



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report No.: 50-395/92-13

Licensee: South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
Columbia, SC 29218

Docket No.: 50-395

License No.: NPF-12

Facility Name: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station

Inspection Conducted: June 1 through July 10, 1992

Inspectors: R. C. Haag, Jr.
R. C. Haag, Senior Resident Inspector

7/23/92
Date Signed

L. A. Keller, Jr.
L. A. Keller, Resident Inspector

7/23/92
Date Signed

Approved by: Floyd S. Cantrell, Jr.
Floyd S. Cantrell, Chief
Projects Section 1B
Division of Reactor Projects

7/24/92
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observations, operational safety verification, fire protection, onsite follow-up of written reports of nonroutine events at power reactor facilities, follow-up review and action on previous inspection findings. Selected tours were conducted on backs . ft or weekends. Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on thirteen occasions.

Results:

No violations or deviations were identified.

Failure to follow specific procedural work instructions was noted during two maintenance activities. Corrective action has been initiated. The inspector will continue to follow-up on these type events (paragraph 4). Conservative judgment was used for dispositioning discrepancies noted during a test activity (paragraph 3). Numerous problems have continued to occur with radiation monitor RMA 13. Continued management attention is needed to ensure this issue is resolved (paragraph 4). Overall, the fire protection program and it's implementation was viewed as a strength. Specific problems involving reactor building smoke

detectors and fire dampers have not been resolved and require additional attention (paragraph 6). Overall planning and execution of the primary power supply replacement in control cabinet XPN7005 was considered a strength (paragraph 4). A TS required sample was missed due to personnel error and weaknesses associated with TS amendment implementations (paragraph 5).

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*F. Bacon, Associate Manager, Chemistry
*W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics
K. Beale, Supervisor, Emergency Services
*C. Bowman, Manager, Maintenance Services
*M. Browne, Manager, Design Engineering
*B. Christiansen, Manager, Technical Services
H. Donnelly, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Licensing
*M. Fowlkes, Associate Manager, Shift Engineering
*S. Furstenberg, Associate Manager, Operations
G. Hall, Associate Manager, Health Physics
*W. Higgins, Acting Manager, Nuclear Licensing
*S. Hunt, Acting General Manager, Nuclear Safety
*A. Koon, Nuclear Operations Project Coordinator
K. Nettles, General Manager, Station Support
*H. O'Quinn, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
*C. Osier, Acting Manager, Systems and Performance
Engineering
J. Proper, Associate Manager, Quality Assurance
*M. Quinton, General Manager, Engineering Services
J. Skolds, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
*G. Taylor, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
*A. Torres, Associate Manager, Quality Control
*R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, S. C. Public Service
Authority
B. Williams, Manager, Operations

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

*Attended exit interview

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

2. Plant Status

The plant operated at or near 100 percent power during the inspection period with the exceptions of a power decrease to 88 percent on June 5 and 6, 1992, to replace a main feedwater pump seal and a short power reduction to 93 percent on June 24, 1992, when the 2A heater drain valve inadvertently opened.

Other inspection or meetings:

- * Floyd Cantrell, Section Chief, DRP was on site June 8-10, 1992, to review resident inspector activities, tour the plant, and meet with licensee management.

3. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components listed below to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements. The inspectors verified that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, test instrumentation was calibrated, and limiting conditions for operation were met. Upon completion of the test, the inspectors verified that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements, any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved, and the systems were properly returned to service. Specifically, the inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:

- Monthly valve line-up verification for the service water system (STP 123.001).
- Semi-annual inspection of ten fire dampers associated with CCW pump speed switchgear room air handling unit XAH 19A (STP 428.063).
- Dynamic flow testing of chill water discharge valve XVG6517 for "C" CCW pump motor (PTP 270.015). This test was performed at the valve's design-basis differential pressure (DP) and flow condition as required by NRC Generic Letter 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance". The valve, which had previously been adjusted during MOVATS testing under static conditions, operated satisfactorily during the dynamic test. While reviewing the test results, the inspector noted the actual DP with the valve closed was 102 psig. However, the calculated DP that the licensee had determined for these flow conditions was only 50 psig. The licensee had also noticed this large difference between calculated and actual DP's. After further review, the licensee discovered the downstream pressure gauge was not providing accurate information.

Testing revealed that it took approximately seven minutes for pressure at the gauge to stabilize. The licensee believes the valve or tubing connected to the gauge was partially clogged. Due to the inaccurate DP readings, the flow test was considered invalid. The test will be reperformed after the valve and tubing have been cleaned.

- Chill water (VU) system flow balance verification (PTP 280.002). Individual flow measurements for the various components served by "B" train VU were taken during this test. The discharge throttle valves were fully open for the test. After the flow measurements were taken on three separate occasions to verify consistent readings, the data was given to design engineering for analysis. The goal of this test is to verify that adequate flow is provided to individual components with all the throttle valves open. During previous VU system operations, the use of flow restriction orifices and throttle valves were required to balance VU flows. After resizing the flow orifices, the licensee stated that they believe the use of throttle valves will not be required.

The observed tests were performed in accordance with procedural requirements and demonstrated acceptable results. The decision to invalidate the dynamic flow test demonstrated conservative judgement.

4. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities for the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards and in conformance with TS.

The following items were considered during this review: that limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service, activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable, functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service, activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, and radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance that may affect system performance. The

following maintenance activities were observed:

- Preventive maintenance task to perform quarterly filter inspection for emergency feedwater pump room cooling unit XAH0011B (PMTS P0157120).
- Preventive maintenance to backflush the service water (SW) side of the CCW heat exchanger XHE002B (PTF 173.001). The monthly task is performed to minimize the buildup of marine growth which could reduce the heat exchange capacity.
- During the quarterly maintenance outage for "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG), the inspector observed replacement of the rocker arm lube oil filters (PMTS P0157297), changing the oil in the generator outboard bearing (PMTS P0157295) and change out of the main lube oil duplex strainer elements (MWR S203321). The strainer elements were changed due to the 10 psi differential pressure limit having been met during a previous EDG run. The inspector noted that the instructions in MMP 180.008, Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil System Maintenance, section 7.18, for cleaning the lube oil strainer required cleaning of the strainer body after removal of the elements. Due to a small undrainable amount of oil in the bottom of the body, the mechanics used their hands to verify that no foreign material was in the bottom of the strainer body. The inside of the strainer body was not cleaned. With the exception of the strainer bottom which could not be viewed, the inspector noted that the overall cleanliness of the strainer body appeared to be acceptable. During the subsequent EDG test, the differential pressure for the strainer was 4 psi, which verified the strainer element change out corrected the problem.

The inspector informed licensee management of his concern that procedural instructions were not followed during this maintenance activity. After reviewing this activity, the licensee informed the inspector that their expectations for procedural compliance were not met. The involved individuals were counseled on the required actions to follow when procedural instructions can not be completed as written. Also, the licensee will determine if all the lube oil can be drained or removed from the strainer body to allow easier cleaning.

- Replacement of the primary power supply in control cabinet XPN7005 (MWR 9203721). The inspector reviewed the procedure that was developed to accomplish this task and observed the replacement activity. The procedure was well written and provided clear, detailed directions for the technicians, as well as a list of affected indications and control functions if XPN7005 had become de-energized. The inspector noted that the technicians reviewed the procedure prior to the job and that management oversight was present. Overall planning and execution of this task was considered a strength.
- Calibration of the low pressure alarm for "A" motor driven emergency feedwater pump suction pressure switch (PMTS P0157249).
- Cleaning and inspection of charging pump "C" transfer switch XET2002C (PMTS P0157421). Inspection revealed cosmetic damage to arc chutes for two of the knife switches. Also, it was noted that each time the switch is cycled, paint falls off the cabinet walls and ceiling. Both these items were dispositioned under NCN 4493. In the NCN, the arc chutes were permanently accepted "as-is" due to damage being minor surface abrasions which do not affect the insulation value or switch operation. The cabinet interior will be repainted as plant conditions allow. After review of this activity, the inspector agreed with the NCN evaluations.
- Investigate and repair the cause of alarm from seismic recorder IYA1780 (MWR 9203737). The technician discovered that the movement arm associated with 25.4 Hertz was touching the contact which initiates the alarm signal. The contact setting was adjusted to the proper specification.
- Repairing the remote temperature indicator for reactor building hydrogen recombiner XHR004A (MWR 9203739).
- Semi-annual preventive maintenance on "C" component cooling water pump motor MPP001C (PMTS P0158145).
- MOVATS testing of chill water discharge valve XVG6517 for "C" CCW pump motor (PMTS P0158052). During the test, a torque thrust cell (TTC) was mounted between the Limitorque actuator and the valve yoke. The strain gauge in the TTC provides a direct estimate of valve stem thrust. Using this arrangement for measuring force, the

licensee can use the stated accuracy given by MOVATS for their diagnostic equipment. NRC Information Notice 92-23, "Results of Validation Testing of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment", provides the basis for accepting the accuracy of various diagnostic equipment.

- Removing the clog in the discharge piping drain line for "C" main steam power operated relief valve (PORV) IPV2020 (MWR 9203755). Earlier operations personnel had identified standing water at the roof penetration for "B" and "C" PORV. After further investigation the licensee discovered that the PORV discharge piping was partially filled with water. The drain lines which are installed to remove any condensation from steam leakage were found to be clogged. Initially, tapping on the "B" PORV drain line and removing a plug in "C" PORV drain line allowed draining of the standing water in the discharge piping. Later the drain lines were removed and mechanically cleaned to remove debris and corrosion products from drain lines. The inspector questioned the licensee if the drain lines for the other PORV and the main steam atmospheric dump valves would be removed and cleaned. The licensee responded that these drain lines currently have some flow through the piping, therefore, they are not clogged. However, the licensee will review the need to clean these drain lines to prevent future clogging. Also, the licensee is reviewing options to replace the steam flow reduction orifices in the drain lines with a steam tray device.
- Preventive maintenance to inspect, clean and lubricate air handling unit X-11-A (PMTS P0157832). While reviewing the instructions in MMP 460.022, Inspection, Cleaning and Lubrication of Fan Coil Units, the inspector questioned the mechanic if several steps had been completed. The MPP requires cleaning of the refrigerant coils, drain pan and drain line. A note states that cleaning of the drain line may require removal and disassembly of the piping. The mechanic informed the inspector that the coils and drain pan did not require cleaning based on a visual inspection and the drain line did not require cleaning since water was dripping from the pipe. Later a mechanical supervisor reviewing the job also noticed that these steps were not completed. The supervisor instructed the mechanic to perform these steps since the procedure required the completion of the work.

The inspector later observed a work activity which signifies the importance of performing steps as specified in procedures. On July 6, 1992, maintenance was notified to clean the drain line on control room air handling unit, XAH 12B, due to standing water (approximately four inches) in the bottom of the unit. While some water was dripping out of the drain line it appeared the amount of flow was not adequate to prevent overflowing of the drain pan. Based on the large amount of debris removed from the drain line after disassembly, the licensee concluded that a partially clogged drain line was the cause of the standing water in the unit. Based on air handling units receiving the cleaning and inspection PM once every six months, the inspector questioned if the drain line had previously been adequately cleaned.

Attentive supervision was provided for the above maintenance activity to ensure work was accomplished per procedural requirements. The inspector also noted that improvements are needed for individuals to recognize their responsibility for procedural compliance.

Troubleshooting and repair of the main plant vent high range radiation monitor RMA 13 (MWR 9203723). On June 17, 1992, RMA 13 was declared inoperable due to spiking and spurious alarms. The monitor was returned to service eight days later after replacement of a circuit board. Two days later, on June 27, 1992, RMA 13 was again declared inoperable due to unreliable (drifting) indication. After replacement of the detector and the entire circuit drawer, the monitor was returned to service on July 6, 1992. Earlier on June 7, 1992, RMA 13 was taken out of service for approximately three days due to higher than normal readings for no apparent reason. The repair effort then consisted of circuit board replacements. Previous problems with RMA 13 were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-395/91-17. In 1990 and up to August, 1991, ten repair activities on RMA 13 were performed. Three additional repairs were performed from that time period until the repairs that are discussed above. All of these repair activities have been related to spiking or drifting indication or spurious alarms.

Engineering has been involved with the troubleshooting efforts on RMA 13. However, the inspector has noted that the root cause of the problems has not been identified nor has permanent corrective action been

accomplished. Continued management support and commitment to resolve the continuing RMA 13 problems is needed.

- Investigate and repair the cause of low discharge pressure from "A" waste gas compressor XGC01A (MWR 9203654). Inspect and repair the "A" waste gas compressor discharge valve PCV1030D (MWR 9203691). Both of these MWR's were worked to resolve the low pressure conditions at the discharge of the compressor. During both of these jobs, personnel were contaminated. One event occurred when PCV1030D was cycled without a water seal in the compressor which allowed contaminated gas to enter the room where work was being performed. The second event resulted from running the compressor when the mechanical seal was "cocked" and spraying water into the room. The inspector noted that these work activities should be thoroughly reviewed by the licensee to determine what procedural improvements are needed to prevent similar recurrences.
- Replacement of small diameter piping in the SW return line from "B" SW pump motor upper bearing cooler (MWR 90T0519). This section of piping was replaced due to a pinhole leak that had been previously identified.

Two maintenance activities which involved failure to follow specific procedural instructions indicate that improvements are warranted in this area. For one of these activities, licensee supervision directed the completion of all the tasks. Pre-job planning and performance of a power supply replacement was completed in a deliberate and well supervised manner. Continued problems are occurring with radiation monitor RMA 13. Improvements in work practices related to the waste gas compressors are needed to prevent future personnel contaminations. The inspector will continue routine follow-up on these type events.

5. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

a. Plant Tour and Observations

The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas: control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, TS, and limiting conditions for operations; and review of control room operator logs, operating

orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedures.

The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas: verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component(s), and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performance.

Plant tours included observation of general plant/equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazards. Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken if required. Selected tours were conducted on backshifts or weekends.

During a tour of the turbine driven EFW pump room, the inspector noted a 1990 danger tag attached to MS drain valve XVT2803B. The purpose of the danger tag was to ensure the valve would remain closed. Previously the valve had been opened which allowed steam to bypass the trip and throttle valve and enter the turbine. The reason for the tag as stated on the danger tag log was to prevent inadvertent operation of the valve until MRF 21886 is completed. The inspector found that MRF 21886 has no scheduled completion date. Based on the length of time this danger tag had been in place, the inspector believed a different method of preventing inadvertent valve operation, i.e., locked valve program, would have been appropriate. The licensee informed the inspector that XVT2803B would be placed in the locked valve program.

While in elevation 412 west penetration room, the inspector noted that the size of the steam leak at the cap of check valve XVC519A (S/G blowdown flow control valve bypass) had increased. The metal drip pan was not collecting all of the condensing steam. Water from area XVC519A (a posted contaminated area) was flowing out into a clean area and to a floor drain. The inspector questioned an HP technician concerning the contaminated area boundaries and was informed that

periodic checks were made to ensure contamination is not being spread. While no spread of contamination had been detected, the inspector considered the flow of water from a contaminated to a clean area a poor radiological work practice.

b. Missed Technical Specification Required Sample

On June 1, 1992, at 0200 hours, the Hydrogen Recombiner A Outlet Gas Oxygen Analyzer was declared inoperable due to irregular readings. This resulted in an entry into TS 3.3.3.9, Table 3.3-13, Item 1.a. This required that grab samples be taken and analyzed at least once per 24 hours whenever there are less than two operable channels of oxygen monitors in the Waste Gas Holdup Explosive Gas Monitoring System. The first sample was taken on June 1 at 1610. The second sample, which was due no later than June 2 at 1610, was not taken until June 3 at 0600. Additional samples were taken within the required frequency until the analyzer was placed back in service. The TS limits for explosive gas were not exceeded during this event.

The primary cause of the missed sample was personnel error. The shift on which the sample was missed believed the sample had been performed or was to be performed by the other shift. However, the licensee also identified that the procedure used to track TS action items (GTP 702) was not revised prior to implementing the latest amendment to this technical specification. Prior to this event, the licensee did not require revising affected procedures prior to implementation of TS amendments, if the amendment was perceived to be a relaxation of requirements. The specific part of the amendment which changed TS 3.3.3.9, Table 3.3-13, was incorrectly assumed to be a relaxation of requirements.

Immediate corrective action consisted of stressing the importance of complying with TS related sampling to operations and chemistry personnel during shift meetings. The procedure used to track TS action items is being compared to other TS amendments to ensure the procedure is current and correct. Additionally, the licensee is reviewing it's policy of implementing TS amendments prior to revising affected procedures. The licensee has committed to complete these items by July 31, 1992. The inspectors will review the results of the licensee's procedure review to determine the scope

of the problem. The failure to take a TS required sample and the possible problems associated with the procedure used to track TS action items has been identified as Unresolved Item (URI 395/92-13-01).

The radiological work practices involving a steam leak in a contaminated area should be reviewed to determine if improvements are needed. The scope of problems associated with the procedure for tracking TS action items needs to be determined and appropriate corrective action taken.

6. Fire Protection/Prevention Program Review

The inspector reviewed both programmatic and the implementation aspects of the licensee's fire protection program. The fire protection group is responsible for maintaining and implementing the fire protection program. The inspector considered this organization, which has adequate resources and management support, a strength in the licensee's efforts to protect the plant from potential fires.

The inspector reviewed the following procedures:

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|---------|---|
| EPP-013 | Fire Emergency |
| FPP-003 | Control of Transient Combustibles |
| FPP-004 | Duties of a Fire Watch |
| FPP-005 | Burn Permits |
| FPP-006 | Handling and Storage of Flammable Liquids and Gases |
| FPP-010 | Barrier Control |

Compliance with procedural controls was noted for transient combustibles, fire watches and barrier control during tours in the plant. While observing applicable maintenance activities, the inspector verified that the requirements for burn permits and fire watches were satisfied. Previously, the inspector had verified that minimum staffing requirements of maintenance and operations personnel on the backshift were adequate to meet fire brigade staffing. During backshift inspections, the inspector routinely verifies that minimum staffing requirements are met. The inspector performed a walkdown inspection of the halon and low pressure carbon dioxide systems and portions of the main fire service system. Overall the piping systems, components and associated areas were well maintained. The correct position was verified for the valves that were inspected.

The licensee continues to experience problems with reactor building (RB) smoke detector failures. Since the last refueling, October 1991, when all the smoke detectors were repaired, 15 of the 46 RB smoke detectors have had failures. A recently completed root cause analysis identified that these failures were caused by the heat and radiation conditions in the RB. Hourly RB temperatures are logged by operations to compensate for the failed smoke detectors. The licensee plans to replace the RB smoke detectors with a less sensitive model during the next refueling outage.

While observing a visual inspection of fire dampers, the inspector questioned the adequacy of the inspections to ensure proper damper operation. On August 29, 1992, an error while testing an electrical fire protection panel resulted in the actuation of fire dampers associated with the relay room. Six of the 38 dampers that received an actuation signal failed to fully close. The dampers were repaired and verified to fully close, however, the generic implication of these failures and how they could relate to other fire dampers was not fully addressed. On April 13, 1992, QA stated that the corrective action provided on the NCN was incomplete since there were no provisions that would prevent recurrence of the dampers failure if they were actuated. Engineering informed the inspector of their plans to resolve this issue; however, no actions have been currently initiated to fulfill this goal.

7. Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities (92700)

(Closed) LER 92-005, Missed Explosive Gas Sample Due to Personnel Error. This item is being tracked under URI 395/92-13-10.

(Closed) LER 91-01, Missed Surveillance for Axial Flux Difference (AFD) Verification

Due to the failure to recognize that the computer program, which monitors AFD was not running, the operators failed to initiate compensatory measures for verification of AFD parameters. Corrective actions included changes to the annunciator response procedure for AFD alarms and computer failure alarm to ensure the applicable programs are running or compensating actions are initiated. Also, a new computer display group was created to allow easier

monitoring of computer program status (running or halted). The inspectors have noted frequent use of the new display group by operations personnel.

(Closed) LER 92-01, Missed Surveillance for AFD Verification

This missed surveillance was due to the removing a computer point from scan that is also used in the AFD computer calculation. Removing the point from scan did not halt the AFD program, but it did prevent the program from calculating AFD and comparing it to the alarm limits. Corrective action involved a procedure change which requires that computer points can only be deleted from processing as directly specified by approved plant procedures. While reviewing this second event the inspector does not believe that corrective action from the first event could have reasonably been expected to prevent the second event.

8. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 10, 1992, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings.

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.

| <u>Item Number</u> | <u>Description and Reference</u> |
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| 395/92-13-01 | URI - Failure to take a required technical specification explosive gas sample (paragraph 5). |

9. Acronyms and Initialisms

| | |
|-----|----------------------------|
| AFD | Axial Flux Difference |
| CCW | Component Cooling Water |
| DP | Differential Pressure |
| EDG | Emergency Diesel Generator |
| EFW | Emergency Feedwater |
| EPP | Emergency Plan Procedure |
| ESF | Engineered Safety Feature |
| FPP | Fire Protection Procedure |

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|--------|---------------------------------------|
| GTP | General Test Procedure |
| LER | Licensee Event Reports |
| MMP | Mechanical Maintenance Procedure |
| MOVATS | Motor Operated Valve Actuator Testing |
| MRF | Modification Request Form |
| MS | Mainsteam |
| MWR | Maintenance Work Request |
| NCN | Nonconformance Notice |
| NRC | Nuclear Regulatory Commission |
| NRR | Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| PM | Preventive Maintenance |
| PMTS | Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet |
| PORV | Power Operated Relief Valve |
| PSI | Pounds Per Square Inch |
| PSIG | Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge |
| PTP | Plant Test Procedure |
| QA | Quality Assurance |
| RB | Reactor Building |
| RCS | Reactor Coolant System |
| RWP | Radiation Work Permits |
| SPR | Special Reports |
| STP | Surveillance Test Procedures |
| SW | Service Water |
| TS | Technical Specifications |
| TTC | Torque Thrust Cell |
| URI | Unresolved Item |
| VU | Chill Water |