NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7

PAGE (3): 1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
Containment Isolation Valve Closure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	0 7	8 5	8 5	— 0 2 1	— 0 0	0 3	2 8	8 5		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	X OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) 50.72(b)(2)(ii)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
R. L. Koenigs, Compliance Engineer	AREA CODE 5 0 9 3 7 7 - 2 5 0 1 Ext. 2279

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
X	HY	ISV	M090	N							
X	HY	ISV	T020	N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 3/7/85 control room operators noted the following indications:

1. Reactor Recirculation Flow Control Valve "B" Hydraulic Power Unit (HY-HP-3B) had tripped off.

2. Recirculation Flow Control Valve "B" Hydraulic Power Unit Containment Isolation Valves HY-V-17B, 18B, 19B, 20B, 33B, 34B, 35B, 36B were closed.

Initial and final investigations into this condition yielded no apparent cause and the hydraulic unit and valves were returned to normal operation. This is considered to be an unplanned actuation of an Engineered Safeguards Feature (ESF).

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 7	8 5	0 2 1	0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

a) Power Level - 100%
b) Plant Mode - 1

Event

At 0947 on 3/7/85 operators noted that Reactor Recirculation Flow Control Valve "B" Hydraulic Power Unit (HY-HP-3B) was tripped off and the associated containment isolation valves HY-V-17B, 18B, 19B, 20B, 33B, 34B, 35B & 36B were closed.

During the investigation it was noted that no maintenance activity was working which would have caused the valves to isolate. At this time, no cause for isolation was determinable, and the valves and hydraulic power unit were returned to normal service.

Secondary investigation into this event determined that the closure of the containment isolation valves caused the Recirculation Flow Control Valve to become fixed "In Position". This caused the hydraulic unit to trip due to the excessive servo error resulting from normal system automatic corrections.

The cause of the containment isolation valve closure is, however, still indeterminable (i.e., no apparent cause).

Initial Corrective Action

No immediate cause for the isolation could be identified and the valves and hydraulic control unit were returned to normal service.

Further Corrective Action

Observation of containment isolation valve status since the event shows that no similar event has occurred to these valves or others of their service category.

A continued trend of valve status will be maintained using the Transient Data Acquisition System (TDAS) to monitor for like occurrences as well as valve operability, which will also be verified during Technical Specification required surveillance procedures.

Safety Significance

There was no impact to the safety of the Plant, Plant personnel or public which would have resulted from this event. The containment isolation valve closure has no input to Plant safety or automatic protection systems which could result in their actuation or place then in an inoperable status.

The closure was also in the safe (Closed) direction which is the desired failure mode of these containment isolation valves.

Similar Events

None

Washington Public Power Supply System
P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

Docket No. 50-397

March 28, 1985

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 85-021

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 85-021 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 1231 hours on March 7, 1985.

Very truly yours,

C M Powers for
J. D. Martin (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

JDM:mm

Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 85-021

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V
Mr. A. D. Toth, NRC - Site (901A)
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA

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