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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION
P. O. BOX 402
MINERAL, VIRGINIA 25117

10 CFR 50.73

October 15, 1992

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

NAPS:MPW
Docket Nos. 50-338
Docket Nos. 50-339
License Nos. NPF-4
License Nos. NPF-7


Dear Sirs:

The Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Units 1 & 2.

Report No. 50-338,339/92-012-00

This Report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Corporate Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very Truly Yours,


G. E. Kane
Station Manager

Enclosure:

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. M. S. Lesser
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
North Anna Power Station

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) North Anna Power Station Units 1 & 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050003381	PAGE (3) 1 OF 03
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TITLE (4) MISSED SURVEILLANCE ON TWO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY VALVES AND FOUR LEAKAGE MONITORING CONNECTION VALVES DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR RESULTING IN INADEQUATE TEST PROCEDURES.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME(S)		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
09	25	92	92	012	00	10	15	92	North Anna Unit 2		05000339
<small>THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)</small>											

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	75.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 085	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.90(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	75.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.90(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	(See end of Test, NRC Form 306A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME G. E. Kane, Station Manager		AREA CODE	
		703	894-2101

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately three single-spaced 8 1/2" x 11" lines) (16)

On September 25, 1992, with Unit 2 at 100 percent power (Mode 1), a continuing evaluation of surveillance requirements was being performed as a corrective action reported under LER 50-338,339/92-007-00. During this review, it was determined that two containment isolation instrument air supply trip valves had not been tested in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.3.1.2.(a). Subsequently, TS 4.0.3 was entered and the valves were tested successfully. The action was cleared at 1305 hours, on September 25, 1992. Further review identified four leakage monitoring connection (LMC) valves that had not been verified closed and capped every 31 days as required by TS 4.6.1.1.(a). The LMC valves were verified closed and capped. These events are reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B).

The cause of the missed surveillance for the instrument air supply trip valves was personnel error due to failure to follow procedure. The cause of the missed surveillance for the LMC valves was personnel error due to an inadequate evaluation during a prior TS surveillance requirement review.

No significant safety consequences resulted from these events because containment integrity was verified by confirming that the containment isolation instrument air supply trip valves and the purge exhaust penetration LMC valves were in their required closed position. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 80.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

North Anna Power Station Units 1 & 2

YEAR

SERIAL NUMBER

REVISION NUMBER

0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 9 | 2 | - | 0 | 1 | 2 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | OF | 0 | 3

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 360A, (17))

1.0 Description of the Event

On September 25, 1992, with Unit 2 at 100 percent power (Mode 1), a continuing evaluation of surveillance requirements was being performed as a corrective action for missed surveillance's reported under LER 50-338,339/92-007-00. During this review it was determined that two containment isolation instrument air supply trip valves (EIIS System Identifier LD, Component Identifier ISV) had not been tested in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.3.1.2.(a). Subsequently, the 24 hour missed surveillance action statement of TS 4.0.3 was entered and the valves were tested successfully. The action was cleared at 1305 hours, on September 25, 1992.

Periodic Test Procedure 2-PT-57.4, Safety Injection (SI) (EIIS System Identifier BQ) Functional Test, was revised on February 19, 1992 to add steps to test the SI transfer to the cold leg recirculation mode on a simulated refueling water storage tank (EIIS System Identifier BE, Component Identifier TK) Lo-Lo level. It was during this revision process that 2-IA-TV-201A and 2-IA-TV-201B were inadvertently deleted. The two trip valves are located on a containment penetration (EIIS Component Identifier PEN) that is not used and has a blind flange (EIIS Component Identifier PSP) installed on each end.

On October 7, 1992, further TS surveillance review determined that four leakage monitoring connection valves (LMC) 1-HV-1000, 1-HV-1001, 2-HV-2000, and 2-HV-2001, (EIIS System Identifier VA, Component Identifier VTV) on the purge/exhaust piping were not being verified closed and capped every 31 days as required by TS 4.6.1.1.a. The LMC valves were verified closed and capped. These events are reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B).

2.0 Significant Safety Consequences and Implications

No significant safety consequences resulted from these events because containment integrity was verified by confirming that the containment isolation instrument air supply trip valves and the purge exhaust penetration LMC valves were in their required closed position. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event.

3.0 Cause of the Event

The cause of the instrument air supply trip valve missed surveillance was personnel error due to failure to follow procedure. During the last procedure revision, on February 19, 1992, the two trip valves were inadvertently removed. The procedure governing procedure process control requires a technical review and validation of any procedure being revised. The validation methods used on 2-PT 57.4 Revision 17 included Table Top and Simulator reviews. During the simulator validation the valves in question were noted as a discrepancy since the control room simulator is modeled identical to Unit 1 and the trip valves are unique to Unit 2. Personnel were aware that the penetration existed on Unit 2 but was abandoned (blind flanged on both sides). The valves were inadvertently deleted from the procedure without a proper validation of valve status.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) North Anna Power Station Units 1 & 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 8 0 0 0 3 3 8 6 2	LER NUMBER (5)				PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 2	0 1 2	0 0	0 3	OF 0 3	

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

3.0 Cause of the Event (continued)

During previous surveillance requirement reviews the LMC valves were not identified as requiring the 31 day verification. As a result, the containment integrity procedure was not revised to include the LMC valves and the monthly verification surveillance was not performed.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Actions

Containment instrument air supply trip valves, 2-1A-TV-201A and 201B, were declared inoperable. The 24 hour action of TS 4.0.3 was entered. At 1350 hours the action statement was cleared and the valves were returned to operable status following satisfactory SI functional testing.

The leakage monitoring control valves were verified closed and capped.

5.0 Additional Corrective Actions

Changes to Periodic Test Procedure 2-PT-57.4, Safety Injection (SI) Functional Test will be made, prior to the next refueling outage, to reinstate verification that 2-1A-TV-201A and 201B actuate to their isolation position on a Phase "A" isolation test signal.

Changes to Periodic Test Procedures 1 & 2-60.1, Containment Integrity, have been made to include the LMC valves to ensure verification in the future.

6.0 Actions to Prevent Recurrence

Personnel awareness is being heightened on procedure process controls relating to procedure use, revisions, and compliance by way of station wide employee information meetings.

7.0 Similar Events

Previous reportable events concerning missed surveillance's on TS valves due to surveillance program errors have occurred on Unit 1 - LERs N1-80-041, N1-83-022, N1-85-002, N1-88-099, and Unit 1/2 N1/2-90-003.

8.0 Additional Information

North Anna Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 84.6% power on September 25, 1992 and in a refueling coastdown.