


Georgia Power Company
40 Inverness Center Parkway
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201
Telephone 205 877-7279

J. T. Beckham, Jr.
Vice President - Nuclear
Hatch Project



HL-2372
003865

August 14, 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

PLANT HATCH - UNIT 2
NRC DOCKET 50-366
OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
INOPERABILITY OF STATION SERVICE BATTERY AND CHARGERS
RESULTS IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NONCOMPLIANCE

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) concerning a condition of noncompliance with the Technical Specifications. This event occurred at Plant Hatch - Unit 2.

Sincerely,

J. T. Beckham, Jr.

JKB/cr

Enclosure: LER 50-366/i992-011

cc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant
NORMS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

170091
9208180154 920814
PDR ADDCK 05000366
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) **PLANT HATCH, UNIT 2** DOCKET NUMBER (2) **05000366** PAGE (3) **1** OF **10**

TITLE (4) **INOPERABILITY OF STATION SERVICE BATTERY AND CHARGERS RESULTS IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION NONCOMPLIANCE**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
07	12	92	92	011	00	08	14	92		05000
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (11)										
1	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)							
POWER LEVEL 100	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)							
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below)							
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)								
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)								
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
 NAME: **STEVEN B. TIPPS, MANAGER NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE, HATCH**
 TELEPHONE NUMBER: **912 367-7851**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORT TO NPRDS
X	EJ	BYC	E356	YES					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
 YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO
 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH: DAY: YEAR:

ABSTRACT (16)

On 7/15/92, Unit 2 was in the Run mode at 2436 CMWT (100 percent rated thermal power). Between 7/12/92 and 7/15/92, a sequence of events occurred resulting in the inoperability of the 2A Station Service Battery in one case and in the inoperability of battery Chargers 2B and 2C in another case for greater than 2 hours. With these components inoperable for greater than 2 hours, Technical Specifications section 3.8.2.3 requires that the unit be brought to Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours and Cold Shutdown within the following 24 hours. Upon determining that the components were inoperable, licensed personnel complied with the appropriate Technical Specifications limiting conditions for operations based on the time of discovery. They were not aware at the time that the conditions had already existed for greater than the Technical Specifications time constraints. As a consequence, shutdown action statements were not implemented.

Upon a subsequent review of the events on 7/15/92, it was determined that the inoperable conditions had existed for a period of time in excess of the Technical Specifications time constraints. Consequently, it was then realized that the Technical Specifications section 3.8.2.3 had not been complied with in those two instances.

The causes of the event were personnel error, less than adequate procedure, component failure, and an improper alarm setpoint.

Corrective actions for the event include counseling personnel, revising a procedure, repair of components, and changing an alarm setpoint.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1) PLANT HATCH, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV		
		9 2	0 1 1	0 0	2	OF 10

TEXT

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor
Energy Industry Identification System codes are identified in the text as (EIIIS Code XX).

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On 7/13/92, at 1005 CDT, Unit 2 was in the Run mode at 2436 CMWT (100 percent rated thermal power). At that time, a nonlicensed operator performing inside rounds per procedure 34GO-OPS-030-2S, "Daily Inside Rounds," noted that the output voltage of Station Service Battery Charger 2B was not within the procedural acceptance criterion. The procedure specifies a voltage of 130 - 140.5 V; however, the output voltage at that time was only 124 V. The operator notified a licensed operator in the control room as required by the procedure. At the time of the event, the charger was aligned to the PN-N bank of Station Service Battery 2A. The licensed operator had the 2B Charger removed from service and the 2C Charger aligned to the PN-N bank.

Three chargers serve the 2A Station Service Battery - Chargers 2A, 2B, and 2C. Charger 2A is dedicated to the P-PN bank of the battery; Charger 2B is dedicated to the PN-N bank of the battery; and, Charger 2C can serve either of the two battery banks. At the time the 2B Charger was found failed, the 2A Charger was in standby, the 2C Charger was aligned to the P-PN bank, and the 2B Charger was aligned to the PN-N bank. Consequently, when the 2B Charger was removed from service, the 2C Charger had to be transferred from the P-PN bank to the PN-N bank and Charger 2A was lined up to the P-PN bank.

The licensed shift supervisor and superintendent on shift questioned the state of the PN-N bank of Station Service Battery 2A upon finding the 2B Charger output voltage out-of-spec. They subsequently checked the voltage across the PN-N bank using voltmeter 2R42-R600. The voltage displayed on the voltmeter was 124 V, which was greater than the minimum required by the Technical Specifications of 120 V. Based on this voltage reading, they concluded that the battery was operable and no further actions were deemed necessary regarding the battery.

Several minutes after the 2C Charger was transferred to the PN-N bank, the 2C 600 V supply breaker to the charger tripped. Electricians were called to assist. When the electricians arrived at the charger, it was realigned to the PN-N bank of the battery. Several minutes later, at 1030 CDT, four of six charger rectifier bank power fuses blew along with the companion trigger fuses. The charger output subsequently decreased from approximately 400 A to approximately 100 A. Since the backup for the 2C Charger (that is the 2B Charger) was being repaired and since Charger 2C was supplying current, the 2C Charger was left in service.

Following discussions with Nuclear Safety and Compliance (NSAC) and Engineering personnel, licensed Operations personnel declared the 2C Charger inoperable at 1220 CDT. With both the 2B and the 2C Chargers inoperable, the requirements of Technical Specifications section 3.8.2.3 could not be met.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV		
PLANT HATCH, UNIT 2	05000366	92	011	00	3	OF 10

TEXT

Unit 2 Technical Specifications section 3.8.2.3 requires that each Station Service Battery, Battery 2A and 2B, be operable and that two of three chargers for each battery be operable. If this requirement cannot be met, the Technical Specifications require that the affected components be returned to operable status within 2 hours or be in Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours and Cold Shutdown within the following 24 hours. With the 2B and 2C Chargers inoperable, only one charger for the 2A Station Service Battery was operable. Consequently, the Technical Specifications requirement was not met and Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 2-92-501 was initiated to track compliance with the specification.

Several circuit boards in the 2B Charger were replaced and, at 1400 CDT, the 2B Charger was placed in service. Its output amperage was unacceptable and the charger was removed from service for further repair. In the meantime, the four blown power fuses and companion trigger fuses on the 2C Charger were replaced and it was returned to service. The voltage demand on the charger was adjusted to decrease the load to approximately 50 percent to preclude another trip. Over a period of time, the voltage demand was increased as the battery voltage increased until the normal float voltage of the charger was achieved.

At 1515 CDT, the normal float voltage was achieved on the 2C Charger. At this time, it was declared operable based on its operating parameters being within procedural specifications, and LCO 2-92-501 was terminated since all requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.2.3 were apparently met.

On 7/14/92, at 0500 CDT, additional circuit boards had been replaced in the 2B Charger and it was returned to service. The voltage and current parameters of the charger were within procedural specifications and the charger was declared operable. As of this time, no detailed evaluation of the overall condition of the 2A batteries had been conducted.

On 7/14/92, at 1315 CDT, during a routine, weekly Technical Specifications surveillance of the 2A Station Service Battery bank PN-N pilot cell, the specific gravity of the pilot cell electrolyte was found to be less than the Technical Specifications limit. The Technical Specifications require that the specific gravity be greater than or equal to 1.205 where as the specific gravity found in the pilot cell was 1.198. The charger supplying the PN-N bank was placed on equalize charge to provide a fast charge to the battery. The electrolyte specific gravity of the P-PN pilot cell was found to be at an acceptable level - 1.215.

With the specific gravity of the PN-N pilot cell at an unacceptable level, the 2A Station Service Battery (DC power Division I) was declared inoperable. With one division of DC power inoperable, the requirements of Technical Specifications section 3.8.2.3 were not met. Consequently, as done previously, an LCO (LGO 2-92-506) was entered requiring the 2A Station Service Battery to be returned to operable status within 2 hours or be in Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours and Cold Shutdown within the following 24 hours. It appeared that the specific gravity of the battery was not going to be restored within the time constraints of the LCO. Thus, a temporary waiver of compliance was requested and was granted by the NRC, allowing 72 hours to restore the battery specific

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV		
PLANT HATCH, UNIT 2	05000366	92	011	00	4	OF 10

TEXT

gravity to within Technical Specifications limits or be in Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours and Cold Shutdown within the following 24 hours.

On 7/15/92, at 0250 CDT, the specific gravity of the battery had been restored to greater than that required by the Technical Specifications. Consequently, at that time, 13 hours and 35 minutes after the LCO was entered, LCO 2-92-506 was terminated.

On 7/15/92, an investigation was initiated into the preceding events. Early in the investigation, it was determined that during the event the 2B Charger had been inoperable for at least 26.3 hours and the required Technical Specifications action statements had not been implemented. Specifically, the inside rounds data package for 7/12/92 showed that at approximately 0800 CDT the voltage for the 2B Charger was out-of-spec (127 V versus 130 - 140.5 V). The nonlicensed operator documented the voltage in the data package but failed to note that it was out-of-spec and, thus, did not notify the control room personnel. Consequently, the 2B Charger remained in service and yet inoperable from at least 7/12/92, at 0800 CDT, to 7/13/92, at 1020 CDT or 26.3 hours. As noted previously, the Technical Specifications allows only two hours for an inoperable charger to be aligned to the battery. If this condition is not corrected within this time period, the plant should be brought to Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours and Cold Shutdown within the following 24 hours. Since plant personnel were unaware of this condition at the time that it existed, the Technical Specifications action statements were not complied with.

Also, during the investigation, it was determined that Charger 2B had not been properly functionally tested prior to its return to service on 7/14/92. Several solid state components had been replaced in the 2B Charger during repair activities on 7/13/92 and 7/14/92. The functional test for this repair was to verify that the output voltage and amperage were within procedure specification with the charger on float charge. However, the components that were replaced during the repair could potentially affect performance of the charger under full load if they had not been adjusted correctly. Consequently, on 7/15/92, at 1328 CDT, the charger was declared inoperable and was subjected to a full load test in accordance with procedure 42SV-R42-007-0S, "Battery Charger Capacity Test." During the load test, it was determined that the charger current limiter, which limits the output of the charger, was set high. The current limiter and firing legs were adjusted and the load test was satisfactorily completed. Also, the charger voltmeter was found to be reading high and was replaced. Previous voltage readings may have been 6-7 percent high. The 2B Charger was declared operable on 7/16/92, at 1825 CDT. It should be noted that the as found condition of the charger was such that it would have been capable of performing its safety function since its repair on 7/14.

The 2C Charger failure was reviewed during the investigation on 7/17/92. It was determined that the functional test for the 2C Charger was also inadequate. Consequently, the charger was declared inoperable on 7/17/92, at 1502 CDT. The 600 V supply breaker to the charger was tested and found to function correctly. A load test was performed and the six firing legs of the charger rectifier bank were found to be significantly out of balance. Adjustments were made to

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1) PLANT HATCH, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV			
		9 2	0 1 1	0 0	5	OF	10

TEXT

rebalance the legs and the load test was satisfactorily completed. The 2C Charger was then declared operable on 7/19/92, at 1520 CDT.

For purposes of clarity, the following chronological sequence of events is provided:

Date	Time	Event
7/11	a.m.	During performance of inside rounds procedure, it was noted that the 2B Charger output amperage and voltage (40A, 138V) were within the procedural acceptance criteria (130 - 140.5 V, 0 - 100 A).
7/12	0800 CDT	Inside rounds data showed that the 2B charger voltage was not within the procedural specification (127 V versus 130 - 140.5 V) and that the amperage output was 0 A. The plant equipment operator performing the rounds inadvertently overlooked the out-of-spec voltage and failed to "red circle" this reading; consequently, no action was taken. Also, the plant operator and shift supervisor reviewing the completed rounds data package missed the out-of-spec parameter.
7/13	1005 CDT	The 2B Charger output voltage was noted during inside rounds as being 124 V. The out-of-spec parameter was brought to the attention of a plant operator.
	1020 CDT	The 2B Charger was declared inoperable. The 2B Charger (aligned to the PN-N bank) was removed from service, the 2C Charger was transferred from the P-PN bank to the PN-N bank, and the 2A Charger was aligned to the P-PN bank. The 2C Charger amp output peaked in the upper 400s and settled at 420 amps.
	*1024 CDT	The AC feeder breaker for the 2C Charger tripped.
	*1026 CDT	The AC feeder breaker was reclosed placing the 2C Charger back in service.
	1030 CDT	Received fuse failure alarm and the 2C Charger output reduced to 100 A.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1) PLANT HATCH, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000366	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV			
		92	011	00	6	OF	10

TEXT

Found 4 of 6 power fuses and the companion trigger fuses blown in the rectifier circuit of the charger.

The charger was maintained in service since it was providing some output and the 2B Charger was being repaired.

1230 CDT The 2C Charger was declared inoperable following consultation with NSAC and Engineering.

LCO 2-92-501 was initiated for the 2A Battery not having two operable chargers.

1400 CDT Circuit boards in the 2B Charger had been replaced. 2C Charger was removed from service and the 2B Charger was placed in service.

2B Charger output was only approximately 20 A.

Removed 2B Charger from service. Fuses had been replaced in the 2C Charger; consequently, 2C Charger was returned to service.

To preclude the possibility of a repeat failure, the voltage demand on the 2C Charger was decreased to limit the amp output to 200 A.

As the batteries were recharged and the amp output of the 2C Charger decreased, the voltage demand was increased over a period of time until the charger output voltage was adjusted to obtain the normal charger float voltage.

1515 CDT Charger 2C was declared operable. LCO 2-92-501 was terminated.

7/14 0500 CDT Additional circuit boards had been replaced in the 2B Charger. The charger was declared operable.

1315 CDT The specific gravity of the Station Service Battery 2A pilot cell was found to be less than the Technical Specifications limit (1.198 versus 1.205) during the weekly pilot cell surveillance. LCO 2-92-506 was initiated.

7/15 0250 CDT The specific gravity was brought back to within the Technical Specifications limit. LCO 2-92-506 was terminated.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1) PLANT HATCH, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000366	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV		
		92	011	00	7	OF 10

TEXT

1328 CDT Operability of the 2B Charger was questioned because of less than adequate functional testing on 7/14. The charger was declared inoperable. The 2B Charger was load tested. Minor adjustments were made to balance the firing legs and the current limiter had to be adjusted. The load test confirmed that the 2B charger had been capable of performing its intended safety function since the time of repair on 7/14.

7/16 1825 CDT The 2B Charger was declared operable.

7/17 1502 CDT Operability of the 2C Charger was questioned because of less than adequate functional testing on 7/13. The charger was declared inoperable.

7/19 The 2C Charger load test was initiated and a significant imbalance in the firing legs was found. The legs were rebalanced and the load test was completed.

1520 CDT The 2C Charger was declared operable.

(* Denotes approximate times.)

CAUSE OF EVENT

Causes of the 2B Charger not being identified as inoperable in a timely manner were a less than adequate procedure and cognitive personnel errors. The inside rounds procedure was less than adequate in that the acceptance criterion for the charger output amperage was incorrect. As a consequence, the procedure led the nonlicensed operator to incorrectly conclude that zero amp output of the charger was acceptable and, thus, that the charger was operable. The personnel errors involved data collection and data review. Specifically, the nonlicensed operator failed to identify the output voltage of the 2B Charger on 7/12/92 as being out-of-spec during the performance of inside rounds. The charger output voltage acceptance criterion is found in the procedure and is correct; however, the operator, relying on his memory, did not check the procedure specification and incorrectly thought that the voltage was acceptable. Subsequent reviews of the inside rounds data package by the licensed plant operator and the licensed shift supervisor failed to identify the out-of-spec voltage.

The cause of the inadequate functional tests being assigned to the 2B and 2C Chargers following the work performed on them on 7/13/92 and on 7/14/92 was cognitive personnel error. The individuals assigning the functional tests failed to realize the need for special technical expertise in determining the functional test for the work performed on the chargers. Consequently, they did not obtain the necessary engineering input and assigned a less than adequate functional test.

The cause of the inoperability of the 2B Charger was component failure. Circuit boards in the charger failed resulting in no output from the charger.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV		
PLANT HATCH, UNIT 2	05000366	92	011	00	8	OF 10

TEXT

The cause of the 2C 600 V feeder breaker to the 2C Charger tripping and the 2C Charger fuses blowing was component failure. For unknown reasons, the charger rectifier bank became imbalanced. This condition, coupled with the full load demand of the battery, resulted in excessive currents in the charger rectifier firing circuits and in the AC supply to the charger. It is concluded that the excessive currents resulted in the AC supply breaker tripping after a designed time delay. After the breaker had been reset several minutes following the trip, the fuses, not having an opportunity to cool, blew before the breaker trip time delay expired.

A cause of the Station Service Battery degrading without early detection was the battery low voltage annunciator setpoint being set too low. Specifically, the annunciator was designed to alarm at 117 V which is below the Tech Spec limit of 120 V. The annunciator should be designed to alarm before the battery reaches a discharged condition. Had this been the case, the degrading battery condition likely would have been identified and corrective actions implemented prior to the battery becoming inoperable.

REPORTABILITY ANALYSIS AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This report is required pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) because in two cases in this event Technical Specifications section 3.8.2.3 was not complied with. Specifically, Technical Specifications section 3.8.2.3 requires that Station Service Batteries 2A and 2B be operable and that two chargers for each battery be operable. If these conditions cannot be met, the Technical Specifications require that the affected components be returned to operable status in two hours or be in Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours and Cold Shutdown within the following 24 hours.

In the first case, the 2A Station Service Battery did not have two operable chargers aligned to it from prior to 7/12/92, at 0800 CDT, to 7/16/92 at 1825 CDT. Specifically, both the 2B and 2C Chargers were technically inoperable during this time, leaving only the 2A Charger aligned to the P-PN bank of the battery. As stated previously, the Technical Specifications require that the condition be restored in two hours or be in Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours and Cold Shutdown within the following 24 hours. At the time, plant personnel did not realize that such a condition existed; therefore, the plant was not taken to a shutdown condition. It should be noted that the reporting date is based on the discovery date of 7/15/92 as opposed to the event date of 7/12/92.

Furthermore, it is assumed the 2A Station Service Battery did not meet the Technical Specifications operability requirements for specific gravity from 0800 CDT 7/12/92 until 0205 CDT 7/15/92, a period of 67 hours. Since this was not known during the event, the operators did not realize that they needed to enter the Technical Specifications action statement, resulting in a noncompliance with the Technical Specifications.

The Station Service Batteries are designed to provide reliable power to systems such as Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) control logic, the Analog Transmitter Trip System, the Low Pressure Coolant Injection System (LPCI, EIIS Code B0)

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1) PLANT HATCH, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV			
		9 2	0 1 1	0 0	9	OF	10

TEXT

inverters, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC, EISS Code BN) motor operated valves (powered from battery 2A), the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI, EISS Code BJ) motor operated valves (powered from battery 2B), and essential switchgear controls. The Station Service Batteries are divisionally separated into Battery 2A and 2B. Each division of batteries has three 100 percent capacity chargers, one for the P-PN bank, one for the PN-N bank, and the other acts as a standby. The batteries are maintained fully charged and have sufficient stored capacity to carry all required emergency loads for at least two hours after a loss of essential AC power. During normal operation, the battery chargers provide a trickle charge on the batteries in order to maintain them at full capacity. The chargers also provide charging capability to restore the batteries to a fully charged state while also supplying the maximum demand of the steady state loads.

In this event, inoperability of the 2B Charger resulted in the 2A Station Service Battery being in a partially discharged condition. However, an analysis of the actual condition of the battery from the time the condition should have been discovered (7/12/92, 0800 CDT) until the appropriate Tech Spec actions were taken (7/13/92, 1020 CDT) showed that it was capable of carrying the safety related loads necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Consequently, in a design basis accident coincident with a loss of essential AC power, the 2A Station Service Battery would have been capable of performing its intended function.

Based on this evaluation, it is concluded this event had no significant adverse impact on nuclear safety.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The appropriate personnel have been counseled.

Operating Order 00-01-08922S has been issued which includes the correct amperage output acceptance criteria for the chargers. The operating order will be temporarily used when performing checks of the chargers. Procedure 34CO-OPS-030-2S will be revised to reflect the appropriate acceptance criterion for charger output amperage. The revision will be implemented by 9/7/92.

The feeder breaker to the 2C Charger was tested in accordance with plant procedures. No problems were found during the testing that would have resulted in the trip.

The failed solid state components of the 2B Charger were replaced. The charger was subsequently load tested per procedure 42SV-R42-007-0S. During the load test, the current limiter and firing legs had to be adjusted. The charger was then returned to operable status on 7/16/92, at 1825 CDT.

The four blown power fuses and companion trigger fuses for the 2C Charger were replaced. The rectifier firing legs of Charger 2C were then reba'nced during the charger load test. The load test, performed in accordance with procedure 42SV-R42-007-0S, was then satisfactorily completed. The 2C Charger was then returned to operable status on 7/19/92, at 1520 CDT.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) PLANT HATCH, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000366	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQ NUM	REV		
		92	011	00	10	OF 10

TEXT

As previously scheduled, the Unit Two Station Service battery chargers, the 1B Diesel Generator batteries and chargers, and the Unit 2 Diesel Generator battery chargers will be replaced during the Fall 1992 refueling outage. This activity is one of the final steps in a long term program to upgrade the DC power system at Plant Hatch. Equipment replaced within the last 2 years includes Unit 1 Station Service battery chargers, Diesel Generator batteries and chargers.

A design change request has been initiated to correct the setpoint for the Station Service Battery low voltage annunciator. This change will be implemented on all Station Service and Diesel Generator batteries by 9/7/92.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

No systems other than those previously mentioned in the report were affected by this event.

Previous similar events in which personnel error, a less than adequate procedure, improper setpoint, or a failed component resulted in a noncompliance with Technical Specifications limiting conditions for operations in the past two years were reported in the following LERs:

- 50-321/90-19, dated 10/23/90
- 50-366/90-11, dated 11/29/90
- 50-321/92-17, dated 7/21/92
- 50-366/92-03, date: 3/31/92
- 50-366/92-04, dated 4/30/92

Corrective actions included revising procedures, repairing or replacing components, counseling individuals and implementing a design change. These corrective actions involved personnel, procedures, and systems different from those involved in the event addressed by this report. Thus, these corrective actions could not have prevented this event.

Failed Component Information:

Plant Identification: 2F42-S027, 2R42-S028
 Component Type: Battery Chargers
 EISS Component Code: BYC
 Manufacturer: Exide Power Systems
 Manufacture Code: E356