NRC For (9-83)	- 364				LIC	ENSE	E EVE	NT RE	PORT	(LER)	U.S. NU A E	CLEAR RE	GULATO	0. 3150-01	MISSION 04
FACILITY	-	1)								1	DOCKET NUMBER	(2)		PAR	CE (3)
For	t Cal	houn	Stat	ion, Unit	No. 1			12.1			0 15 10 10	10121	815	1 OF	03
TITLE (4															
VIA	S Act	uati	on												
EVI	ENT DATE	(B)	VEAD	SEQUENTIAL	AEVISION	HONTH	DAY	VEAR		FACILITY NAS	HES INVO	DOCKET	NUMBER	R(S)	
MONTH	DAT	TEAN	TEAM	NUMBER	NUMBER	MONTH		TEAC		N		0 151	010	101	
												- 1-1	-1-	1-1-	
0 3	06	8 5	8 5	002	-00	04	08	8 4				0 151	010	101	1.1
OPI	RATING		THIS RE	PORT IS SUBMITTE	D PURBUANT	TO THE R	EQUIREME	NTS OF 1	CFR §: /	Check one or more	of the following) (11	1)			
	DOE (9)	h	20.	402(6)		20.408	(c)		X	60.73(e)(2)(iv)	14 14 19	73.1	71(b)		
LEVE		~ ~	20.	405 (a) (1) (i)	-	60.3810	1)(1)		-	60.73(a)(2)(v)		73.7	71(0)		
(10)		10 p	20.	408(a)(1)(#)	-	50.381	.)(2)		-	50.73(a)(2),vii)		011 Dello	we and in	o Text, NR	C Form
			- 20	408(a)(1)(iv)		60,734	1(2)(0)		-	60.73(a)(2)(viii)()		,00	~		
			20	405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a	1(2)(11)			50.73(a)(2)(x)					
						ICENSEE	CONTACT	FOR THIS	LER (12)						
NAME												TELEPHON	E NUM	BER	
Law	rence	е Т.	Kusek	, Supervi	sor-Ope	ratio	ons				AREA CODE		-		
For	t Ca	houn	Stat	tion, Unit	No. I						4192	414	61-	1410	1111
				COMPLETE	ONE LINE FOR	EACH C	OMPONENT	FAILURE	DESCRIBE	D IN THIS REPOR	IT (13)	-	F		
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMP	ONENT	TURER	TO NPRDS			CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC TURER	TO NP	ABLE	•	
								1						•••••	******
В	CIB	PIS	IXI	X191919	Y				1		1.11				
						<u> </u>					-LLL	1			· ·
				BUPPLEME	NTAL REPORT	EXPECT	ED (14)				EXPECTE		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YE	s (11 yes, c	omplete E	XPECTED	SUBMISSION DATE	,	5	X NO				DATE (11	6)	1	1.	
ABSTRA	T (Limit	to 1400 m	wcas, i.e., a	pproximately lifteen	single-space type	written li	nes/ (18)								
Du Is En RM Fo im sy hi	ring clat gined -061 llow pleme stem gh a	norm ion A ered ing r ented were irbor	nal pl actuat Safet receip L. Pe e cycl rne ac	lant opera tion Signa ty Feature of of the er EP-11, led throug tivity.	tion at 1 (VIAS (ESF), VIAS, E the dam h vario	1009) occ was merge pers us 1	% powe curred init ency F and f ineups	er, ar i at 1 iated Proceed fans c i to 1	dure E dure E of the try ar	anned act on March (ontainment P-11 (Hig Auxilian od identi	tuation o 6, 1985. t stack pa gh Radioa ry Buildi fy the so	f the The N articu ctivit ng ver urce o	Ven VIAS ulat ty) ntil of t	tilat , an e mon was ation he	ion itor
On su ma	the ction inter	morr n of nance	the '	of March 7 'B" chargi er was iss	, 1985, ng pump ued and	a si Ti the	mall n he pur pump	reacto np was sucti	or coc s shut ion li	lant lead down, iso ine was re	k was ide plated an epaired.	ntific d dra	ed a ined	t the . A	
Fo Th	llow e VI	ing t AS tr	the re	epairs, no ignal was	rmal ve reset a	ntil t 19	ation 17 on	was n March	restor 7,1	red to the 1985.	e Auxilia	ry Bu	ildi	ng.	
Qu	anti	tativ gs ir	ve ana ndicat	alyses of ted that n	grab ai o Techn	r sa ical	mples Spec	and v ificat	ventil tion o	ation sta or 10CFR20	ack proce O limits	ss moi were d	nito exce	r eded.	
No	ope	rator	erro	ors occurr	ed. Al	1 En	ginee	red Sa	afety	Features	function	ed as	des	igned	i.
NRC For	. 384	80.5	5041 DR	80040 85 ADOCK 05	0408 000285 PDR									I	E 22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

	VEAR	SEQUENTIAL	REVISION		
					1.00
0 15 10 10 10 12 1 8 5	8 5	-01012	- 010	01 ? OF	013
	8 5	1815 8 5	1815 85-01012	1815 8 5 - 0 10 2 - 0 0	1815 8 5 - 0 0 2 - 0 0 0 2 OF

While operating at 100% power on March 6, 1985, a Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal (VIAS) occurred at 1735 due to increasing activity levels as monitored by RM-O61, the vent stack particulate monitor. Prior to the actuation, maintenance personnel had been grinding in the "A" section of VA-18, the contaminated area air exhaust unit housing, in order to install a prefilter upstream of the HEPA filter.

Prior to the VIAS, a gaseous leak had existed on the waste gas vent header in the charging pump valve room (Room 7) and the room was isolated. Even though Room 7 had a known activity source, the maintenance being performed on VA-18 led Operations personnel to initially believe that the VIAS was a result of this job. Thus, in implementing Emergency Procedure EP-11 (High Radioactivity), an extensive search for a coolant leak source was initiated. This search was accomplished by isolating all of the rooms in the control area of the auxiliary building and by cycling the supply and exhaust fans VA-35A&B and VA-40B&C, respectively. It was determined that the RM-061 activity levels decreased whenever VA-40B was shutdown. Nevertheless, the search continued through the night of March 6-7, 1985.

At approximately 0800 on March 7, a health physics technician was making a routine survey of the charging pump room when she noticed what appeared to be smoke rising from the suction side of "B" charging pump. The technician immediately notified the control room, which in turn notified the auxiliary building equipment operator. The result of the equipment operator's inspection showed that a small leak had developed in a weld on the suction line of "B" charging pump. At 0833, the control room operator started "C" charging pump and shutdown "B" charging pump. The equipment operator immediately isolated the affected pump and relieved the pressure on the degraded weld.

A maintenance order was issued to repair the degraded weld. Once the leak was repaired, ventilation in the control area of the auxiliary building was returned to normal. The VIAS signal was reset at 1917. "B" charging pump was placed in service at O141 on March 8, 1985.

It has been determined through quantitative analyses of grab air samples and ventilation stack process monitor readings that the limits set forth for such releases by Technical Specifications and IOCFR20 were not exceeded. Exposure to participating plant personnel was minimal.

VIAS, as described in the USAR, is designed to mitigate a release of significant radioiodine or radiogas from the containment to atmosphere from such sources as reactor coolant leaks. VIAS is initiated by a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) or a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS) or a containment radiation high signal (CRHS). The CRHS feature employs five radiation monitors taking samples from the containment and/or ventilation stack. These monitors supply a 1-out-of-5 logic network to trip the VIAS lockout relay.

The five ventilation radiation monitors that actuate VIAS are also used for an isolation function similar to that performed by other process radiation monitor systems. The ventilation monitors are used as process monitors in order to satisfy the Technical Specification 2.9 objective of controlling the release of radioactive effluents to the environs to as low as practicable.

AC Form 386A

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

FACI	ITY	NAME	(1)
12000	-		-

NRC Form 366A

			EXPINES B/31/85									
	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)					PAGE (3)				
	영화 이상 영화	VEAR	F	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER						
Unit No. 1	0 15 10 0 0 2 8	5 8 5	-	0 0 2	-	010	0 3	OF	0	3		

Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1 TEXT (// more space a required, use additional NRC Form 3084's) (17)

The VIAS performs the following functions:

1. Closes the containment purge valves.

2. Closes the containment relief valves.

3. Stops the containment purge fans.

4. Closes the containment air sampling valves.

5. Places the control room ventilation in a filtered air makeup mode.

6. Closes the waste gas header release valve to the stack.

The actuation of the VIAS in this case was initiated to mitgate the consequences of an event as described in the USAR. Prior to and during this incident, containment integrity was in force and the containment ventilation valves were closed and sealed. Although there was a radioactive release to the environment, it was well contained within the specified limitations and the emergency response plan was not initiated. All plant systems involved in this scenario operated within their design basis. No operator errors or Engineered Safety Feature malfunctions occurred.

Omaha Public Power District

1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102 402/536-4000

> April 8, 1985 LIC-85-143 FC-150-85

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Gentlemen:

Licensee Event Report 85-002

Please find attached Licensee Event Report 85-002 dated April 8, 1985. This report is being submitted per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Sincerely,

R. L. Jaworski for

R. L. Andrews Division Manager Nuclear Production

RLA/CWN/dao

cc: Mr. Dorwin R. Hunter, Chief Reactor Project Branch 2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011

> Mr. E. G. Tourigny, NRC Project Manager Mr. L. A. Yandell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

INPO Records Center
Fort Calhoun File (2)
W. G. Gates - PRC Chairman
F. A. Thurtell - SARC Chairman

LEZZ '/I