

EEB 23 1986

Docket
File
52-18

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing
Division of Licensing

FROM: Thomas P. Speis, Assistant Director for Reactor Safety
Division of Systems Integration

SUBJECT: WATERFORD UNIT 3 - ICSB POSITION ON REMOTE SHUTDOWN
CAPABILITY

Plant Name: Waterford 3
Docket No.: 90-382
Licensing Status: OL
Responsible Branch: LB /J
Project Manager: S. Black
Review Branch: ICSB
Review Status: Incomplete



The Instrumentation & Control Systems Branch (ICSB) review of the Waterford Unit 3 local control panel (LCP) has identified concerns regarding the capability of the current LCP design to comply with the subject staff position. The applicant has requested to receive the staff position regarding shutdown capability from a location outside the main control room in order to better understand staff concerns and to aid in further LCP design considerations. Pursuant to this request, enclosed is the ICSB position for remote shutdown capability for the Waterford 3 plant. We request that this position be forwarded to the applicant.

Original Signed By
Thomas P. Speis

Thomas P. Speis, Assistant Director
for Reactor Safety
Division of Systems Integration

Attachment:
As stated

cc: R. Mattson
F. Rosa
O. Parr
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S. Black
F. Hingst
J. Rosenthal
C. Rossi
R. Stevens

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OFFICE	ICSB/DSI	ICSB/DSI	ICSB/DSI	ADRS/DSI
SUBJECT	R. Stevens: ct	CEROSST	FRosa	TPSpeis
DATE	2/22/82	2/22/82	2/22/82	2/22/82

To Meet GDC-19 (As interpreted in SRP Section 7.4)

- 1) The design should provide redundant safety grade capability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown from a location or locations remote from the control room, assuming no fire damage to any required systems and equipment and assuming no accident has occurred. Credit may be taken for manual actuation (exclusive of continuous control) of systems from locations that are reasonably accessible from the Remote Shutdown Panel. Credit may not be taken for manual actions involving jumpering, rewiring or disconnecting circuits.
- 2) The design should provide redundant safety grade capability for attaining subsequent cold shutdown through the use of suitable procedures.

To Meet Appendix K (ECCS Requirements)

- 3) The design should be such that the manual transfer of control to the remote location(s) should not disable any automatic actuation of ESF functions while the plant is attaining or maintained in hot shutdown, other than where ESF features are manually placed in service to achieve or maintain hot shutdown. It is permissible to disable automatic LPCI actuation in this manner only when necessary in order to enable control of the RHR system from the remote location and while operating this system to effect cold shutdown from hot shutdown.

To Meet Appendix R (Fire Protection Requirements)

- 4) The design should provide, as a minimum, non-redundant non-safety grade systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown from either the control room or from a remote location(s) assuming a postulated fire in any fire area, including the control room or the Remote Shutdown Panel. Credit may be taken for manual actuation (exclusive of continuous control) of systems from locations that are reasonably accessible from the control room or the Remote Shutdown Panel, as applicable. Credit may not be taken for manual actions involving jumpering, rewiring or disconnecting circuits.

5) The design should provide, as a minimum, non-redundant non-safety grade systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or from a remote location(s). The design should be such that in the event of fire damage in any fire area, systems could be repaired or made operable within 72 hours if required for cold shutdown.

For further guidance, see 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R.