



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.: 50-424/92-19 and 50-425/92-19

Licensee: Georgia Power Company  
P. O. Box 1295  
Birmingham, AL 35201

Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81

Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: August 7 - 18, 1992

Inspector: *[Signature]* 8-20-92  
for B. R. Benser, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

*[Signature]* 8-20-92  
for R. D. Starkey, Resident Inspector Date Signed

*[Signature]* 8-20-92  
for P. A. Balmain, Resident Inspector Date Signed

Approved by: *[Signature]* 8-20-92  
P. Skinner, Chief Date Signed  
Reactor Projects Section 3B  
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This special inspection, conducted by the resident inspectors, concerns an event where the "at the controls" area of Unit 2 was left unattended for approximately 15 seconds.

Results: One apparent violation was identified involving the Unit 2 "at the controls" area being left unattended. (paragraph 3)

## REPORT DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Licensee Employees

- \*M. Ajluni, Manager Safety Audit and Engineering Review
- J. Gasser, Operations Unit Superintendent
- S. Hargis, Operations Shift Superintendent
- \*K. Holmes, Manager Health Physics and Chemistry
- \*G. Hooper, Performance Engineering Supervisor
- W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Support
- \*R. LeGrand, Manager Operations
- C. Meyer, Operations Support Superintendent
- M. Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor
- \*W. Shipman, General Manager
- \*J. Swartzwelder, Manager Outage and Planning
- \*C. Tynan, Nuclear Procedures Supervisor
- \*T. Webb, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Supervisor

#### Oglethorpe Power Company Representative

T. Mozingo

#### NRC Resident Inspectors

- B. Bonser
- \*D. Starkey
- \*P. Balmain

#### Accompanying Personnel

- \*J. Starefos
- D. Hood

#### \*Attended Exit Interview

An alphabetical list of abbreviations is located in the last paragraph of the inspection report.

### 2. Event Description

On August 7, at approximately 11:00 am, the licensee identified an event which occurred in the Unit 2 control room where the "at the controls" area was left unattended for approximately 15 seconds. Prior to the event, the RO told the BOP operator that he was leaving the control room to get a cup of coffee. The BOP operator acknowledged this and thereby accepted the responsibilities of the operator "at the controls." Both the RO and BOP are licensed reactor operators. The SS (senior reactor operator) who was on the Unit 2 side of the podium went to his desk on the Unit 1

side of the podium at about the same time the RO went to get coffee. The USS (senior reactor operator) then told the BOP operator that he was going to check a damper lineup on the QHVC panel, which is a back panel located behind the main control board and outside of the "at the controls" area. At this time the BOP operator followed the USS to the QHVC panel and left the "at the controls" area unattended. The SS completed his activities at the desk and then moved back into the line of sight of the Unit 2 "at the controls" area and observed that no one was in this area. The SS then immediately stepped down from the podium and into the "at the controls" area to confirm this. The SS was in this area when the RO returned from the kitchen. The BOP operator and USS returned shortly after the RO. The licensee estimates that the total time from the BOP operator leaving the "at the controls" area to the SS entering the area was 15 seconds. There was no clear estimate of how long the BOP operator and USS were at the back panel, but it was estimated to be a similarly brief period of time.

Interviews by the inspectors of the SS revealed that throughout the morning the BOP operator and the USS had been attempting to establish flow with one of the auxiliary building exhaust fans. Apparently, the BOP operator became focused on the HVAC system and momentarily overlooked his primary responsibility to remain at the controls. When the USS went to check the damper lineup, the BOP operator followed to pass along information which he had developed earlier in the course of trying to solve the flow problem.

On August 17 and 18, the inspectors requested that the licensee conduct an annunciator/alarm test in the Unit 2 control room in order to determine if an operator at the QHVC panel could hear control room alarms. The inspectors could barely discern the "first out" alarms above the background ventilation noise and could not hear the other control room alarms. The Unit 2 Control Room alarms are audible at the podium and at Unit 1's "at the controls" area.

### 3. Requirements

The inspectors reviewed the requirements for shift manning. Procedure 10003-C, Manning The Shift, item 3.1 requires in part that at least one operator on the applicable unit shall be in the control room when fuel is in either reactor. He shall remain in the "at the controls" area until relieved by another qualified Reactor Operator. The "at the controls" area is defined in item 2.1 of procedure 10003-C as the designated area, as shown in Figure 1 of the procedure. 10CFR50.54(k) also requires, in part, that an operator or senior operator shall be present "at the controls" at all

times during the operation of the facility. TS 6.2.2a Table 6.2-1 requires that when both units are in Mode 1, that a minimum shift crew composition will consist of one operations supervisor with an senior operators license, one SRO and three ROs. The licensee exceeded TS staffing limits at the time the event occurred. In addition to the BOP operator and the USS for Unit 2 at the back panel, and the SS at his desk, there was one SRO and three ROs in the "at the controls" area of Unit 1.

The licensee reported this event as a 24 hour notification and is planning a LER. Corrective actions for this event included a shift briefing for all the shift crews. The BOP operator was disciplined. In addition, the licensee plans to conduct individual briefings with each RO to stress the importance and responsibilities of operator "at the controls" duties. The licensee is reviewing operator relief practices.

This event is significant because leaving the area where continuous attention can be given to reactor operating conditions and where the operator has access to the reactor controls for nonemergency reasons is unacceptable. This event is identified as an apparent violation 50-425/92-19-01, Failure Of Licensed Operator To Remain In The "At The Controls" Area.

#### 4. Exit Meeting

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 18, 1992, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

<u>Item no.</u>	<u>Description and Reference</u>
APPARENT VIOLATION 425/92-19-01	Failure of Licensed Operator to Remain in the "At The Controls" Area.

#### 5. Abbreviations

BOP Balance of Plant  
 HVAC Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning  
 LER Licensee Event Report  
 NPF Nuclear Power Facility  
 NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
 QHVC Designation for the main control room HVAC control panel

RO Reactor Operator  
SRO Senior Reactor Operator  
SS Shift Superintendent  
USS Unit Shift Supervisor