U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-341/85014

Docket No. 50-341 License No. CPPR-87

Licensee: Detroit Edison Company
2000 Second Avenue
Detroit, MI 48224

Facility Name: Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2

Inspection At: Fermi 2 Site, Newport, Michigan

Inspection Conducted: March 5-7, and 13, 1985

Inspectors: J. Holmes — 4-2-85 Date

F. Maura — 4-2-85 Date

J. Ulie — 4/2/85 Date

Approved By: W. G. Guldemond, Chief
Operational Programs Section — 4-3-85 Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on March 5-7, and 13, 1985 (Report No. 50-341/85014)
Areas Inspected: Special, announced inspection by Region III based inspectors of the licensee's safe shutdown procedures, open items, unresolved items, and items of noncompliance. The inspection involved 63 inspector-hours by three NRC inspectors, including 6 inspector-hours during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Detroit Edison Company

D. Aniol, Shift Supervisor
*R. Anderson, Systems Engineer
G. Bragg, QA Specialist
*J. Coleman, Training, Work Leader
*#J. Conen, Licensing Engineer
*E. Griffing, Assistant Manager Nuclear Operations
*R. Henson, Nuclear Shift Supervisor
*D. Holland, Nuclear Fire Protection Specialist
*W. Holland, Vice President
*W. Jens, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
*E. Juarez, Supervisor Nuclear Training
D. McCracken, Station Technical Assistant
*S. Noetzel, Assistant Manager, Fermi 2
*G. Preston, Operations Engineer
*R. Olson, System Engineer
*F. Svetkovich, System Engineer
*G. Wilson, Fire Protection Engineer

Power Consulting, Inc.

*F. Reimann, President

*Denotes persons attending the exit meeting of March 7, 1985.
#Denotes persons attending the exit meeting of March 13, 1985.

The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including members of the operations, training, and engineering departments.

2. Action on Previous Inspection Findings

a. (Open) IE Circular 78-18: This circular identified three concerns. One of the three concerns was closed in Inspection Report No. 50-341/84-49. The remaining two concerns were:

(1) Small fires may not actuate sprinkler systems (melting of sprinkler head fusible links) in a timely manner. Licensee internal memorandum R. Olson to T. O'Keefe, dated February 15, 1985, (EF2-70433) addresses this concern and was reviewed by the inspector. The major fixed combustible in the majority of the plant is electrical cabling which produces a slow developing fire. The intent of fast response sprinkler heads is to sense a fast developing fire (i.e., flammable liquids). According to UL the acceptance criteria for a fast response sprinkler head is for the head to actuate within thirteen seconds of the start of the test. The UL Fire Protection Equipment Directory dated

January, 1982 regarding quick response sprinkler assemblies indicated that these devices have thermal response times at least fifty percent quicker than presently listed link and lever type sprinklers in the ordinary temperature rating. Being that a cable type fire is a slow developing fire and since the thermal response times between the fast response and standard response sprinkler heads is minimal relative to a slow developing fire, the inspector concluded that the sprinkler heads presently installed in these areas are adequate. However, based on our review of your response additional concerns need to be addressed prior to closing this item. The first concern is regarding those safety related areas of the plant that have combustibles which would produce a fast developing fire and are protected by a sprinkler system. Justification for not installing fast response sprinkler heads in safety related areas having combustibles which would produce a fast developing fire is required (e.g. EDG Rooms). An additional concern related to sprinkler systems is identified in your February 15, 1985 internal memo (EF2-70433) regarding sprinkler systems which were reviewed in their installed as-built conditions by your Fire Protection Consultant for potential problems from ventilation air patterns and their effect on sprinkler head actuation. The inspector's request that you document the manner in which your consultant performed this review regarding any potential problems from ventilation air flows affecting a delay in sprinkler head response. This portion of the item will remain open pending the inspector's review of the above two noted concerns.

(2) The path of air movement influences the actuation of fire detection devices thus having an impact on placement of these devices. Licensee internal memoranda dated April 23, 1984 (EF2-68261) and February 15, 1985, (EF2-70433) state that indicated air flow movements were considered in the design of the fire detection system in accordance with NFPA 72E. Since deviations from the SER (Design of the Fire Detection System deviated from NFPA 72E) were identified during the inspection visit of January 22-25, 1985 (Inspection Report No. 50-341/84-49), Region III referred this issue to NRR for resolution. By letter dated March 1, 1985, NRR requested additional justification regarding the design adequacy of the fire detection system. By letters dated February 4 and March 4, 1985, the licensee provided a response to NRR's request that included a commitment to install additional detectors or relocate detectors to meet the requirements of NFPA 72E or provide any further justification requested by the NRC to show that equivalent fire detection capability exists in the required plant areas. The licensee plans on completing these actions by June 30, 1985. The necessary modifications are required to be completed prior to exceeding 5% power. Those deviations requiring modifications have been incorporated into license condition number (9)(e).

b. (Closed) Noncompliance (341/83-12-09(DRS)): Fire door nos. T3-6, R3-13, R3-30, RM2-1, R2-13, R2-16, R2-11, RM2-2, RM2-3, and RM2-4 did not have labels attesting to their fire endurance capability. By letter dated

March 4, 1985, the licensee committed to have Underwriters Laboratory (UL) affix UL labels to the subject unlabeled fire door assemblies or if necessary replace the subject fire door assemblies with approved and labeled fire doors with the exception of doors R3-13 and R3-20. With respect to door R3-13, the licensee submitted additional information to NRR demonstrating its acceptability. Door R3-20 will be replaced by a labeled door. During the interim an hourly fire watch patrol has been instituted according to the limiting condition for operation in Technical Specification 3.7.8. This item has been incorporated into license condition number (9)(e) which is required to be completed prior to exceeding 5% power.

c. (Closed) Unresolved Item (341/84-16-01(DRS)): Relay room not in compliance with requirements for safe shutdown. By letter dated October 22, 1984, the licensee committed to provide alternative shutdown capability for this area by startup after the first fuel cycle. For interim operation the licensee will implement compensatory measures. On March 6, 1985, the inspectors verified that a continuous fire watch patrol was in place in the relay room. This item has been incorported into license condition number (9)(d) which should not extend beyond December 31, 1986.

d. (Closed) Deviation (341/84-16-02(DRS)): Control room panels P601, P602, P807, P808, P809, and P810 containing the controls, instrumentation, and associated circuits for all required safe shutdown functions were not designed and installed for fire endurance in accordance with the FSAR and commitments made to the NRC. By letter dated October 22, 1984, the licensee committed to provide alternative shutdown capability for this area by startup after the first fuel cycle. For interim operation, the licensee implemented compensatory fire watch patrols. The plant's Nuclear Fire Protection Specialist provided an inspector with a copy of plant order EFO-8071 (Rev. 0) regarding the duties and responsibilities of the interim compensatory fire watch patrols. The control room is manned twenty-four hours a day by operators who are also qualified fire brigade members (Brigade members receive training far in excess of the training provided fire watch patrols). Therefore, the compensatory measures for this area are being fulfilled. Regarding the long term action, this item has been incorporated into license condition number (9)(d) which should not extend beyond December 31, 1986.

e. (Closed) Unresolved Item (341/84-16-03(DRS)): Present alternative shutdown systems are not electrically independent of the control room. Safe shutdown procedures developed for this condition were found unacceptable as the procedures would not prevent uncovering the reactor core within the allotted time. By letter dated October 22, 1984, the licensee committed to provide alternative shutdown capability for this area by startup after the first fuel cycle. For interim operation, the licensee proposed a limited fire concept to the NRC which would allow the development of acceptable supplemental safe shutdown procedures. NRR accepted the licensee's limited fire concept with the provision that acceptable supplemental safe shutdown procedures be developed for interim operation. The results of the safe shutdown procedure review are contained in paragraph 3 of this report. This item has been incorporated into license condition number (9)(d) which should not extend beyond December 31, 1986.

f. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-16-05(DRS)): Associated circuits - a fire in the control room which damages control room panels H11-P601 and H11-P602 will also cause the loss of both remote shutdown panels. The control and instrumentation circuits for the Division I and II shutdown systems are not electrically isolated between the control room panels and remote shutdown panels H21-P100 and H21-P101. On the basis that the NRC has accepted the licensee's limited fire concept for interim operation, the concerns identified in this item are not relevant for interim operation. By letter dated October 22, 1984, the licensee committed to provide alternative shutdown capability for this area by startup after the first fuel cycle. This item has been incorporated into license condition number (9)(d) which should not extend beyond December 31, 1986.

g. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-16-06(DRS)): The licensee's associated circuit analysis of the relay room was based on a limited fire and not a complete burn up of the entire room's equipment. By letter dated October 22, 1984, the licensee committed to provide alternative shutdown capability for this area by startup after the first fuel cycle. As mentioned in Unresolved Item (341/84-16-01(DRS)), interim compensatory measures were verified to be in place at the time of this inspection visit. This item has been incorporated into license condition number (9)(d) which should not extend beyond December 31, 1986.

h. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-16-08): The present control system for the emergency diesel generator, service water pumps, RHR service water pumps, and fuel oil transfer pump could be lost due to a fire in the control room. This condition also applies to the emergency diesel generator bus breakers EA3, EB3, EC3 and ED3 due to a fire which occurs in the relay room. The loss of these breakers would inhibit the ability to load the safe shutdown system on the emergency busses. By letter dated October 22, 1984, the licensee committed to provide alternative shutdown capability for this area by startup after the first fuel cycle. For interim operation the licensee will implement compensatory measures. The inspectors reviewed the fire watch log sheets to verify areas containing the equipment noted above were being patrolled hourly by a fire watch patrol. This item has been incorporated into license condition number (9)(d) which should not extend beyond December 31, 1986.

i. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-49-01(DRS)): The minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2.2-1 of Technical Specification 6.0 is inadequate to accomplish both post fire safe shutdown and fire fighting activities by the fire brigade. The inspectors reviewed Table 6.2.2-1 of Technical Specification 6.0 and compared the minimum shift manning requirements against the minimum manning required to perform the Plant Operations Manual Procedure Nos. 20.501.02 (Rev. 2), 20.000.22 (Rev. 4), and 20.000.19 (Rev. 4) and determined that adequate shift manning was required to perform fire brigade activities concurrent with bringing the plant to a safe shutdown condition.

j. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-49-02(DRS)): The licensee agreed to submit surveillance requirements and limiting conditions for operation for the alternative shutdown systems by September 30, 1985.

This item has been incorporated into license condition number (9)(d) which should not extend beyond December 31, 1986.

k. (Open) Open Item (341/84-49-04(DRS)): The licensee was requested to reassess each FSAR commitment to the NRC's fire protection criteria and identify all areas of nonconformance, deviation, and exception. The results of this reassessment are to be formally submitted to NRR for review and acceptance. By letters dated February 4 and March 4, 1985, the licensee submitted information regarding deviations from either previous commitments or from NFPA codes to provide justification and resolution of certain fire protection issues. By letter dated February 18, 1985, the licensee indicated that a specific walkdown will be conducted by a third party knowledgeable in the NFPA codes by June 30, 1985 to identify any potential deviations from the NFPA codes. The licensee also indicated that any deviations identified will either be corrected or specifically justified to NRC in writing. This item remains open pending completion of this walkdown and its findings.

l. (Closed) Unresolved Item (341/84-49-06(DRS)): The hydrostatic test results of the fire protection yard piping did not completely meet the requirements of NFPA 24 for new piping. By letters dated February 4 and March 4, 1985, the licensee provided additional information regarding the fire protection yard piping. However, this item will remain open pending the rehydrotesting of the yard piping under its as-installed condition and evaluation of the system leakage. This item has been incorporated into license condition number (9)(e) which is required to be completed prior to exceeding 5% power.

M. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-49-07(DRS)): The licensee agreed to retest the electric and diesel fire pumps and to acquire the original manufacturer's shop test or field acceptance test results in order to determine acceptability of the two pump's performances. The licensee provided the inspector with documentation involving the diesel and electric fire pump tests conducted on January 31, 1985. Both pump's performance was found to be within acceptable limits.

n. (Closed) Unresolved Item (341/84-49-09(DRS)): The licensee was requested to show how equivalent protection has been provided in locations where the interior fire hose station pressures exceed 100 PSI as required by NFPA 14. The licensee provided justification by letter dated February 18, 1985, for deviating from NFPA 14 for areas exceeding 100 PSI as accepted previously by Region III. The justification provided was based on the use of fog nozzles in all safety-related areas and areas adjacent to safety-related areas except for the fifth floor of the Reactor Building (refuel floor) which has installed pressure reducing devices. Further justification was provided in that the fire brigade members have been trained with pressures exceeding 100 PSI, the general employee training program includes instruction indicating that the inside fire hose stations are for fire brigade use only, and signs have been ordered and will be placed on hose stations inside safety-related buildings which identify fire hose stations for fire brigade use only. The inspector found this acceptable.

o. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-49-11(DRS)): This item remained open pending installation of a 2 1/2" gate valve on the hydrant in yard hydrant house No. 2. On March 5, 1985, the inspector verified that the valve was installed.

p. (Closed) Deviation (341/84-49-12(DRS)): The inspectors were unable to locate any area fire detectors installed in the ceiling of the personnel hatch interlock area as indicated by Figure 9B.4 of the FSAR. By letters dated February 4 and March 1, 1985, the licensee committed to installing a detector to meet the requirements of NFPA 72E by June 30, 1985. This modification is required to be completed prior to exceeding 5% power. This item has been incorporated into license condition number (9)(e).

q. (Closed) Unresolved Item (341/84-49-13(DRS)): By letter dated January 27, 1985, the licensee agreed to install a detector at the stairway ceiling adjacent to the control room. This modification is required to be completed prior to exceeding 5% power. This item has been incorporated into license conditions number (9)(e).

r. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-49-14(DRS)): The licensee was requested to document a complete reassessment of fire detector installations throughout the facility for conformance with NFPA 72E. Refer to the discussion of IE Circular 78-18 part (b) in this inspection report for details. Required modifications must be completed prior to exceeding 5% power. This item has been incorporated into license condition number (9)(e).

s. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-49-15(DRS)): The licensee was requested to provide an evaluation of the adequacy of ganged, multi-damper assemblies installed at Fermi Unit 2. By letter dated February 4, 1985, the licensee provided the requested evaluation. On February 20 and 22, 1985, conference calls were held between the licensee, NRR, and Region III to discuss a the February 4th licensee submittal. By letter dated February 28, 1985, the licensee committed to install six additional HVAC fire dampers and one pipe chase fire barrier prior to exceeding 5% power. In addition, in the same letter the licensee committed to perform a drawing verification to supplement the walkdown inspection on the HVAC duct penetrations to determine if other fire barriers require additional fire dampers. Required dampers will be installed prior to exceeding 5% power.

t. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-49-16(DRS)): The licensee agreed to remove power from the Division I and II cooling tower bypass valves (No. E1150-F603A and F603B) and from either the single series valve (No. E11-F008) in the residual heat removal (RHR) system or the two parallel RHR suction valves (Nos. E11-F608 and E11-F009). On March 7, 1985, the inspectors verified that the valve had been closed and the power fuses had been removed. For further information, refer to paragraphs 3.h. and 3.i. of this inspection report.

u. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-49-17(DRS)): The licensee indicated that six operators were required to perform the shutdown procedures as

written. On March 6, 1985, during the walkdown of Plant Operations Manual Procedure Nos. 20.501.02 (Rev. 2), 20.000.22 (Rev. 4), and 20.000.19 (Rev. 4) the inspectors determined that three plant personnel (2 operations personnel and 1 I&C technician) would be required to perform these interim procedures. As noted in open item (341/84-49-01(DRS)) the inspectors determined that separate from the personnel required to perform these procedures, five additional personnel would be available to perform firefighting activities as required by Technical Specifications.

v. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-49-18(DRS)): The licensee was requested to perform a complete communications analysis and determine that suitable means of communications for all areas required for safe shutdown existed. The inspector also noted that if portable radios are designated for this purpose, test results must show that the caution signs prohibiting their use are unnecessary and those signs should be removed. At the entrance meeting of March 5, 1985, and during the procedural walkdown on March 6, 1985, the licensee provided clarification to the inspector regarding the purpose of the caution signs installed on certain equipment throughout the plant. The licensee indicated that during normal plant operation the transmission by use of the handheld portable radios could cause an inadvertent trip of the reactor. As a precaution to prevent an inadvertent trip of the reactor, caution signs have been installed on certain equipment requiring radio transmissions to take place of six feet away from the applicable equipment. However, in the Appendix R fire scenario the reactor is tripped at the initiation of the event; thus, the concern regarding the caution signs is not applicable. During the March 6, 1985 walkdown of the procedures, the inspectors requested the licensee staff member accompanying the inspectors to perform two separate radio tests to verify adequacy of the radio communications system. These tests were conducted with no problem being identified. In addition, inspector discussions held with the senior resident inspector indicated previous communication problems that had existed were corrected by separating the power source of the portable radio repeaters and the plant sound powered communications system so as to prevent one fire from affecting these two communication systems simultaneously. Based on the above information, the inspectors determined no further licensee action was required at this time.

w. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-49-19(DRS)): The licensee committed to have as a compensatory measure for interim operation fire watch patrols in seven areas of the plant and a continuous fire watch patrol in the relay room (El. 613'6"). During the walkdown of the Plant Operations Manual Procedures Numbered 20.501.02 and 20.000.19, the inspectors reviewed the hourly fire watch patrol log for the seven areas requiring an hourly fire watch patrol and also verified that a continuous fire watch patrol was stationed in the relay room.

x. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-49-21(DRS)): Implementation of the monthly surveillance procedure numbered 27.322.0 was required prior to fuel load. The licensee provided the inspectors with the emergency lighting monthly surveillance procedure numbered 27.322.01 indicating that the procedure had been implemented prior to February 28, 1985.

y. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-49-05(DRS)): The licensee was requested to provide valid documentation detailing the complete methodology and technique used in thrust blocking the underground fire main. Thrust blocking is required on the transite section of the underground fire main which provides hydrant protection for the security house, cafeteria, Comstock main office, construction office, and warehouse 19. The transite underground fire main does not supply water to hydrants or sprinkler systems protecting the turbine building, auxiliary building, reactor building and the RHR complex. The inspectors reviewed work order 552268, dated January 30, 1985, which indicated that the transite section of pipe was to be separated from the welded underground fire main and fed from the Fermi I fire pumps. On March 13, 1985, the inspector visually confirmed the valve that separates the transite section from the welded section of the underground pipe was closed as indicated in the work order 552268. The licensee also indicated that a monthly surveillance will be conducted on this valve and that this surveillance will be incorporated into the Fermi 2 Technical Specifications. The inspectors found this to be an acceptable alternative to providing thrust block calculations.

z. (Closed) Open Item (341/84-53-04): CILRT Valve Lineup Penalties. The inspector reviewed the local leak rate test results of all penetrations which deviated from the ideal valve lineup for the CILRT. The total leakage rate from the penetrations was 40.25 scf/day or 0.003 wt %/day which was well within the maximum acceptable value of 0.124 wt %/day.

3. Safe Shutdown Procedures

The inspectors reviewed the operating procedures developed to achieve safe shutdown following a limited fire with loss of offsite power during the interim period between fuel load and the completion of the alternate shutdown system. The procedures reviewed and walked down were:

- 20.501.02, Revision 2 - Control Center Complex Fires
- 20.000.19, Revision 4 - Shutdown From Outside The Control Room
- 20.000.22, Revision 4 - Plant Fires

During the walkdown the following problems were found, which, in most cases, the licensee was able to correct prior to the conclusion of the inspection:

a. Procedure No. 20.501.02 outlines the repairs which may be required in the Relay Room in case of a fire in control room panels H11-P601 or H11-P807. The areas where the repairs are to be performed lack emergency lighting. Temporary Change Request (TCR) No. T1210 to procedure 20.501.02 was issued on March 6, 1985 to require the individual performing the repairs to bring portable lighting into the area. The inspectors verified that two portable lanterns are being stored in the safe shutdown equipment locker located near the Division 1 Remote Shutdown Panel.

b. Procedure No. 20.501.02, Attachment 1, step 2.2 requires that four jumpers be installed in panel H11-P915 terminal block D. From an observation of the terminal block design it was determined that the

existing jumpers (with alligator clips) in the Safe Shutdown Equipment Locker would not be able to perform the intended function. TCR No. T1210 to procedure 20.501.02 issued March 6, 1985 modified step 2.2 to require that the jumper be handwired when needed. The inspectors verified that enough wire to fabricate the jumpers, wire cutters, and a wire stripper had been placed in the Safe Shutdown Equipment Locker.

c. Procedure No. 20.501.02, Attachment 2, step 2.6 requires entry into Relay Room Panel H11-P868 to lift 3 leads from terminal strip B which had their respective plastic knife switches identified with red dots. The licensee was unable to open panel H11-P868 with the keys located in the Safe Shutdown Equipment Locker. After opening the panel with a key from the master set it was noted that the red dot identifications were missing. The inspectors later verified that new keys were made, capable of opening the panel doors, and the correct terminals were identified with red dots.

d. Procedures 20.000.19 requires that communications be established between remote shutdown panels H21-P100 and H21-P101. During the walkdown the licensee stated sound powered head sets were going to be used as communication between the two panels; however no such equipment was available in the Safe Shutdown Equipment Locker. On March 7, 1985 the inspectors verified the required headsets and communications panel jumper cable were available in the equipment locker.

e. Procedure 20.000.19 requires that suppression pool cooling (RHR) be initiated within 2 hours. If this operation cannot be accomplished from panel H21-P100, and assuming control room entry is not possible, the operator is referred to Enclosure 4 of the procedure to operate the necessary valves and start the pumps. Enclosure 4 states that cables to be cut have been identified by a distinctive type tape. The licensee is using a white tape to identify all cables which must be cut or lifted. During the walkdown the RHR service water pump A 4160V cubicle was opened. All the wires to be cut or lifted were properly identified with the exception of terminal AJ-6 to which two cables were connected. It was not possible to determine which of the two wires needed to be removed. No other 4160 cubicles were opened at the RHR complex. The licensee is referring this item to the Engineering Department for resolution. This item remains open (341/85014-01(DRS)) pending licensee verification that all cables to be cut or lifted have been correctly marked.

In addition, the inspectors noted the lack of emergency lighting in the area where the wire cutting is to be performed. TCR No. 1211 to procedure 20.000.19 was issued on March 6, 1985, to require that the operator dispatched to the RHR complex carry with him portable lighting.

f. Procedure 20.000.19, Enclosure 4, page 12 listed two RCIC system valves to be manually operated in case of hot shorts, etc. The inspectors identified an additional 6 valves in the system which could require manual operation under similar circumstances and inquired why only two out of the eight valves were listed in

Enclosure 4. TCR No. T1211 to procedure 20.000.19, Revision 4, deletes the two valves from the Enclosure, since HPCI will be available during the concept of a limited fire in the control room affecting panel H11-P601 only.

g. Procedure 20.000.19, Attachment 4 describes the operations required to place the RHR service water system in operation and to control the RHR reservoir temperature. At this point in time it is possible for the operators to inadvertently close both the low speed and high speed breakers to the cooling tower fans. TCR No. T1211 has added a caution note to the procedure reminding the operator not have both breakers closed at the same time.

h. Cooling tower bypass valves E1150-F603A and F603B are required to be open and their breaker deenergized, to prevent the valves from closing due to hot shorts during a fire. During the plant walkdown the inspectors noted the valves' breakers were not disabled with the valves in the open position. Station procedures did not require such operation. TCR No. T1209 to procedure 23.208, Revision 6 has added a precaution step and has revised page 1 of Attachment 2B to ensure the valves are opened and the breakers' power fuses are removed. On March 7, 1985 the inspectors verified the valves had been opened and the power fuses had been removed from the breakers.

i. Hi-lo pressure interface (shutdown cooling suction) valves E11-F608 and F009 or valve E11-F008 are required by the proposed Fermi 2 license to be closed and their breakers deenergized to prevent RPV pressure from being applied to the low pressure piping downstream of the valves in the event of a hot short caused by a fire. During the plant walkdown the inspectors noted that the licensee only intended to comply for valve E11-F608. TCR No. T1208 to procedure 23.205, Revision 4, has revised step 3.15 and page 4 of Attachment 2 requiring E11-F008 to be closed and the power fuses in the breaker cabinet removed. On March 7, 1985, the inspectors verified that the valve had been closed and the power fuses had been removed.

j. During the walkdown the inspectors noted that several QA Conditional Release Cards were still attached to plant equipment and questioned their status. Among the examples given to the licensee were conditional release #83-41, dated November 2, 1983 with cards hanging on a relay inside switchgear cubicle for RHR service water pump A, and on Bus 72EA, pos 2BCB. The licensee is to determine which QA conditional release numbers are still outstanding and ensure those are the only ones still attached to their respective components. This item remains open (341/85014-02(DRS)) pending review of the licensees corrective action.

k. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's training records regarding safe shutdown procedures. As of March 7, 1985 four of the six operating shifts personnel required for safe shutdown had completed the training. Due to procedure changes required by our inspection the licensee will retrain all six shifts to the latest revision. This is an open item (341/85014-03(DRS)) pending inspector review of the retraining records.

4. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 3.e, 3.j, and 3.k.

5. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 7 and again on March 13, 1985, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the statements made by the inspector. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents as proprietary.