minimum required AC power sources and continue until the LCO requirements are restored.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A have been modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to one ESF bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.10 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit whether or not a division is de-energized. LCO 3.8.10 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized division.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.2.1

SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3 8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. SR 3.8.1.17 is not required to be met because the required OPERABLE DG(s) is not required to undergo periods of being synchronized to the offsite circuit. SR 3.8.1.20 is excepted because starting independence is not required with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.1 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. With limited AC sources available, a single event could compromise both the required circuit and the DG. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG is required to be OPERABLE.

REFERENCES

None.



B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air

BASTS

BACKGROUND Each diesel generator (DG) is provided with a storage tank having a fuel oil capacity sufficient to operate that DG for a period of 7 days while the DG is supplying maximum post loss of coolant accident (LOCA) load demand discussed in FSAR, Section [9.5.2] (Ref. 1). The maximum load demand is calculated using the assumption that at least two DGs are available. This onsite fuel oil capacity is sufficient to operate the DGs for longer than the time to replenish the onsite supply from outside sources.

> Fuel oil is transferred from storage tank to day tank by either of two transfer pumps associated with each storage tank. Redundancy of pumps and piping precludes the failure of one pump, or the rupture of any pipe, valve, or tank to result in the loss of more than one DG. All outside tanks, pumps, and piping are located underground.

> For proper operation of the standby DGs, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the fuel oil. Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 2) addresses the recommended fuel oil practices as supplemented by ANSI N195 (Ref. 3). The fuel oil properties governed by these SRs are the water and sediment content, the kinematic viscosity, specific gravity (or API gravity), and impurity level.

The DG lubrication system is designed to provide sufficient lubrication to permit proper operation of its associated DG under all loading conditions. The system is required to circulate the lube oil to the diesel engine working surfaces and to remove excess heat generated by friction during operation. Each engine oil sump contains an inventory capable of supporting a minimum of [7] days of operation. [The onsite storage in addition to the engine oil sump is sufficient to ensure 7 days' continuous operation.] This supply is sufficient to allow the coerator to replenish lube oil from outside sources.

Each DG has an air start system with adequate capacity for five successive start attempts on the DG without recharging the air start receiver(s).



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

BASES (continued)

1.00

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES Transient analyses in FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref. 4), and Chapter [15] (Ref. 5), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLF. The DGs are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Cases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

> Since diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and starting air subsystem support the operation of the standby AC power sources, they satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

Stored diesel fuel oil is required to have sufficient supply for 7 days of full load operation. It is also required to meet specific standards for quality. Additionally, sufficient lube oil supply must be available to ensure the capability to operate at full load for 7 days. This requirement, in conjunction with an ability to obtain replacement supplies within 7 days, supports the availability of DGs required to shut down the reactor and to maintain it in a safe condition for an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA with loss of offsite power. DG day tank fuel oil requirements, as well as transfer capability from the storage tank to the day tank, are addressed in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown."

The starting air system is required to have a minimum capacity for five successive DG start attempts without recharging the air start receivers.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources (LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2) are required to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an AOO or a postulated DBA. Because stored diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and starting air subsystem support LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2, stored diesel fuel oil, lube oil,







JASES

PLICABILITY and starting air are required to be within limits when the (continued) associated DG is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS

A.1

In this Condition, the 7 day fuel oil supply for a DG is not available. However, the Condition is restricted to fuel cil level reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. These circumstances may be caused by events such as:

- Full load operation required for an inadvertent start while at minimum required level; or
- b. Feed and bleed operations that may be necessitated by increasing particulate levels or any number of other oil quality degradations.

This restriction allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume and performing the analyses required prior to addition of the fuel oil to the tank. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required level prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the fact that procedures will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

<u>B.1</u>

With lube oil inventory < 500 gal, sufficient lube oil to support 7 days of continuous DG operation at full load conditions may not be available. However, the Condition is restricted to lube oil volume reductions that maintain at least a 6 day supply. This restriction allows sufficient time for obtaining the requisite replacement volume. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration of the required volume prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining capacity (> 6 days), the low rate of usage, the fact that procedures will be initiated to obtain replenishment, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

This Condition is entered as a result of a failure to meet the acceptance criterion for particulates. Normally, trending of particulate levels allows sufficient time to correct high particulate levels prior to reaching the limit of acceptability. Poor sample procedures (bottom sampling), contaminated sampling equipment, and errors in laboratory analysis can produce failures that do not follow a trend. Since the presence of particulates does not mean failure of the fuel oil to burn properly in the diesel engine, since particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Surveillance Frequency intervals, and since proper engine performance has been recently demonstrated (within 31 days), it is prudent to allow a brief period prior to declaring the associated DG inoperable. The 7 day Completion Time allows for further evaluation, resampling, and re-analysis of the DG fuel oil.

D.1

C.1

With the new fuel oil properties defined in the Bases for SR 3.8.3.3 not within the required limits, a period of 30 days is allowed for restoring the stored fuel oil properties. This period provides sufficient time to test the stored fuel oil to determine that the new fuel oil, when mixed with previously stored fuel oil, remains acceptable, or to restore the stored fuel oil properties. This restoration may involve feed and bleed procedures, filtering, or combination of these procedures. Even if a DG start and load was required during this time interval and the fuel oil properties were outside limits, there is high likelihood that the DG would still be capable of performing its intended function.

E.1

With starting air receiver pressure < [225] psig, sufficient capacity for five successive DG start attempts does not exist. However, as long as the receiver pressure is > [125] psig, there is adequate capacity for at least one start attempt, and the DG can be considered OPERABLE while the air receiver pressure is restored to the required limit. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete


Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3



ACTIONS

BASES

E.1 (continued)

restoration to the required pressure prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining air star: capacity, the fact that most DG starts are accomplished on the first attempt, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

F.1

With a Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, or the stored diesel fuel oil or lube oil not within limits for reasons other than addressed by Conditions A through E, the associated DG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.1

This SR provides verification that there is an adequate inventory of fuel oil in the storage tanks to support each DG's operation for 7 days at full load. The 7 day period is sufficient time to place the unit in a safe shutdown condition and to bring in replenishment fuel from an offsite location.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and unit operators would be aware of any Targe uses of fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.3.2

This Surveillance ensures that sufficient lubricating oil inventory is available to support at least 7 days of full load operation for each DG. The [500] gal requirement is based on the DG manufacturer's consumption values for the run time of the DG. Implicit in this SR is the requirement to verify the capability to transfer the lube oil from its storage location to the DG, when the DG lube oil sump does not hold adequate inventory for 7 days of full load



Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 2.8.3



BASES

SURVEILLANCE <u>SR 3.8.3.2</u> (continued) REQUIREMENTS

operation without the level reaching the manufacturer's recommended minimum level.

A 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient lube oil supply is onsite, since DG starts and run time are closely monitored by the plant staff.

SR 3.8.3.3

The tests listed below are a means of determining whether new fuel oil is of the appropriate grade and has not been contaminated with substances that would have an immediate detrimental impact on diesel engine combustion. If results from these tests are within acceptable limits, the fuel oil may be added to the storage tanks without concern for contaminating the entire volume of fuel oil in the storage tanks. These tests are to be conducted prior to adding the new fuel to the storage tank(s), but in no case is the time between receipt of new fuel and conducting the tests to exceed 31 days. The tests, limits, and applicable ASTM Standards are as follows:

- a. Sample the new fuel oil in accordance with ASTM D4054-[] (Ref. 6);
- b. Verify in accordance with the tests specified in ASTM D975-[] (Ref. 6) that the sample has an absolute specific gravity at 60/60°F of ≥ 0.83° and ≤ 0.89° or an API gravity at 60°F of ≥ 27° and ≤ 39°, a kinematic viscosity at 40°C of ≥ 1.9 centistokes and ≤ 4.1 centistokes, and a flash point of ≥ 125°F; and
- c. Verify that the new fuel oil has a clear and bright appearance with proper color when tested in accordance with ASTM D4176-[] (Ref. 6).

Failure to meet any of the above limits is cause for rejecting the new fuel oil, but does not represent a failure to meet the LCO concern since the fuel oil is not added to the storage tanks.

Within [31] days following the initial new fuel oil sample, the fuel oil is analyzed to establish that the other





SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.3.3 (continued)

properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-[] (Ref. 6) are met for new fuel oil when tested in accordance with ASTM D975-[] (Ref. 6), except that the analysis for sulfur may be performed in accordance with ASTM D1522-[] (Ref. 6) or ASTM D2622-[] (Ref. 6). The [31] day period is acceptable because the fuel oil properties of interest, even if they were not within stated limits, would not have an immediate effect on DG operation. This Surveillance ensures the availability of high quality fuel oil for the DGs.

Fuel oil degradation during long term storage shows up as an increase in particulate, mostly due to oxidation. The presence of particulate does not mean that the fuel oil will not burn properly in a diesel engine. The particulate can cause fouling of filters and fuel oil injection equipment, however, which can cause engine failure.

Particulate concentrations should be determined in accordance with ASTM D2276-[] (Ref. 6), Method A. Inis method involves a gravimetric determination of total particulate concentration in the fuel oil and has a limit of 10 mg/l. It is acceptable to obtain a field sample for subsequent laboratory testing in lieu of field testing. [For those designs in which the total volume of stored fuel oil is contained in two or more interconnected tanks, each tank must be considered and tested separately.]

The Frequency of this test takes into consideration fuel oil degradation trends that indicate that particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Frequency intervals.

SR 3.8.3.4

This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for each DG is available. The system design requirements provide for a minimum of [five] engine start cycles without recharging. [A start cycle is defined by the DG vendor, but usually is measured in terms of time (seconds of cranking) or engine cranking speed.] The pressure specified in this SR is intended to reflect the lowest value at which the [five] starts can be accomplished.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8 3



BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.4 (continued)

The [31] day Frequency takes into account the capacity, capability, redundancy, and diversity of the AC sources and other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure.

SR 3.8.3.5

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel storage tanks once every [31] days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential or water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies are established by Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 2). This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this SR, provided the accumulated water is removed during performance of the Surveillance.

SR 3.8.3.6

Draining of the fuel oil stored in the supply tanks, removal of accumulated sediment, and tank cleaning are required at 10 year intervals by Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 2), paragraph 2.f. This SR is typically performed in conjunction with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI (Ref. 7), examinations of the tanks. To preclude the introduction of surfactants in the fuel oil system, the cleaning should be accomplished using sodium hypochlorite solutions or their equivalent, rather than soap or detergents. This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of sediment does not necessarily represent a



Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Uil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3

BASES				
SURVEILLANCE	<u>SR 3.8.3.6</u> (continued)			
	failure of this SR, provided that accumulated sediment is removed during performance of the Surveillance.			
REFERENCES	1. FSAR, Section [9.5 2].			
	2. Regulatory Guide 1.137.			
	3. ANSI N195, 1976.			
	4. FSAR, Chapter [6].			
	5. FSAR, Chapter [15].			
	<pre>6. ASTM Standards: D4054-[]; D975-[]; D4176-[]; D1522-[]; D262. 7]; and D2276-[].</pre>			
	7. ASME, Boiler and Fr re Vessel Code, Section XI.			





B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The DC electrical power system provides the AC emergency power system with control power. It also provides both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment. Also, these DC subsystems provide DC electrical power to inverters, which in turn power the AC vital buses. As required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref. 1), the DC electrical power system is designed to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions, assuming a single failure. The DC electrical power system also conforms to the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.6 (Ref. 2) and IEEE-308 (Ref. 3).

The station service DC power sources provide both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment, as well as circuit breaker control power for the nonsafety related 4160 V, and all 600 V and lower, AC distribution systems. Each DC subsystem is energized by one 125/250 V station service battery and three 125 V battery chargers (two normally inservice chargers and one spare charger). Each battery is exclusively associated with a single 125/250 VDC bus. Each set of battery chargers exclusively associated with a 125/250 VDC subsystem cannot be interconnected with any other 125/250 VDC subsystem. The normal and backup chargers are supplied from the same AC load groups for which the associated DC subsystem supplies the control power. The loads between the redundant 125/250 VDC subsystem are not transferable except for the Automatic Depressurization System, the logic circuits and valves of which are normally fed from the Division 1 DC system.

The diesel generator (DG) DC power sources provide control and instrumentation power for their respective DG. In addition, DG 2A and 2C DC power sources provide circuit breaker control power for the loads on the 4160 V 2E, 2F, and 2G emergency buses. Each DG DC subsystem is energized by one 125 V battery and one 125 V battery charger. Provisions exist for connecting a portable alternate battery charger.

During normal operation, the DC loads are powered from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system.



DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4

BACKGROUND (continued)

BASES

In case of loss of normal power to the battery charger, the DC 'bads are automatically powered from the station batteries.

The DC power distribution system is described in more detail in Bases for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution System- Operating," and LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution System-Shutdown."

Each battery has adequate storage capacity to carry the required load continuously for approximately 2 hours (Ref. 3).

Each DC battery subsystem is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distribution centers. Each subsystem is located in an area separated physically and electrically from the other subsystems to ensure that a single failure is one subsystem does not cause a failure in a redundant subsystem. There is no sharing between redundant Class 1E subsystems such as batteries, battery chargers, or distribution panels.

The batteries for DC electrical power subsystems are sized to produce required capacity at 80% of nameplate rating, corresponding to warranted capacity at end of life cycles and *'a 100% design demand. The minimum design voltage lim * is 105/210 V.

Each battery charger of DC electrical power sub-ystem has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining its battery bank fully charged. Each station service battery charger has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 24 hours while supplying normal steady state loads (Ref. 3).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref. 4) and Chapter [15] (Ref. 5), assume that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the DGs, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation. The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the



DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4



APFLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining DC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:
	 An assumed loss of all offsite AC power or all onsite AC power; and
	b. A worst case single failure.
	The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

The DC electrical power subsystems—with: 1) each station service DC subsystem consisting of two 125 V batteries in series two battery chargers and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling; and 2) each DG DC subsystem consisting of one battery bank, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling—are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA. Loss of any DC electrical power subsystem does not prevent the minimum safety function from being performed (Ref. 3).

- APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure safe unit operation and to ensure that:
 - Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
 - b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 4 and 5 are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources-Shutcown."

BASES

LCO



BASES (continued)

ACTIONS



A.1

Condition A represents one division with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event, and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected division. The 2 hour limit is consistent with the allowed time for a inoperable DC Distribution System division.

If one of the required DC electrical power subsystems is inoperable (e.g., inoperable battery, inoperable battery charger(s), or inoperable battery charger and associated inoperable battery), the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time is based on Regulatory Guide 1 93 (Ref. 6) and reflects a reasonable time to assess unit status as a function of the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem and, if the DC electrical power subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unit shutdown.

B.1 and B.2

If the station service DC electrical power subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The Completion Time to bring the unit to MODE 4 is consistent with the time required in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6).

DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4

BASES	
ACTIONS (continued)	<u>C.1</u>
	If the DG DC electrical power subsystem cannot be restored to OPERF3LE status in the associated Completion Time, the associa d DG may be incapable of performing its intended
	function, and must be immediately declared inoperable. This declaration also requires entry into applicable Conditions

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.1

Sources - Operating."

Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended for the float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery (or battery cell) and maintain the battery (or a battery cell) in a fully charged state. The voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the initial voltages assumed in the battery sizing calculations. The 7 day Frequency is consistent with manufacturer recommendations and IEEE-450 (Ref. 7).

and Required Actions for an inoperable DG, LCO 3.8.1, "AC

SR 3.8.4.2

Visual inspection to detect corrosion of the battery cells and connections, or measurement of the resistance of each inter-cell, inter-rack, inter-tier, and terminal connection, provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The connection resistance limits established for this SR must be no more than 20% above the resistance as measured during installation or not above the ceiling value established by the manufacturer.

The Frequency for these inspections, which can detect conditions that can cause power losses due to resistance heating, is 92 days. This Frequency is considered

DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.4.2 (continued)

acceptable based on operating experie ce related to detecting corrosion trends.

SR 3.8.4.3

Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and battery racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The 12 month Frequency for this SR is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 7), which recommends detailed visual inspection of cell condition and rack integrity on a yearly basis.

SR 3.8.4.4 and SR 3.8.4.5

Visual inspection and resistance measurements of inter-cell, inter-rack, inter-tier, and terminal connections provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could indicate degraded battery condition. The anti-corrosion material is used to help ensure good electrical connections and to reduce terminal deterioration. The visual inspection for corrosion is not intended to require removal of and inspection under each terminal connection.

The removal of visible corrosion is a preventive maintenance SR. The presence of visible corrosion does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR, provided visible corrosion is removed during performance of this Surveillance.

The connection resistance limits for this SR must be no more than 20% above the resistance as measured during installation, or not above the ceiling value established by the manufacturer.

The 12 month Frequency of these SRs is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 7), which recommends detailed visual inspection of cell condition and inspection of cell to cell and terminal connection resistance on a year'v basis.



(continued)

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.4.6

Battery charger capability requirements are based on the design capacity of the chargers (Ref. 3). According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 8), the battery charger supply is required to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensures that these requirements can be satisfied.

The Frequency is acceptable, given the unit conditions required to perform the test and the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these [18 month] intervals. In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel. cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DC electrical power subsystem from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Note 2 is added to this SR to acknowledge that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy the Surveillance.

SR 3.8.4.7

A battery service test is a special test of the battery's capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length corresponds to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4.

The Frequency of [18 months] is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 8) and Regulatory Guide 1.129 (Ref. 9), which state that the battery service test should be performed during refueling operations or at some other outage, with intervals between tests not to exceed [18 months].

This SR is modified by three Notes. Note 1 to SR 3.8.4.7 allows the once per 60 months performance of SR 3.8.4.8 in







SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.7 (continued)

lieu of SR 3.8.4.7. This substitution is acceptable because SR 3.8.4.8 represents a more severe test of battery capacity than SR 3.8.4.7. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DC electrical power subsystem from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Note 3 is added to this SR to acknowledge that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy the Surveillance.

SR 3.8.4.8

A battery performance test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the as found condition, after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.

The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 7) and IEEE-435 (Ref. 10). These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer's rating. A capacity of 80% shows that the battery rate of deterioration is increasing, even if there is ample capacity to meet the load requirements.

The Frequency for this test is 60 months, or every 12 months if the battery shows degradation or has reached 85% of its expected life. Degradation is indicated, according to IEEE-450 (Ref. 7), when the battery capacity drops by more than 10% relative to its capacity on the previous performance test or when it is 10% below the manufacturer's rating. All these Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE-450 (Ref. 7).

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DC electrical power subsystem from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Note 2 is added to this SR to acknowledge that credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy the Surveillance.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4



BASES (continued)

REFERENCES	1.	10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
	2.	Regulatory Guide 1.6.
	3.	IEEE Standard 308, 1978.
	4,	FSAR, Chapter [6].
	5.	FSAR, Chapier [15].
	6.	Regulatory Guiue 1.93.
	7.	IEEE Standard 450.
	8.	Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.
	9.	Regulatory Guide 1.129, December 1974.
	10.	IEEE Standard 485, 1983.





R 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown

BASES PACAGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-Operating." APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref. 1) and Chapter [15] (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature SAFETY ANALYSES systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation. The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY. The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 ensures that: a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods: b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate C . events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident. The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO The DC electrical power subsystems-with: 1) each station service DC subsystem consisting of two 125 V batteries in series, two battery chargers, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling; and 2) each DG DC

(continued)

9

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5

	20.
188	59.6
	6.69
122	
182	100

LCO (continued)	subsystem consisting of one battery bank, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling—are required to be OPERABLE to support required DC distribution subsystems required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems—Shutdown." This requirement ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).		
APPLICABILITY	The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:		
	 Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel; 		
	 Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available; 		
	c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and		
	d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.		
	The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.4.		
ACTIONS	A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4		
	If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required		

according to LCO 3.8.10, the DC subsystems remaining OPERABLE with one or more DC power sources inoperable may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and

(continued)

RASES



RASES

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4 (continued)

operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with associated DC power sources inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, the unit is still without sufficient DC power sources to operate in a safe manner. Therefore, action must be initiated to restore the minimum required DC power sources and continue until the LCO requirements are restored.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electric 1 power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.5.1

SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

B 3.8-61

DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5

BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter [6].

2. FSAR, Chapter [15].





B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters

BASES

BACKGROUND This LCO delineates the limits on electrolyte temperature, level, float voltage, and specific gravity for the DC electrical power subsystems batteries. A discussion of these batteries and their OPERABILITY requirements is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-Operating," and LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources-Shutdown."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES Transient analyses in FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref. 1) and Chapter [15] (Ref. 2), assime Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power subsystems provide normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining at least one division of DC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions, in the event of:

- An assumed loss of all offsite AC or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A worst case single failurs.

Since battery cell parameters support the operation of the DC electrical power subsystems, they satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

Battery cell parameters must remain within acceptable limits to ensure availability of the required DC power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. Electrolyte limits are conservatively established, allowing continued DC electrical systom function even with Category A and B limits not met.



LCO

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The battery cell parameters are required solely for the support of the associated DC electrical power subsystem. Therefore, battery electrolyte is only required when the DC power source is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the Applicability discussions in Bases for LCO 3.8.4 and LCO 3.8.5.

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, and A.3

With parameters of one or more cells in one or more batteries not within limits (i.e., Category A limits not met or Category B limits not met, or Category A and B limits not met) but within the Allowable Values (Category C limits are met) specified in Table 3.8.6-1, operation is permitted for a limited period since sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function.

The pilot cell electrolyte level and float voltage are required to be verified to meet the Category C Allowable Values within 1 hour (Required Action A.1). This check provides a quick indication of the status of the remainder of the battery cells. One hour provides time to inspect the electrolyte level and to confirm the float voltage of the pilot cells. One hour is considered a reasonable amount of time to perform the required verification.

Verification that the Category C Allowable Values are met (Required Action A.2) provides assurance that during the time needed to restore the parameters to the Category A and B limits, the battery is still capable of performing its intended function. A period of 24 hours is allowed to complete the required verification because specifir gravity measurements must be obtained for each connected cell. Taking into consideration both the time required to perform the required verification and the assurance that the battery cell parameters as not severely degraded, this time is considered reasonable.

Continued operation is only permitted for 31 days before battery cell parameters must be restored to within Category A and B limits. Taking into consideration that, while battery capacity is degraded, sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and to allow time to fully restore the battery cell parameters to normal limits,



ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued)

this time is acceptable for operation prior to declaring the DC batteries inoperable.

8.1

When any battery parameter is outside the Category C Allowable Value for any connected cell, sufficient capacity to supply the maximum expected load requirement is not ensured and the corresponding DC electrical power subsystem must be declared inoperable. Additionally, other potentially extreme conditions, such as not completing the Required Actions of Condition A within the required Completion Time or average electrolyte temperature of representative cells falling below 60°F, also are cause for immediately declaring the associated DC electrical power subsystem inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE

<u>SR 3.8.6.1</u>

This SR verifies that Category A battery cell parameters are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends regular battery inspections (at least one per month) including voltage, specific gravity, and electrolyte temperature of pilot cells.

SR 3.8.6.2

The quarterly inspection of specific gravity and voltage is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3). In addition, within 24 hours of a battery discharge < [110] V or a battery overcharge > [150] V, the battery must be demonstrated to meet Cacegory B limits. This inspection is also consistent with IFEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends special inspections following a severe discharge or overcharge, to ensure that no significant degradation of the battery occurs as a consequence of such discharge or overcharge.



SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.8.6.3

This Surveillance verification that the average temperature of representative cells is within limits is consistent with a recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) that states that the temperation of electrolytes in representative cells should be determined on a quarterly basis.

Lower than normal temperatures act to inhibit or reduce battery capacity. This SR ensures that the operating temperatures remain within an acceptable operating range. This limit is based on manufacturer's recommendations.

Table 3.8.6-1

This table delineates the limits on electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific gravity for three different categories. The meaning of each category is discussed below.

Category A defines the normal parameter limit for each designed pilot cell in each battery. The cells selected as pilot cells are those whose temperature, voltage, and electrolyte specific gravity approximate the state of charge of the entire battery.

The Category A limits specified for electrolyte level are based on manufacturer's recommendations and are consistent with the guidance in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), with the extra & inch allowance above the high water level indication for operating margin to account for temperature and charge effects. In addition to this allowance, footnote a to Table 3.8.6-1 permits the electrolyte level to be above the specified maximum level during equalizing charge, provided it is not overflowing. These limits ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage, and that adequate electron transfer capability is maintained in the event of transient conditions. IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) recommends that electrolyte level readings should be made only after the battery has been at float charge for at least 72 hours.

The Category A limit specified for float voltage is ≥ 2.13 V per cell. This value is based on the recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which states that prolonged operation of cells below 2.13 V can reduce the life expectancy of cells.



SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

The Category A imit specified for specific gravity for each pilot cell is \geq [1.200] (0.015 below the manufacturer's fully charged nominal specific gravity or a battery charging current that had stabilized at a low value). This value is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. According to IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), the specific gravity readings are based on a temperature of 77°F (25°C).

The specific gravity readings are corrected for actual electrolyte temperature and level. For each 3°F (1.67°C) above 77°F (25°C). 1 point (0.001) is added to the reading; 1 point is subtracted for each 3°F below 77°F. The specific c vity of the electrolyte in a cell increases with a loss of water due to electrolysis or evaporation. Level correction will be in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations. Footnote b of lable 3.8.6-1 requires the above mentioned correction for electrolyte level and temperature, with the exception that level correction is not required when battery charging current, while on float charge, is < 1 amp for station service batteries and < 0.5 amp for DG batteries. This currert provides, in general, an indication of overall battery condition.

Because of specific gravity gradients that are produced during the recharging process, delays of several days may occur while waiting for the specific gravity to stabilize. A stabilized charger current is an acceptable alternative to specific gravity measurement for determining the state of charge of the designated pilot cell. This phenomenon is discussed in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3). Footnote c to Table 3.8.6-1 allows the float charge current to be used as an alternate to specific gravity for up to 7 days following a battery recharge.

Category B defines the normal parameter limits for each connected cell. The term "connected cell" excludes any battery cell that may be jumpered out.

The Category B limits specified for electrolyte level and float voltage are the same as those specified for Category A and have been discussed above. The Category B limit specified for specific gravity for each connected coll is ≥ 1.195 (0.020 below the manufacturer's fully charged, nominal specific gravity) with the average of all connected

(continued)

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

BWR/4 STS

B 3.8-67





SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

cells [1.205] (0.010 below the manufacturer's fully charged, nominal specific gravity). These values are based on manufacturer's recommendations. The minimum specific gravity value required for each cell ensures that the effects of a highly charged or newly installed cell do not mask overall degradation of the bactery. Footnote b to Table 3.8.6-1 requires conjection of specific gravity for electrolyte temperature and level. This level correction is not required when battery charging current, while on float charge, is < 1 amp for station service batteries and < 0.5 amp for DG batteries.

Category C defines the Allowable Values for each connected cell. These values, althors: reduced, provide assurance that sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and maintain a margin of safety. When any battery parameter is outside the Category C Allowable Value, the assurance of sufficient capacity described above no longer exists, and the battery must be declared inoperable.

The Category C Allowable Values specified for electrolyte level (above the top of the plates and not overflowing) ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage and maintain adequate electron transfer capability. The Category C Allowable Value for voltage is based on IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which states that a cell voltage of 2.07 V or below, under float conditions and not caused by elevated temperature of the cell, indicates internal cell problems and may require cell replacement.

The Category C Allowable Value of average specific gravity $[\geq 1.195]$, is based on manufacturer's recommendations (0.020 below the manufacturer's recommended fully charged, nominal specific gravity). In addition to that limit, it is required that the specific gravity for each connected cell must be no less than 0.020 below the average of all connected cells. This limit ensures that the effect of a highly charged or new cell does not mask overall degradation of the battery. The footnotes to Table 3.8.6-1 that apply to specific gravity are applicable to Category A, B, and C specific gravity.



Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6

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BASES (continued)

REFERENCES	1_{\pm}	FSAR, Chapter	[6].
	2.	FSAR, Chapter	[15].
	3.	IEEE Standard	450, 1987.





BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.7 Inverters-Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The inverters are the preferred source of power for the AC vital buses because of the stability and reliability they achieve in being powered from the 120 VDC battery source. There is one inverter per AC vital bus, making a total of four inverters. The function of the inverter is to convert DC electrical power to AC electrical power, thus providing an uninterruptible power source for the instrumentation and controls for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) initiation.

Specific details on inverters and their operating characteristics are found in FSAR, Chapter [8] (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref. 2) and Chapter [15] (Ref. 3), assume Engineered Safety Feature _ystems are OPERABLE. The inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to the RPS and ECCS instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolart System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based on meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining electrical power sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- An assumed loss of all offsite AC electrical power or all onsite AC electrical power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

The inverters are a part of the distribution system and, as such, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.





BASES (continued)

LCO

The inverters ensure the availability of AC electrical power for the instrumentation for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA.

Maintaining the required inverters OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of the RPS and ECCS instrumentation and controls is maintained. The four battery powered inverters ensure an uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 4.16 kV safety buses are dependence.

OPERABLE inverters require that the vital bus be powered by the inverter via inverted DC voltage. This requirement assumes that a correct DC voltage (120 V) is applied, that a correct AC voltage is at the output, and that these voltages are within the design voltage and frequency tolerances.

This LCO is modified by a Note allowing [two] inverter[s] to be disconnected from their associated DC buses for ≤ 24 hours. This allowance is provided to perform an equalizing charge on one battery. if the inverters were not disconnected, the resulting voltage condition might damage the inverters energized from their associated DC bus. Disconnecting the inverters is allowed provided that the associated AC vital buses are energized from their Class 1E constant voltage source transformer and that the AC vital buses for the other division(s) are energized from the associated inverters connected to their DC buses. These provisions minimize the loss of equipment that occurs in the event of a loss of offsite power. The 24 hour time period for the allowance minimizes the time during which a loss of offsite power could result in the loss of equipment energized from the affected AC vital bus while it takes into consideration the time required to perform an equalizing charge on the batteries.

The intent of the Note is to limit the number of inverters that may be disconnected. Only those inverters associated with the single battery undergoing an equalizing charge may be disconnected. All other inverters must be aligned to their associated batteries, regardless of the number of inverters or plant design.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Inverters-Operating B 3.8.7

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The inverters are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that:

- Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

Inverter requirement for MODES 4 and 5 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Inverters-Shutdown."

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

With a required inverter inoperable, its associated AC vital bus becomes inoperable until it is manually re-energized from its Class 1E constant voltage source transformer. LCO 3.8.9 addresses this action; however, pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions would not be entered even if the AC vital bus were de-energized. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A are modified by a Note to require ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.9 be entered immediately. This ensures the vital bus is returned to OPERABLE status within 2 hours.

Required Action A.1 allows 24 hours to fix the inoperable inverter and return it to service. The 2-hour limit is based upon engineering judgment and takes into consideration the time required to repair an inverter and the additional risk to which the unit is exposed because of the inverter inoperability. This risk has to be balanced against the risk of an immediate shutdown, along with the potential challenges to safety systems that such a shutdown might entail. When the AC vital bus is powered from its constant voltage source, it is relying upon interruptible AC electrical power sources (offsite and onsite). Similarly, the uninterruptible, battery backed, inverter source to the AC vital buses is the preferred source for powering instrumentation trip setpoint devices.



Inverters-Operating B 3.8.7



BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1 and B.2

If the inoperable devices or components cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, The unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and *0 MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.7.1

This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

REFERENCES

FSAR, Chapter [8].
 FSAR, Chapter [6].
 FSAR, Chapter [15].



B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.8 Inverters - Shu down

BASES BACKGPOUND A description of the inverters is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Inverters-Operating." APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref. 1) and Chapter [15] (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are C/ERABLE. The DC to AC inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to the Reactor Protection System and Emergency Core Cooling Systems instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY. The OPERABILITY of the minimum inverters to each AC vital bus during MODES 4 and 5 ensures that: The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or ā. refueling condition for extended periods; Sufficient instrumentation and control capability are b. available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and Adequate power is available to mitigate events C. postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the ussel or a fuel handling accident. The inverters were previously identified as part of the Distribution System and, as such, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.



Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8

BASES (continued)

LCO

The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or postulated DBA. The battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized. OPERABLE inverters require the AC vital bus be powered by the inverter through inverted DC voltage. This ensures the availability of sufficient inverter power sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and also any time during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [primary or secondary] containment provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coclant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4

If two divisions are required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems-Shutdown," the remaining OPERABLE inverters may be

(continued)

Rev. 0, 09/28/92



Inverters - Shutdown B 3.3.8

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4 (continued)

capable of supporting sufficient required feature(s) to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By the allowance of the option to declare required feature(s) inoperable with the associated inverter(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected required feature(s) of the LCOS' ACTIONS. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [primary or secondary] containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverters and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary inverter power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, the unit is still without sufficient AC vital power sources to operate in a safe manner. Therefore, action must be initiated to restore the minimum required AC vital power sources and continue until the LCO requirements are restored.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the plant safety systems may be without power or powered from a constant voltage source transformer.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.8.1

This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers

SURVEILLANCE <u>SR 3.8.8.1</u> (continued) REQUIREMENTS

closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter [6].

2. FSAR, Chapter [15].





Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating

BASES	
BACKGROUND	The onsite Class 1E AC and DC electrical power distribution system is divided into redundant and independent AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems.
	The primary AC distribution system consists of three 4.16 kV Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) buses each having an offsite source of power as well as a dedicated onsite diesel generator (DG) source. Each 4.16 kV ESF bus is normally connected to a normal source startup auxiliary transformer (SAT) (2D). During a loss of the normal offsite power source to the 4.16 kV ESF buses, the alternate supply breaker from SAT 2C attempts to close. If all offsite sources are unavailable, the onsite emergency DGs supply power to the 4.16 kV ESF buses.
	The secondary plant distribution system includes 600 VAC emergency buses 2C and 2D and associated load centers, and transformers.
	The 120 VAC vital buses 2YV1, 2YV2, 2YV3, and 2YV4 are arranged in four load groups and are normally powered from DC. The alternate power supply for the vital buses is a Class 1E constant voltage source transformer powered from the same division as the associated inverter, and its use is governed by LCO 3.8.7, "Inverters—Operating." Each constant voltage source transformer is powered from AC.
	There are two independent 125/250 VDC station service electrical power distribution subsystems and three independent 125 VDC DG electrical power distribution subsystems that support the necessary power for ESF functions.
	The list of all distribution buses is presented in Table B 3.8.9-1.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref. 1) and Chapter [15] (Ref. 2), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The
	(continued)



Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9

PASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

AC and DC riectrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of recessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6 Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite the electrical power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution system satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

The required electrical power distribution subsystems listed in Table B 3.8.9-1 ensure the availability of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOU) or a postulated DBA. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

Maintaining the [Division 1 and 2] AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses and electrical circuits to be energized to their proper voltages.



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BWR/4 STS

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BASES	
LCO (continued)	In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety related AC, DC, and AC vital bus power distribution subsystems, if they exist, must be open. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem, which could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function(s). If any tie breakers are closed, the affected redundant electrical power distribution subsystems are considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, salety related, redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. It does not, however, preclude redundant Class IE 4.16 kV ESF buses from being towered from the same offsite circuit.
APPLICABILITY	The electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that:
	a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
	b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.
	Electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 4 and 5 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems—Shutdown."
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u>
	With one or more required AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, or distribution panels in one division inoperable, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because single failure in the remaining power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC


BASES

ACTIONS.

A.1 (continued)

buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours.

The Condition A worst scenario is one division without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to the division and the associated DG inoperable). In this Condition, the unit is more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the unit operators' attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining division by stabilizing the unit, and on restoring power to the affected division. The 8 hour time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because:

- a. There is a potential for decreased safety if the unit operators' attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected division to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit.
- t. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the division with AC power. (The redundant component is verified OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 5.8, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP).")

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, this LCO may already have been not met for up to 2 hours. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the AC distribution system. At this time a DC circuit could again become inoperable, and AC distribution could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This results in establishing the "time zero" at the time



Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9



ACTIONS

BASES

A.1 (continued)

this LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.

B.1

With one AC vital bus inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE AC vital buses are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit and maintain it in the safe shutdown condition. Overall reliability is reduced, however, since an additional single failure could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC vital bus must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours.

Condition B represents one AC vital bus without power; potentially both the DC source and the associated AC source are nonfunctioning. In this situation the plant is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all noninterruptible power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vital buses, and restoring power to the affected AC vital buses.

This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allow for the majority of components that are without adequate vital AC power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital AC power, that would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

 The potential for decreases safety when requiring a change in plant conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while not allowing stable operations to continue;



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				B	3.8.9

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CTIONS	B.1 (continued)
	D. The potential for decreased safety when requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without adequate vital AC power, while not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions to restore power to the affected division; and
	c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a ingle failure of a redundant component.
	The 2 h Completion Time takes into account the importanc to safe of restoring the AC vital bus to OPERABLE status. the re dant capability afforded by the other OPERABLE vitalses, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
	The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combinition of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an AC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 8 hours. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the vital bus distribution system. At this time an AC division could again become inoperable, and vital bus distribution could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.
	This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This allowance results in establishing the "time zero" at the time that the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time that Condition B was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.
	<u>C.1</u>
	With one station service DC bus inoperable, the remaining D electrical power distribution subsystem is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut

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BWR/4 STS

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Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

down the reactor and maintain it in a safe statdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required DC buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours.

Condition C represents one division without adequate DC power, potentially with both the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation the plant is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining divisions, and restoring power to the affected division.

This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the majority of components that would be without power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate DC power, which would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours, is acceptable because of:

- The potential for decreased safety when requiring a change in plant conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while not allowing stable operations to continue;
- b. The potential for decreased safety when requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power, while not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected division;
- c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3).







BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

The second Completion Time for Required Action C.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition C is entered while, for instare, an AC bus is inoperable and subsequently restored C ERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 8 hours. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the DC dist ibution system. At this time, an AC division could again become inoperable, and DC distribution could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an reception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This allowance results in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition C was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential of failing to meet the LCO indefinitely.

D.1 and D.2

If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status withi. the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1

With one or more DG DC buses inoperable, the associated DG(s) may be incapable of performing their intended functions. In this situation the DG(s) must be immediately declared inoperable. This action also requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating."



Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9

BASEs (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.9.1

This Surveillance verifies that the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly, with all the required circuit breakers closed and the buses energized from normal power. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required power is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

REFERENCES

- 1. FSAR, Chapter [6].
- 2. FSAR, Chapter [15].

3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.



Distribution Systems—Operating B 3.8.9

TYPE	VOLTAGE	[DIVISION 1]*	[DIVISION 2]*
AC safety	[4160 V]	[ESF Bus] [NB01]	[ESF Bus] [NB02]
buses	[480 V]	Load Centers [NG01, NG03]	Load Centers [NGO2, NGO4]
	[480 V]	Motor Control Centcrs [NG01A, NG01I, NG01B, NG03C, NG03I, NG03D]	Motor Control Centers [NG02A, NG02I, NG02B, NG04C, NG04I, NG04D]
	[120 V]	Distribution Panels [NP01, NP03]	Distribution Panels [NP02, NP04]
DC buses	[125 V]	Bus [NK01] from battery [NK11] and charger [NK21]	Bus [NK02] from battery [NK12] and charger [NK22]
		Bus [NK03] from battery [NK13] and charger [NK23]	Bus [NK04] from battery [NN14] and charger [NK24]
		Distribution Panels [NK41, NK43, NK51]	Distribution Panels [NK42, NK44, NK52]
AC vital buses	[120 V]	Bus [NN01] from inverter [NN11] connected to bus [NK01]	Bus [NN02] from inverter [NN12] connected to bus [NK02]
		Bus [NN03] from inverter [NN13] connected to bus [NK03]	Bus [NN04] from inverter [NN14] connected to bus [NK04]

Table B 3.8.9-1 (page 1 of 1) AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution System

 * Each [division] of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is a subsystem.



Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown

BACKGROUND	A description of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems—Operating."			
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref. 1) and Chapter [15] (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.			
	The OPERABILITY of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.			
	The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5 ensures that:			
	 The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods; 			
	b. Sufficient instrumentation and centrol capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and			
	c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.			
	The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.			



Distr	ibution	Systems-	.St	ut	dow	n
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BASES (continued)

LCO

Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energ lation of the portions of the electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications required systems, equipment, and components—both specifically addressed by their own LCO, and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are vailable for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCG 3.8.3.



Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, and A.2.5

Although redundant required features may require redundant divisions of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem division may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an incoerable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made, (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal-shutdown cooling (RHR-SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, these Required Actions of Condition A do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolan: circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR-SDC ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A direct declaring RHR-SDC inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate RHR-SDC ACTIONS.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the plant safety systems may be without power.

97



BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.10.1

This Surveillance verifies that the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem is functioning properly, with the buses energized. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required power is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the electrical power distribution subsystems, as well as other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

REFERENCES 1.

- FSAR, Chapter [6].
- 2. FSAR, Chapter [15].





B 3.9 REFUELING OPEPATIONS

B 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks

BASES

BACKGROUND

Refueling equipment interlocks restrict the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods to reinforce unit procedures that prevent the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling. The refueling interiock circuitry senses the conditions of the refueling equipment and the control rods. Depending on the sensed conditions, interlocks are actuated to prevent the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods.

GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods, when fully inserted, serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold control control all fuel movement activities and accidents.

One channel of instrumentation is provided to sense the position of the refueling platform, the loading of the refueling platform fuel grapple, and the full insertion of all control rods. Additionally, inputs are provided for the loading of the refueling platform frame mounted hoist, the loading of the refueling platform monorail mounted hoist, the full retraction of the fuel grapple, and the loading of the service platform hoist. With the reactor mode switch in the shutdown or refueling position, the indicated conditions are combined in logic circuits to determine if all restrictions on refueling equipment operations and control rod insertion are satisfied.

A control rod not at its full-in position interrupts power to the refueling equipment and prevents operating the equipment over the reactor core when loaded with a fuel assembly. Conversely, the refueling equipment located over the core and loaded with fuel inserts a control rod withdrawal block in the Control Rod Drive System to prevent withdrawing a control rod.

The refueling platform has two mechanical switches that open before the platform or any of its hoists are physically

(continued)



BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1



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3A(: ROUND (continued)

BASES

located over the reactor vessel. All refuering hoists have switches that open when the hoists are loaded with fuel.

The refueling interlocks use these indications to prevent operation of the refueling equipment with fuel loaded over the core whenever any control rod is withdrawn, or to prevent control rod withdrawal whenever fuel loa d refueling equipment is over the core (Ref. 2).

the hoist switchs, open at a load lighter than the weight of single fuel as wably in water.

VICABLE

the fueling interlocks are explicitly assumed in the FSAR as for the control rod removal error during refueling 3) and the fuel assembly insertion error during ling (Ref. 4). These analyses evaluate the sences of control rod withdrawal during refueling and also used assembly insertion with a control rod withdrawn. A proopt reactivity excursion curing refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

Criticality and, therefore, subsequent prompt reactivity excursions are prevented during the insertion of the provided all control rods are fully erted during the fuel insertion. The refueing interloc complian this by preventing loading of fuel into the core with any control rod withdrawn and preventing withdrawal of a roc from the core during in course.

The refueling platform location switches activate at a point outside of the reactor core such that, considering switch hysteresis and maximum platform momentum toward the core at the time of power loss with a fuel assembly loaded and a control rod witndrawn, the fuel is not over the core.

Refueling equipment interlocks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

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To prevent criticality during refueling, the refueling interlocks ensure that fuel assemblies are not loaded with any control rod withdrawn.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

BASES

- LCO To prevent these conditions from developing, the (continued) all-rods-in, the refueling platform position, the refueling platform fuel grapple fuel loaded, the refueling platform monorail mounted hoist fuel loaded, the refueling platform fuel grapple fully retracted position, and the service platform hoist fuel loaded inputs are required to be OPERABLE. These inputs are combined in logic circuits, which provide refueling equipment or control rod blocks to prevent operations that could result in criticality during refueling operations.
- APPLICABILITY In MODE 5, a prompt reactivity excursion could cause fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. The refueling equipment interlocks protect agai at prompt reactivity excursions during MODE 5. The interlocks are required to be OPERABLE during in-vessel fuel movement with refueling equipment associated with the interlocks.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vesse¹ head is on, and COPE ALTERATIONS are not possible. Therefore, the refueling interlocks are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTIONS

<u>A.1</u>

With one or more of the required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable (does not include the one-rod-out interlock addressed in LCO 3.9.2), the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. In-vessel fuel movement with the affected refueling equipment must be immediately suspended. This action ensures that operations are not performed with equipment that would potentially not be blocked from unacceptable operations (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with a control rod withdrawn).

Suspension of in-vessel fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.



BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1

BASES (continued)

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<u>SR_3.9.1.1</u>				
	Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates each required refueling equipment interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested.				
	The 7 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of refueling interlocks and their associated input statue that are available to unit operations personnel				
REFERENCES	1. 10 JFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.				
	2. FSAR, Section [7.6.1].				
	3. FSAR, Section [15.1.13].				
	4. FSAR, Section [15.1.14].				



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Refuel Pusition One-Rod-Out Interiock D 3.9.2

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock

BASES

BACKGROUND The refuel position one-rod-out interlock restricts the movement of control rods to reinforce unit procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod is permitted to be withdrawn.

> GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

The refuel position one rod-out interiock prevents the selection of a second control rod for movement when any other control rod is not fully inserted (Ref. 2). It is a logic circuit that has redundant channels. It uses the all-rods-in signal (from the control rod full-i position indicators discussed in LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication") and a rod selection signal (from the Reactor Manual Control System).

This Specification ensures that the performance of the refuel position one-rod-out interlock in the event of a Design Basis Accident meets the assumptions used in the safety analysis of Reference 3.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The refue' ng position one-rod-out interlock is explicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 3). This analysis evaluates the consequences of control rod witndrawal during refueling. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

The refuel po.ition one-rod-out interlock and adequate SDM (LCO 3.1.1) prevent criticality by preventing withdrawal of more than one control rod. With one control rod withdrawn,



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BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock B 3.9.2

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BASES				
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	the core will remain subcritical, thereby preventing any prompt critical excursion.			
(concluded)	The refuel position one-rod-out interlock satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.			
LCO	To prevent criticality during MODE 5, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock ensures ro more than one control rod may be withdrawn. Both channels of the refuel position one-rod-out interlock are required to be OPERABLE.			
APPLICABILITY	In MCOR 5, with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the OPERABLE refuel position one-rod-out interlock provides protection against prompt reactivity excursions.			
	In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock is not required to be OPERABLE and is bypassed. In MODES 1 and 2, the Reactor Protection System (LCO 3.3.1.1) and the control rods (LCO 3.1.2) provide mitigation of potential reactivity excursions. In MODES 3 and 4, with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod block (LCO 3.3.2.1) ensures all control rods are inserted, thereby preventing criticality during shutdown conditions.			
ACTIONS	A.1 and A.2			
	With one or both channels of the refueling position one-rod-out interlock inoperable, the refueling interlocks may not be capable of preventing more than one control rod from being withdrawn. This condition may lead to criticality.			
	Control rod withdrawal must is immediately suspended, and action must be immediately , itiated to full insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Action must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, do not have to be inserted.			

Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock B 3.9.2

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.2.1

Proper functioning of the refueling position one-rod-out interlock requires the reactor mode switch to be in Refuer. During cor rol rod withdrawal in M2DE 5, improper positioning of the reactor mode switch could, in some instances, allow improper bypassing of required interlocks. Therefore, this Surveillance imposes an additional level of assurance that the refueling position one-rod-out interlock will be OPERABLE when required. By "locking" the reactor mode switch in the proper position, an additional administrative control is in place to preclude operator errors from resulting in unanalyzed operation.

The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other administrative controls utilized during refueling operations to ensure safe operation.

SR 3.9.2.2

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each channel demonstrates the associated refuel position one-rod-out interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested. The 7 day Frequency is considered adequate because of demonstrated circuit reliability, procedural controls on control rod withdrawals, and visual and audible indications available in the control room to alert the operator to control rods not fully inserted. To perform the required testing, the applicable condition must be entered (i.e., a control rod must be withdrawn from its full-in position). Therefore, SR 3.9.2.1 has been modified by a Note that states the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn.



Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock B 3.9.2



BASES (continued)

REFERENCES

5 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.

2. FSAR, Section [7.6.1.1].

3. FSAR, Section [15.4.1.1].





B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.3 Control Rod Position

BASES Control rods provide the capability to maintain the reactor BACKGROUND subcritical under all conditions and to limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase caused by a malfunction in the Control Rod Drive System. During refueling, movement of control rods is limited by the refueling interlocks (CO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2) or the control rod block with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position (LCO 3.3.2.1). GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions. The refueling interlocks allow a single control rod to be

withdrawn at any time unless fuel is being loaded into the core. To preclude loading fuel assemblies into the core with a control rod withdrawn, all control rods must be fully inserted. This prevents the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling operations.

APPLICABLE Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions SAFETY ANALYSES during refueling are provided by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1), the intermediate range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1), the average power range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1).

> The safety analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling in the FSAR (Ref. 2) assumes the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM. The analysis for the fuel assembly insertion error (Ref. 3) assumes all control rods are fully inserted. Thus, prior to fuel reload, all control rods must be fully inserted to ensure an inadvertent criticality does not occur.



Control Rod Position B 3.9.3

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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	Control rod position satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.
LCO	All control rods must be fully inserted during applicable refueling conditions to prevent an inadvertent criticality during refueling.
APPLICABILITY	During MODE 5, loading fuel into a core cell with the control rod withdrawn may result in inadvertent criticality. Therefore, the control rod must be inserted before loading fuel into a core cell. All control rods must be inserted before loading fuel to ensure that a fuel loading error does not result in loading fuel into a core cell with the coatrol rod withdrawn.
	In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and no fuel loading activities are possible. Therefore, this Specification is not applicable in these MODES.
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u>
	With all control rods not fully inserted during the applicable conditions, an inadvertent criticality could occur that is not analyzed in the FSAR. All fuel loading operations must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.
SURVETLLANCE	<u>SR 3.9.3.1</u>
REQUIREMENTS	During refueling, to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical, all control rods must be fully inserted prior to and during fuel loading. Periodic checks of the control rod position ensure this condition is maintained.

BWR/4 STS

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Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Control Rod Position B 3.9.3

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<u>SR 3.9.3.1</u> (continued) The 12 hour Frequency takes into consideration the procedural controls on control rod movement during refueling as well as the redundant functions of the refueling interlocks.
REFERENCES	1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
	2. FSAR, Section [15.1.13].

3. FSAR, Section [15.1.14].





B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication

BACKGROUND	The full-in position indication channel for each control provides necessary information to the refueling interlocks to prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling operations. During refueling, the refueling interlock. (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2) use the full-in position indication channel to limit the operation of the refueling equipment and the movement of the control rods. The absence of the full-in position channel signal for any control rod removes the all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks and prevents fuel loading. Also, this condition causes the refuel position one-rod-out interlock to not allow the withdrawal of any other control rod.
	GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2), the SDM (LtO 3.1.1), the intermediate range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1), the average power range monitor neutror flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1).
	The safety analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 2) assumes the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM. The analysis for the fuel assembly insertion error (Ref. 3) assumes all control rods are fully inserted. The full-in position indication channel is required to be OPERABLE so that the refueling interlocks can ensure that fuel cannot be loaded with any control rod withdrawn and that no more than one control rod can be withdrawn at a time.

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кеv. 0, 09/28/92

Control Rod Position Indication B 3.9.4

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APPLICABLE Control rod position indication satisfies Criterion 3 of the SAFETY ANALYSES NRC Policy Statement. (continued)

LCO

BASES

Each control rod full-in position indication channel must to OPERABLE to provide the required input to the refueling interlocks. A channel is OPERABLE if it provides correct position indication to the refueling interlock logic.

APPLICABILITY During MODE 5, the control rods must have OPERABLE full-in position indication channels to ensure the applicable refueling interlocks will be OPERABLE.

In MODES 1 and 2, requirements for control rod position are specified in LCO 3.1.2, "Control Rod OPERABILITY." In MODES 3 and 4, with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod block (LCO 3.3.2.1) ensures all control rods are inserted, thereby preventing criticality during shutdown conditions.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to control rod position indication channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent trains, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition. discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable control rod position indication channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, this Note has been provided, which allows separate Condition indication channel.



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BWR/4 STS



BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1.1. A.1.2, A.1.3, A.2.1 and A.2.2

With one or more required full-in position indication channels inoperable, compensating actions must be taken to protect against potential reactivity excursions from fuel assembly insertions or control rod withdrawals. This may be accomplished by immediately suspending in-vessel fuel movement and control rod withdrawal, and immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Actions must continue until all insertable control rods in cure cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted. Suspension of in-vessel fuel movements and control rod withdrawal shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position.

Alternatively, actions must be immediately initiated to fully insert the control rod(s) associated with the inoperable full-in position indicator(s) and disarm the drive(s) to ensure that the control rod is not withdrawn. Actions must continue until all associated control rods are fully inserted and drives are disarmed.

Under these conditions, an inoperable full-in channel may be bypassed to allow refueling operations to proceed. An alternate method must be used to ensure the control rod is fully inserted (e.g., use the "OC" notch position indication). If all fuel is removed from a core cell, the full-in position indication may be bypassed, since the control rod may be withdrawn and the position indication is not required to be OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.4.1

The full-in position indication channels provide input to the one-rod-out interlock and other refueling interlocks that require an all-rods-in permissive The interlocks are actuated when the full-in position indication for any control rod is not present, since this indicates that all rods are not fully inserted. Therefore, testing of the full-in position indication channels is performed to ensure that when a control rod is withdrawn, the full-in position indication is not present. Performing the SR each time a control rod is withdrawn is considered adequate because of

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Control Rod Position Indication B 3.9.4

and taken

BASES	
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<u>SR 3.9.4.1</u> (continued)
	the procedural controls on control rod withdrawals and the visual and audible indications available in the control room to alert the operator to control rods not fully inserted.
REFERENCES	1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
	2. FSAR, Section [15.1.13].
	3. FSAR, Section [15.1.14].





Control Rod OPERABILITY-Refueling B 3.9.5

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY-Refueling

BACKGROUND	Control rods are components of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System, the primary reactivity control system for the reactor. In conjunction with the Reactor Protection System, the CRD System provides the means for the reliable control of reactivity charges during refueling operation. In addition, the control rods provide the capability to maintain the reactor subcritical under all conditions and to limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase caused by a malfunction in the CRD System.
	GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The CRD System is the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided by refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1), the intermediate range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1), the average power range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1).
	The safety analyses for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 2) and the fuel assembly insertion error (Ref. 3) evaluate the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling and also fuel assembly insertion with a control rod withdrawn. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. Control rod scram provides backup protection should a prompt reactivity excursion occur.
	Control rod OFERABILITY during refueling satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.



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Rev. 0. 09/28/92

Control Rod OPERABILITY-Refueling B 3.9.5

BASES (continued)

LCO

Each withdrawn control rod must be OPERABLE. The withdrawn control rod is considered OPERABLE if the scram accumulator pressure is > [940] psig and the control rod is capable of being automatically inserted upon receipt of a scram signal. Inserted control rods have already completed their reactivity control function.

APPLICABILITY During MODE 5, withdrawn control rods must be OFERABLE to ensure that in a scram the control rods will insert and provide the required negative reactivity to maintain the reactor subcritical.

> For MODES 1 and 2, control rod requirements are found in LCO 3.1.2, "Reactivity Anomalies," LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times," and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators." During MODES 3 and 4, control rods are only allowed to be withdrawn under LCO 3.10.3, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Hot Shutder," and LCO 3.10.4, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Coin Shutdown," in the Special Operations section. These provide adequate requirements for control rod OPERABILITY during these conditions.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one or more withdrawn control rods inoperable, action must be immediately initiated to fully insert the inoperable control rod(s). Inserting the control rod(s) ensures the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. Actions must continue until the inoperable control rod(s) is fully inserted.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.5.1 and SR 3.9.5.2

During MODE 5, the OPERABILITY of control rods is primarily required to ensure a withdrawn control rod will automatically insert if a signal requiring a reactor shutdown occurs. Because no explicit analysis exists for automatic shutdown during refueling, the shutdown function is satisfied if the withdrawn control rod is capable of



BASES	
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<u>SR 3.9.5.1 and SR 3.9.5.2</u> (continued)
	automatic insertion and the associated CRD scram accumulator pressure is [940] psig.
	The 7 day Frequency takes into consideration equipment reliability, procedur 1 controls over the scram accumulators, and control room alarms and indicating lights that indicate low accumulator charge pressures.
REFERENCES	1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.
	2. FSAR, Section [15.1.13].
	3. FSAR, Section [15.1.14]



BWR/4 STS

RPV Water Level[-Irradiated Fuel] B 3.9.6

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level[-Irradiated Fuel]

BASES

BACKGROUND The movement of fuel assemblies or handling of control rods within the RPV requires a minimum water level of [23] ft above the top of the RPV flange. During refueling, this maintains a sufficient water level in the reactor vessel cavity and spent fuel pool. Sufficient water is necessary to retain iodine fission product activity in the water in the event of a fuel handling accident (Refs. 1 and 2). Jufficient iodine activity would be retained to limit offsite doses from the accident to ≤ 25% of 10 CFR 100 limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES During movement of fuel assemblies or handling of control rods, the water level in the RPV and the spent fuel pool is an initial condition design parameter in the analysis of a fuel nandling acrident in containment postulated by Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 1). A minimum water level of [23] ft (Regulatory Position C.1.c of Ref. 1) allows a decontamination factor of 100 (Regulatory Pointior C.1.g of Ref. 1) to be used in the accident analysis for iodine. This relates to the assumption that 99% of the total iodine released from the pellet to cladding gap of all the dropped fuel assembly rods is retained by the water. The fuel pellet to cladding gap is assumed to contain 10% of the total fuel rod indine inventory (Ref. 1).

Analysis of the fue! handling accident inside containment is described in Reference 2. With a minimum water level of [23] ft and a minimum decay time of 24 hours prior to fuel handling, the analysis and test programs demonstrate that the iodine release due to a postul.ted fuel handling accident is adequately captured by the water and that offsite doses are maintained within allowable limits (Ref. 4).

RPV water level satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS

RPV Water Level[-Irradiated Fuel] B 3.9.6

BASES (continued) A minimum water level of [23] ft above the top of the RPV flange is required to ensure that the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident are within acceptable limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3. APPLICASILITY. LCO 3.9.6 is applicable when moving fuel assemblies or handling control rods (i.e., movement with other than the normal control rod drive) within the RPV. The LCO minimizes the possibility of a fuel handling accident in containment that is beyond the assumptions of the safety analysis. If irradiated fuel is not present within the RPV, there can be no significant radioactivity release as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident. Requirements for fuel handling accidents in the spent fuel storage pool are covered by LCO 3.7.8, "Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level." Reviewer's Note: LCO 3.9.6 is written to cover new fuel and control rods as well as irradiated fuel. If a plant adopts LCO 3.9.7, however, the second portion of this Applicability may be omitted and the LCO name and Required Action A.1 modified appropriately. ACTIONS A.1 If the water level is < [23] ft above the top of the RPV flauge, all operations involving movement of fuel assemblies and handling of control rods within the RPV shall be suspended immediately to ensure that a fuel handling accident cannot occur. The suspension of fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.6.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification of a minimum water level of [23] 'i above the top of the RPV flange ensures that the design basis for the postulated fuel handling accident analysis during refueling operations is met. Water at the required level limits the consequences of damaged fuel rods, which are postulated to

RPV Water	Level	[-Irradiated	Fuel]
		В	3.9.6

BASES	
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<u>SR 3.9.6.1</u> (continued)
	result from a fuel handling accident in containment (Ref. 2).
	The Frequency of 24 hours is based on engineering judgmen and is considered adequate in view of the large volume of water and the normal procedural controls on valve positions, which make significant unplanned level changes unlikely.
REFERENCES	1. Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 23, 1972.
	2. FSAR, Section [15.1.41].
	3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4.
	4. 10 CFR 100.11.





RPV Water Level—Ne.4 Fuel or Control Rods B 3.9.7

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.7 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level-New Fuel or Control Rods

BASES

BACKGROUND The novement of new fuel assemblies or handling of control rods within the RPV when fuel assemblies seated within the reactor vessel are irradiated requires a minimum water level of [23] ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV. During refueling, this maintains a sufficient water level above the irradiated fuel. Sufficient water is necessary to retain iodine fission product activity in the water in the event of a fuel handling accident (Refs. 1 and 2). Sufficient iodine activity would be retained to limit offsite doses from the accident to $\leq 25\%$ of 10 CFR 100 limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.

APPLICABLE During movement of new fuel assemblies or handling of SAFETY ANALYSES control rods over irradiated fuel assemblies, the water level in the RPV and the spent fuel pool is an initial condition design parameter in the analysis of a fuel handling accident in containment postulated by Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 1). A minimum water level of [23] ft (Regulatory Position C.1.c of Ref. 1) allows a decontamination factor of 100 (Regulatory Position C.1.g of Ref. 1) to be used in the accident analysis for iodine. This relates to the assumption that 99% of the total iodine released from the pellet to cladding gap of all the dropped fuel assembly rods is retained by the water. The fuel pellet to cladding gap is assumed to contain 10% of the total fuel rod iodine inventory (Ref. 1).

Analysis of the fuel handling accident inside containment is described in Reference 2. With a minimum water level of [23] ft and a minimum decay time of 24 hours prior to fuel handling, the analysis and test programs demonstrate that the iodine release due to a postulated fuel handling accident is adequately captured by the water and that offsite doses are maintained within allowable limits (Ref. 4).

RPV water level satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.





BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

BASES (continued)

LCO

A minimum water level of [23] ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV flange is required to ensure that the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident are within acceptable limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 5.

APPLICABILITY

LCO 3.9.7 is applicable when moving new fuel assemblies or handling control rcds (i.e., movement with other than the normal control rod drive) over irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV. The LCO minimizes the possibility of a fuel handling accident in containment that is beyond the assumptions of the safety analysis. If irradiated fuel is not present within the RPV, there can be no significant radioactivity release as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident. Requirements for fuel handling accidents in the spent fuel storage pool are covered by LCO 3.7.8, "Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level." Requirements for handling irradiated fuel over the RPV are covered by LCO 3.9.6, "[Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)] Water Level [-Irradiated Fuel]."

ACTIONS

<u>A.1</u>

If the water level is < [23] ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV, all operations involving movement of fuel assemblies and handling of control rods within the RPV shall be suspended immediately to ensure that a fuel handling accident cannot occur. The suspension of fuel movement and control rod handling shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.7.1

Verification of a minimum water level of [23] ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV ensures that the design basis for the postulated fuel handling accident analysis during refueling operations is met. Water at the required level limits the consequences of



RPV Water Level—New Fuel or Control Rods B 3.9.7

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	SR	<u>SR 3.9.7.1</u> (continued) damaged uel rods, which are postulated to result from a fuel handling accident in containment (Ref. 2).			
	dam fue				
	The Frequency of 2 · hours is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the large volume of water and the normal procedural controls on valve positions, which make significant unplanned level changes unlikely.				
REFERENCES	1.	Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 23, 1972.			
	2.	FSAR, Section [15.1.41].			
	3.	NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4.			
	4	10 CFR 100.11.			





BASES



IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)

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B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level

BASES

BACKGRCUND

The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 5 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant, as required by GDC 34. Each of the too shutdown cooling loops of the RHR System can provide the required decay heat removal. Each loop consists of two motor driven pumps, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. Both loops have a common suction from the same recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after it has been cooled by circulation through the respective heat exchangers, to the reactor via the associated recirculation loop or to the reactor via the low pressure coolant injection path. The RHR heat exchangers transfer heat to the RFT Service Water System (LCO 3.7.1). The RHR shutdown cooling mode is manually controlled.

In addition to the RHR subsystems, the volume of water above the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) flange provides a heat sink for decay heat removal.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES With the unit in MODE 5, the RHR System is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. The RHR System is required for removing decay heat to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant.

Although the RHR System does not meet a specific criterion of the NRC Policy Statement, it was identified in the NRC Policy Statement as an important contributor to risk reduction. Therefore, the RHR System is retained as a Specification.

LCO

Only one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is required to be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 5 with the water level ≥ [23] ft above the RPV flange. Only one subsystem is required because the volume of water above the RPV flange provides backup decay heat removal capability.



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RHR-High Water Level B 3.9.8



LCO (contir.:^d)	An OPERABLE RHR shutdown cooling subsystem consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. In MODE 5, the RHR cross tie valve is not required to be closed; thus, the valve may be opened to allow pumps in one loop to discharge through the opposite loop's heat exchanger to make a complete subsystem.
	Additionally, each RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required. A Note is provided to allow a 2 hour exception to shut down the operating subsystem every 8 hours.
A≓PLICABILITY	One RHR shutdown cooling subsystem must be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 5, with the water level ≥ [23] feet above the top of the RPV flange, to provide decay heat removal. RHR System requirements in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Ser ion 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems. RHR System requirements in MODE 5 wit the water level < [23] ft above the RPV flange are given in LCO 3.9.9.
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u>
	With no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem OPERABLE, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be established within 1 hour. In this condition, the volume of water abov the RPV flange provides adequate capability to remove decay heat from the reactor core. However, the overall reliat.lity is reduced because loss of water level could result in reduced decay heat removal capability. The 1 hou Completion Time is based on decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore, verification of the

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BASES

(continued)



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BWR/4 STS

RHR-High Water Level B 3.9.8

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

functional availability of these alternate method(s) must be reconfirmed every 24 hours thereafter. This will ensure continued heat removal capability.

Alternate decay heat removal methods are available to the operators for review and preplanning in the unit's Operating Procedures. For example, this may include the use of the Reactor Water Cleanup System, operating with the regenerative heat exchanger bypassed. The method used to remove the decay heat should be the most prudent choice based on unit conditions.

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4

If no RHR subsystem is OPERABLE and an alternate method of decay heat removal is not available in accordance with Required Action A.1, actions shall be taken immediately to suspend operations involving an increase in reactor decay heat load by suspending loading of irradiated fuel assemblies into the RPV.

Additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes initiating immediate action to restore the following to OPERABLE status: secondary containment, one standby gas treatment subsystem, and one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation in each associated penetration not isolated. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine whather the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, a surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

B 3.9-27

RHR-High Water Level B 3.9.8



BASES

ACTIONS (continued) C.1 and C.2

If no RHR Shutdown Cooling System is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR Shutdown Cooling System), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT[®]

SR 3.9.8.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that the RHR subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant.

The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the RHR subsystem in the control room.

REFERENCES

None.



B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND	The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 5 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant, as required by GDC 34. Each of the two shutdown cooling loops of the RHR System can provide the required decay heat removal. Each loop consists of two motor driven pumps, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. Both loops have a common suction from the same recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after it has been cooled by circulation through the respective heat exchangers, to the reactor via the associated recirculation loop or to the reactor via the low pressure coolant injection path. The RHR heat exchangers transfer heat to the RHR Service Water System (LCO 3.7.1). The RHR shutdown cooling mode is manually controlled.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	With the unit in MODE 5, the RHR System is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. The RHR System is required for removing decay heat to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant.
	Although the RHR System does not meet a specific criterion of the NRC Policy Statement, it was identified in the NRC Policy Statement as an important contributor to risk reduction. Therefore, the RHR System is retained as a Specification.

LCO

In MODE 5 with the water level < 23 ft above the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) flange both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems must be OPERABLE.

An OPERABLE RHR shutdown cooling subsystem consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. To meet the LCO, both pumps in one loop or one pump in each of the two loops must be OPERABLE. In MODE 5, the RHR cross tie valve is not required to be closed; thus, the valve may be opened to



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

B 3.9-29

Rev. 0, 09/28/92



BASES 1.00 allow pumps in one loop to discharge through the opposite (continued) loop's heat exchanger to make a complete subsystem. Additionally, each RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required. A Note is provided to allow a 2 hour exception to shut down the operating subsystem every 8 hours. APPLICABILITY Two RHR shutdown cooling subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and one must be in operation in MODE 5, with the water level < [23] ft above the top of the RPV flange, to provide decay heat removal. RHR System requirements in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems. RHR System requirements in MODE 5 with the water level ≥ [23] ft above the RPV flange are given in LCO 3.9.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level." ACTIONS A.1 With one of the two required RHR shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable, the remaining subsystem is capable of providing the required decay neat removal. However, the overall reliability is reduced. Therefore an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided. With both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided in addition to that provided for the initial RHR shutdown cooling subsystem

inoperability. This re-establishes backup decay heat removal capabilities, similar to the requirements of the LCO. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore, verification of the functional availability of this

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

alternate method(s) must be reconfirmed every 24 hours thereafter. This will ensure continued heat removal capability.

Alternate decay heat removal methods are available to the operators for review and preplanning in the unit's Operating Procedures. For example, this may include the use of the Reactor Water Cleanup System, operating with the regenerative heat exchanger bypassed. The method used to remove decay heat should be the most prudent choice based on unit conditions.

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4

If no RHR subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is most is d such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for the occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR Shutdown Cooling System), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

If at least one RHR subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status immediately, additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes initiating immediate action to restore the following to OPERABLE status: secondary containment, one standby gas treatment subsystem, and one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation in each associated penetration not isolated. This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the surveillance may need to be performed to restore the

BWR/4 STS



ACTIONS

BASES

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 (continued)

component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.9.1

None.

This Surveillance demonstrates that one RHR subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability.

The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the RHR subsystems in the control room.

REFERENCES



2

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to allow certain reactor coolant pressure tests to be performed in MODE 4 when the metallurgical characteristics of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) require the pressure testing at temperatures > 200°F (normally corresponding to MODE 3).

Inservice hydrostatic testing and system leakage pressure tests required by Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Ref. 1) are performed prior to the reactor going critical after a refueling outage. Recirculation pump operation and a water solid RPV (except for an air bubble for pressure control) are used to achieve the necessary temperatures and pressures required for these tests. The minimum temperatures (at the required pressures) allowed for these tests are determined from the RPV pressure and temperature (P/T) limits required by LCO 3.4.10, "Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits." These limits are conservatively based on the fracture toughness of the reactor vessel, taking into account anticipated vessel neutron fluence.

With increased reactor vessel fluence over time, the minimum allowable vessel temperature increases at a given pressure. Periodic updates to the RPV P/T limit curves are performed as necessary, based upon the results of analyses of irradiated surveillance specimens removed from the vessel. Hydrostatic and leak testing will eventually be required with minimum reactor coolant temperatures > 200°F.

The hydrostatic test requires increasing pressure to []% of design pressure (1250 psig) or [] psig, and because of the expected increase in reactor vessel fluence, the minimum allowable vessel temperature according to LCO 3.4.10 is increased to []°F. This increase to []% of design pressure does not exceed the Safety Limit of 1375 psig.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE

Allowing the reactor to be considered in MCDE 4 during hydrostatic or leak testing, when the reactor coolant SAFETY ANALYSES temperature is > 200°F, effectively provides an exception to MODE 3 requirements, including OPERABILITY of primary containment and the full complement of redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since the hydrostatic or leak tests are performed water solid, at low decay heat values, and near MODE 4 conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be very low. Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity ab ve the LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Specific Activity," lights are minimized. In addition, the secondary containment will be OPERABLE, in accordance with this Special Operations LCO, and will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that ould occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The consequences of a steam leak under pressure testing conditions, with the secondary containment OPERABLE, will be conservative', bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment accident analysis described in Reference 2. Therefore, requiring the secondary containment to be OPERABLE will conservatively ensure that any potential airborne radiation from steam leaks will be filtered through the Standby Gas Treatment System, thereby limiting radiation releases to the environment.

> In the event of a large primary system leak, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize, allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The capability of the low pressure coolant injection and core spray subsystems, as required in MODE 4 by LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS-Shutdown," would be more than adequate to keep the core flooded under this low decay heat load condition. Small system leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.

> For the purnoses of this test, the protection provided by normally required MODE 4 applicable LCOs, in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be met by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of



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APPLICABLE the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs SAFETY A MALYSES (continued) appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

BASES

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation at reactor coolant temperatures > 200°F can be in accordance with Table 1.1-1 for MODE 3 operation without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. This option may be required due to P/T limits, however, which require testing at temperatures > 200°F, while the ASME inservice test itself requires the safety/relief valves to be gagged, preventing their OPERABILITY.

If it is desired to perform these tests while complying with this Special Operations LCO, then the MODE 4 applicable LCOs and specified MODE 3 LCOs must be met. This Special Operations LCO allows changing Table 1.1-1 temperature limits for MODE 4 to "NA" and suspending the requirements of LCO 3.4.9, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System—Cold Shutdown." The additional requirements for secondary containment LCOs to be met will provide sufficient protection for operations at reactor coolant temperatures > 200°F for the purpose of performing either an inservice leak or hydrostatic test.

This LCO allows primary containment to be open for frequent unobstructed access to perform inspitions, and for outage activities on various systems to continue consistent with the MODE 4 applicable requirements that are in effect immediately prior to and immediately after this operation.

APPLICABILITY

The MODE 4 requirements may only be modified for the performance of inservice leak or hydrostatic tests so that these operations can be considered as in MODE 4, even though the reactor coolant temperature is > 200°F. The additional requirement for secondary containment OPERABILITY according to the imposed MODE 3 requirements provides conservatism in the response of the unit to any event that may occur. Operations in all other MODES are unaffected by this LCO.



BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operation. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent trains, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.

A.1

If an LCO specified in LCO 3.10.1 is not met, the ACTIONS applicable to the stated requirements are entered immediately and complied with. Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that clarifies the intent of another LCO's Required Action to be in MODE 4 includes reducing the average reactor coolant temperature to $\leq 200^{\circ}$ F.

A.2.1 and A.2.2

Required Action A.2.1 and Required Action A.2.2 are alternate Required Actions that can be taken instead of Required Action A.1 to restore compliance with the normal MODE 4 requirements, and thereby exit this Special Operation LCO's Applicability. Activities that could further increase reactor coolant temperature or pressure are suspended immediately, in accordance with Required Action A.2.1, and the reactor coolant temperature is reduced to establish normal MODE 4 requirements. The allowed Completion Time of 24 hours for Required Action A.2.2 is based on engineering judgment and provides sufficient time to reduce the average reactor coolant temperature from the highest expected value to $\leq 200^{\circ}$ F with normal cooldown procedures. The Completion Time is also consistent with the time provided in LCO 3.0.3 to reach MODE 4 from MODE 3.



BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<u>SR 3.10.1.1</u> The LCOs made applicable are required to have their Surveillances met to establish that this LCO is being met. A discussion of the applicable SRs is provided in their respective Bases.				
REFERENCES	 American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI. FSAR, Section [15.1.40]. 				



Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing B 3.10.2

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.2 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing

BASES	
BACKGROUND	The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to permit operation of the reactor mode switch from one position to another to confirm certain aspects of associated interlocks during periodic tests and calibrations in MODES 3, 4, and 5.
	The reactor mode switch is a conveniently located, multiposition, keylock switch provided to select the necessary scram functions for various plant conditions (Ref. 1). The reactor mode switch selects the appropriate trip relays for scram functions and provides appropriate bypasses. The mode switch positions and related scram interlock functions are summarized as follows:
	 a. Shutdown—Initiates a reactor scram; bypasses main steam line isolation and reactor high water level scrams,
	b. Refuel—Selects Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) scram function for low neutron flux level operation (but does not disable the average power range monitor scram); bypasses main steam line isolation and reactor high water level scrams;
	c. Startup/Hot Standby—Selects NMS scram function for low neutron flux level operation (intermediate range monitors); bypasses main steam line isolation and reactor high water level scrams; and
	d. Run—Selects NMS scram function for power range operation.
	The reactor mode switch also provides interlocks for such functions as control roblocks, scram discharge volume trip bypass, refueling interlocks, suppression pool makeup, and main steam isolation valve isolations.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The acceptance criterion for reactor mode switch interlock testing is to prevent fuel failure by precluding reactivity excursions or core criticality. The interlock functions of
	(continued)





BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

the shutdown and refuel positions normally maintained for the reactor mode switch in MODES 3, 4, and 5 are provided to preclude reactivity excursions that could potentially result in fuel failure. Interlock testing that requires moving the reactor mode switch to other positions (run, startup/hot standby, or refuel) while in MODE 3, 4, or 5, requires administratively maintaining all control rods inserted and no other CORE ALTERATIONS in progress. With all control rods inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies, and no CORE ALTERATIONS in progress, there are no credible mechanisms for unacceptable reactivity excursions during the planned interlock testing.

For postulated accidents, such as control rod removal error during refueling or loading of fuel with a control rod withdrawn, the accident analysis demonstrates that fuel failure will not occur (Refs. 2 and 3). The withdrawal of a single control rod will not result in criticality when adequate SDM is maintained. Also, loading fuel assemblies into the core with a single control rod withdrawn will not result in criticality, thereby preventing fuel failure.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. MODES 3, 4, and 5 operations not specified in Table 1.1-1 can be performed in accordance with other Special Operations LCOs (i.e., LCO 3.10.3, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Hot Shutdown," LCO 3.10.4, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Cold Shutdown," and LCO 3.10.7, "Control Rod Testing—Operating") without meeting this LCO or its ACTIONS. If any testing is performed that involves the reactor mode switch interlocks and requires repositioning beyond that specified in Table 1.1-1 for the current MODE of operation, the testing can be performed, provided all interlock functions potentially defeated are administratively controlled. In MODES 3, 4, and 5 with the reactor mode switch in shutdown



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Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing B 3.10.2

LCO as specified in Table 1.1-1, all control rods are fully (continued) inserted and a control rod block is initiated. Therefore, all control rods in core cells that contain one or more fuel assemblies must be verified fully inserted while in MODES 3, 4, and 5, with the reactor mode switch in other than the shutdown position. The additional LCO requirement to preclude CORE ALTERATIONS is appropriate for MODE 5 operations, as discussed below, and is inherently met in MODES 3 and 4 by the definition of CLAE ALTERATIONS, which cannot be performed with the vessel head in place. In MODE 5, with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, only one control rod can be withdrawn under the refuel position one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock"). The refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Eauipment Interlocks") appropriately control other CORE ALTERATIONS. Due to the increased potential for error in controlling these multiple interlocks, and the limited duration of tests involving the reactor mode switch position, conservative controls are required, consistent with MODES 3 and 4. The additional controls of administratively not permitting other CORE ALTERATIONS will adequately ensure that the reactor does not become critical during these tests. APPLICABILITY Any required periodic interlock testing involving the reactor mode switch, while in MODES 1 and 2, can be performed without the need for Special Operations exceptions. Mode switch manipulations in these MODES would likely result in unit trips. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, this Special Operations LCO is only permitted to be used to allow reactor mode switch interlock testing that cannot conveniently be performed while in other MODES. Such interlock testing may consist of required Surveillances, or may be the result of maintenance, repair, or troublechooting activities. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the interlock functions provided by the reactor mode switch in shutdown (i.e., all control rods inserted and incapable of withdrawal) and refueling (i.e., refueling interlocks to prevent inadvertent criticality during CORE ALTERATIONS) positions can be administratively controlled adequately during the performance of certain tests.



BWR/4 STS

BASES

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, A.3.1, and A.3.2

These Required Actions are provided to restore compliance with the Technical Specifications overridden by this Special Operations LCO. Restoring compliance will also result in exiting the Applicability of this Special Operations LCO.

All CORE ALTERATIONS, if in progress, are immediately suspended in accordance with Required Action A.1, and all insertable control rods in core cells that contain one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted within 1 hour, in accordance with Required Action A.2. This will preclude potential mechanisms that could lead to criticality. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude the completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position will ensure that all inserted control rods remain inserted and result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1. Alternatively, if in MODE 5, the reactor mode switch shall be placed in the refuel position, which will also result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1. A Note is added to Required Action A.3.2 to indicate that this Required Action is not applicable in MODES 3 and 4, since only the shutdown position is allowed in these MODES. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour for Required Action A.2, Required Action A.3.1, and Required Action A.3.2 provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods and place the reactor mode switch in the required position, based on operating experience, and is acceptable given that all operations that could increase core reactivity have been suspended.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.2.1 and SR 3.10.2.2

Meeting the requirements of this Special Operations LCO maintains operation consistent with or conservative to operating with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position (or the refuel position for MODE 5). The functions of the reactor mode switch interlocks that are not in effect, due to the testing in progress, are adequately compensated for by the Special Operations LCO requirements. The administrative controls are to be periodically verified to ensure that the operational requirements continue to be met. The Surveillances performed at the 12 hour and 24 hour



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Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing B 3.10.2

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BASES	
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	<u>SR 3.10.2.1 and SR 3.10.2.2</u> (continued)
	Frequencies are intended to provide appropriate assurance that each operating shift is aware of and verifies compliance with these Special Operations LCO requirements.
REFERENCES	1. FSAR, Chapter [7].
	2. FSAR, Section [15.1.13].
	3. FSAR, Section [15.1.14].





Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Hot Shutdown B 3.10.3

8 3.10 SPECIAL OFERATIONS

B 3.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Hot Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of this MODE 3 Special Operations LCO is to permit the withdrawal of a single control rod for testing while in hot shutdown, by imposing certain restrictions. In MODE 3, the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, and all control rods are inserted and blocked from withdrawal. Many systems and functions are not required in these conditions, due to the other installed interlocks that are actuated when the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position. However, circumstances will arise while in MODE 3 that present the need to withdraw a single control rod for various tests (e.g., friction tests, scram timing, and coupling integrity checks). These single control rod withdrawals are normally accomplished by selecting the

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod withdrawal during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied in MODE 3, these analyses will bound the consequences of an accident. Explicit safety analyses in the FSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

refuel position for the reactor mode switch. This Special Operations LCO provides the appropriate additional controls

to allow a single control rod withdrawal in MODE 3.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SDM exists.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling.



Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Hot Shutdown B 3.10.3

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)	Alternate backup protection can be obtained by ensuring that a five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal.
	As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special "perations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 3 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position can be performed in accordance with other Special Operations LCOs (i.e., LCO 3.10.2, "Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing," and LCO 3.10.4, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Cold Shutdown") without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. However, if a single control rod withdrawal is desired in MODE 3, controls consistent with those required during refueling must be implemented and this Special Operations LCO applied. The refueling interlocks of LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock," required by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure that only one control rod can be withdrawn.

To back up the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.2), the ability to scram the withdrawn control rod in the event of an inadvertent criticality is provided by this Special Operations LCO's requirements in Item d.1. Alternately, provided a sufficient number of control rods in the vicinity of the withdrawn control rod are known to be inserted and incapable of withdrawal, the possibility of criticality on withdrawal of this control rod is sufficiently precluded, so as not to require the scram capability of the withdrawn control rod.

APPLICABILITY Control rod withdrawals are adequately controlled in MODES 1, 2, and 5 by existing LCOs. In MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in

(continued)



BASES

LCO



Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Hot Shutdown B 3.10.3

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued) accordance with this Special Operations LCO or Special Operations LCO 3.10.4, and if limited to one control rod. This allowance is only provided with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position. For these conditions, the one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2), control rod position indication (LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication"), full insertion requirements for all other control rods and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and LCO 3.9.5, Control Rod OPERABILITY—Refueling"), or the added administrative controls in Item d.2 of this Special Operations LCO, minimize potential reactivity excursions.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to a single control rod withdrawal while in MODE 3. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent trains, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.

<u>A.1</u>

If one or more of the requirements specified in this Special Operations LCO are not met, the ACTIONS applicable to the stated requirements of the affected LCOs are immediately entered as directed by Required Action A.1. Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that clarifies the intent of any other LCO's Required Actions, in accordance with the other applicable LCOs, to insert all control rods and to also require exiting this Special Operations Applicability by returning the reactor mode switch to the shutdown position. A second Note has been added, which clarifies that this Required Action is only applicable if the requirements not met are for an affected LCO.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Single Control Rod Withdrawal --- Hot Shutdown B 3.10.3



BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.2.1 and A.2.2

Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are alternate Required Actions that can be taken instead of Required Action A.1 to restore compliance with the normal MODE 3 requirements, thereby exiting this Special Operations LCO's Applicability. Actions must be initiated immediately to insert all insertable control rods. Actions must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. Flacing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position will ensure all inserted rods remain inserted and restore operation in accordance with Table 1.1-1. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour to place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.3.1, SR 3.10.3.2, and SR 3.10.3.3

The other LCOs made applicable in this Special Operations LCO are required to have their Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification in accordance with SR 3.10.3.2 is required to preclude the possibility of criticality. SR 3.10.3.2 has been modified by a Note, which clarifies that this SR is not required to be met if SR 3.10.3.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.3.d.1 requirements, since SR 3.10.3.2 demonstrates that the alternative LCO 3.10.3.d.2 requirements are satisfied. Also, SR 3.10.3.3 verifies that all control rods other than the control rod being withdrawn are fully inserted. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable because of the administrative controls on control rod withdrawal, the protection afforded by the LCOs involved, and hardwire interlocks that preclude additional control rod withdrawals.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [15.1.13].





Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Cold Shutdown B 3.10.4

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.4 Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Cold Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 4 Special Operations LCO is to permit the withdrawal of a single control rod for testing or maintenance, while in cold shutdown, by imposing certain restrictions. In MODE 4, the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, and all control rods are inserted and blocked from withdrawal. Many systems and functions are not required in these conditions, due to the installed interlocks associated with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Circumstances will arise while in MODE 4, however, that present the need to withdraw a single control rod for various tests (e.g., friction tests, scram time testing, and coupling integrity checks). Certain situations may also require the removal of the associated control rod drive (CRD). These single control rod withdrawals and possible subsequent removals are normally accomplished by selecting the refuel position for the reactor mode switch.



APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod withdrawal during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied in MODE 4, these analyses will bound the consequences of an accident. Explicit safety analyses in the FSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Refueling interlocks restrict the nevement of control rods to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SDM exists.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. Alternate backup protection can be obtained by ensuring that

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Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Cold Shutdown B 3.10.4

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APPLICABLE	a five by five array of control rods, centered on the
SAFETY ANALYSES	withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of
(continued)	withdrawal. This alternate backup protection is required
	when removing a CRD because this removal renders the withdrawn control rod incapable of being scrammed.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

BASES

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 4 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position can be performed in accordance with other LCOs (i.e., Special Operations LCO 3.10.2, "Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing," and LCO 3.10.2 fingle Control Rod Withdrawal—Hot Shutdown") without me/ g this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. If a single control rod withdrawal is desired in MODE 4, controls consistent with those required during refueling must be implemented and this Special Operations LCO applied.

The refueling interlocks of LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock," required by this Special Operations LCO 3.10.4 will ensure that only one control rod can be withdrawn. At the time CRD removal begins, the disconnection of the position indication probe will cause LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," and therefore, LCO 3.9.2 to fail to be met. At this time, a control rod withdrawal block will be inserted to ensure that no additional control rods can be withdrawn and that compliance with thi. Special Operations LCO is maintained.

To back up the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.2) or the control rod withdrawal block, the ability to scram the withdrawn control rod in the event of an inadvertent criticality is provided by this Special Operations LCO requirements in Item c.1. Alternatively, when the scram function is not OPERABLE, or when the CRD is to be removed, a sufficient number of rods in the vicinity of the withdrawn control rod are required to be inserted and made incapable



Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Cold Shutdown B 3.10.4

BASES

(continued)

of withdrawal. This precludes the possibility of criticality upon withdrawal of this control rod.

APPLICABILITY

Control rod withdrawals are adequately controlled in MODES 1, 2, and 5 by existing LCOs. In MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with Special Operations LCO 3.10.3, or this Special Operations LCO, and if limited to one control rod. This allowance is only provided with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position.

During these conditions, the full insertion requirements for all other control rods, the one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2), control rod position indication (LCO 3.9.4), and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY—Refueling"), or the added administrative controls in Item b.2 and Item c.2 of this Special Operations LCO, provide mitigation of potential reactivity excursions.

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to a single control rod withdrawal while in MODE 3. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent trains, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

If one or more of the _ quirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met with the affected control rod insertable, these Required Actions restore operation consistent with normal MODE 4 conditions (i.e., all rods



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Cold Shutdown B 3.10.4

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2 (continued)

inserted) or with the exceptions allowed in this Special Operations LCO. Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that clarifies that the intent of any other LCO Required Actions, in accordance with the other applicable LCOs, to insert all control rods includes exiting this Special Operations Applicability by returning the reactor mode switch to the shutdown position. A second Note has been added to Required Action A.1 to clarify that this Required Action is only applicable if the requirements not met are for an affected LCO.

Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are specified, based on the assumption that the control rod is being withdrawn. If the control rod is still insertable, actions must be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods and within 1 hour place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Actions must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour for placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.

B.1, B.2.1, and B.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met with the affected control rod not insertable, withdrawal of the control rod and removal of the associated CRD must be immediately suspended. If the CRD has been removed, such that the control rod is not insertable, the Required Actions require the most expeditious action be taken to either initiate action to restore the CRD and insert its control rod, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.4.1, SR 3.10.4.2, SR 3.10.4.3, and SR 3.10.4.4

The other LCOs made applicable by this Special Operations LCO are required to have their associated surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed

(continued)





ASES

ACTIONS.

Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Cold Shutdown B 3.10.4



BASES

SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.10.4.1, SR 3.10.4.2, SR 3.10.4.3, and SR 3.10.4.4</u> (continued)

while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. Also, all the control rods are verified to be inserted, as well as the control rod withdrawal block. Verification that all the other control rods are fully inserted is required to meet the SDM requirements. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted ensures that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the affected control rod. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable because of the administrative controls on control rod withdrawals, the protection afforded by the LCOs involved, and hardwire interlocks to preclude an additional control rod withdrawal.

SR 3.10.4.2 and SR 3.10.4.4 have been modified by Notes, which clarify that these SRs are not required to be met if the alternative requirements demonstrated by SR 3.10.4.1 are satisfied.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [15.1.13].



B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.5 Single Control Rod Prive (CRD) Removal-Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit the removal of a single CRD during refueling operations by imposing certain administrative controls. Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, pr more than one control rod is permitted to be withdra... from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. The refueling interlocks use the "full in" position indicators to determine the position of all control rods. If the "full in" position signal is not present for every control rod, then the all rods in nermissive for the refueling equipment interlocks is not present and fuel loading is prevented. Also, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock will not allow the withdrawal of a second control rod.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures, as do the refueling interlocks described above, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. The requirement for this function to be OPERABLE precludes the possibility of removing the CRD once a control rod is withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. This Special Operations LCO provides controls sufficient to ensure the possibility of an inadvertent criticality is precluded, while allowing a single CRD to be removed from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. The removal of the CRD involves disconnecting the position indication probe, which causes noncompliance with LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," and, therefore, LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks," and LCO 3.9.2, "Refueling Position One-Rod-Out Interlock." The CRD removal also requires isolation of the CRD from the CRD Hydraulic System, thereby causing inoperability of the control rod (LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY -- Refueling").



BWR/4 STS

B 3.10-20

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the SAFETY ANALYSES analyses for control rod withdrawal during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied, these analyses will bound the consequences of accidents. Explicit safety analyses in the FSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that proper operation of the refueling interiocks and adequate SDM will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

> Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SDM exists. By requiring all other control rods to be inserted and a control rod withdrawal block initiated, the function of the inoperable one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) is adequately maintained. This Special Operations LCO requirement to suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS adequately compensates for the inoperable all rods in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1).

> The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. Since the scram function and refueling interlocks may be suspended, alternate backup protection required by this Special Operations LCO is obtained by ensuring that a five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and are incapable of being withdrawn (by insertion of a control rod block).

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying quirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is

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(continued)

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Single CRD Removal—Refueling B 3.10.5

BASES (continued)

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 5 with any of the following LCOs, LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.8.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring," LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, 'CO 3.9.4, or LCO 3.9.5 not met, can be performed in accordance with the Required Actions of these LCOs without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. However, if a single CRD removal from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies is desired in MODE 5, cortrols consistent with those required by LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.3.8.2, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 must be implemented, and this Special Operations LCO applied.

By requiring all other control rous to he inserted and a control rod withdrawal block initiated, the function of the inoperable one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) is adequately maintained. This Special Operations LCO requirement to suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS adequately compensates for the inoperable all rods in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1). Ensuring that the five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal adequately satisfies the backup protection that LCO 3.3.1.1 and LCO 3.9.2 would have otherwise provided.

The exemption granted in this Special Operations LCO to assume that the withdrawn control rod is the highest worth control rod to satisfy LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)," and the inability to withdraw another control rod during this operation without additional SDM demonstrations, is conservative (i.e., the withdrawn control rod may not be the highest worth control rod).

APPLICABILITY Operation in MODE 5 is controlled by existing LCOs. The allowance to comply with this Special Operations LCO in lieu of the ACTIONS of LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.3.8.2, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 is appropriately controlled with the additional administrative controls sequired by this Special Operations LCO, which reduce the potential for reactivity excursions.



BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met, the immediate implementation of these Required Actions restores operation consistent with the normal requirements for failure to meet LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 (i.e., all control rods inserted) or with the allowances of this special Operations LCO. The Completion Times for Required Action A.1, Required Action A.2.1, and Required Action A.2.2 are intended to require that these Required Actions be implemented in a very short time and carried through in an expeditious manner to either initiate action to restore the CRD and insert its control rod, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO. Actions must continue until either Required Action A.2.1 or Required Action A.2.2 is satisfied.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>SR 3.10.5.1, SR 3.10.5.2, SR 3.10.5.3, SR 3.10.5.4,</u> and <u>SR 3.10.5.5</u>

Verification that all the control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, are fully inserted is required to ensure the SDM is within limits. Verification that the local five by five array of control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for removal of the associated CRD, is inserted and disarmed, while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted ensures that no other control rods can be inadvertencly withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the withdrawn control rod. The Surveillance for LCO 3.1.1, which is made applicable by this Special Operations LCO, is required in order to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. Verification that no other CORE ALTERATIONS are being made is required to ensure the assumptions of the safety analysis are satisfied.

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable, given the administrative

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BWR/4 STS

Rev. 0, 09/28/92

Single CRD Removal—Refueling B 3.10.5

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	SR 3.10.5.1, SR 3.10.5.2, SR 3.10.5.3, SR 3.10.5.4, and SR 3.10.5.5 (continued)
	controls on control rod removal and hardwire interlock to block an additional control rod withdrawal.
REFERENCES	1. FSAR, Section [15.1.13].





BASES
Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal-Refueling B 3.10.6

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.6 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal-Refueling

SACKGROUND	The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit multiple control rod withdrawal during refueling by imposing certain administrative controls.
	Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod is permitted to be withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. When all four fuel assemblies are removed from a cell, the control rod may be withdrawn with no restrictions. Any number of control rods may be withdrawn and removed from the reactor vessel if their cells contain no fuel.
	The refueling interlocks use the "full in" position indicators to determine the position of all control rods. If the "full in" position signal is not present for every control rod, then the all rods in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks is not present and fuel loading is prevented. Also, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock will not allow the withdrawal of a second control rod.
	To allow more than one control rod to be withdrawn during refueling, these interlocks must be defeated. This Special Operations LCO establishes the necessary administrative controls to allow bypassing the "full in" position indicators.

SAFETY ANALYSES

Explicit safety analyses in the FSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will prevent unacceptable reactivity excursions during refueling. To allow multiple control rod withdrawals, control rod removals, associated control rod drive (CRD) removal, or any combination of these, the "full in" position indication is allowed to be bypassed for each withdrawn control rod if all fuel has been removed from the



(continued)

Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal--Refueling B 3.10.6

CALES

LCO

APPLICABL SAFFTY ANA ES (CONSTAND) cell. With no fuel assemblies in the core cell, the associated control rod has no reactivity control function and is not required to remain inserted. Prior to reloading fuel into the cell, however, the associated control rod must be inserted to ensure that an inadvertent criticality does not occur, as evaluated in the Reference 1 analysis.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 5 with either LCO 3.9.3, "Control Rod Position," LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," or LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY—Refueling," not met, can be performed in accordance with the Required Actions of these LCOs without meeting this Special Opera ions LCO or its ACTIONS. If multiple control rod withgrawal or removal, or CRD removal is desired, all four fuel assemblies are required to be removed from the associated cells. Prior to entering this LCO, any fuel remaining in a cell whose control rod was previously removed under the provisions of another LCO must be removed.

When fuel is loaded into the core with multiple control rods withdrawn, special spiral reload sequences are used to ensure that reactivity additions are minimized. Otherwise, all control rods must be fully inserted before loading fuel.

APPLICABILITY Operation in MODE 5 is controlled by existing LCOs. The exceptions from other LCO requirements (e.g., the ACTIONS of LCO 3.9.3, LCO 3.9.4, or LCO 3.9.5) allowed by this Special Operations LCO are appropriately controlled by requiring all fuel to be removed from cells whose "full in" indicators are allowed to be bypassed.



Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal—Refueling B 3.10.6

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met, the immediate implementation of these Required Actions restores operation consistent with the normal requirements for refueling (i.e., all control rods inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies) or with the exceptions granted by this Special Operations LCO. The Completion Times for Required Action A.1, Regared Action A.2.1, and Required Action A.2.2 are intended to require that these Required Actions be implemented in a very short time and carried through in an expeditious manner to either initiate action to restore the affected CRDs and insert their control rods, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	SR 3.10.6.1, SR 3.10.6.2, and SR 3.10.6.3 Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable, given the administrative controls on fuel assembly and control rod removal, and takes into account other indications of control rod status available in the control room.
REFFRENCES	1. FSAR, Section [15.1.13].



B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.7 Control Rod Testing-Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to permit control rod testing, while in MODES 1 and 2, by imposing certain administrative controls. Control rod patterns during startup conditions are controlled by the operator and the rod worth minimizer (RWM) (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Centrol Rod Block Instrumentation"), such that only the specified control rod sequences and relative positions required by LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control," are allowed over the operating range from all control rods inserted to the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM. The sequences effectively limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase that could occur during a control rod drop accident (CRDA). During these conditions, control rod testing is sometimes required that may result in control rod patterns not in compliance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6. These tests include SDM demonstrations, control rod scram time testing, control rod friction testing, and testing performed during the Startup Test Program. This Special Operations LCO provides the necessary exemption to the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 and provides additional administrative controls to allow the deviations in such tests from the prescribed sequences in LCO 3.1.6.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the CRDA are summarized in References 1 and 2. CRDA analyses assume the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. These sequences define the potential initial conditions for the CRDA analyses. The RWM provides backup to operator control of the withdrawal sequences to ensure the initial conditions of the CRDA analyses are not violated. For special sequences developed for control rod testing, the initial control rod patterns assumed in the safety analysis of References 1 and 2 may not be preserved. Therefore special CRDA analyses are required to demonstrate that these special sequences will not result in unacceptable consequences, should a CRDA occur during the testing. These analyses, performed in accordance with an NRC approved methodology, are dependent on the specific test being performed.



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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

BASES

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Control rod testing may be performed in compliance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6, and during these tests, no exceptions to the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 are necessary. For testing performed with a sequence not in compliance with LCO 3.1.6, the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 may be suspended, provided additional administrative controls are placed on the test to ensure that the assumptions of the special safety analysis for the test sequence are satisfied. Assurances that the test sequence is followed can be provided by either programming the test sequence into the RWM, with conformance verified as specified in SR 3.3.2.1.8 and allowing the RWM to monitor control "od withdrawal and provide appropriate control rod blocks if necessary, or by verifying conformance to the approved test sequence by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff. These controls are consistent with those normally applied to operation in the startup range as defined in the SRs and ACTIONS of LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation."

APPLICABILITY

Control rod testing, while in MODES 1 and 2, with THERMAL POWER greater than the LPSP of the RWM, is adequately controlled by the existing LCOs on power distribution limits and control rod block instrumentation. Control rod movement during these conditions is not restricted to prescribed sequences and can be performed within the constraints of LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," LCO 3.2.3, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)," and LCO 3.3.2.1. With THERMAL POWER less than or equal to the LPSP of the RWM, the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are necessary to perform special tests that are not in conformance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6.



(continued)

BWR/4 STS

APPLICABILITY (continued) While in MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with Special Operations LCO 3.10.3, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Hot Shutdown," or Special Operations LCO 3.10.4, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Cold Shutdown," which provide adequate controls to ensure that the assumptions of the safety analyses of Reference 1 and 2 are satisfied. During these Special Operations and while in MODE 5, the one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock,") and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY—Refueling"), or the added administrative controls prescribed in the applicable Special Operations LCOs, provide mitigation of potential reactive excursions.

ACTIONS

BASES

With the requirements of the LCO not met (e.g., the control rod pattern is not in compliance with the special test sequence, the sequence is improperly loaded in the RWM) the testing is required to be immediately suspended. Upon suspension of the special test, the provisions of LCO 3.1.6 are no longer excepted, and appropriate actions are to be taken to restore the control rod sequence to the prescribed sequence of LCO 3.1.6, or to shut down the reactor, if required by LCO 3.1.6.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.7.1

A.1

With the special test sequence not programmed into the RWM, a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff is required to verify conformance with the approved sequence for the test. [Note: A member of the technical staff is considered to be qualified if he possesses skills equal to a licensed operator [in the following areas:].] This verification must be performed during control rod movement to prevent deviations from the specified sequence. A Note is added to indicate that this Surveillance does not need to be performed if SR 3.10.7.2 is satisfied.



Control Rod Testing-Operating B 3.10.7



BASES

SURVEILLANCE

(continued)

SR 3.10.7.2

When the RWM provides conformance to the special test sequence, the test sequence must be verified to be correctly loaded into the RWM prior to control rod movement. This Surveillance demonstrates compliance with SR 3.3.2.1.8, thereby demonstrating that the RWM is OPERABLE. A Note has been added to indicate that this Surveillance does not need to be performed if SR 3.10.7.1 is satisfied.

REFERENCES

- NEDE-24011-P-A-US, General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Supplement for United States (as amended).
- Letter from T. Pickens (BWROG) to G.C. Lainas (NRC) "Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A," August 15, 1986.



B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

BASES

8 3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test-Refueling

The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to BACKGROUND permit SDM testing to be performed for those plant configurations in which the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head is either not in place or the head bolts are not fully tensioned. LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)," requires that adequate SDM be demonstrated following fuel movements or control rod replacement within the RPV. The demonstration must be performed prior to or within 4 hours after criticality is reached. This SDM test may be performed prior to or during the first startup following the refueling. Performing the SDM test prior to startup requires the test to be performed while in MODE 5, with the vessel head bolts less than fully tensioned (and possibly with the vessel head removed). while in MODE 5, the reactor mode switch is required to be in the shutdown or refuel position, where the applicable control rod blocks ensure that the reactor will not become critical. The SDM test requires the reactor mode switch to be in the startup or hot standby position, since more than one control rod will be withdrawn for the purpose of demonstrating adequate SDM. This Special Operations LCO provides the appropriate additional controls to allow withdrawing more than one control rod from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies when the reactor vessel head bolts are less than fully tensioned. APPLICABLE Prevention and mitigation of unacceptable reactivity SAFETY ANALYSES excursions during control rod withdrawal, with the reactor mode switch in the startup or hot standby position while in MODE 5, is provided by the intermediate range monitor (IRM) neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), average power range monitor (APRM) neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1), and control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation"). The limiting reactivity excursion during startup conditions while in MODE 5 is the control rod drop accident (CRDA). (continued)



BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (contir ed) CRDA analyses assume that the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. For SDM tests performed within these defined sequences, the analyses of References 1 and 2 are applicable. However, for some sequences developed for the SDM testing, the control rod patterns assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 may not be met. Therefore, special CRDA analyses, performed in accordance with an NRC approved methodology, are required to demonstrate the SDM test sequence will not result in unacceptable consequences should a CRDA occur during the testing. For the purpose of this test, the protection provided by the normally required MODE 5 applicable LCOs, in addition the requirements of this LCO, will maintain normal te operations as well as postulated accidents within the bounds of the appropriate safety analyses (Refs. 1 and 2). In addition to the added requirements for the RWM, IRM, APRM, and control rod coupling, the notch out mode is specified for out of sequence withdrawals. Requiring the notch out mode limits withdrawal steps to a single notch, which limits inserted reactivity, and allows adequate monitoring of changes in neutron flux, which may occur during the test.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. SDM tests may be performed while in MODE 2, in accordance with Table 1.1-1, without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. For SDM tests performed while in MODE 5, additional requirements must be met to ensure that adequate protection against potential reactivity excursions is available. Because multiple control rods will be withdrawn and the reactor will potentially become critical, the approved control rod withdrawal sequence must be enforced by the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 2, MODE 2), or must be verified by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff. To provide additional protection against



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BWR/ TS

SDM	Test	t	Ref	ue	1	in	q
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BASES	
LCO (continued)	an inadvertent criticality, control rod withdrawals that do not conform to the banked position withdrawal sequence specified in LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control," (i.e., out of sequence control rod withdrawals) must be made in the individual notched withdrawal mode to minimize the potential reactivity insertion associated with each movement. Coupling integrity of withdrawn control rods is required to minimize the probability of a CRDA and ensure proper functioning of the withdrawn control rods, if they are required to scram. Because the reactor vessel head may be removed during these tests, no other CORE ALTERATIONS may be in progress. This Special Operations LCO then allows changing the Table 1.1-1 reactor mode switch position requirements to include the startup/hot standby position, such that the SDM tests may be performed while in MODE 5.
APPLICABILITY	These SDM test Special Operations requirements are only applicable if the SDM tests are to be performed while in MGDE 5 with the reactor vessel head removed or the head bolts not fully tensioned. Additional requirements during these tests to enforce control rod withdrawal sequences and restrict other CORE ALTERATIONS provide protection against potential reactivity excursions. Operations in all other MODES are unaffected by this LCO.
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u>
	With one or more of the requirements of this LCO not met, the testing should be immediately stopped by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown or refuel position. This results in a condition that is consistent with the requirements for MODE 5 where the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are no longer required.
SURVEILLANCE	<u>SR 3.10.8.1 and SR 3.10.8.2</u>
REQUIREMENTS	The control rod withdrawal sequences during the SDM tests may be enforced by the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 2, MODE 2 requirements) or by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff. As noted, either
	(continued)



BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.8.1 and SR 3.10.8.2 (continued)

the applicable SRs for the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1) must be satisfied according to the applicable Frequencies (SR 3.10.8.1), or the proper movement of control rods must be verified (SR 3.10.8.2). This latter verification (i.e., SR 3.10.8.2) must be performed during control rod movement to prevent deviations from the specified sequence. These surveillances provide adequate assurance that the specified test sequence is being followed.

SR 3.10.8.3

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this LCO will ensure that the reactor is operated within the bounds of the safety analysis. The 12 hour Frequency is intended to provide appropriate assurance that each operating shift is aware of and verifies compliance with these Special Operations LCO requirements.

SR 3.10.8.4

Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the control rod drive mechanism and will perform its intended function when necessary. The verification is required to be performed any time a control rod is withdrawn to the "full out" notch position, or prior to declaring the control rod OPERABLE after work on the control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling. This Frequency is acceptable, considering the low probability that a Control rod will become uncoupled when it is not being moved as woll as operating experience related to uncoupling events.

REFERENCES

- NEGE-24011-P-A-US, General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, Supplement for United States (as amended).
- Letter from T. Pickens (BWROG) to G.C. Lainas, NRC, "Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A," August 15, 1986.





SDM Test-Refueling B 3.10.8



REFERENCES (continued)

BASES

[Plant specific transient analysis].
 Plant specific reload analysis].





Recirculation Loops—Testing B 3.10.9

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.9 Recirculation Loops-Testing

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO in MODES 1 and 2 is to allow either PHYSICS TESTS or the Startup Test Program to be performed with less than two recirculation loops in operation.

Testing performed as part of the Startup Test Program (Ref. 1), or PHYSICS TESTS authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 (Ref. 2) or otherwise approved by the NRC, may be required to be performed under natural circulation conditions with the reactor critical. LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating," requires that one or both recirculation loops be in operation during MODES 1 and 2. This Special Operations LCO provides the appropriate additional restrictions to allow testing at natural circulation conditions or in single loop operation with the reactor critical.

0

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The operation of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System is an initial condition assumed in the design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) (Ref. 3). During a LOCA caused by a recirculation loop pipe break, the intact loop is assumed to provide coolant flow during the first few seconds of the postulated accident. During PHYSICS TESTS \leq [5]% RTP, or limited testing during the Startup Test Program for the initial cycle, the decay heat in the reactor is sufficiently low, such that the consequences of an accident are reduced and the coastdown characteristics of the recirculation loops are not important. In addition, the probability of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or other accidents occurring during the limited time allowed at natural circulation or in single loop operation is low.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.



BWR/4 STS

BASES (continued)

1.00

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. However, to perform testing at natural circulation conditions or with a single operating hop, operations must be limited to those tests defined in the Startup Test Program or approved PHYSICS TESTS performed at \leq [5]% RTP. To minimize the probability of an accident, while operating at natural circulation conditions or with one operating loop, the duration of these tests is limited to \leq 24 hours. This Special Operations LCO then allows suspension of the requirements of LCO 3.4.1 during such testing. In addition to the requirements of this LCO, the normally required MODE 1 or MODE 2 applicable LCOs must be met.

APPLICABILITY

This Special Operations LCO may only be used while performing testing at natural circulation conditions or while operating with a single loop, as may be required as part of the Startup Test Program or during low power PHYSICS TESTS. Additional requirements during these tests to limit the time at natural circulation conditions reduces the probability that a DBA may occur with both recirculation loops not in operation. Operations in all other MODES are unaffected by thⁱs LCO.

ACTIONS

A.1

With the testing performed at natural circulation conditions or with a single operating loop, and the duration of the test exceeding the 24 hour time limit, actions should be taken to promptly shut down. Inserting all insertable control rods will result in a condition that does not require both recirculation loops to be in operation. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour provides sufficient time to normally insert the withdrawn control rods.

8.1

With the requirements of this LCO not met for reasons other than those specified in Condition A (i.e., low power PHYSICS TESTS exceeding [5]% RTP, or unapproved testing at natural circulation), the reactor mode switch should immediately be



Recirculation Loops-Testing B 3.10.9

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

placed in the shutdown position. This results in a condition that does not require both recirculation loops to be in operation. The action to immediately place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position prevents unacceptable consequences from an accident initiated from outside the analysis bounds. Also, operation beyond authorized bounds should be terminated upon discovery.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.9.1 and SR 3.10.9.2

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this LCO will ensure that the reactor is operated within the bounds of this LCO. Because the 1 hour Frequency provides frequent checks of the LCO requirements during the allowed 24 hour testing interval, the probability of operation outside the limits concurrent with a postulated accident is reduced even further.

REFERENCES	1.	FSAR, Chapter	[14].
	2.	10 CFR 50.59.	
	3.	FSAR, Section	[6.3.3.4].
	4.	FSAR, Section	[].



8 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.10 Training Startups

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to permit training startups to be performed while in MODE 2 to provide plant startup experience for reactor operators. This training involves withdrawal of control rods to achieve criticality and then further withdrawa? of control rods, as would be experienced during an actual plant startup. During th e training startups, if the reactor coolant is allowed to neat up, maintenance of a constant reactor vessel water level requires the rejection of reactor coolant through the Reactor Water Cleanup System as the reactor coolant specific volume increases. Since this results in reactor water discharge to the radioactive waste disposal system, the amount of discharge should be minimized. This Special Operations LCO provides the appr priate additional controls to allow one residual heat remains (RHR) subsystem to be aligned in the shutdown cooling tode, so that the reactor coolant temperature can be controlled during the training startups, thereby minimizing the discharge of reactor water to the radioactive waste disposal system.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is designed to provide core cooling following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the RHR System is one of the ECCS subsystems assumed to function during a LOCA. With reactor power $\leq 1\%$ RTP (equivalent to all OPERABLE intermediate range monitor (IRM) channels $\leq 25/40$ divisions of full scale on Range 7) and average reactor coolant temperature $< 200^{\circ}$ F, the stored energy in the reactor core and coolant system is very low, and a reduced complement of ECCS can provide the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation with one RHR subsystem in the shutdown cooling mode (Ref. 1).

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A



APPLICABLE discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is SAFETY ANALYSES provided in their respective Bases. (continued)

LCO

BASES

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Training startups may be performed while in MODE 2 with no RHR subsystems aligned in the shutdown cooling mode and, therefore, without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. However, to minimize the discharge of reactor coolant to the radioactive waste disposal system, performance of the training startups may be accomplished with one RHR subsystem aligned in the shutdown cooling mode to maintain average reactor coolant temperature < 200°F. Under these conditions, the THERMAL POWER must be maintained ≤ 1% RTP (equivalent to all OPERABLE IRM channels ≤ 25/40 divisions of full scale on Range 7) and the average reactor coolant temperature must be < 200°F. This Special Operations LCC then allows changing the CPC! OPERABILITY requirements. In addition to the requirements of this LCO, the normally required MODE 2 applicable LCOs must also be met.

APPLICABILITY

Training startups while in MODE 2 may be performed with one RHR subsystem aligned in the shutdown cooling mode to control the reactor coolant temperature. Additional requirements during these tests to restrict the reactor power and reactor coolant temperature provide protection against potential conditions that could require operation of both RHR subsystems in the LPCI mode of operation. Operations in all other MODES are unaffected by this LCO.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one or more of the requirements of this LCO not met, (i.e., any OPERABLE IRM channel > 25/40 divisions of full scale on Range 7, or average reactor coolant temperature ≥ 200°F) the reactor may be in a condition that requires the full complement of ECCS subsystems and the reactor mode switch must be immediately placed in the shutdown position. This results in a condition that does not require all RHR



(continuer)

BWR/4 STS

Training Startups B 3.10.10

BASES	
ACTIONS	<u>A.1</u> (continued)
	subsystems to be OPERABLE in the LPCI mode of operation. This action may restore compliance with the requirements of this Special Operations LC or may result in placing the plant in either MODE 3 or ODE 4.
SURVEILLANCE	SR 3.10.10.1 and SR 3.10.10.2
KEQUIKEMENIS	Periodic verification that the THERMAL POWER and reactor coolant temperature limits of this Special Operations LCO are satisfied will ensure that the stored energy in the reactor core and reactor coolant are sufficiently low to preclude the need for all RHR subsystems to be aligned in the LPCI mode of operation. The 1 hour Frequency provides frequent checks of these LCO requirements during the training startup.
REFERENCES	1. FSAR, Section [6.3.2].





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