



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report Nos.: 50-424/96-04 and 50-425/96-04

Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201

Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425

License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81

Facility Name: Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: May 13-17, 1996

Inspector: W. W. Stansberry
W. W. Stansberry, Safeguards Inspector

6/17/96
Date Signed

Approved by: P. E. Fredrickson
P. E. Fredrickson, Chief
Special Inspections Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

6/17/96
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the area of Physical Security Program for Power Reactors. The specific areas evaluated were detection and assessment aids; vital area access control of packages, personnel, and vehicles; and alarm stations and communications.

Results:

In the areas inspected, no violations were identified. Four violations were closed (95-28-03, 95-29-01, 95-29-02, and 95-29-03). The licensee's intrusion detection systems were functional, effective and met licensee commitments. The vital area access controls for packages, personnel and vehicles were found adequate. The licensee's alarm stations and communication equipment were appropriate for their intended functions and operated as required.

REPORT DETAILS

1.0 Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *J. Beasley, General Manager, Georgia Power Company (GPC)
- *S. Driven, Supervisor, Plant Training, GPC
- *J. Gasser, Assistant General Manager, Operations, GPC
- *K. Holmes, Manager, Maintenance, GPC
- *D. Hugck, Manager, Nuclear Security, GPC
- *W. Jukes, Supervisor, Nuclear Security-Operations, GPC
- *C. Kitchens, Supervisor, Nuclear Security-Administration, GPC
- *W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager, Support, GPC
- *C. Stinespring, Manager, Plant Administration, GPC
- *C. Tippins, Nuclear Specialist, Technical Support, GPC

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.

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- *C. Ogle, Senior Resident Inspector

*Attended exit interview

2.0 Physical Security Program for Power Reactor (81700)

2.1 Protected Area Detection Equipment

Based on the commitments in Chapter 6 of the Physical Security Plan (PSP), the inspector evaluated the licensee's intrusion detection systems to verify that they were functionally effective and met licensee commitments. This evaluation was also to ensure that there were no vulnerabilities that could be exploited to avoid detection.

The licensee had installed intrusion detection systems that could detect attempted penetrations through the isolation zone, and attempts to gain unauthorized access to the protected area. Systems had diversity to assure maintenance of the system's capabilities. The licensee segmented the intrusion detection systems into enough alarm zones to provide adequate coverage of the protected area perimeter barrier and isolation zones. Observation of the licensee's 7-day test of protected area alarm zones verified alarm operability. Tests of the intrusion detection systems were accomplished by the method of walking through the detection zone. These systems communicated alarm conditions to response force personnel through the alarm stations, allowing for response to assess and correct the conditions. Observation of the 7-day test of the special detection equipment at the

protected area access point verified alarm and detection operability. Random review of the documentation of previous tests verified that the appropriate procedural data sheets were being completed.

Based upon the above evaluation, the inspector concluded that the licensee's intrusion detection systems were functional, effective and met licensee commitments. There were no vulnerabilities found that could be exploited to avoid detection.

There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this area.

2.2 Vital Area Access Control of Packages, Personnel and Vehicles

The inspector evaluated the licensee's program to control access of packages, personnel, and vehicles to the vital areas according to criteria in Chapter 6 of the PSP, Security Procedures (SP)-90200-C, "Security Seven Day Vital Area Portal Inspection", Revision 19 and SP 90015-C, "Vehicle Access", Revision 11. This was to ensure that the licensee had positive access controls of personnel, places where packages and materials can enter the vital areas, and vehicles entering vital areas.

Personnel, hand-carried and delivered items, and vehicles were searched at the protected area entrance before being admitted to a vital area.

The inspector found that personnel access control to vital areas was controlled by key cards. The licensee installed intrusion alarm equipment on vital area portals that alarmed in the central and secondary alarm stations. The licensee had compensatory measures for defective or inoperative access control and search equipment.

The inspector observed one vehicle vital area entrance. A tractor/trailer entered the vital area. The licensee disconnected the trailer, the tractor left the vital area leaving the trailer in the vital area.

This evaluation of the vital area access controls for packages, personnel and vehicles revealed that the criteria in Chapter 6 of the PSP, and SP-90200 and 90015 were carried out.

There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this area.

2.3 Alarm Stations and Communications

The inspector evaluated the licensee's alarm stations and communication equipment to ensure application of the criteria in Chapters 6 and 7 of the PSP, SP-90014-C, "Alarm Station Operations", Revision 9 and SP-90017-C, "Security Radio and Communication Systems", Revision 14.

The inspector verified that annunciation of protected and vital area alarms occurred audibly and visually in the alarm stations. The licensee equipped both stations with CCTV assessment capabilities and communication equipment. Alarms were tamper-indicating and self-checking, and provided with an uninterruptable power supply. These stations were continually manned by

capable and knowledgeable security operators. The stations were independent yet redundant in operation. Alarm station's interiors were not visible from the protected area, and no single act could remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm. Alarm stations' walls, doors, floors, ceiling and windows were bullet-resistant at the high-powered rifle rating (UL752).

The inspector evaluated the provision, operation, and maintenance of internal and external security communication links, and determined that they were adequate and appropriate for their intended function. Each security force member could communicate with an individual in each of the alarm stations who could call for assistance from other security force personnel and from local law enforcement agencies. The alarm stations had the capability for continuous two-way voice radio and telephone communication with the Burk County Sheriffs Department. The licensee had compensatory measures for defective or inoperable communication equipment. The inspector observed both onsite and offsite communication and also station duress alarm tests on two different occasions.

Based on this evaluation, the inspector concluded that the licensee was complying with the criteria in Chapters 6 and 7 of the PSP, SP-90014, and SP-90017.

There were no violations of regulatory requirements found in this area.

3.0 Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92904)

3.1 (CLOSED) VIO 50-424, 425/95-28-03, Unattended Designated Vehicle:

The licensee has counseled and retrained the individual involved. The number of designated vehicles have been reduced. Awareness briefings have been conducted with those departments that have designated drivers. There has not been any additional unattended vehicles reported since this violation. However, there appears to be conflicting guidance between Chapter 5 of the PSP and SP-90015-C, "Vehicle Access". This was discussed with the licensee and the licensee indicated that they would review their documentation and make appropriate corrections if found necessary.

3.2 (CLOSED) VIO 50-424, 425/95-29-01, Retention of Maintenance and Testing Documents:

Document Control personnel involved were counseled and retrained. Security documents will be stored in the order of date received, with each year's respective documents filed together and labeled accordingly. The original document destruction list was audited to verify that no other documents were destroyed. One other document was identified on the original destruction list that should not have been destroyed. The inspector randomly selected nine documents to verify that the three year retention requirement was being implemented. One document was not found. Review of document control's receiving log indicated that the document was not received at document control. Reviews of security logs and interviews with security personnel revealed that the document was not completed/filled out. This was during the

time period that shift rotates were changing from 8 hours per shift to 12 hours per shift and was forgotten during this security shift realignment. This was an isolated minor violation with no safety significant, and, as such will not be cited.

3.3 (CLOSED) VIO 50-424, 425/95-29-02, Unsecured and Unattended Safeguards Information:

An inventory of the unsecured Safeguards (SGI) container revealed no document were missing and the information would not have significantly assisted an individual in radiological sabotage. The responsible person was counseled on the requirements of properly securing SGI containers. Other applicable employees have been trained to heighten their awareness of SGI security. Department procedures have been changed to require independent verification of proper closure of each SGI container at the close of each business day. Another unattended SGI incident occurred after this violation, but before the independent assessment performed by the licensee's quality assurance department. The document was left unattended in a locked office inside the protected area and has since been declassified. Consequently, since this incident happened during the period of corrective action and was a minor violation, it was not cited.

3.4 (CLOSED) VIO 50-424, 425/95-29-03, Access Authorization:

This violation was reclassified as a Noncited Violation (NCV) after review of the licensee's reply to the notice of violation. Consequently, this violation is closed. A NCV was previously open and closed.

4.0 Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 17, 1996, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. Four violations were closed (95-28-03, 95-29-01, 95-29-02, and 95-29-03). The licensee's intrusion detection systems were functional, effective and met licensee commitments. The vital area access controls for packages, personnel and vehicles were found adequate. The licensee's alarm stations and communication equipment were appropriate for their intended functions and operated as required. Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.