NRC Form 366 (9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Millstone Point Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 6	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4): Unplanned Actuation of Containmnet Purge Valve Isolation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	0 2	8 5	8 5	— 0 0 2 —	0 0	0 4	0 1	8 5		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): 5

POWER LEVEL (10): 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (AREA CODE)
Gary E. Komosky, Unit Engineer	2 0 3 4 4 7 - 1 7 9 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

When in Mode 5 and again when the core was off-loaded, the Engineered Safety Actuation System processed a Containment Purge Valve Isolation Signal that was generated by a Containment Air Monitoring System Radiation Monitor tripping which satisfied the one out of four trip logic and consequently closed the containment purge valves. The radiation monitor was tripped during troubleshooting for an intermittent alarm problem when an Instrument and Control (I&C) Technician (the first time) and a Reactor Operator unintensionally caused the radiation monitor to fail.

The radiation monitor was restored to its operating mode and the Containment Purge Valves were re-opened by Operations after the cause of the actuation was determined.

In order to prevent recurrence, signs were placed at the radiation monitor locations which will alert personnel that the purge valves are open. In addition, the radiation monitor circuitry will be reviewed so improvements can be made.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On the morning of March 2, 1985, with the reactor plant in Mode 5 (0% power, 107°F, 0 psig), and again on the morning of March 25, 1985, with no fuel in the reactor vessel, plant personnel were dispatched to investigate an intermittent annunciator alarm that indicated that a process radiation monitor tripped on high radiation or had failed. This annunciation is triggered by any one of a series of radiation monitors including the Containment Air Monitoring System gas and particulate monitors. In order to determine which radiation monitor of the series is causing the annunciation, the monitors have to be tested one at a time until the active monitor is found. These monitors are located on a Control Panel (RC 14) in the Control Room; the radiation sensors are at different locations in the plant. The test usually performed consists of depressing the monitor reset button for a split second and listening for the electrical contacts to change state. When this test was performed by an I&C technician on March 2nd and by a reactor operator on March 25th, the reset button on one of the containment gas radiation monitors (RM 8123Б/RM 8123A) was depressed too long and the indicated value on the monitor dropped downscale causing the monitor to assume a failed condition; this failed condition generated a Containment Purge Valve Isolation Signal which was received and processed by the Engineered Safety Actuation System (ESAS) which satisfied the one out of four trip logic and consequently closed the containment purge valves. This is the proper system response for this type of signal.

The reactor operators immediately noticed that a Containment Purge Valve Isolation has occurred. They were aware that the radiation monitor troubleshooting was being done, and after talking to the person conducting the troubleshooting, they determined what caused the ESAS actuation. Once the cause was determined the reactor operators re-instated containment purge. It should be noted that on March 2nd the purge valves were closed for one hour and five minutes but radiation monitor surveillances were done during this time extending the time that they were closed; on March 25th the purge valves were closed for approximately ten minutes. The troubleshooting continued after the event and the cause of the annunciator alarm was found.

This event occurred during Mode 5 and again when the core was off-loaded with the Reactor Coolant System cold and depressurized. There were no safety implications because the actuation was caused by a design deficiency and not a high radiation event.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

In order to prevent recurrence, signs were placed at the radiation monitor locations in the Control Room which will indicate that the pushbutton should not be utilized for testing for the four containment sensors. An alternate method with more control will be utilized. Also, a review of the radiation monitor circuitry will be conducted and, if necessary, changes will be made to eliminate the possibility of an ESAS actuation while troubleshooting.

There were no similar LER's.

NORTHEAST UTILITIES
THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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April 1, 1985
MP-6774

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-65
Docket No. 50-336
Reportable Occurrence RO 50-366/85-002-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report 85-002-00 required to be submitted within thirty days pursuant to Paragraph 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), reporting any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature System.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

E. J. Mroczka
Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/GK:ejl

Attachment: LER 50-336/85-002-00

cc: Dr. T. E. Murley, Region I

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