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Northeast Utilities System 107 Selden Street, Berlin, CT 06037

Northeast Utilities Service Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06141-0270 (203) 665-5000

July 26, 1996

Docket No. 50-423 B15818

Re: 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

JE221/,

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 96-022-00, documenting a condition that was determined at Millstone Unit No. 3 on July 22, 1996. This LER is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

M. H. Brothers Unit Director, Millstone Unit No. 3

Attachment: LER 96-022-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator

A. C. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 3

V. L. Rooney, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3

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NRC FORM 366 (4-95)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION							APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONE LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FEE						
		LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)							BACK TO INDUSTRY FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDER ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT 6 F33). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20565-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104)						
(See reverse for required number of								OFFICI	E OF MANAGEMEN	TAND BUDGET, WAS	MING TON, DC 2050.	5.			
			digits/	characters for e	ach block)										
FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3									DOCKET NUM	PAGE (3)					
									050004	23	1 of 3				
TITLE (4)									L						
E	Emerge	ency D	iesel G	enerator Cont	rol Panel I	Noncomp	oliance	with S	Seism	nic Design B	Basis				
EVENT DATE (5)			1	LER NUMBER	REPORT DATE (7)			1	OLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACIL	ITY N. ME	DC	DOCKET NUMBER			
07	22	96	96	022	00	07	26	96	FACIL	ITY NAME	00	POCKET NUMBER			
OPERAT	TING		THIS R	EPORT IS SUPMI	TTED PURS	UANT TO	THE REC	UIREME	NTS	OF IC CFR S:	(Check one or	more) (11)			
MODE	5	20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)						T	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)	(viii)			
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.2203(a)(1)			20.2203(a)(3)(i)				X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)			
		000	20.2203(a)(2)(i)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			-1	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71			
			20.	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER			
			20.	2205(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v) Sr	Specify in Abstract below				
			20	20 2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii) or	or in NRC Form 366A			
					LICENSEE	CONTACT	FOR TH	IS LER (12)						
NAME	W	/illiam	J. Tem	ple, Nuclear L	icensing S	Superviso	or			TELEPHONE NUM	BER (Include Area Co (860)437-	^{ide)} 5904			
	С	OMPLI	ETE ON	E LINE FOR E	ACH CON	IPONEN	T FAIL	URE D	ESC	RIBED IN TI	HIS REPORT	(13)			
CAUSE	SYST	EM COM	MPONENT	T MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	E	CAUS	E SY	STEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURE	R REPORT TO NP	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)							EX'PE	CTED	MONTH	DAY	YEAR				
YES (If yes,	comple	te EXPE	CTED SI	UBMISSION DAT	E).	NO			SJBM	ISSION					

On July 22, 1996, at 1836 hours, with the plant shutdown in Mode 5, it was determined that control panel cabinets in both trains of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) system had several pawl latches that had not been used and that two latches on the "A" train panel were broken. The condition, existing for a number of years, had invalidated the seismic qualification of the control panel. The relays, switches, annunciators, and meters mounted on the doors were therefore outside their design configuration. A seismic event could have resulted in unanticipated operation of relays, switches or annuciators causing unanticipated automatic actions which could, in turn, have rendered the Emergency Diesel Generators incapable of meeting their design function. An immediate notification was made on July 22, 1996 at 1844 hours, pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) for a condition outside the design basis of the plant. As initial corrective action all latches on the "B" control panel were engaged and all but two latches on the "A" EDG control cabinet were engaged. Subsequently, the remaining two latches were repaired and engaged. Additional reviews are being performed to ensure compliance with design requirements.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION							
TE	XT CONTINUATION							
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		PAGE (3)					
	05000400	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL	REVISION				

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. Description of Event

On June 24, 1996, at 1230 hours, as the result of system walk-downs being performed as part of the system review, it was discovered that latches on the control panels doors for both trains of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were not being used. The question arose as to whether these latches were required to maintain seismic qualification. The follow up investigation determined on July 22, 1996, that the latches were required to maintain the seismic qualification. A seismic event could have resulted in unanticipated operation of relays, switches, or annunciators, causing automatic actions that could effect the Emergency Diesel Generators. Accordingly, an immediate notification was made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(1)(ii)(B) at 1844 hours on July 22, 1996, for a condition which was outside the design basis of the plant.

The immediate plant response to this condition was to engage the pawl latches. After engaging the latches on the protected B train, work commenced to engage the latches on the non-protected A train. All but two latches, which were missing, were engaged at that time. Repairs were promptly made and the remaining latches were engaged, thereby restoring both trains of Emergency Diesel Generators to an operable status.

II. Cause of Event

The cause of the noncompliance with the seismic qualification design basis is that plant personnel did not realize that the pawl latches were required to maintain seismic qualification, and thus they were allowed to deteoriate and had not been used consistently for many years.

III. Analysis of Event

The doors for the EDG control panels are hinged doors that are secured by a latch handle and two pawl type latches on the non-hinged side. Since this side was held in place by the latch handle, plant personnel did not realize that the pawl latches were required to maintain the seismic qualification. The latches on the control panel doors had not been consistently used for many years because plant personnel did not realize that their function was to maintain the seismic qualification.

The relays, switches, annunciators, and meters mounted on the doors were therefore outside their design configuration. This, under a design basis seismic event, could have resulted in unanticipated operation of relays, switches or annuciators causing unanticipated automatic actions which could, in turn, have rendered the Emergency Diesel Generators' incapable of meeting their design function.

The seismic design noncompliance is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) for a condition outside the design basis of the plant. The condition existed for a number of years due to not maintaining the seismic requirements for the Emergency Diesel Generators control panels.

NRC FORM 3624

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)					PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3	3 05000423	YEAR	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER			REVISION NUMBER	3 of 3
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

IV. Corrective Action

As corrective action for the design noncompliance, all latches have been repaired and restored.

The seismic requirements have been communicated to all plant departments that perform work on the control panels, and the related operations and maintenance procedures will be revised to include a step to engage and/or check engagement of the pawl latches.

V. Additional Information

Similar Events

LER 96-016-00 Switchgear Cabinet Noncompliance with Seismic Design Basis, and Subsequent Inadvertent Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signal. The corrective actions associated with this event lead to discovery of the condition being reported.

Manufacturer Data

EllS System Codes Emergency Diesel Generator - EK

EIIS Equipment Codes Control Cabinet - CAB