

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report No. 50-247/92-11

Docket No. 50-247

License No. DPR-26

Licensee: Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place
Buchanan, New York 10003

Facility Name: Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2

Inspection At: Buchanan, New York

Inspection Conducted: July 13-17, 1992

Inspector: Edward B. King
E. B. King, Physical Security Inspector

7/23/92
date

Approved by: R. R. Keimig
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section
Division of Radiation Safety and
Safeguards

7-23-92
date

Areas Inspected: Licensee Action on Previously Identified Security Item; Management Support and Audits; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; Lock and Key Control; Emergency Power Supply; and Security Training and Qualifications.

Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with the NRC requirements in the areas inspected. One previously identified unresolved item was closed. Security program upgrades and enhancements continue to be made and management attention to the program was evident.

DETAILS

1.0 Key Persons Contacted

1.1 Licensee and Contractor Personnel

- *T. Schmeiser, Acting General Manager (GM) Nuclear Power Generation
- *V. Mullin, Acting GM Technical Support
- *J. M. Drexel, Site Protection Manager
- *G. Cullen, Security Superintendent
- *T. S. Elzroth, Security Administrator
- *K. Price, Site Protection Supervisor
- *C. Monahan, Site Protection Supervisor
- *M. A. Whitney, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety - Licensing
- *J. McCann, Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Engineer
- *J. L. Worrall, Site Manager, The Wackenhut Corporation (TWC)
- *R. Meyer, Site Captain (TWC)
- *F. Wiedeman, Training Manager (TWC)
- *J. Martorano, Lieutenant (TWC)

1.2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- *G. Hunegs, Senior Resident Inspector

*Denotes those present at the exit interview

The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor security personnel during this inspection.

2.0 Followup of Previously Identified Security Item

(Closed) UNR 50-247/91-14-02: Inadequate Assessment of Temporary Barriers

During a previous inspection (50-247/91-14), the resident inspector observed that a penetration had been made in the side wall of a building which contained vital equipment. The penetration was covered with a temporary barrier after the penetration work was completed. During the work, a security guard had been posted to prevent unauthorized entry into the building through the penetration. The resident inspector determined that the barrier was only marginally effective in preventing entry and concluded that security supervision had not conducted an adequate evaluation of the situation prior to removing the guard post. A review of the matter by the licensee concluded that there was a lack of consistency among the security supervisors in assessing the adequacy of security barriers. The licensee committed to develop a lesson plan addressing the issue and to provide additional training to the security supervisors. Additionally, the licensee committed to obtain feedback from the security supervisors that received the training, develop guidelines for assessing security barriers and incorporate the guidelines into security procedures.

Based on a review of the security training lesson plans and a review of the developed procedures, during this inspection, the inspector determined that the corrective actions taken by the licensee appeared to be adequate.

3.0 Management Support and Audits

3.1 Management Support

Management support for the licensee's physical security program was determined to be consistent with program needs. This determination was based upon the inspector review of the various aspects of the licensee's program during this inspection as documented in this report.

Security program enhancements made since the last routine physical security inspection (50-247/92-05) were:

- the addition of three new four wheel drive site patrol vehicles;
- the installation of an image capture system to collect and store data including photos and fingerprint cards;
- the installation of weapons racks and ordinance lockers in guard force patrol vehicles; and
- the participation by security management at a physical protection course conducted by Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

3.2 Audits

The inspector reviewed the licensee's annual Quality Assurance Audit of the security program, No. 92-06-A, which was conducted from June 15-26, 1992. The inspector verified that the audit had been planned and carried out in accordance with the NRC-approved security plan (the Plan). During the audit, no adverse findings were identified but three recommendations were made. The audit was very comprehensive in scope, and the results were reported to the appropriate level of management. The audit team was composed of individuals with nuclear security expertise. No deficiencies were noted.

4.0 Protected and Vital Area Physical Barrier, Detection and Assessment Aids

4.1 Protected Area Barrier

The inspector conducted a physical inspection of the protected area (PA) barrier on July 13, 1992. The inspector determined by observation that the barrier was installed and maintained as described in the Plan. The inspector also noted that a barrier upgrade is proceeding satisfactorily and is tentatively scheduled for completion by December 1992.

4.2 Protected Area Detection Aids

The inspector observed the perimeter intrusion detection system (IDS) on July 14, 1992, and determined that it was installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. The inspector observed licensee testing of several IDS zones and determined that it was being performed in accordance with licensee testing procedures and in a manner which effectively challenged the detection capability of the system.

4.3 Protected Area and Isolation Zone Lighting

The inspector conducted a PA and isolation zone lighting survey on July 16, 1992, from approximately 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., accompanied by a licensee security supervisor. The inspector determined by use of the licensee's calibrated light meter that the station's lighting system met NRC requirements, was very effective and that the isolation zones were adequately maintained to permit observation of activities on both sides of the PA barrier.

4.4 Assessment Aids

The inspector observed the PA perimeter assessment aids during day and night periods and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.

However, during previous inspections, inspectors identified several areas where the assessment aids were only marginally effective. As interim corrective action, compensatory measures were implemented and are still in place. To correct this potential weakness, the licensee developed and is implementing a long-term assessment system upgrade. A portion of this upgrade has been completed. Another portion is scheduled to begin after the completion of the PA barrier upgrade. It will include the repositioning and, if needed, the addition of cameras to enhance assessment capabilities. All assessment upgrades are scheduled for completion in 1995. This item will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.

4.5 Vital Area Barriers

The inspector conducted a physical inspection of selected vital area (VA) barriers on July 16, 1992. The inspector determined by observation that the VA barriers were installed and maintained and described in the Plan.

4.6 Vital Area Detection Aids

The inspector observed licensee testing of selected VA detection aids on July 16, 1992, and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.

In summary, except for the concerns noted in Section 4.4, the licensee has an effective program which satisfies the NRC requirements in the areas of PA and VA physical barrier, detection and assessment aids.

5.0 Protected and Vital Areas Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles

5.1 Personnel Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and VAs. This determination was based on the following:

- 5.1.1 The inspector verified that personnel were properly identified and authorization was checked prior to issuance of badges and key cards.
- 5.1.2 The inspector verified that the licensee was implementing a search program for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials as committed to in the plan. The inspector observed both plant and visitor personnel access processing during peak and off-peak traffic periods on July 14 and 17, 1992. The inspector also interviewed members of the security force and licensee security staff about personnel access procedures.
- 5.1.3 The inspector determined, by observation, that individuals in the PA and VAs displayed their badges as required.
- 5.1.4 The inspector verified that the licensee had escort procedures for visitors into the PA and VAs.
- 5.1.5 The licensee had a mechanism for expediting access to the vital equipment during emergencies and that mechanism was adequate for its purpose.

5.2 Package and Material Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over packages and materials that were brought into the PA through the main access portal. The inspector also observed package and material processing and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about package and material control procedures.

5.3 Vehicle Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee properly controls vehicle access to and within the PA. The inspector verified that vehicles were properly authorized prior to being allowed to enter the PA. Identification was verified by a security force member (SFM) at the main access portal. This procedure was consistent with the commitments in the Plan. The inspector also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector determined that at least two SFMs control vehicle access at the main vehicle access portal. On July 14, 1992, the inspector also observed vehicle searches and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about vehicle search procedures.

In summary, the licensee has effective programs which meets the NRC requirements in the areas of PA and VA access control of personnel, packages, and vehicles.

6.0 Alarm Stations and Communications

The inspector observed the operations in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and determined they were operated as committed to in the Plan. CAS and SAS operators were interviewed by the inspector and found to be knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The inspector verified that the CAS and SAS did not require any operational activities that would interfere with the assessment and response functions. No deficiencies were noted.

7.0 Lock and Key Control

The security lock and key procedures were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector reviewed the lock and key records and discussed the procedures with the licensee's security staff. No deficiencies were noted.

8.0 Emergency Power Supply

The inspector verified that there are several electrical systems (batteries, security diesel generator, plant emergency diesel generators and plant on-site AC power) that provide backup power to the security systems and reviewed the accompanying test and maintenance procedures. The systems and procedures are consistent with the Plan. The backup systems are located in locked vital areas. No deficiencies were noted.

9.0 Security Training and Qualification

The inspector randomly selected and reviewed training and qualification records for nine SFMs. The physical qualification and firearms requalifications records were inspected for armed SFMs and security supervisors. The inspector determined that the training had been conducted in accordance with the security training and qualification (T&Q) plan and that it was properly documented.

The inspector observed security tactical response training on July 15, 1992, observed a response drill on July 16, 1992, and determined that the training department has improved the response training as evident by the manner in which the drills were developed, controlled, and critiqued by the training staff. However, the inspector noted that even though the NRC's Design Basis Threat had been considered in the development of the drill scenarios, the observed performance of several SFMs during the drill did not appear to reflect a thorough appreciation of all elements of the threat. This indicated to the inspector that additional instructions in the fundamentals should be pursued and emphasized during tactical response training. This was discussed by the inspector with the licensee. The licensee agreed to consider the inspector's comments.

Several SFMs were interviewed to determine if they possessed the requisite knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties. The interview results indicated that they were professional and knowledgeable of the job requirements. No deficiencies were noted.

9.0 Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee's representatives indicated in Paragraph 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection of July 17, 1992. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed, and the findings were presented. The items as documented in this report were reviewed with the licensee.